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Abstract
The subjec t o f  this s tudy is the influence o f  an oil boom  on the econom ic  
grow th  and structure  o f  a open small econom y  with refe rence  to Libya 
fo llow ing  the d iscovery  o f  oil. The  re levan t theoretical literature  is based  upon 
the Dutch Disease theory.
A fter a survey o f  the literature upon this theory, the s tudy  investigates the 
econom ic  grow th  and structural changes w hich  occurred  in the Libyan 
econom y  during the three decades  to 1990. The analysis  is c o n d u c te d  w ith in  a 
t im e-fram e com posed  o f  three d istinct periods: these are the p re -b o o m  period, 
the boom  period  and the post-boom  period.
Historical trends depic ted  w ith in  these periods  show  that the Libyan 
econom y  had undergone  several fundam enta l s tructural changes  and  that the 
biggest o f  these took p lace during the oil p rice shock period  be tw een  1973- 
1 c>82. The investigation exam ines  Libya's experience  o f  sectoral shifts  and the 
perfo rm ance  o f  the agricu lture  and m anufac tu r ing  sectors under  boom ing  
conditions. It is show n that in both these sectors  boom ing  cond it ions  brought 
about rapidly  increased  dem and, relative price changes and change  o f  technical 
cond it ions  o f  production . These  in turn led to rapid  expansion  in the 
m anufactu r ing  sectors share  within the total tradables  outpu t c o m b in e d  with a 
decline in the share for agriculture. The study dem onstra tes  that the fall in the 
share o f  agricu lture  w as the result o f  fast industria lisa tion  ra ther  than the Dutch 
Disease effect.
In general the s tudy reveals  that speedy grow th  o f  oil export  revenues 
was associa ted  with high investm ent and econom ic  activity in com m od ity  
producing  sectors (m anufac tu ring  and agricu ltu re)  and that the period  o f  s lum p 
in oil revenues had co inc ided  with s low er grow th  and low er  inves tm en t in 
these sectors. The study's m ain  find ing  is that the p rob lem s e n c o u n te re d  in the 
Libyan econom y  w ere  not those pred ic ted  by  the Dutch D isease  bu t that they  
were  m ore  d irectly  connected  w ith  the e ff ic iency  o f  inves tm en t  and 
governm en t strategy tow ard  the industr ia lisa tion  process.
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Introduction
The puipose of this study is to examine the influence of an oil boom on the 
economic growth and structural change of an open small economy with 
reference of Libya over the three decades to 1990.
The study is based theoretically on the Dutch Disease Theoiy. The 
phenomenon of the Dutch Disease has drawn the attention of a number of 
economists from both developed and developing countries. It is commonly 
described as de-industrialisation as a result of oil windfalls. It derives its name 
from the experience of the Dutch economy following the discovery of North 
Sea gas in the late 1960,s. This initial addition to national wealth, 
paradoxically, appeared to have led to high adjustment costs in the rest of the 
economy and to structural problems which had an adverse impact on medium 
and long term growth and the national welfare. Since then there has been a 
considerable amount of theoretical and empirical work done on the subject for 
advanced countries, including the UK and the Netherlands, as well as for 
developing countries.
However, the Dutch Disease does not merely refer to the problem of de­
industrialisation, but also to the decline of the share of the tradable sectors 
(both manufacturing and agriculture) in GDP in response to exogenous 
windfalls, typically from oil exports. '/
According to the classical model, the main mechanism through which the 
Disease occurs is the real appreciation of the exchange rate (i.e., an increase in 
the price of non-tradables relative to that of tradables). The real appreciation is 
caused by the asymmetry between the tradable and non-tradable sectors in their 
response to an increase in demand. As the windfall income fuels domestic 
demand, the markets for tradables adjust by increasing imports, and the price 
of tradables remains constant and equal to its international level. On the other 
hand, with the assumption of full employment, the markets for non-tradables
' /  For various case studies and policy discussion see, for example, Barker and Brailovsky (1981), Blackaby 
(1979), Cfelb and Associated (1988)
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can only adjust through increasing prices. The final result, as non-tradables 
become more profitable, is that resources shift to the production of them and, 
consequently, the relative size of the tradable sector in the economy declines. 
A second important mechanism of the Disease is that, due to the surge in 
demand and economic activity, the cost of factors of production (including 
labour) increase, leading to the eventual crowding-out of the tradable sectors.
There are three main reasons for such a set of changes to be described as a 
disease. First, if the windfalls are temporaiy, and if it is believed that tradables, 
particularly manufacturing, once left to decline will not be able to smoothly 
regain their competitiveness and expand again, it follows that when the 
windfalls decline, the economy will not be able to export enough tradables to 
finance the amount of imports sufficiently to maintain full employment and 
sustain growth. Furthermore, the continuous shifts of resources between the 
different sectors and the sequential expansion and contraction of these sectors 
in response to temporary booms and busts, can result in considerable 
reallocation and frictional costs. The volatility of relative prices will also create
an environment of severe uncertainty that will necessitate high risk premia
2  11 *which will reduce investment to a sub-optimal level. / Secondly, by allowing
the tradable sector to decline, the economy will become more vulnerable to
external shocks because it will be at the mercy of factors affecting the
international price of oil and the demand for it. Thirdly, manufacturing is
believed by many economists to be subject to increasing returns and to produce
various positive externalities, including the creation of linkages and the
dispersion of technological progress, innovation and dynamism in the whole
economy. Allowing de-industrialisation, it seems therefore, would deprive the
economy of these positive externalities.
"/ Such volatility of demand and relative pnces due to the spending effect of the Disease need not exist under two 
conditions. First, the consumption is determined by permanent rather than temporary income and it is known with 
certainty how much this permanent income is. Secondly, international financial markets are perfect, so that 
domestic agents can engage with the outside world in saving and borrowing in order to smooth short-term income 
fluctuations It is doubtful, however, that these conditions materialise in the real wnrld specifically, in developing 
countries.
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This thesis is the first study of its kind that comprehensively examines the 
topic in the context of Libya. It empirically investigates the magnitude and 
sources of the Dutch Disease and the mechanisms through which it would be 
transmitted into the rest of the economy. In other words, the study documents 
an era of rapid sectoral shifts in the economic history of Libya but it should be 
noted that this study is positive and not normative. However, it provides some 
of the positive analysis required for the full normative analysis of policies used 
by industrialising economies benefiting from favourable exogenous shocks.
The study also highlights the main limitation aspects of the Model in 
analysing the experiences of booms, especially when it is applied to 
industrialising economies. These limitations have centred around three issues. 
First, the short-to-medium term nature of the Model analysis does not 
accommodate important inter-temporal issues of adjustment. That is, in most 
economies that benefit from booms, the cost of adjustment to non-booming 
conditions has proven to be very high. This is especially true if the boom is 
temporary and the economy adjusts to the boom as recommended by the Dutch 
Disease advocating theoreticians. Second, the Dutch Disease Models behaviour 
of private agents only, while a significant proportion of the boom windfall 
accrues to the public sector. This constitutes an oversight given that 
government would play an important role in reallocating economic resources 
either directly through directing the investment policies and controlling the 
spending behaviour or indirectly through fiscal and monetaiy polices. Third, 
the Model has also been criticised for its assumption of full employment when 
the case is more usually that most developing economies are far more likely to 
have an excess supply of labour in the pre-boom period, which can neutralise 
the resource movement effect.
In addition to these considerations, the study attempts to extend the 
critique into other analytical areas, mainly, that of the dynamic analysis and the 
effect of changes in the structure of demand on sectoral output. The static 
nature of the Dutch Disease analysis does not take into account the impact of
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productivity growth on resources allocation and, consequently on the structure 
of production. Since productivity differentials between sectors are an essential 
cause of sectoral shifts on the supply side, ignoring them is therefore a serious 
oversight of the Dutch Disease Model. Equally importantly, changes in the 
demand patterns that might be induced by the booming conditions, would also 
directly change the structure of production. In developing economies 
particularly those experiencing booming conditions, demand patterns can 
change in three different ways. First, as per-capita income rises, the share of 
manufactured goods in total expenditure tends to grow at the expense of that of 
agricultural ones. Second, expenditure on investment goods will rise as 
economic activity increases. Third, if the boom is regional, as was the case of 
Libya and other Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries, demand for the 
countiy's exports may change.
It should be noted that the demand aspect of the critique becomes 
important only when dynamic aspects of growth and structural change are 
taken into consideration. Otherwise, such changes would produce the same 
results predicted by the Dutch Disease Model since the only important variable 
in such cases would be the new structure of price. Any change in demand for 
tradables can be met through imports, whose prices are lower under booming 
conditions than otherwise.
The elaboration of these points of criticism in the body of the thesis 
assists in establishing an alternative analytical approach to investigate the 
impact of booms on an economy. This alternative approach has three main 
stands. First, in challenging the Theory's assumptions of model macro­
equilibrium with full employment, perfect factor markets, fixed national stock 
of both capital and labour and the immutability of technical conditions of 
production. Second, it uses the two mechanisms of the resource movement 
effect and the spending effect to examine the boom effect on changing relative 
prices. Third, taking into consideration the new structure of prices and demand, 
productivity analysis is conducted to show the impact of booming conditions
16
on changing the technical conditions of production and thus on the profitability 
of the traded sectors.
In general, the thesis attempts to shed light on important structural 
features of the Libyan economy during the last three decades. These have 
important policy implications for economic performance and development. 
Looking at all the above issues in the context of Libya and bearing in mind the 
experiences of other developing countries, the thesis also attempts to contribute 
towards a better conceptual and practical understanding of the Dutch Disease 
Model and its application to developing countries.
In studying the above issues, the thesis compiles an economic data set for 
Libya, a large part of which is constructed from widely dispersed raw data. The 
data set embraces the period 1962-1990 and includes the structure of nominal 
and real GDP, domestic absorption, investment components both in macro and 
sectoral levels, external trade and the balance of payments. This task was 
carried out with care, and the sub-sectors were cross-checked in order to 
maintain strict accuracy. Also a field study for gathering data about the 
manufacturing sector has been carried out. The information obtained from this 
survey was carefully treated and cross-checked too.
Libya is a particularly good case for the study of these issues. It is a 
small-sized developing country which embarked on an import-substitution 
industrialisation programme before exporting an enormous oil-related boom in 
the early 1970’s. After almost a decade, the boom turned into bust and the 
economy faced serious difficulties. The country is now implementing an 
unannounced structural adjustment programme. In the meantime capital 
inflows, mainly oil revenue, declined sharply after the early 1980's and created 
the risk that the decline may have intensified and complicated macroeconomics 
management further.
During the Seventies, and the early Eighties, as has been indicated, the 
Libyan economy enjoyed a stream of windfalls (oil exports) whose 
contribution amounted to 99% of GDP and 88% of merchandise exports in
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some years. In the same period certain non-liberalisation measures were 
introduced, including the enhancement of state monopoly on foreign trade and 
the increase of its intervention in various aspects of the economy. During that 
period, the Libyan economy was one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world, with an average real GDP growth of almost 13% per annum. However, 
it can be argued now that the boom was a wasted opportunity and that the 
windfalls revenue was not utilised in a way that would have promoted 
alternative sources of exports and created sustained growth. The impressive 
growth rate of that period concealed serious adverse developments, one of 
which was the decline in the share of tradables in GDP from 17.4% in the early 
1970’s to 11.5% in the early 1980’s. The share of agriculture in non-oil GDP 
declined by alm ost 10% over the boom  period and that of m anufacturing 
stagnated over almost the whole boom period. By the end of the boom, the 
Libyan economy was still depending on oil exports to cover its imports despite 
the remarkable increase in non-oil exports.
Not surprisingly, when oil prices collapsed in the early 1980’s, so did the 
growth rate. By the late 1980’s per-capita GDP had declined and the external 
financial position became critical. The Government found great difficulty in 
financing the most basic imports. The situation was saved by liberalising the 
internal and external trade.
The rest of this thesis is organised as outlined:
Chapter 2: “The Dutch Disease Model: Theoretical and Empirical 
Background”. This introduces the core model and the classical mechanisms 
through which it affects an economy as described in the literature. The chapter 
also introduces the criticism of the model and presents various extensions of it 
that may be of relevance to the case of Libya as well.
Chapter 3: “Literature Review and Synthesis” . This chapter reviews some 
of the developed and developing countries experiences with booms that have 
been discussed in the literature. Two types of booms are considered: those 
arising from the discovery of a natural resource and those emanating from
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favourable change in the resource price. In the former case the resource 
movement dominates, and in the latter the spending effect does. A distinction 
is made between permanent and temporary booms on the basis that they 
required different levels of adjustment. The chapter also deals with the 
differences of the experiences of booms between developed economies and 
developing ones with regard to the boom's effects on the structure of 
production. In addition to that, emphasis is placed on how economic conditions 
prior to the boom may differ, including the level of per-capita income, the 
degree of industrialisation and the existence of constraints in capital markets. 
The role of government action is also discussed.
Chapter 4: '‘Review of the Libyan Economy, Structural Changes and 
Development Patterns.” This chapter is mainly an illustrative account. It casts a 
light on the Libyan economy since Independence and examines the major 
changes which took place in it during the period of 1962-1990. The analysis is 
done within a time-frame composed of three distinct periods. An effort is made 
to incorporate demand-side factors into the analysis of sectoral shifts in order 
to redress the balance of the Dutch Disease supply-side analysis. Factor input 
and output growth are compared to test whether or not productivity change had 
contributed to the growth of the Libyan economy. The role of the Government 
in influencing sectoral shifts in favour of productive sectors is brought to the 
fore. Factors underlying the atypical structure of production in Libya with a 
disproportionately large share of services are also studied.
Chapter 5: “An Empirical Investigation of the Dutch Disease in Libya” 
attempts to quantify Libya’s variety of the Disease. It constructs a 27-year 
Dutch Disease index for Libya using a counter factual analysis. The index is 
calculated for both manufacturing and agriculture to give a detailed picture of 
their reactions to the boom. Then the chapter turns to investigating the 
transmission mechanisms of the Disease. In the Libyan case, it analyses 
developments in the indices against both policy shifts and trends in the 
mechanisms of the Disease. It particularly examines the real exchange rate as
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well as other relevant aggregates including domestic absorption. This 
investigation attempts to establish what role if any, the classic mechanisms 
played in the Libyan case..
Chapters 6 and 7 examine the performance of both the agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors during the boom and the sequence of analysis adopted in 
each chapter is>
Firstly, the growth of these sectors and their contribution to output and 
employment over the course of time are researched to reveal whether or not 
their performances during the boom period diverged from those calculated to 
have been expected from the observed precedents. Then patterns in output, 
import-substitution and exports are set up to presents the impact of domestic 
demand and trade on the structure of production. Factor input is compared with 
output growth to discover whether productivity growth had been large enough 
for the growth of both sectors and to assist their contributions to aggregate 
output. In agriculture, changes in the output prices of cereals, vegetables and 
fruit including factor cost, productivity growth and profitability are all 
analysed at the enterprise level. In the case of manufacturing industries the 
analysis is undertaken at three-digit level.
It should be asserted that although the general outline for the analysis is 
similar for both agriculture and manufacturing their treatment differs a lot 
because of the technology of production in each. For instance, whereas 
technological innovations, in the form of equipment or machinery, will be 
introduced likewise into agriculture as well as manufacturing, the greatest 
agents for technological change in agriculture production may be the agro­
chemicals that are used.
The sectors are inherently dissimilar in other respects too. There is no 
parallel in manufacturing for the way in which investment in equipment- 
irrigation and new material inputs complement each other in agriculture. 
Neither is there a parallel for the increased total factor input of increased land 
utilisation and double-cropping brought about by irrigation. On the other hand,
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the effect of factor input on output growth is substantially changed by the 
dynamic economies of scale that are ubiquitous in manufacturing but not in 
agriculture.
Finally, it is necessary to mention the difficulties arising from the 
differential effects of a rise in per-capita income on demand for goods in both 
sectors. As the rise in per-capita income fuelled by the boom escalates, the 
amount of money spent on manufacturing goods escalates also and in so doing 
naturally reduces the share of that spent on agricultural products. 
Consequently, resources will be drawn from agriculture into manufacturing.
A rise in manufacturing output is attributed to the effects of successful 
industrialisation but a decline is pronounced as being the result of the Dutch 
Disease effect. But a decline in agriculture can be diagnosed as the outcome of 
either successful industrialisation or the Dutch Disease. So it can be seen from 
this that the attribution of cause in agricultural performance in times of boom is 
an enigmatic and ambivalent endeavour.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO THE 
DUTCH DISEASE THEORY
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II-l Introduction
It has been argued that a resource discovery for export does not guarantee 
economic development. More often it is the case that a temporary rapid 
increase in exports gives rise to an adverse effect and therefore adjustment 
problems throughout the rest of the economy. This problem is referred to in the 
economic literature as “the Dutch Disease.” This term derives from the 
difficulties experienced by the Dutch economy as a result of the natural gas 
discoveries of the 1960’s. The export boom caused a real appreciation of the 
Gilder (above the level at which it would otherwise have been), reducing the 
competitiveness of the Dutch industry relative to the rest of the world.
The Dutch Disease Theory is a comparative static approach exploring the 
short to medium term structural effects of a boom emanating from either a new 
resource discovery or an increase in the price of an exportable commodity. In 
simple terms the model concerns the impact of the boom on the functional 
distribution of income, profitability and the size of the manufacturing sector of 
the economy.
The theory focuses on the interrelationship between factors mobility, 
output and output prices and predicts that, in an economy in full employment 
equilibrium, a permanent increase in the inflow of external funds will lead to a 
change in relative prices in favour of the non-traded goods sector but against 
the traded goods sector, which in turn will lead to a contraction of employment 
and output in the traded sector. This phenomenon is referred to in the Dutch 
Disease literature as “De-industrialisation” (M. Karshenas and Associates, 
1994, P. 152).
The key issue in this process is the real exchange rate - which is the 
relative price of non-traded goods to traded goods Pn/Pt. or the real effective 
exchange rate - which is an index of domestic prices for both tradable and non­
tradable goods relative to the prices of main trading partners in terms of market
♦
exchange rate Pd/eP (Dombusch and Associates, 1988, PP. 11-26).
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The Dutch Disease Model can be regarded as a special case of the older 
named general booming sector model. This older model concerns the impact 
which a boom in one sector of the economy has on the other sectors and on the 
economy as a whole.
One of the earliest analyses done in this area was on the impact that the 
nineteenth-century gold discoveries in Australia had upon the Australian 
economy (Caimes, 1859). Recent literature also refers to cases as old as that of 
sixteenth-century Spain and the effect of American inflows upon Spanish 
industry (Forsyth, and Nicholas, 1983).
The theoretical origins of the Dutch Disease Model can be found in 
Salter’s Dependent Economy Model (Salter, 1959) where he discusses the 
relationship between external and internal balances. Salter examines the impact 
of a boom on both the tradable and non-tradable sectors of the economy. / He 
shows that this impact occurs through changes in domestic expenditure, 
affecting the real exchange rate. The varieties of the Model also influenced by 
these factors are Jones’s Specific Model (1971) and Samuleson’s (1971). 
Therefore, when discussing the consequences of the boom, these varieties of 
the Model assume that some factors are specific to certain sectors and others 
are intersectorally mobile. In fact, the differences which emerge from different 
varieties of the Model are mainly due to their different assumptions about 
factors mobility. The extensive theoretical literature that followed has been 
surveyed by Gregory (1976), Snape (1977) and developed further by Corden 
and Neary (1982) and Corden (in 1983 and 1984).
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows: Section II illustrates the 
Core Model of the Dutch Disease and demonstrates how the disease occurs. 
Section III presents some extensions of the Model. Section IV explains why 
the phenomenon is considered a disease. Section V concludes by highlighting
V For the purpose of convenience we will refer to the tradable sector an non-tradable sector as tradables and non 
tradables. Tradables include sectors that produce all potentially international tradable goods mainly agriculture and 
manufacturing. Non-tradables include sectors that produce goods which are not commonly traded internationally 
mainly construction and services. It is true that international trade in services is increasing but their tradability is 
still generally Limited.
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some policy implications and options. The discussion is presented in a way that 
reflects the classical literature as it stands and finally, Section VI gives 
criticism of the Model, re-examines some of the issues and offers an alternative 
understanding of the phenomenon and the optimal policy response.
II-2 The Core Model of The Dutch Disease Theory.
As already mentioned, the Dutch Disease Theory emerged in the booming 
sector literature which drew its originality from other economic disciplines. 
Disciplines such as international trade theory, macro-economic analysis and 
resources and exhaustion. The cornerstone and main prominent features of this 
Theory, known in the literature as the Partial Equilibrium Model, have been 
put forward by Gregory (1976) and Snape (1977) when they studied 
Australia’s latest mineral discoveries of 1968-1974 (Corden, 1981 Section 5).
This Model describes demand and supply in the traded sector under the 
assumptions of given international terms of trade and perfect substitution 
between import and importables goods as shown in Figure II-1. The vertical 
axis there denotes the relative price between traded and non-traded goods and 
the horizontal axis shows the quantity of traded goods and non-traded goods, 
and X0 and M0 indicate the supply of exports and demand for imports prior to 
the boom respectively.
Before the boom equilibrium is at point a. Where Po refers to the 
equilibrium of the traded and non-traded goods price and Q0 refers to the 
equilibrium of the traded and non-traded quantities (ibid. 1981, Section 5).
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Figure II-1
The Effects of A Boom on Exports & Imports
P t  / Pn 
▲
Po
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Qx; Q m
Q i Qo Q2
Following the boom the export curve Xo will shift to X\ leading to the new 
equilibrium point b. At this point price Pj is lower than before the boom
Ignoring the effects of domestic inflation and exchange rate revaluation, 
this lower price will lead to an increase in the quantity supplied of non-tradable 
goods; a decrease in the quantity supplied of pre-existing exports from Q0 to 
Qi and an increase in the quantity demanded of imports from Q0 to Q2.
The general conclusion of the Model is that, with mineral discoveries, the 
price of non-tradables will increase relative to that of tradable goods and that 
non-mineral tradables production will contract. Consequently, both import- 
competing industries and pre-existing exporting industries will diminish in size 
(Snape: 155).
This Model was developed further by Snape in 1977 when he noticed that 
the export and import curves in the Model were not shifted as aggregate 
variables. He also realised that the impact of the new discovery outlay on the 
pre-existing importables and exportables industries was not considered (ibid. 
155). In view of these effects he designed a General Equilibrium Model and 
this, in turn, was developed further by Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden 
(1983; 1984). This Model is known in the Dutch Disease literature as the
26
General Equilibrium Effects of the Boom and is the Core Model of the Dutch 
Disease Theory
II-2-1 The Framework and Basic Assumptions of the Model
In the Dutch Disease Model, the economy presented is a small open economy 
in which total production and consumption can be divided into three main 
sectors, the booming sector (B), the tradable sector T 4/ and the non-tradable 
sector N. V The price of tradables PT is exogenously determined in the 
international market and not affected by domestic policies. So it is assumed to 
be constant and equal to the international price6/. On the other hand, the price 
of non-tradables PN is determined domestically, and varies so as to clear the 
market. In the basic case of the Model, the source of the boom is assumed to be 
equivalent to once-and-for all Hicks-neutral progress in production 
technology7/. It is also assumed that all the production of the booming sector 
is exported. The three sectors use specific factor (capital) as well as an 
intersectorally mobile factor (labour). The real wage (w) is assumed to be 
flexible and real prices (and wage) are measured in terms of Pj. The additional 
assumptions underlying the Model are that there are no distortions in the 
commodity or factor markets to rule out the possibility of immiserising growth 
for the economy as a whole, that both traded and non-traded goods are normal 
goods and used for final consumption, that national output and expenditure are 
always equal so that trade is always balanced overall and finally, that the oil 
sector uses no domestic mobile resources. In such circumstances, therefore, an 
increase in oil revenue resulting from an increase in the oil price is taken to be 
equivalent to a capital transfer.
V Note that, although B also produces tradable goods, the tradable sector (T), as defined here, includes all
tradables a part from these produced in the booming sector.
7  In some of the literature, the booming sector is called the mining sector, the tradable sector is called booming 
sector, and the non-tradable sector is called the lagging sector, we find the denomination used above less 
confusing and less limited to the specific case when the windfalls occurs in the mining sector.
7 This true only w'hen assuming that the size of (T) is not large enough to influence its international price.
/ This analysis is perfectly applicable to a price increase.
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According to the Dutch Disease Theory, when a boom occurs, it can lead 
to the expansion of the booming sector (B) and the non-tradable sector (N) and 
the contraction of the tradable sector (T), through two effects: The first of these 
is the resource movement effect (or the shift effect) which draws factors of 
production out of used activities and into the booming sector and secondly, the 
spending effect, which draws factors of production out of activities producing 
traded goods (substituted by imports) and into non-traded sectors. 8/. This 
process can be illustrated as in Figure II-2 which describes the commodity 
market by measuring the non-traded goods output along the horizontal axis and 
traded goods output (including both manufacturing and the booming sector 
output) along the vertical axis. In this figure, TN is the economy pre-boom 
production frontier curve (represented the aggregate supply side depending on 
domestic technology and factor endowments) (Neary, and Associates, 1985, 
pp. 15, 16)
Before the boom and in the absence of any intervention in market 
mechanisms or commodity distortion, equilibrium in the commodity market 
is determined by the intersection of the production possibilities curve (TN) 
with the highest attainable social indifference curve I0, (representing the 
aggregate demand side), at point a. This initial real exchange rate is equal to 
the slop of the relative price line P0Po
*/ See Corden and Neary (1982), Corden (1984), Van Wijnbergen (1984), and Gelb and Associates (1988).
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Figure II-2 
Response to the Windfalls
T
T,
Non-Tradables
II-2-2 The Spending Effect
A boom in B leads to a shift o f the initial production possibilities curve 
outwards to TiN. The equilibrium point moves to point b which lies to the left 
of point a. at this point the domestic output of both N and T remains the same 
but total availability of T is increased from OT to OTj.since relative prices will 
remain unchanged, desired consumption must lie at point d, where the price 
line extending from the origin intersects the income-consumption line 
extending from the origin via point a. There is an excess demand for non- 
traded goods N, and this excess demand will lead to a driving up of their 
relative price until a new equilibrium is attained such as at point c. Thus the
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relative price of traded goods to non-traded goods Pj /P n must fall to restore the 
equilibrium of the N market (therefore reduce demand for N goods and 
increase spending on traded goods to reduce the surplus). This fall in the 
relative price of traded goods is referred to as a real appreciation. In addition, 
at the new equilibrium point the output of N has risen whereas the output of T 
has declined and thus domestic welfare has increased, so there is de­
industrialisation. So the spending effect of the boom gives rise to both de­
industrialisation and to real appreciation.
The adjustment however will be expressed through increase in the Pn 
goods if the exchange rate is fixed and through a combination of nominal 
exchange rate appreciation and an increase in the Pn provided the exchange 
rate is flexible. Furthermore, since equilibrium in the market is brought about 
by the adjustment of the price of non-traded relative to traded goods. The 
output of the non-traded goods will depend solely on the real exchange rate. 
The demand in terms of non-traded goods depends on the level of income y 
and this is determined exogenously by the assumption of full employment. The 
equilibrium conditions of this Model in terms of the market clearing conditions 
can then be expressed by the following formula:
XN(q) = CN(q, y). (1).
Where XN and CN indicate domestic production and consumption of the non- 
traded goods respectively and q and y are the prices of non-traded goods 
relative to traded goods and the level of income in terms of traded goods 
respectively (ibid: 1986, P. 17).
II-2-3 The Resource Movement Effect (the Shift Effect)
The appreciation of the real exchange rate will tend to draw resources out of 
the non-oil traded sector into the non-traded sector and will also move demand 
away from the non-traded goods sector towards the non-oil sector (assuming
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perfect substitution). Equilibrium is attained at point d where total demand for 
traded and non-traded goods equal supplies. The final result is that there is a 
movement along the production possibilities curve from d to c and the 
production of traded goods will fall with the production of non-traded goods 
rising as factors shift. This squeeze on the non-oil traded goods sector is known 
as de-industrialisation.
Furthermore, if the booming sector B employs domestic factors the boom 
will entail an increase in the marginal product of the production factors 
employed in the booming sector B. This increase in the marginal product of 
production factors leads to an excess demand for these factors in that sector. 
Consequently, B draws factors of production out of both the non-traded goods 
N and non-oil traded T sectors and there are then two subsequent effects. 
Firstly the movement of the production factors out of the non-oil traded goods 
sector into B without involving the N market which lowers the output in that 
sector. (This is referred to as direct de-industrialisation). Secondly the 
movement of the mobile production factors out of N to B will lead to an 
increase excess demand created by the spending effect and thus add to upward 
pressure on the price of non-traded goods Pn. This will draw more labour out 
of the non-oil traded goods sector. In addition, labour will move from the 
booming sector as prices rise in that sector and this will offset the resource 
movement out of the N goods sector and into the booming sector. However it 
is presumed that this offset is small, so there will still be a net increase in oil 
production.
Under the assumption that each sector employs a single specific factor as 
well as drawing on the intersector mobility of the labour, the output of each 
sector will depend on the real wage (w) in addition to q and y indicated by 
equation (1). Hence equation (1) has to be modified to include the wage rate 
(w) as shown in equation (2).
XN (q / w) =CN ( q / y) (2).
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Solving this equation can be done by using the Labour Market Equilibrium 
Equation denoted by equation(3).
L = Ln ( q / w ) + Lt ( w ) +Lb ( w, b ) (3)
Where L is the total available supply of labour (assumed to be fixed) Lj is the 
labour function for sector i and b is the demand for labour that was created by 
the boom effect.
The determination of equilibrium in this model can be done by plotting 
these equations in (w, q) dimensions as two curves whereas N0 depicting 
equation (2) and L0 representing equation (3) as illustrated in Figure II-3.
Figure II-3 
Spending and Resource movement 
Effects of A Boom
It is obvious from equation (2) that either an increase in (q) or a decrease in (w) 
produces an excess supply of N goods and the curve N0 must be upward- 
sloping. Since an equi-proportionate increase in (q) or (w) leads to unchanged 
supply of N goods, while a decreased demand for N goods will lead to an 
excess supply, the slope of the curve N0 must be more than one. Similarly, 
according to Equation (3) either an increase in (w) or a decrease in (q) will lead 
to a rise in unemployment and hence the curve L0 must also be upward- 
sloping.
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Furthermore, since an equi-proportionate increase in (q) and (w) has no 
effect on changing the N goods demand for labour but reduces it in both T and 
B, so leading to unemployment. The slope of the curve L0 is then less than one. 
The pre-boom equilibrium point is at point a where the curve N0 (which 
represented the equilibrium in the non-traded goods market) intersects the 
curve L0 (which represented the equilibrium in the labour market).
Following the boom the spending effect shifts the N0 curve rightwards to 
N t and thus the initial equilibrium point moves to a new equilibrium point. The 
position of this new equilibrium point depends on the resource movement 
effect. If there was no resource movement effect the new equilibrium 
intersection point will take place at point d. While under a resource movement 
effect L0 curve will shift upward to Li. Thus the equilibrium will be at point/. 
This demonstrates the resource movement effect reinforcing the spending 
effect in terms of higher (q) and (w) and shows both the spending and resource 
movement effects leading to real appreciation and de-industrialisation (ibid. 
1986 PP.17, 18).
11-2-4 The Final Outcome of the Boom.
The output of the non-traded goods sector might be higher or lower than before 
the boom because the resource movement effect results in lowering both the 
output and employment of non-traded goods whilst the spending effect tends to 
raise them. However, there is a definite decline in the output of the non-traded 
goods sector by both effects. But it should be noted that the final results are 
dependent upon which effect will dominate. In other words the final results are 
dependent on the assumptions made regarding the resource movement between 
sectors and the relative strengths of the spending effect versus the resource 
movement effect.
The resource movement effect produces rises both in direct and indirect 
de-industrialisation, in the case of direct de-industrialisation, it is shown by the 
fall of N output due to the movement of resources out of T and into B with out
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involving the market for N. In the instance of indirect de-industrialisation it is 
caused by the real appreciation that results both from the reduced output of N 
goods at the initial real exchange rate due to the resource movement effect and 
from the increased demand for N goods due to the spending effect. 
Furthermore, since N employment is unambiguous, the spending effect and the 
resource movement effect both lead to the withdrawal of resources out of T 
and hence the crowding out of output. Thus the output of T unambiguously 
falls. This can be illustrated by Figure II-4 in which the price of N relative to 
that of T is measured along the vertical axis and the non-traded goods on the 
horizontal axis. S0 and D0 indicate the supply and demand curves for N, 
respectively.
Figure II-4.
The Effect of the Boom on 
the Supply and Demand
Non- Tradables
Given the assumption that the initial exchange rate is fixed the spending effect 
will lead to drawing the mobile resources out of T and into N as well as 
shifting demand away from N towards B and T and thus the demand curve will 
move from D0 to D] and the price of N relative to that in the traded sector will
rise.
The resource movement effect on the other hand leads to shifts in the 
supply curve into Si and thus induces an additional excess demand and so real
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appreciation will take place. Thus the resource movement effect creates an 
additional movement of labour from T to N which in turn brings about indirect 
de-industrialisation.
11-2-5 The Effect of the Boom on Income Distribution 
II-2-5-1. The Effect of the Boom on Real Wages.
As already mentioned under the resource movement effect, when labour moves 
out of N into B the output of N tends to decline. Thus the wage measured in 
terms of N will rise and lead to an increase in the real wage which takes 
account of changes in the prices of all goods consumed by wage-eamers.
Similarly, under the spending effect the output of N will increase as a 
response to labour movement from T to N and therefore the wage, measured in 
terms of N, will fall. Since the wage, in terms of T, tends to rise due to the 
spending effect through a real appreciation, the real wage may rise or fall. Thus 
when the two effects are combined the final outcome is uncertain. That is a fall 
in the real wage will depend on the labour mobility and the share of the N 
sector in wage-eamers consumption (ibid, 1986,PP. 19-22).
11-2-5-2 The Effect of the Boom on the Profitability of Sectors
Factor mobility has a negative impact on its return when prices in the sector in 
which it is employed fall. Profitability in T tends to fall under both the resource 
movement effect and the spending effect. On the other hand profitability in N 
would fall under the resource movement effect while tending to rise under the 
spending effect. The combined effect of resource movement and the spending 
effect on profitability in N is ambiguous. In other words the final outcome 
depends on which effect dominates. In the booming sector profitability tends to 
rise because of the resource movement effect and fall because of the spending 
effect. Thus the return to the fixed factor in T suffers in terms of PN and PT 
while that in N gains most. In addition any change in PN has a
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disproportionately large effect in increasing capital in N (Corden 1984, PP.
364.365).
Moreover, in the medium-to-long run, resource allocation depends on 
relative profitability. The return to the specific factor therefore depends on the 
factor intensities in terms of value shares. That is with a relatively smaller 
share of labour in the value of T output, real wage in terms of T rises and 
profitability in the traded sector tends to fall but by less than it reduces in both 
non-traded sectors and the booming sector. In other words if the traded sector 
is capital-intensive relative to the non-traded sector and if the resource 
movement effect is dominated the boom raises profitability in the traded sector 
relative to that in the non-traded sector. While if the traded sector is more 
capital-intensive than the booming sector and the spending effect is dominated 
profitability in the traded sector tends to fall but by less than that within the 
booming sector. Whether this brings about the de-industrialisation or not will 
depend on which effect dominates. That is if this reflects in terms of falls in 
output and employment in the traded sector there must be de-industrialisation.
However, in the real world, the boom, the resource movement effect and 
the spending effect and their consequences on the balance of trade do not occur 
instantly. Mechanisms take time to operate and expectations play an important 
role too. Dynamic analysis considers three time periods. In the first period, 
expectations about the boom are found, consequently, expenditure rises and a 
balance of trade deficit occurs. The boom occurring in the second period turns 
the trade deficit into surplus. In the third period, the boom effects build up, 
restore the trade balance. If expectations are not accurate, which often is the 
case, the spending effect may exceed what it would be otherwise. That why it 
is sometimes important to distinguish between the impact of false expectations 
and the impact of the boom.
The above mentioned mechanisms are usually accompanied by political 
mechanisms which exacerbate the disease. This is often the case where a 
significant part of the windfalls accrues directly to the governments.
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Incremental expenditure is then more likely to be geared to expanding the 
welfare state, as in Northern Europe, or toward buying legitimacy by providing 
subsidised services and goods, or even building "white elephant" projects as in 
many developing countries. In addition to contributing to the spending effect 
such politically oriented expenditure is usually difficult to scale down when the 
boom ends.
II-3 The Extensions of the Model.
As mentioned earlier, the various extensions of the core Dutch Disease Model 
differ mainly in their assumptions regarding intersectoral and international 
factors mobility. These extensions show that, in certain circumstances, the 
Model predicts that the boom will result in industrialisation rather than de­
industrialisation. However, these circumstances are never expected to 
materialise in the case of most oil booms and this can be seen from the 
overview of six important extensions below. Therefore, in the context of the 
neo-classical analysis that characterises the Model, it is de-industrialisation that 
is likely to occur as a consequence of such booms.
11-3-1 The Paradox Model (more than one factor mobile)
This model is concerned with the effect of the boom over the medium-to-long 
run under the following assumptions:
There are three sectors B, T and N. The booming sector B have its own 
specific factor and labour is mobile between all sectors. Capital is mobile 
between T and N. the two sectors behave as a Heckscher-Ohlin economy 
which faces a variable supply of labour equal to the total labour supply in the 
economy less labour employed in the B sector. As well as one of them being 
capital intensive and the other labour intensive.
Under these assumptions following the boom the output and employment 
in both T and N will depend on the sector relative intensities. Where the 
resource movement effect has some contradictory results. That is at a constant
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real exchange rate the resource movement effect will cause the output of the 
capital-intensive sector expand, this is because of under the resource 
movement effect labour moves out of both T and N into B. while if T is 
relatively more capital intensive sector than N there will be a tendency to pro- 
industrialisation. This result will be opposed by the spending effect through the 
mechanism of real appreciation and the movement of both capital and labour 
out of T into N. However, in contrast output of T could expand (Corden, 1984: 
363).
II-3-2 Decomposition of the Lagging Sector
When the lagging sector is decomposed into several industries. Under the 
assumptions that each industry employs capital and labour and the two factors 
are mobile between its sub-industries. The boom entails a movement of labour 
out of T as a whole. With the stock capital for the sectors as a whole fixed and 
amount of labour reduced, the labour intensive industry will contract, while the 
capital-intensive industry will expand.
11-3-3. Intersectoral Capital Mobility.
In this model, another immobility assumption is relaxed. Let us assume that 
capital is intersectorally mobile between the non-tradable sector N and the 
tradable sector (T). 91
It was shown above that the resource movement effect leads to an out 
flow of labour from T and N into B. This means that the structure of resources 
available to N and T will become more capital intensive.10/ If we assume that T 
is more capital intensive than N, which is usually the case, then T is likely to 
benefit from this situation at the expense of N. If this is not offset by the
V Excluding B from the assumption of intersectoral capital mobility is not unrealistic, especially in the case of oil, 
where capital is highly specialised and most important is foreign.
"V It is obvious this is not applicable to only oil booms where the amount of labour required is negligible.
I Iowever, it can still be of some relevance if we assume that oil booms increase available capital relative to labour 
as the economy becomes relatively wealthier.
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spending effect, the final result is likely to be industrialisation rather than de­
industrialisation. " /
Let us assume that, on the contrary to the above case, the non-tradable 
sector (N) is more capital intensive than the tradable sector (T). In this case the 
output of N will expand at the expense of T. If this is not offset by any other 
mechanism, Pn/Pt is likely to decline, i.e. real appreciation will happen. This 
will counteract the initial hypothesis of real appreciation resulting from the 
spending effect and the final impact on the real exchange rate and, 
subsequently on T will be ambiguous, with the possibility of industrialisation. 
However, this paradoxical result is most unlikely, especially in the case of oil 
where the amount of labour withdrawn from T and N is negligible and, more 
importantly, where the spending effect is overwhelming.
II-3-4 International Capital Mobility
We now turn to the case where capital is intersectorally immobile (sector- 
specific) but internationally mobile.
When the boom takes place rents are likely to rise in B and T and fall in T as 
explained in the Core Model. Now, since capital is internationally mobile, it is 
likely that it will outflow from T and inflow to N. This will boost adjustment 
through the quantities produced in each sector and will reduce the amount of 
change required in relative prices (Pn/P t). The extent of this happening will 
depend on the degree of the international mobility of capital. If this mobility is
perfect with elastic supply, then de-industrialisation can occur in response to
12minor changes in the real exchange rate (Pn/P t)- /
1'/  It is worth nothing that within the manufacturing sector itself some specific industries may expand, and other 
may contracting, according to this specific capital intensity. Thus, it can happen that even if  de-industnalisation 
occurs in general, specific industries may still expand.
17  Snce labour remain sectorally mobile as in the Core Model This outcome supports the argument for some
restrictions on the capital movement to neutralise the disease where in the cases of free international capital
movements, a smaller rise in the relative price of non-tradables (PN /PT) results in a greater structural change (de­
industrialisation), drawing more domestic labour from the tradables than in the cases where there are restrictions
on international capital mobility
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II-3-5 International labour Mobility (Immigration).
In response to the boom, demand for labour rises leading to an increase in the 
real wage in terms of tradables (w). But since the price of non-tradables (PN) 
also raises the ”true“ real wage (w*) may rise or fall depending on both the 
extent of the rise in PN and the share of the non-tradables in labourers
consumption bundle. 13/
•¥
If w increases this is expected to lead to foreign labour immigrating into 
the country. Immigration will raise both domestic demand for and the supply 
of N and T. Thus, its influence on the relative price of non-tradables (Pn/P t) 
may vary from one case to another.
a|c '
Immigration is expected to continue until w is restored to its initial 
(lower) level. But what is more relevant is determining the final size of T w not 
w* .So that the important question here is whether the restoration of w* will 
lead to the restoration of w. This is not feasible as long as some of the boom 
and the immigrants, income is spent on N. Pressure on factors other than 
labour producing N will lead to the rise of (PN), while Pp will be fixed at its 
international level. Even if we assume that capital is internationally mobile, 
this is not possible to lead. So, in this variety of the Model, the boom will not 
lead to industrialisation unless N is subjected to increasing returns.
II-3-6 The Domestic Absorption Effect.
This variety of the Model concerns the case where the boom is specifically due 
to a rise in the international (and, thus, the domestic) price of the booming 
sector products (Pb) and some of the product is used domestically. 14/
Let us first assume that the product of (B) is used only for final 
consumption. A rise in the price of B (PB) will lead to an increased rent in B 
(Rb). Here we are faced with both an income effect and a substitution effect. 
We first consider the income effect.
I3/ As noted earlier, in the Core Model, the real wage, like all other prices, is measured in terms of price of 
tradables only and is not influenced by changes in the price of non-tradables.
14/ This variety of the model is sometimes called the domestic utilisation effect.
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The rise in PB is equivalent to B taxing the rest of the economy for 
consuming its product. There will be a positive spending effect from the part of 
Rb and negative spending effect from the rest of the economy. The magnitude 
of each will depend on the marginal propensity of each sector to consume N. If 
the propensity varies between different sectors, the outcome is ambiguous. 
Both real appreciation and real devaluation are feasible.
As regards the substitution effect, there is no ambiguity, PB rises and 
consumers shift some of their initial consumption of B to T and N. This boosts 
real appreciation through the spending effect and a shift effect occurs in the 
usual fashion, due to the rise in marginal productivity of factors producing B.
If the product of B is used as an intermediate good, similar analysis and 
ambiguity applies as in the above case of the final product. The adverse impact 
on T is, however, expected to be greater because the resource movement effect 
will be larger. The marginal productivity of the mobile factor in B will rise as 
usual. What is new here is that it will also decline in T and N due to the 
decrease of rent in them RT and Rn ' 3/ This situation is exacerbated if T 
happens to be more intensive than N in its use of the product of B. This is 
likely to be the case where the boom is oil related.
As regards to the substitution effect, it will be stronger when the product 
of B is used as intermediate input. Products of N and T will be used as 
substitutes for the more expensive product of B. This will lead to further real 
appreciation because of the increasing pressure on available factors of 
production.
II-4 The 'Enclave' Nature of the Oil Sector.
For oil booms the resource movement effect is not significant due to the 
special factor market characteristics of the oil sector. Because of the weak 
forward and backward linkages of the oil sector, "one should perhaps 
emphasise that the oil industry is much like a small enclave in terms of the
! V Rt and Rn will decrease due to the raise of the price of B which assumed to be used as input in both N and T.
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almost negligible direct reliance on domestic labour and capital in OPEC", 
(Mckinnon, 1976, p. 162). As Neary (1983) puts it, the models analysing an oil 
boom "do not allow any participation by the booming sector in the domestic 
factor market" and the 'Dutch Disease' models, which analyse the case of the 
oil boom traditionally abstract from the resource movement effects16/. This is 
justified for at least two reasons. First, the oil industry is highly foreign capital- 
intensive and the domestic labour used by the oil sector constitutes a negligible 
part of the labour force. In addition, the skill of labour employed in the oil 
sector is, at least in the short run, highly sector specific. Moreover, the labour 
employed in the oil sector is consists mostly of foreigners, at least for the small 
oil-exporting countries such as Libya. Second, the oil sector in such countries 
is almost wholly owned by governments therefore, the increased oil revenues 
usually accrue to the government as monopoly rent and not to the factors of 
production. Also, the governments do not monetise the oil revenue right away. 
As a result, the real return of factors of production in the oil sector is initially 
unaffected by the boom.
Considering the spending effect alone leads us to conclude that in a 
competitive equilibrium the oil boom unambiguously undermines the non-oil 
tradable goods sector and expands the non-tradable goods sector.
II-5 Monetary Aspects of the Dutch Disease Theory.
The preceding discussion of the Dutch Disease Theory has been focused on 
those predictions which are relevant to the allocation of the real resources. In 
this section we turn to consider the monetary aspects of the Dutch Disease 
Model. This model assumes that the economy is small relative to the world 
markets for N goods and small in assets markets. It assumes that both the 
wages and prices in terms of N are flexible, but price in terms of T is fixed. It 
also assumes that capital is internationally mobile and that there is no political
10 The oil sector in developing countries is treated as an enclave in the sense that it requires negligible domestic 
resources. Therefore, an increase in oil prices or production represents an increased transfer from abroad, e g. 
McHinnon (1976); Forsyth and Kay (1980), Buiter and Purvis (1980); Bruno and Satchs (1982); Wijnbergen 
1984b); Benjamin, Devarajan and Weine (1984b); Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner (1986) etc.
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risk and transaction cost (foreign and domestic money are perfect substitutes) 
and that the domestic money constitutes the domestic assets. Under these 
assumptions the money market equilibrium can be illustrated by using Figure 
11-5 in which the nominal price in terms of N is measured along vertical axis 
and the nominal exchange rate (the domestic-currency price of a unit of foreign 
exchange) along the horizontal axis E\ is the price in terms of T goods the 
curve M 0Mo denotes the money market equilibrium condition obtained by 
substituting the domestic money supply into the following conventional money 
demand equation:
Where R is referring to domestic interest rate, M is the log of nominal 
money demand P and Y indicates the price level and the real level of income 
respectively. While the curve SoSo indicates the equilibrium condition of non- 
traded goods
M-P -  aY-5R (4)
Figure II-5 
Effect of the Boom under Fixed 
and Floating Exchange Rate Regimes
P
A
c
6
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Before the boom and under the assumption that the exchange rate (g) is 
flexible and the domestic money market is in equilibrium status, an increase in 
PN will lead to a fall in the exchange rate. If the money supply is held constant 
the level of the domestic interest rate will equal the world interest rate. That is 
the economy will lie along the curve M0M0. However if  the exchange rate is 
fixed the economy will lie at a point above M0M0, where at this point the actual 
holdings of real money balances below desired holdings (disequilibrium 
status). In order to expand domestic money supply the disequilibrium can be 
equalised by building up foreign reserves. That is to say every point above the 
curve M0M0.indicates the surplus in the balance of trade and the opposite is 
also true: every point below this curve corresponds to a deficit in the balance of 
trade. In addition to this, the rise in PN will induce an excess supply of non- 
tradable goods while an increase in the exchange rate will induce an excess 
demand for them. This is amounts to saying that with a fixed nominal money 
supply an equally proportional increase in both PN> and the exchange rate g will 
lead to an excess supply of N by reducing the value of real balances and 
therefore will decrease the spending. In other words, the non-trade market 
equilibrium curve S0So is upward sloping and less steep than a ray from the 
origin. The pre-boom equilibrium point is therefore at point a, where the 
curves M0M0 intersect the curve S0S0.
As presented already, at initial prices both the resource movement effect 
and the spending effect will lead to an excess demand for the N goods sector. 
Consequently, curve SoSo will shift upwards to Si S i. This will raise the real 
income demand. Under the assumption that this change is not combined with 
an increase in money supply the domestic price level must fall to re-equilibrate 
the money market. This is known as the liquidity effect. This fall in the price 
level will lead to a shift of the curve M0M0 inwards to MilVf. The analysis can 
now be conducted in two stages. First the nominal exchange rate g is allowed 
to move freely and second the nominal exchange rate is held constant. Under 
the first assumption the new equilibrium point will be at point b. At this point
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the real exchange rate will fall. This fall in the real exchange rate will be equal 
to the slope of the line ob relative to the slope of line oa. Additionally the fall 
in the real exchange rate will be associated with a fall in the nominal exchange 
rate. Thus the domestic prices of traded goods will decline. However prices in 
terms of non-traded goods may rise or fall. On the other hand, under the second 
assumption and with a constant nominal money supply the two curves will 
move to Mi Mi and Si Si as stated above, but if price in terms of N is free to 
adjust the economy will move in the short-run to the point d. At this point the 
change in the relative price of N will be less than that which would be required 
for long-run equilibrium given that the spending effect is lower due to the 
balance of trade surplus and the desired money balance is greater than the 
actual economy at this point will be in disequilibrium. Thus the trade balance 
surplus is directed to build up the foreign reserves. Consequently, the domestic 
money supply will gradually increase. This will force both Mi Mi and Sj Si to 
move upwards until the new equilibrium is attained at point c. At this point the 
surplus will be eliminated and the economy reaches its long-run equilibrium. 
This amounts to saying that the fixed exchange rate will delay the effect of the 
boom and raise the inflation. In other words, in the short-run and in order to 
eliminate the inflationary consequences, the Central Bank will impose the 
exchange rate protection policy through reducing the money supply and 
increasing reserves. This policy will lead to de-industrialisation.(Neary, 1985,. 
PP. 357 to 373).
II-6 The Dynamic Analysis of the Dutch Disease
In the absence of any market distortions such as short run inflexibility, 
sluggishness in economic variables or externalities, the boom raises national 
welfare. Therefore, as regarded in some of the literature the Dutch Disease is 
not looked upon as a problem unless it occurs with the presence of some kinds 
of economic distortions or externalities. Several Dutch Disease models were 
developed to trace either the effects of short run macro-dynamics given
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sluggish adjustment of economic variables, or adverse welfare effects 
associated with the presence of a market distortion or externality. The former 
will be discussed in this section while the latter will be discussed in the next 
section.
Neary and Purvis (1981) examine the short run adjustment of an economy 
faced with a resource boom towards the long-run equilibrium. They assume an 
open economy with three sectors, the booming sector (B), the non-booming 
traded sector (T) and the non-traded sector N. The booming sector employs 
capital and a factor-specific in its production process, where the traded sector 
uses both capital and labour. The stock of capital used in both sectors is 
assumed to be gradually augmented or depleted with the passage of time. 
Therefore, the booming sector is assumed to use no mobile factors in the short- 
run which implies that the resource movement effects of a resource boom are 
precluded. This assumption is consistent with the enclave nature of the oil 
sector. The non-traded sector in this model uses labour but was extended by 
Neaiy (1985) to allow for a factor specific to the non-traded sector with the 
same model. The latter extension does not change the conclusion of the model. 
All wages and prices are kept perfectly flexible in this model, as opposed to 
Dombusch’s overshooting model (Dombusch, 1978), but the model assumes 
sluggish adjustment in the reallocation of capital between the two traded 
sectors (B and T).
Let the economy initially operate in long-run equilibrium. The effects of 
the boom in the booming sector could be illustrated by a figure which was used 
by Neaiy (1985) but with some modification (See Figure II-6). The horizontal 
axis represents the stock of capital allocated to the T sector. Therefore, in the 
short-run the economy is constrained by the initial allocation of capital to that 
sector, K°t. The vertical axis denotes the real exchange rate Pn/Pt, which is 
simply the relative price of N to the price of T. The curve SS is the locus of all 
combinations of Pn/Pt and Kt which are consistent with equilibrium in the 
market for N goods before the boom takes place. The curve is upward sloping,
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because a rise in Kt, with no change in Pn/Pt-, indicates that labour is moving 
out of the N, which generates excess demand for N goods. To eliminate the 
excess demand, the real exchange rate must rise, which discourages the 
demand and stimulates the supply of N goods. The initial equilibrium is 
satisfied at point a.
Since there is only a spending effect in the short-run, the boom will cause 
the locus SS to shift upward to S'S'. The boom leads to a higher income and 
demand for N goods which raises their relative prices. While the wage in terms 
of N falls and induces higher demand for labour in that sector, the wage in 
terms of T increases thus discouraging the demand for labour in the booming 
sector. Hence labour moves from the latter towards the former. With Kt fixed 
in the short-run, this implies that the short-run equilibrium is satisfied at Pint b 
with a higher real exchange rate and lower non-resource traded employment 
and output. The short-run effect of the boom on the return to capital is positive 
in the booming sector but it is negative in the traded sector. Therefore, there is 
a clear incentive for capital to flow from the latter to the former. The short-run 
effect of the boom on the non-booming sector will be reinforced by the 
adjustment of the reallocation of capital in the long-run. The reallocation of 
capital out of T is more likely (given complementarity between capital and 
labour) to be accompanied by labour movement out of that sector and into N 
and this in turn works to mitigate the initial real exchange rate appreciation.
Moreover, since capital is now allocated more efficiently between the 
sectors, real income rises, which in turn induces an expansion in the N by 
squeezing labour out of B.
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Figure II-6 
Dutch Disease in Dynamic Framework
II-7. Why The Phenomenon is A Disease.
It was shown in the Core Model that real appreciation and de-industrialisation 
were necessary to achieve optimality in the case of a boom, so why should the 
phenomenon be considered a disease? There are two sets of reasons for this. 
The first is related to adjustment costs, and the second concerns various 
favourable characteristics that are usually associated with industry.
With regard to adjustment costs, if the boom is temporary then the initial 
de-industrialisation will have to be reversed when the boom ends. This reversal 
is usually difficult, costly and takes time to achieve. Shares in international 
markets are not easy to establish, and neither is international competitiveness 
because “learning by exporting” takes time to produce its desired effect. 
Furthermore, when a country stops exporting for a while, its institutional 
setting and industrial and organisational skills become out of date and lose 
their relevance for the international market which is increasingly developing 
and is characterised by fast changes. When the windfall ends, the country will
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therefore be unable, for a considerable time, to produce enough exports to 
sustain full employment and growth.
In addition, the volatility of the real exchange rate and relative prices in 
the economy entail high risk premia and lead to sub-optimal levels of 
investment. There will also be enormous frictional and adjustment costs as 
factors keep on shifting between the different sectors in response to the volatile 
real exchange rate ,7. Other adjustment costs arise from fiscal instability and 
the intertemporal volatility of consumption which implies serious welfare 
losses.
The second set of reasons for considering the phenomenon to be a disease 
has regard to the favourable characteristics of industry and these can be 
summarised as follows:-
II-7-1 Increasing Returns
Industry is regarded to be subject to increasing returns (Kaldor, 1961). The 
more an industry expands, the more efficient and productive it becomes. This 
is due to various reasons including, for example, the almost unlimited scope for 
specialisation and the division of labour in industry. Another factor 
contributing to the increasing returns in industry is the “learning by doing
hypothesis” (Romer, 1986; 1987). The more you do in industry the more you
18learn and the more profitable it becomes. /
11-7-2 Positive Externalities.
Furthermore, industry is also believed to produce externalities in terms of 
spreading technical programmes, innovation and dynamism in the whole 
economy. It also creates backward and forward linkages more than other
sectors.
! / These include, inter alia, frictional unemployment, the unemployment of sector-specific factors of production 
and training and relocation costs
17  For these reasons Kaldor argued that Verdooif s Law applies more to industry than to any other sector of the 
economy. Verdoon's Law states that the faster the growth of industrial production, the faster the growth in 
productivity. The references on Verdoon's Law are Verdoon (1949), Kaldor (1966), and McCombie (1987)
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Another feature that may be considered a positive externality of industry 
is that it reduces structural imbalances. In developing countries as per-capita 
income increases so does the income elasticity of demand for, usually, 
imported manufacturing. This results in a widening balance of trade deficit and 
increasing unemployment. What exacerbates these problems is the inability of 
the primary sector to expand or absorb new entrants to the labour force. The 
capacity of this sector to expand is limited by its wealth or poverty of natural 
resources endowments and it is usually overburdened with disguised 
unemployment.
II-7-3 Terms of Trade
It is well established that the income elasticity of demand for primary goods is 
low while that for manufactured goods is high. This contributes to the 
declining trends in terms of the trade of non-industrial countries. The 
"deteriorating terms of trade" argument also holds at the empirical level despite 
the various methodological difficulties.
Countries which do not industrialise therefore are likely to remain poor 
and their balance of payments problems are bound to worsen. These factors 
beg industrialisation and justify the "Dutch Disease" connotation of windfall- 
induced de-industrialisation.
11-8 Policy Implications and Options
The above sections instructed that, according to the Dutch Disease Model, de­
industrialisation is likely to occur in response to a boom. The possibilities of 
industrialisation in the context of the neo-classical analysis of the Dutch 
Disease Model, were shown to be limited to specific circumstances and to be 
negligible in the case of oil-related booms.
According to the orthodox version of neo-classical economics, excessive 
appreciation, and therefore the Disease itself, would not occur if market forces 
were left to operate freely. This is because the neo-classical theoiy assumes
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that perfect foresight and rational expectations prevail. In this context, financial 
markets will ensure that the currency does not appreciate beyond the level 
determined by long-run fundamentals, including the level of permanent 
income. It is also clear, however, that these assumptions are unrealistic. 
Mainstream neo-classical economics firmly asserts that indeed the Disease can 
be expected to occur as a result of windfalls and proclaims that it will be 
automatically reversed through real devaluation as the boom fades away. 
However, this mainstream philosophy still calls for action to avoid high 
adjustment costs, despite its acknowledgement of the positive externalities of 
industry for, inter alia, "learning by doing" reasons (e.g., Van Wijnbergan, 
1984) and the main thrust of the Dutch Disease Model remains neo-classical. 
This is reflected in its general equilibrium framework of analysis with all its 
underlying assumptions including that of full employment and has implications 
for the explanations and policy recommendations that the Model offers.
To conclude the above overview, the main policy options that a country 
experiencing an oil boom faces are highlighted below.
The very first question that arises is how much of the oil resource to 
extract now and how much to leave for future extraction? This question is in 
the domain of the economics of exhaustible resources. The basic rule here is to 
compare the current price of oil to the expected future price, discounted by a 
social discount factor that more than likely reflects both the social rate of 
return on investment and the rate of time preference. This is called the 
Hotelling Rule (Hotelling, 1931). We leave this issue here as it is not the 
primary concern of this thesis. 19
The second question that arises is this: once a certain amount of the oil 
windfalls are received, how can these windfalls be utilised in a way that is 
optimal and which neutralises the Disease? There are two broad alternative
1 V For more details about this approach see Dasgupta and Heal 1979). Furthermore, it is important to note that 
this model suffers from similar shortcomings to those associated with the neo-classical approach of the Dutch
Disease
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strategies: the first is spending-financial stabilisation, and the second is 
absorbing the boom domestically by investing in tradables, especially industry.
The spending or financial stabilisation is the first best option from a neo­
classical point of view. According to the permanent income hypothesis, most 
of the temporary boom income should be saved in order to intertemporarily 
maximise utility from consumption. The country should, therefore, be involved 
in saving abroad during a boom and dissaving during a bust. This will have the 
additional benefit of avoiding any temporary rise in domestic expenditure 
which would lead to real appreciation. Real appreciation will therefore not 
occur and the Dutch Disease will be avoided. According to the neo-classical 
approach the market mechanism will ensure that the structural composition of 
production is optimal and will warrant the simultaneous achievement of both 
internal and external equilibria, as explained earlier. If the exchange rate 
regime was determined administratively and a temporary boom occurs, then 
economic policy should aim at preventing real appreciation. If the government 
does not act and the Dutch Disease occurs, the government should devalue the 
national currency and this, along with the adoption of a liberal economic 
policy, would automatically lead to the reversal of the Disease and the 
restoration of optimality.
The strategy of total dependence on financial stabilisation abstracts not 
only from the positive externalities of industry but also from the fact that 
international capital markets are imperfect and tend to behave pro-cyclically 
rather than counter- cyclically. This pro-cyclical behaviour makes borrowing 
during the down-sliding cycle very difficult (and expensive) and renders the 
interest rate very low on savings abroad during the boom. Furthermore, this 
strategy of over-dependency on financial stabilisation can be self-defeating 
because the apparent strengthening of the final position of the country can lead 
to upward speculations on its currency, resulting in real appreciation, which is 
exactly what the strategy is initially designed to prevent.
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Another important point is that it is questionable whether the price 
mechanism, and the real exchange rate in particular, can alone in reality play a 
decisive role in resources allocation. The appropriateness of the concern about 
keeping the real wage low to maintain competitiveness is also questionable. 
Not only can this wage policy be politically problematic and socially 
undesirable but it can also be argued that it distracts from the arguably more 
important dynamic determinants of promoting productivity and growth (Evans, 
1986).
The alternative strategy to neutralise the Disease is to domestically invest 
most of the boom's revenues in tradables, particularly industry. This strategy 
would have two advantages: benefiting from the positive externalities of 
industry and creating a balance of trade deficit in the short term to ensure that 
the national currency will not appreciate. It can be argued that such a strategy, 
were it successful, would take the economy to new frontiers and would 
increase the capacity to export manufactured goods after the boom ends and 
allow higher rates of employment and sustained growth and development. 
Clearly, this approach is not limited by the inadequacies of the general 
equilibrium framework of analysis but is rather dynamic, and definitely more 
realistic, especially in the case of developing countries. It is, however, 
important to note here two reservations. The first is that this strategy is difficult 
to manage in a way that maintains that efficiency considerations are not totally 
ignored, and the second is that a degree of financial stabilisation would still be 
desirable to maintain financial prudence and to minimise the various 
adjustment costs arising from revenue volatility.
It can be argued that adopting either of these above strategies to extreme 
could prove disastrous. In all, the right balance will depend on the 
characteristics of the particular case in hand.
In conclusion, it can be argued that it is not inevitable that windfall booms 
should give rise to the Dutch Disease and that the final impact of the boom 
depends upon the initial circumstances and characteristics of the economy as
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well as the implementation of a successful policy to neutralise the Disease, 
thus allowing the economy to benefit from the newly available source of the 
boom without suffering from serious structural distortions.
II-9 Critique of the Dutch Disease Theory
Although the Dutch Disease Theory has provided valuable insights into the 
influence of exogenous shocks upon a small open economy, it has come under 
a barrage of criticism, some of which is theoretical in nature, and some is based 
on hard fact. The criticism given here originates from facts. It is not theoretical. 
This argument has been strengthened by the Dutch Disease Model's weak 
explanation of the facts observed to be the case in a number of countries 
experiences with booms, especially in the instances of those less developed oil- 
exporting countries such as Libya.
The discussion here is general, but in later chapters it will be more 
detailed when the Model's applicability to a number of countries is considered, 
and when dealing with specific economic sectors such as, for example, 
agriculture and manufacturing in Libya.
The critique is presented in three parts: the Model's assumptions, the 
nature of its analysis and thirdly its neglect of some important factors which, 
where considered from some points of view, do present the main limitation of 
the Dutch Disease Theoiy.
The first point in this context relates to the Ceteris Paribus Assumption. 
Just as in so many classical and neo-classical approaches, the Dutch Disease 
Model is based upon the Ceteris Paribus Assumption, whereby all things 
remain unchanged throughout the period under investigation. However, since 
some things may change, the Model's predictions may not truly encapsulate 
reality and also, because all countries experience sectoral changes for reasons 
irrelevant to the Model, it is difficult to determine the Dutch Disease effect at 
all, or its extent. Therefore, proving the counterfactual to the Dutch Disease
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Theoiy is a condition rendered absolutely necessary for the correct testing of 
the Theoiy's assumptions.
The second point concerns the Model's weak explanatory capability 
because it does not show the range of change in sectoral contributions, and 
even following Gregory's 1976 Partial Equilibrium Model does little to 
improve this basic inadequacy. In this regard it is important to distinguish 
between the booms emanating from a new resource discovery and those 
induced by a favourable price change. The most prominent distinction between 
the two classes of booms is in the movement of resources. Resource movement 
certainly does take place in the cases where booms emanate from a new 
resource discovery, but it may not necessarily occur where booms are 
generated simply by favourable price changes within the economy. In cases 
where there is indication of resources shift, the General Equilibrium Analysis 
does not add much to the Partial Equilibrium Analysis, apart from showing the 
effect of changes in income and cost on the factors market of both traded and 
non-traded goods. Hence it is safe to say that what the General Equilibrium 
Model sets out to do is to explain sectoral shifts. This it clearly does do but 
only by showing that the traded goods sector declines, which is exactly what 
the Partial Equilibrium Model has already shown. It can also be said that 
resource movement obscures the effect of boom on output and employment 
within the non-traded goods sector. This is not a condemnation of the General 
Equilibrium Model, but it does clearly show that in those cases where there are
resource transfers, there is nothing to be gained by moving from Partial to
• 20General Equilibrium Analysis /.
Now we turn to the subject of full employment. Full employment is 
intrinsic to the Dutch Disease Model. It is founded upon Macro-Equilibrium 
Analysis with full employment. In other words, with no unemployment before,
20 hi fact, when only the spending effect is operative, Corden (1981) employs Partial Equilibrium Analysis for the 
traded and non-traded markets, with General Equilibrium assumed in the background.
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21during or after the boom / Therefore this assumption naturally prevents the 
Dutch Disease Model from being applied to a large number of booming 
economies. If the boom takes place in a low per-capita income economy, and 
some of its resources are idle and the economy is in the downswing of its 
business cycle when the boom starts then, inevitably, the increased demand 
created by the boom will lead to the expansion of the traded sector in both 
absolute and relative terms. This is never the case in economic circumstances 
other than boom conditions because it is usually the traded sectors (particularly 
manufacturing) that suffer most from contracted shares in aggregate output 
whilst services always enjoy a larger share in this.22/ But as demand rises and 
unemployment is reduced, incremental demand will have a far larger effect on 
the manufacturing sector than on the agriculture or services sectors. So with a 
faster rate of growth, the share of investment in GDP is greater, and this also 
implies a relative increase in the demand for manufactured goods.
In addition to that, the existence of an excessive supply of labour at the 
start of the boom means that resource movement need not take place at all 
because the booming sector can draw on unemployed labour, rather than on the 
labour employed in the traded and non-traded sectors. Thus the spending effect 
itself may be neutralised. Consequently, the non-traded goods sector can 
expand without an increase in the price of non-traded goods Pn because 
absorption of excess capacity means that output can expand without increasing 
costs. That is to say that the marginal physical product of labour in the non- 
traded goods sector will rise if wages rise in line with productivity, but not
21 A post-boom unemployment case is discussed by Corden (1984) & Neary and Wijnbergen (1986) using 
disequilibrium analysis- where unemployment is caused downward rigidity of wages. In this case, labour is 
specific to the traded and non-traded sectors, in traded where the resource movement and the spending effect 
reduce returns to the specific factor in that sector, rigid wages can only lead to increasing unemployment, 
furthermore, if workers in the traded sector seek real wage increase to maintain their wages relative to those of the 
workers specific to the booming sector w'here market forces will have raised the real wage, unemployment in the 
traded sector intensifies. The reverse tacks place in the non-traded sector via the spending effect, which increases 
the price of the non-traded goods sector and, therefore, return to the specific factor.
:: Once resources are fully utilised, the path of industrialisation would differ in industrial from industrialising 
economies. In mature industrial economies a further increase in per capita income increases the share of services, 
and contracts that of the manufacturing in aggregate output. This is due to both the Dutch Disease effect and to the 
same factors that cause de-industrialisation in these economies, namely higher productivity growth in 
manufacturing compared with that in services. In industrialising economies, a further increase in per capita 
income leads to a continuation of industrialisation, provided the Dutch disease effect is overcome.
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more. PN need not rise at all. Similarly, in the lagging sector the marginal 
physical product of capital rises because production is taking place at a higher 
level. Consequently, return to the specific factor does not decline even though 
PT is fixed. So, resources do not withdraw out of the traded goods sector and 
transfer to the non-traded goods sector and both direct and indirect de­
industrialisation are thus avoided.
Furthermore, since most of the developing economies are more likely to 
be quantity-constrained in world capital markets and in their own national 
markets (if saving is not approaching and there is credit rationing), then under 
these circumstances the boom will assist in relieving these constraints. This 
will be achieved either through increasing the country's creditworthiness or by 
making capital more abundant. In this case capital, coupled with the surplus 
labour available, will act as a motivation to accelerate the industrialisation 
process.
Another point that can be made against the Dutch Disease Model 
concerns the neo-classical models in general and relates to the assumption of 
no government intervention. According to this assumption only agents that 
optimise rationally in a competitive environment are allowed to shape the 
market 2 V .However, in most cases of resource booms, a significant proportion 
of resource rents are accrued to the governments. From a neo-classical point of 
view, the availability of these rents lowers the price of public revenue, which 
in turn increases the optimal proportion of publicly provided commodities in 
national income (See Neary and Wijnbergen, 1986:328). In principle, even if 
governments supplanted markets, this should not affect the conclusions of the 
Model, provided that government actions reflect the market's mechanisms. 
However, governments do not act in this way, either because it is impossible 
for them to do so, or because they have a political agenda to follow. Once 
removed from market image, government actions can affect the Model's 
outcome in unpredictable ways too. They may emphasise sectoral changes, or
23 For more detail about the effect of the fiscal policies on functional income distribution and resource allocation
see Corden (1981)
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they may dampen them. That is to say that, without the inclusion of 
government in the Model, the outcome of the boom cannot be accurately 
determined.
Government action which relates to the Dutch Disease hypothesis 
includes spending and investment behaviour (the spending effect) and trade 
policies (which may impinge on tradability). Related sets of actions are macro- 
economic policies that are either induced by, or coincide with, the boom. These 
policies would either exaggerate the Dutch Disease effect (e.g. monetary 
contraction leading to currency appreciation), or counterbalance it (e.g. a 
devaluation leading to currency depreciation). Essentially, the effect of such 
government policies should be modelled separately to test the Dutch Disease 
Theory properly. In other words a counter-factual to the effect of the macro- 
economic policies on output and employment should be established before the 
Dutch Disease effect is assessed and in practical terms this would be quite 
difficult to do.
Referring to the static nature of the Model analysis, one could say that 
this is its most limiting aspect, since the dynamics of productivity growth and 
productivity differentials between the sectors are the supply-side factors that 
determine economic growth and sectoral shifts over time.24/. Under booming 
conditions the factors underlying productivity growth do themselves undergo 
significant changes. In developing economies booming conditions can induce 
rapid productivity growth for three main reasons. Firstly, the boom removes 
economic constraints such as the foreign exchange and investment saving gaps 
by making capital more abundant. Production can then take place with better 
quality investment and production inputs. The same result prevails because 
relative price movement makes imported capital and material cheaper relative 
to pre-boom conditions. Secondly, these conditions are consistent with 
technological advance, which is more likely to take place with new investment 
than otherwise. Thirdly, the existence of idle capacity in the pre-boom period,
24 The factors that determined growth and sectoral shares (on the demand side) are the increase in per-capita 
income and the differential income elasticities of demand for sectoral output.
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which is rapidly absorbed as the boom expands demand, means that production 
can rise without additional inputs. More generally, the rapid expansion of 
demand generates rapid productivity growth through dynamic economies of 
scale that arise from leaming-by-experience, integrated technology and new 
investors, etc. These changes are likely to promote industrialisation because of 
the higher productivity levels and growth rates in manufacturing.
Finally, if the boom takes place in the initial stages of industrialisation, 
the boom’s effect on changing the structure of demand, as per-capita income
• • • 9 Srises, is an important factor in inducing further supply-side changes. / Thus, as 
income rises, more income is spent on manufactured goods than on the 
products of agriculture. This result is also created by the effect that the 
expansion of demand has on these supply changes and agricultural output and 
employment must be expected to decline relatively as per-capita income rises. 
It is therefore inaccurate to consider the agriculture and manufacturing sector 
in one category of analysis under booming conditions in these economies. 
Because even though the two sectors are certainly influenced in the same way 
by relative price changes, they are influenced in an opposite way by the income 
and demand effects. Hence Corden's (1984: 362-3) thesis that the Theoiy can 
be applied equally to agriculture and manufacturing is only correct within the 
Dutch Disease formulation, where there is neither growth nor change in 
productivity over time. Once the Model's assumptions are relaxed and dynamic 
analysis is adopted, the two sectors behave in totally different ways.
25 Specifically higher income and elasticity of demand for manufacturing than agriculture (Engle’s Law)
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CHAPTER III  
REVIEW  O F THE L1TERA TURE ON THE 
BOOMING SECTOR
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III.l Introduction.
As has already been mentioned, the Dutch Disease Model is a comparative 
static model applied to analyse the effect of favourable exogenous shocks upon 
an economy arising from either a new resource discovery or from an increase 
in the price of an exportable commodity has on the other sectors of the
economy.
The Theory categorically states that provided the economy is an open 
economy with full employment equilibrium and given technology, the resulting 
relative price changes will decidedly favour the non-traded goods sector and 
lead to the reduction of employment and output in the traded goods sector. But 
the Model does not seem to be applicable to less developed oil-exporting 
countries experiences with booms and in those cases the very opposite end 
result appears to be true. So, is there an essential difference between the 
economies of developed countries and those of less developed ones ?.
Just how far are the predictions of the Dutch Disease Theory supported by 
reality ? Well, it is the intention of this chapter to look into these questions.
As related earlier, the Australian gold discoveries of (1851) and their 
impact on Australia’s agriculture sector and its connected industries is the 
earliest example of boom referred to in the literature on the subject. This 
example raises the question of whether immigration can ward off de­
industrialisation or encourage pro-industrialisation.
Following the discoveries, Australia understandably exploited her new­
found resource by diverting a significant amount of capital and labour out of 
the traditional agricultural sector and into gold production. This in turn 
attracted a huge immigration of labour into the industry and contracted 
Australia's industrial sector.
According to Caimes (1885), an increase of between 200% and 400% 
was needed in the prices of agricultural products simply to recoup this loss in 
labour. Sheep farming was severely affected and was regenerated only by the
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increased demand for meat resulting from the immigration. The price of meat 
actually increased by 400% and facilitated a recovery in the agricultural sector.
This example spotlights the effect that immigration has on the factors 
market of non-traded goods. The Dutch Disease argument claims that 
immigration should compensate for the effect o f resource movement but not 
for the spending effect (including the spending created by the immigration 
itself). From a theoretical point of view, de-industrialisation can be avoided if 
immigration is sufficient to reinstate wages in the traded goods sector to their 
pre-boom level. But this does not seem to have happened in Australia’s case, 
since wages in the traded goods sector witnessed a significant increase. 
However, since migrant workers also spent on non-traded goods this also 
meant the continued production of wool. De-industrialisation seems to have 
been relieved by immigration, but was not reversed by it, nor was it bypassed.
III.2 The Boom Experiences of Developed Economies.
As noted before, Australia’s two new mineral resource discoveries during the 
1970s have aroused much theoretical debate between Gregory’s theory of 1976 
and Snape’s of 1977. This debate constituted the cornerstone of the Dutch 
Disease Model.
Although the two resultant booms increased the share of the minerals in 
GDP only marginally, this small increase involved long term adjustment 
difficulties. Sustainable revenues over a long time combined with fixed 
exchange rates led to the substantial appreciation of Australia’s exchange rate. 
This appreciation was more pronounced in the second boom, compared with 
the first. This was because the expectations were too optimistic regarding the 
size of the second boom to lead to rapid increase in prices and wages. Since 
1982 there was a depreciation consistent with the view that earlier price 
forecasts had certainly been optimistic (Forsyth, 1986, 256).
Excluding oil, most of the other minerals of Australia were exported and 
the booms altered her trading position. As mining grew after the first
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discoveries wool exports declined and the decline might have been more than 
justified by the boom conditions. The Government reduced tariffs by 25% 
(Gregory, 1976, Forsyth, 1986).
The main feature of these booms was the considerable resource 
movement which occurred involving immigration and the withdrawal of 
capital and labour from their usual places and into mining. The outcome for the 
traded goods sector was that output and employment contracted whereas the 
outcome for the non-traded goods sector was ambiguous because it depended 
on the magnitude of change in relative prices and movement of labour 
(Forsyth, 1986).
The third case in this study is the British experience from their North Sea 
oil and gas discoveries. This experience illustrates the enclave type of booms, 
in which little or no resource transfer occurs while the resource rents are very 
large. The spending effect therefore dominates, and leads to the expansion of 
output and employment in the non-traded goods sector. Flowever, since the 
boom started at a time when such economies were experiencing de­
industrialisation, it is crucially important to distinguish between the causes 
induced by the boom and those which are not connected to the boom but may 
have led to the de-industrialisation phenomenon. De-industrialisation in 
developed economies is caused, on the demand side, by the greater than unity 
income elasticity of demand for services and, on the supply side, by the higher 
growth rates in labour productivity in manufacturing compared with services. 
As per-capita income rises, demand for services rises at higher rates than that 
of aggregate demand. However, with productivity in services lagging behind 
that of manufacturing, labour will be drawn from manufacturing into services 
and not from agriculture, whose small share in aggregate output in small 
developed countries cannot be reduced any further. The two effects combined 
lead to an increased share of labour in services and a reduced share in 
manufacturing. Additionally, prices in services will rise and in manufacturing 
they will fall because of the productivity differential between the two sectors,
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thus increasing services and reducing manufacturing's share in aggregate 
output. The Dutch Disease effect in such cases is brought about by the relative 
price movement induced by the boom, which makes tradables less profitable to 
produce than non-tradables.
In the British North Sea oil case, the movement in prices was mainly 
caused by spending the additional income gained from the boom on both the 
traded and non-traded sectors, and by the rise in the prices of non-traded goods 
relative to those of traded, whose prices are determined in the world markets. 
This clarifies how de-industrialisation may have two entirely different causes. 
However, the margin between the two effects is more illusory than real, since 
the sudden rise of income can be expected to reinforce the tendencies 
underlying de-industrialisation.
Theoretically the Dutch Disease Theory does not deal with these 
complexities. It either ignores the effect of growth on general equilibrium or 
ignores productivity growth altogether. Practical analysis is thus left without an 
adequate framework on which to base an accurate assessment of the boom 
effect on sectoral outputs.
Forsyth and Kay (1980) stirred debate concerning the method that was 
used to analyse the economic implications of the North Sea oil revenues. 
Basing their analysis on a neo-classical model, they showed that a balance of 
external trade must be maintained if the use of domestic resources is to rise in 
line with national income. This implies that a movement from deficit to surplus 
in the primary account must be reflected in a movement from surplus to deficit 
in other accounts, which consists largely of manufacturing. Moreover, since 
manufactures make up a much larger ratio of the traded sector than that of the 
economy as a whole, the crowding out effect of the boom will be 
disproportionately concentrated on manufacturing. In other words, there is no 
mechanism for deriving benefit from North Sea oil which does not sooner or 
later require structural changes which then reduce the production of 
manufactures. Forsyth and Kay further went on to say that the benefit to the
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UK citizens(a rise in their income) comes indirectly through changes in terms 
of trade. Such a rise in income then permits a further rise in the utilisation of 
total domestic resource. This additional income is best invested and the most 
ideal type of investment is one that uses tradables to produce non-tradables 
(i.e., imported machinery for use in services). Investment in manufacturing, or 
indeed in any type of protection to manufacturing, is counterproductive. 
Structural unemployment is likely to increase if reductions in wages in 
manufacturing are resisted.
The discussion originated mainly from the suggestion of a reduced role 
for manufacturing in the future development of the UK. Criticisms did not, 
however, challenge the logic of the argument in any essential way (Forsyth and 
Kay, 1980-81). Because Forsyth and Kay’s exposition created a hypothetical 
case based on comparative static analysis and was basically micro-economic, 
while the UK ’s coexistent problems were of a macro-economic nature, the 
article did not answer many normative questions, such as what fiscal, 
monetary, and wage policies the government should follow. Since a large share 
of the rent accrued to the government, the failure to address government 
spending rendered the analysis unduly partial.
The British boom experience highlights the need for micro-economic 
rather than macro-economic analysis, as the boom came at a time when 
economic performance was poor and there was a need for further 
disaggregation of the non-booming traded sector. The oversimplified 
presentation of the economy in two sectors, (traded and non-traded) hides 
much of what actually happened during the British boom (Forsyth, 1986).
The complexity of the British case stems from the presence of other real 
changes which took place during the boom, the effects o f which cannot be 
distinguished from the boom effect. These effects were not large enough to be 
indisputably noticeable in the data (Forsyth, 1986). Their existence, however, 
is evidenced by a larger decline in manufacturing than is justified simply by 
the increase in oil and gas production. Manufacturing fell from 30% of GDP in
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1974 to 23% in the early Eighties, while oil and gas production rose by only 
5% in the same period (Barker, 1981). The uncertainty regarding how large 
any particular change from the boom should be casts a cloud over the Dutch 
Disease analysis especially since more expectations of changes would 
themselves have had real effect on the economy. We have evidence of this in 
the case of Norway just as much as in the British economy. After 1976 the UK 
currency appreciated even before actual oil production had started and whilst 
the balance of payments was still in deficit (Forsyth and Kay, 1980). Whereas 
between 1974 and 1976, when people were unsure how significant the North 
Sea oil find was going to be, the foreign exchange rate was low and it was this 
that led to the revival of industrial production up to 1979 (Forsyth, 1986).
The British boom brings out other important points overlooked by the 
Dutch Disease Model because of the Theory's level of aggregation and its 
assumptions of perfect market and small country. Within manufacturing 
performances differed widely. Whilst some manufacturing industries expanded 
there were others that declined at a faster than average rate for the sector as a 
whole (See Forsyth, 1986: Table 8.15 p. 267).
According to Forsyth, (1986) some markets may have had a lagged 
response to the boom which manifested in the overshooting of the exchange 
rate. The rapid appreciation of the pound and its subsequent rapid decline 
revealed that some overshooting did in fact take place. This is a plausible 
explanation for the larger than merited de-industrialisation in Britain.
Forsyth (ibid.) also mentions the possibility that the small country 
assumption was not justified for all manufacturing industries. As the currency 
appreciated, some industries might have been able to secure higher than market 
prices for their exports, and lower prices for imports. In such cases 
appreciation would have been aggravated, and adjustment would have been 
forced on a smaller number of industries.
The Dutch experience reveals how governments can largely supplant 
market factors and still bring about the same structural changes predicted by
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the Dutch Disease Model. The most prominent feature of the Dutch boom was 
the government sector. Although the government sector in the Netherlands was 
large and already dominated, it expanded further with the discovery of energy 
in the late 1950s. About 80% of gas rents accrued to the Government, making 
up 14% of its total income in 1981. However, public expenditure wildly 
outstripped the growth in revenue. Government expenditure had already 
reached a high level prior to the boom (Ellman, 1981). But by 1981, the share 
of central and local government expenditures in the national income had grown 
to become more than 800% larger than that of gas. Wages also increased 
rapidly during the boom and soon labour productivity could not keep up with 
it. Added to that employers social security contributions increased, swelling the 
increased labour costs. Wages in Holland had become much higher than those 
in Germany-its most important trading partner. The wage differential between 
the two countries exerted pressure on production costs and squeezed profits. As 
a result, rapid structural changes took place in the economy and chief among 
these was the de-industrialisation phenomenon. Labour-intensive manufactures 
such as ship-building, vehicles, metal manufacturing and mechanical 
engineering experienced low profits or even loss because of growing 
aggressive world competition and the textiles, clothing and shoe industries 
almost disappeared during the late Seventies. Consequently, the capital- 
intensive, labour-extensive sectors of the economy replaced those industries. 
Meanwhile the services sector continued to grow but was not able to absorb all 
the labour that manufacturing industry had discarded. Unemployment had not 
existed in Holland prior to the boom but in the early Eighties it stood at 6% 
(Ellman, 1981: 157).
However, as a case for the Dutch Disease, again the Dutch experience 
seems to be far from ideal because the boom was actually superimposed on 
long-drawn out structural changes in the economy. De-industrialisation did not 
start with the energy boom. It started much earlier in the mid-Sixties, as 
indicated by the decline in the share of manufacturing, the balance of payments
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deficit and the rapidly increasing share of the services sector. These trends in 
Holland have also been observed in other progressed economies. So too have 
other symptoms: increasing participation of the public sector in GDP, the 
internationalisation of leading industrial enterprises, modification of the 
sectoral structure within manufacturing industry, a decrease in the rhythm of 
growth of industrial productivity in the mid-1960s, and the falling profit rate 
since the end of the 1960s. All these factors appeared before gas exports 
became relevant to the Dutch economy (Fajnzylber, 1981). An observation 
which should remind us of the need to distinguish between the temporary 
effects of the boom, the Dutch Disease effect and the more profound de­
industrialisation problems in Europe.
In managing energy it is generally accepted that Holland is the example to 
be avoided, and Norway the one to be followed (Kaldor, 1981 and also Barker 
and Brailovsky 1981).
Norway’s oil reserves are larger than Holland’s. Relative to its economy 
Norway’s oil represents a third of exports and an equal output share in GDP as 
that of manufactures, and this major position is expected to prevail well into 
the twenty-first century. Thus long-term adjustment issues are involved. In the 
mid-Seventies, there were expectations of high levels of revenue. Anti­
recessionary measures were adopted, and domestic demand and employment 
were kept high. Foreign borrowing was increased rapidly, and financial 
incentives in different forms were given to some of the struggling industries 
when traditional exports stagnated. In 1978 there were fears that Norwegian 
industry’s competitiveness might decline because of the uncertainty of future 
oil prices and accordingly, the prevailing policy of demand expansion was 
reversed, domestic demand was reined in and a comprehensive prices and 
incomes freeze was instituted (Bjerkholt 1981).
From a neo-classical point of view, this non-adjustment stance entailed 
resources waste, especially since energy resources are sustainable over long 
periods of time. However, the Norwegian example is celebrated because it
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shows how, at an efficiency cost, the transitional cost of adjustment to post­
boom conditions is reduced.
III-3 The Boom Experiences of Developing Economies
The experiences of booms in developing economies raise a number of 
important theoretical issues, some of which have already been discussed in 
connection with the experiences of developed economies. It is, first of all, clear 
that government action plays a crucial role in determining the impact effect of 
boom on resource allocation. Secondly, what is revealed is the importance of 
finally adjusting the traded and non-traded dichotomy on the basis of careful 
examination of trade policies and institutional aspects which affect tradability - 
e.g. low absorptive capacity or high cost of transportation.
One certain thing that causes industrialisation in developing economies is 
the differential income elasticity of demand for manufacturing and agriculture 
(greater than unity in the case of manufacturing and less than unity in the case 
of agriculture). There are supply-side factors underlying industrialisation too. 
The most important of these is the above-average rate of growth in labour 
productivity in manufacturing. As per-capita income increases, the stimulus 
given to manufacturing output is disproportionately larger than that for 
agriculture. Agricultural output declines and is compensated by a rise in the 
share of manufacturing. Thus, the industrialisation process in developing 
economies, which continues during their booms, works in the opposite 
direction to the Dutch Disease effect. This is quite contrary to the experiences 
of developed economies where the two processes work in the same direction. 
But it is just as difficult to distinguish between the two effects in the case of 
developing economies as it is in developed ones, unless the industrialisation 
effect overcomes the Dutch Disease effect, as is the case for most developing 
economies.
There are other aspects in which the experiences of developing economies 
differ widely from those of developed ones and these are connected with the
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initial conditions on which the boom is superimposed. These conditions 
include a low level of per-capita income, a small market, an excess supply of 
labour and constrained borrowing ability. The boom changed those conditions 
in these countries either directly, by making capital more available and creating 
a rapid expansion of demand that absorbed excess capacity, or indirectly 
through relative price changes, which made imported inputs relatively cheaper. 
The outcome of such changes is the acceleration of industrialisation, or 
reversed Dutch Disease.
Now we come to a very interesting case- that of Indonesia. Its 
government’s actions actually reversed the boom’s effect on agriculture rather 
than added to it. The share of oil in Indonesia’s national income is very 
significant (rising from 5% in 1970 to no less than 25% in 1980). The share of 
oil in total exports however, features less prominently because of the 
phenomenal success of other major commodities. The boom revenues 
completely monetised, and as a consequence there was currency appreciation, 
which led the government to devalue twice in 1978 and again in 1983 (Warr 
1986).
Despite appreciation, agricultural output in Indonesia grew by nearly 4% 
p.a. between 1970 and 1982. During this period rice production increased by 
two-thirds, maize production increased by 50% and cassava by 25%. 
Furthermore, the period 1977-82 brought about an agricultural export boom 
due to favourable world prices. Over the Seventies, rubber production 
increased by a fifth, palm oil exports tripled, crop exports rose by nearly half, 
and coffee exports were up to over 40% (Scherr, 1989).
There seems to be four main reasons explaining Indonesia’s singularly 
distinguished performance. First there was the very fortuitous coincidence of 
the Green Revolution. Then there was the equally fortuitous and effective 
setting-up of rural institutions just before the start of the boom (Gelb 1986 : 
337). Thirdly, foreign exchange availability from the oil shock enabled the 
purchase of fertilisers which were necessary for growing the new varieties of
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rice that were planned and lastly the commitment of the Indonesian 
Government to pursue the development of rice products. The Government 
extended subsidies for the purchase of fertilisers to promote Green Revolution 
technologies. They provided technical extension programmes, small scale 
infrastructure improvements and smallholder irrigation rehabilitation in Java 
(ScheiT, 1989).
In general, one might say that government spending priorities heavily 
favoured rural areas. Government spending on agriculture rose from 16% prior 
to the boom to 22% in 1979-80. Prices and trade policies were also used to 
stabilise agriculture. Prices generally followed international markets, but a 
guaranteed base price was maintained. The risks of unfavourable world prices 
and uncertainty were borne by the Government, although there were no large 
net public subsidies. Imports were targeted to cover only domestic production 
shortfalls. Many traditional export taxes were abolished or lowered in 1976 and 
1978 (Scherr, 1989).
According to Gelb (1986), Indonesia’s agricultural change was closer to 
the resource rent and technological change, than it was to the Dutch Disease. 
Manufacturing performed much better than agriculture in Indonesia during the 
boom, supported mainly by an effective rate of protection as high as 66% 
compared with 11% for agriculture (Scherr, 1989)
Despite the celebrated performance of agriculture in Indonesia its share in 
aggregate output had declined at faster rates during the boom period than 
would have been expected had previous trends continued (Warr 1986). Thus, 
even in Indonesia, the boom period seems to have been one of rapid 
industrialisation, since growth in manufacturing’s share in aggregate output 
was also higher than previous trends. The average change in manufacturing’s 
share over 1972-1981 was 0.8% p.a. while the norm change predicted in this 
share on the basis of the Chenery-Syrquin methodology should have been only 
0.34% p.a.
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Now consider Nigeria. It attracted a lot of attention because of its poor 
performance during and after its boom. As a percentage of GDP, oil production 
in Nigeria increased from 8% in 1970 to 22% in 1983, and its share in total 
exports rose from 57% to 70%. With 80% of the population living in rural 
areas, agriculture's performance seems more relevant for Dutch Disease 
analysis than manufacturing does, even though manufacturing increased its 
share at an average 0.48% p.a. against an expected norm of only 0.11% p.a. 
and agriculture declined at 1.9% p.a. against an expected norm of 0.67% (Gelb, 
1988). It must also be said that government policies increased the boom’s 
effect on agriculture.
Nigeria started the boom with an already over-valued currency, but with 
an inflation rate ranging between 20-35% p.a. during the boom, the Nira 
suffered from extreme over-valuation (Scherr, 1989). Between 1973 and 1981 
the effective real exchange rate appreciated by 110%, and by a further 13% in 
1984 (Struthers, 1990). The increased opportunities for employment and self- 
employment in services and distributive branches in urban areas created a pull 
on labour from agriculture, pushing up rural wages three-fold during the period 
1970-1982 (Scherr, 1989). Consequently, CPI-deflated food prices rose by 
46% over 1968-1977 (Struthers, 1990). The result was that food production, 
which constituteed 90% of total agricultural production, increased at the 
modest rate of nearly 3% during the two booms, which was less than 
population growth, while the formerly dynamic agricultural export sector 
declined at an average rate of 30% p.a. Cocoa production declined by 43% p.a., 
rubber by 29% p.a. and cotton by 65% p.a. Groundnut exports declined just to 
meet domestic demand. Only the protected palm kernel and palm oil sectors 
rose by 23% and 30% respectively. Over the same period the share of 
agriculture in national output declined by no less than 55%, and its share of 
total employment declined by 21% (Scherr, 1989).
Although the decline in agriculture in Nigeria had begun prior to the 
boom, there are reasons to believe that during the boom the decline actually
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intensified. Simply during the year between 1976 and 1977 it fell by almost
23%.
Gelb (1986) has argued that, if agriculture is broken down into food 
agriculture and export agriculture, then it can be said that the former was non- 
traded as it was effectively protected from international markets by deficient 
port facilities. If this was so the Nigerian case comes much closer to the model 
of the Dutch Disease Theory. However, this does somewhat over-simplify the 
Nigerian case. The decline in export agriculture in Nigeria was not only the 
result of resource transfers out of agriculture, and of increased spending on 
services, but also of numerous other factors. During its boom Nigeria was 
adopting a strategy of import-substitution, and thus imposed taxes on exports 
and barriers on imports. The adverse terms of trade for agriculture benefited 
food producers for the domestic market, and harmed exporters. Government 
investment policies were disposed against rural development (Struthers, 1990). 
Throughout the decade, government spending on agriculture amounted to 
between 3% and5% of its total expenditure and rose to between 9% and 10% 
during 1980-1982. The largest proportion of government expenditure during 
the boom period went on transport, education, construction, vehicle-assembly 
and a major steel complex (Pinto, 1987). Furthermore, investment in 
agriculture was dominated by large-scale capital intensive projects. Scherr 
(1989) argues that most of these projects were inefficiently managed and drew 
resources out of small agricultural activities. Only 17% of agricultural 
expenditure was placed on small farm activities.
Trade pricing and marketing policies, on the other hand, were irregular 
and seem to have further confused farmers who were already overwhelmed by 
price fluctuations (Scherr 1989). For instance, between 1978 and 1982, import 
duties on maize, rice, wheat and sorghum were increased to between 50% and 
100%, but trade was already controlled by quantitative restrictions through 
import licensing. Export taxes were maintained until 1976, but were replaced 
by subsidies in 1982. Support prices were granted for many major crops, and
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although in some cases they were twice as high as international prices, they did 
not compensate for the indirect tax of currency over-valuation, except in the 
case of palm kernel and palm oil (Scherr 1989). Also agricultural tariff rates 
were lower than those for manufacturing.
In contrast, manufacturing output grew at an average rate of 13.4% p.a. 
over 1970-82. This may be explained by tariff protection and the availability of 
imported input, cheapened by high currency overvaluation. New capital- 
intensive industries, such as iron and steel, and petroleum refining, were 
created during the boom. However, after 1982, manufacturing declined sharply 
because imported raw and intermediate materials were no longer available 
(Struthers, 1990). Thus the growth of the whole of Nigerian manufacturing 
during the boom hinged on relaxing the foreign exchange constraints and on 
relative price movement. Whilst the effect of adverse relative prices on the 
trade position of agriculture in Nigeria is easy to interpret, the same is not true 
of the output of its traded sectors. Disregarding, for the moment, the confusing 
signals government action sent to agriculture, the latter’s performance was not 
as suiprising as the above suggests it ought to be given what happened in 
manufacturing. Manufacturing’s remarkable 13.4% p.a. growth rate compared 
with non-oil GDP growth at 5.3% p.a. over 1972-81 (See Gelb, 1986: p. ,79) by 
necessity meant a large increase of manufacturing’s share in aggregate output 
which was compensated by a decline in that of agriculture. Seen in this light, a 
2.3% p.a. growth in food agriculture, which as has been said, makes up 90% of 
the Nigerian agricultural sector, seems quite reasonable.
The crucial point is that Nigeria’s experience during its oil boom is better 
interpreted as an acceleration of industrialisation, which is to have been 
expected, given the rapid rise in per-capita income and agriculture’s initial 
49% share of gross output. Thus, paradoxically, agriculture’s poor performance 
during the boom is in part the reverse of the Dutch Disease Model and not 
totally a symptom of it.
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Despite the recognition by many Dutch Disease economists, that a rise in 
manufacturing’s share is normally accompanied by a decline in that of 
agriculture, the speeding decline in agriculture’s share is still looked upon 
purely as a symptom of the Dutch Disease rather than merely an 
accompaniment of accelerating industrialisation. This confusion in the 
literature upon the Dutch Disease seems to have been encouraged by Corden’s 
(1984) assertion that the Dutch Disease Model applies equally to agriculture 
and manufacturing, since both produce tradables. The term de-industrialisation 
can therefore be misleading. It has to be reaffirmed that a rise in the 
manufacturing share of an economy's national output would be coupled by a 
decline in its agricultural sector if the circumstances concurred with the 
assumption of Corden’s static model - in other words - with no growth, no 
productivity change and no structural change over time apart from those 
induced by the change in relative prices. But this is not true in real world 
economies where these changes do take place over time, and they do so more 
strongly during the boom than otherwise, because of the rapid rise in income. 
Thus, while it is to be expected that the two sectors would behave similarly in 
response to changes in the structure of prices, their behaviour should be fully 
expected to differ in responding to the income-demand effect, because of 
differential productivity growth in the two sectors and because of differential 
income elasticity of demand, which would instigate different supply responses.
Now let us introduce the Iranian case. However, only performances 
during Iran's first oil boom are considered here, since its second oil boom 
coincided with political instability.
Because oil revenues accrued in totality to the Government, the Iranian 
story is distinguished because it reveals clearly the importance of incorporating 
micro-analysis, the study of socio-economic institutions and an awareness of 
practical reaction to government policies.
Although Iran had been very dependent on oil prior to its boom, its 
dependence had vastly increased following the oil price shock of 1973-1974.
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The ratio of oil to total exports had increased from 75% prior to the boom to 
84% during it. Oil revenues were used for consumption. Consequently, during 
the boom period both the government and private consumption had increased 
at average rates of 12% p.a. and 10% p.a. respectively. For the same period 
investment (in terms of GFCF) had increased at an average rate of 10% p.a.. 
However the share of consumption in total oil revenues was larger than that of 
investment and was equally divided between military and subsidies. 
Investment was directed towards construction and services. Investment in 
agriculture (including the credit to agriculture) constituted about 5% of GDP 
during the boom (Majd, 1991). In the meantime the share of agriculture in non­
oil GDP declined from its pre-boom levels by more than 6% (Jazayeri, 1988: 
54). This performance, however, is open to conflicting interpretations. On the 
one hand Gelb (1988: 88) estimates that agriculture’s share in total output over 
the period of 1972-1981 had declined by 0.42% p.a. more than it should have 
done had the norm been followed. On the other hand Majd (1991) contends 
that agriculture performed rather well during this period since its value added 
rose at an average of 2.5% p.a.
The most prominent feature of Iran’s agricultural performance was that 
small farming enterprises performed more profitably than large ones. The 
reason for this was the phenomenon of family labour and dual employment. It 
was common for people to work part of their time in agriculture and part in 
rug-making or construction to supplement their incomes. So, despite the fact 
that transportation costs and wages rose twice as fast as the increase in sugar 
prices, the total production costs of small farms rose slower than those of larger 
producers. Thus, the cost of yield per hectare was lower for small farms than 
all others. This fact indicates the importance of micro-analysis to understand 
the mechanisms by which a boom’s effects are transmitted to agriculture.
Considering now the manufacturing sector. This sector is less ambiguous 
than agriculture. Its general performance was in line with the Dutch Disease 
Model (Jazayeri, 1988). Prices of manufactures lagged behind those of
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construction, while- in real terms- labour costs increased at an average of 
nearly 13% p.a. Manufacturing had been the largest growing sector in the 
Iranian economy during the ten years previous to the oil boom, but had 
dropped to 5.9% p.a. over 1973-1979 and lost its position to services. 
Manufacturing’s share in total output declined by 6.7% during the first oil 
boom and therefore Iran experienced de-industrialisation.
Performance varied between different industries within manufacturing, 
just as it did in the agriculture sector. The labour - intensive textile industry 
faced stiff competition from cheap imports and started declining from 1976. 
But Jazayeri suggests that growth took place in the manufacturing industries 
with low value-added and a high percentage of imported inputs. Therefore, the 
capital-intensive footwear industry was able to thrive, as also the transport 
equipment and metal products industries. Other non-traded industries grew 
well too-such as non-metal mining products. Thus, even at the micro-level, 
Jazayeri is able to explain the performance of traded goods production while 
staying strictly within the Dutch Disease analysis by using the factor intensity 
argument and the de-composition of the traded sector.
Finally, we include the case of Libya. Comment here, however, is brief 
because extensive facts are provided in the chapters which follow in this 
analysis.
The period of 1970-1982 in Libya, covering its two booms, saw very 
considerable public investment in the traded sectors. Investment in agriculture 
reached an amazing 19.7% of the total investment. In manufacturing it 
consisted of 15.8% of the total. A significant proportion of government 
investment also went into infrastructure: mainly transport and communication, 
electricity and construction. This type of investment directly enhanced 
production and distribution efficiency in the two traded sectors since it 
increased the handling capacity of exporters and the imports of raw and 
intermediate inputs. During these years GDP grew at 9.2% p.a. Growth in 
agriculture was running at 10% p.a. and manufacturing-one of the fastest
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growing sectors-was increasing at no less than 12.5% p.a. The ratio of oil 
revenues to the GDP and exports between 1973 and 1982 averaged at 57.5% 
p.a. and 90% p.a. respectively (Based on 1970 constant price). The 
performance of Libya throughout its boom periods was outstandingly 
remarkable.
Gelb (1986) selected seven booming developing countries- Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria and Iran-to 
examine how closely, if  at all, their experiences fitted the Dutch Disease 
Model. The study revealed that there were deviations from the Model both in 
sectoral shifts and exchange rate movements, and the correlation between these 
two variables was not always good. The study also suggested that government 
role was the single most important determinant of performance both during and 
after the boom.
The estimated average size of the revenues in these economies was about 
a quarter of non-oil GDP and about four-fifths of it accrued to the governments 
whose reactions, therefore, primarily determined the ultimate effects of price 
increase. All the countries examined showed a striking readiness to use about 
half their revenue to finance domestic capital formation. This share was 
reduced by greater consumption in the late 1970s, while the fraction invested 
abroad remained stable at a quarter throughout.
Government strategies varied widely from country to country. At one 
extreme the public sector had accounted for 90% of domestic investment. At 
the other extreme the role of the public sector had been very limited. 
Nevertheless, all these oil exporters witnessed remarkable growth in the size of 
the public sector after 1973 and, in most instances, the public sector 
participated directly in industrial output. Investment was intended to increase 
growth and attenuate currency appreciation and, therefore, the sectoral shifts of 
the non-oil output. However, this depended on the efficacy and distribution of 
capital formation and the factor intensity of various sectors. A recurring effect 
in the countries investigated by Gelb was that the oil price shock itself
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rendered some of the initial capital stock obsolete. Within these economies the 
impact of investment on growth had been disappointing. Most infrastructure 
investments were subject to long gestation lags. Often public investment was in 
large-scale projects, which were enormously costly and produced 
disappointing operating performances. Findings on the performance of 
agriculture show that public and private investment in that sector brought about 
significant technological advances. Investment in public agriculture 
development projects, which started in 1962 and private investment in on-farm 
machinery, improved agricultural input and modernised production techniques. 
These technology-embodying investments changed technical conditions of 
production, and were taking place at much higher levels of productivity and, 
therefore profitability. Once oil revenues had fallen, governments faced serious 
problems in attempting to curb the momentum of public investment, some of 
which implied large future recurrent obligations and growing subsidies.
The rapid increase of oil revenues allowed the existing industries to 
expand very fast without increasing their production cost, through utilising 
more of their existing capacities and enhancing the opportunity to establish 
new industries.
On average, the non-oil economies in these countries were 4% smaller 
during 1979-81 than they would have been had they maintained their 1967-72 
growth trajectories. Average non-oil growth after 1972 was only 0.9% more 
rapid than that of oil-importing developing countries. Moreover, most of this 
growth was demand-led rather than supply-generated, in the sense that non-oil 
growth responded to increased absorption after 1974 but was lowered after 
1978, despite the expectation that large investment undertaken in the period 
1975-78 would begin to contribute to output (Gelb, 1986).
The most salient feature of these experiences with booms is the 
influencing effect they had upon the initial conditions on which the boom is 
superimposed. These initial conditions can be classified into three: i) the level 
of per-capita income and the degree of industrialisation prior to the boom, ii)
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the economic constraints prevailing just prior to the boom and iii) the particular 
phase of the business cycle within which the economy was operating just 
before the boom.
In general, economies can be divided into two groupings on the basis of 
the extent of industrialisation at the start o f the boom: those whose share of 
manufacturing in aggregate output was on an upward trend and those whose 
share was on a downward trend. The forces that underlie industrialisation or 
de-industrialisation, are related to the level of per-capita income, differential 
income elasticities of demand for sectoral output and differential productivity 
growth between sectors. These forces do not stop operating during the boom, 
rather, they operate more powerfully because the boom is equivalent to a 
demand shock if revenue is partially or wholly monetised. But since these 
forces work in the same direction as the Dutch Disease effect in developed 
economies, and in an opposite direction in developing economies, we would 
expect them to augment the Dutch Disease in the former and to counter it in 
the latter cases.
As has been said the second initial condition that influences the sectoral 
outcome is the presence of economic constraints, such as a balance of 
payments deficit, or being quantity-constrained in the capital markets. These 
constraints may hold back industrialisation, so their removal can only 
accelerate it. Furthermore, the availability of capital and imported inputs is 
consistent with both technological advance and rapid productivity growth and 
both of these speed the industrialisation process.
Thirdly, sectoral shifts are also influenced by the economy's position in 
the business cycle at the start of the boom, as already noted. The Dutch Disease 
Model assumes the economy to be in macro-equilibrium with no 
unemployment at any time. On the other hand if, prior to the boom, idle 
capacity exists in the economy, whether it is a developed or developing 
economy, the boom is likely to induce industrialisation. This is because, under
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conditions of repressed demand, the share of services is disproportionately 
large and that of manufacturing disproportionately small.
On the question of employment, the experiences of developed and 
developing economies differ considerably.
It is likely that developed economies start the boom with fully employed 
resources, but the boom creates unemployment because of wage increases and 
downward rigidities in wages, and through the replacement of labour-intensive 
sectors (manufacturing) with capital-intensive, labour-extensive sectors 
(energy). In such cases a more useful model would be one in which the full 
employment assumption is relaxed. Additional employment is created by, 
among other things, oil revenues, government spending, and the wage rate 
(Seers, 1962).
Alternatively, developing economies are likely to start the boom from a 
position of unemployment. This unemployment will be reduced or eliminated 
by the boom as the foreign exchange and savings gaps are relieved. The 
reversal of the boom would reverse the picture, leading again to an excess 
supply of labour. In this case the more useful model is likely to be one in 
which the full employment assumption hinges on the removal of economic 
constraints such as the two-gap model (Salizu, 1990).
It is important to note that, as far as employment is concerned, the 
outcomes for developed and developing economies will differ because the idle 
capacity starting point of developing economies will ensure that productivity 
gains associated with the boom will be very significant, thereby leading to an 
expansion of manufacturing where productivity growth can reasonably be 
expected to be fastest.
III-4 Synthesis
If we synthesise all these factors, namely, the growth in per-capita income and 
its effect on changing demand structure, the presence or absence of economic 
constraints and thirdly, the state of the economy in regard to its position in the
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business cycle, we produce two plausible themes. One of these themes is 
representative of the majority of developed economies experiences, and the 
other represents those of the majority of developing economies. The two 
themes are as follows:
In a pre-boom developing economy, per-capita income is low, demand is 
constrained by a balance of payments deficit and lack of investable funds, and 
there is, therefore, an excess supply of labour. If, in addition, the economy is 
very small there may be idle capacity because of the efficient size of plant 
constraint. Furthermore, much production technology will not be state of the 
art technology because of the foreign exchange constraint, and because 
investment in human resources is also constrained by the generally low level of 
economic activity. As per-capita income rises in the course of development, 
the relative importance of food expenditure undergoes a continuous decline 
and that of manufacturing a continuous rise. However, the above-mentioned 
economic constraints will hold back industrialisation. The boom changes these 
conditions. Per capita-income rises rapidly, inducing a fast expansion of 
demand. Foreign exchange becomes relatively abundant and imported inputs 
are purchased more cheaply than before the boom. Industrialisation can 
proceed at a quick pace since, as idle capacity is reduced, output expands while 
unit costs fall and productivity is advancing. There may also be rapid 
technological change induced by imported capital and material. The effect of 
relative price changes on output (the Dutch Disease effect) would 
counterbalance these forces, but it is unlikely to reverse them.
In developed economies, per capita-income is high and demand is 
buoyant enough to absorb any excess capacity into the economy. Technology 
is state of the art, and production takes place at the frontier. The economy 
experiences de-industrialisation. The rise in per-capita income induced by the 
boom can only accelerate these patterns. In addition to this the Dutch Disease 
effect also reduces the share of manufacturing in aggregate output through 
change in the structure of prices and continued de-industrialisation is the most
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plausible outcome. This assertion is consistent with the experiences of the 
developed booming economies reviewed above.
We end this chapter by stating that the Libyan experience brings to light 
the dynamic approach of booms neglected in the Dutch Disease literature. 
Practical findings on Libya lend support to Karshenas' argument (1990) that 
boom conditions are conducive to rapid technological advancement. Libya's 
experience also shows that investment in non-traded sectors e.g., transport and 
communication, electricity and water and construction can be complementary 
to that in the traded sector and, therefore, increases return to factor employed 
in the production of tradables.
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CHAPTER IV
A REVIEW  O F THE LIBYAN ECONOMY: HISTORICAL  
BACKGROUND, STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND  
DEVELOPM ENT PA TTERNS
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IV-1 Introduction
The structure of the Libyan economy provides a challenge to development 
economists because it does not fit in easily to any of the traditional broad 
classifications of either developed or under-developed economies. The lighting 
speed of change within Libya has contributed to the blurring of this distinction, 
and Libya's economy combines extreme features of both these broad 
classifications.
So, on the one hand, the economy is characterised by rising capital 
surplus. With no country in the world has development proceeded with such 
rapidity as in Libya with the exceptions of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The rate 
of economic growth since the early 1960s has been high and relatively stable, 
averaging 10.5% p.a. (in real terms) over the period of 1962-1990. The country 
has one of the highest per-capita incomes, and one of the highest savings rates. 
These facts in themselves are indicators of a developed economy.
On the other hand, there are striking features of under-development. 
These include Libya’s inadequate indigenous supply of technical manpower, its 
total reliance on the import of both capital and consumer goods, and the over­
dependence of the economy on a single product-namely oil. The country is also 
characterised by a narrow market which is due to the numerical size of the 
population, the pattern of consumption brought about by affluence and the 
inadequacy of domestic products both in terms of quantity and quality.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore further those characteristics 
which are relevant particularly to the Libyan economy and to analyse the trends 
in its economic growth and structural changes which took place during the 
period of 1962 1990.
The analysis compares economic developments during the oil price shock 
period of 1973-1982 with those in the first oil exporting period of 1962-1970 
and the post-boom period of 1983-1990. The first section provides the 
geographical and historical background of the Libyan economy and discusses
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the basic characteristics of it prior to the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities in 1962. The second section deals with the structural changes which 
took place in the economy during the period of 1962-1990, and the third 
section directs attention to productivity growth and technical changes during 
this major period.
However, it is important to emphasise that this analysis is fundamentally 
an illustrative account only to enable more intensive sectoral examination to be 
presented in later chapters.
IV-2 Physical Features: (Geographical and Historical)
Libya (officially the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiryea) is located in 
the northern part of Africa, on its northern side Libya is bounded by the 
Mediterranean Sea. It has Tunisia and Algeria on its western border and Egypt 
and Sudan to the east. Its southern border meets Chad and the Niger Republic. 
The Libyan coast on the Mediterranean Sea extends for about 2,000 kilometres. 
This long coastline affects the climate of the northern part of the country, 
whilst the rest of the country is affected by the great Sahara Desert of Central 
Africa.
The territorial size of Libya is about 1,740,000 square kilometres and is 
considered to be the fourth largest country in Africa, but about 42% of the land 
is desert. Only 10% of the remaining 58% of area is populated and the rest is a 
dry barren uninhabited region (Farley, 1971, p.25).
The population of Libya in 1911 was approximately 750,000. In 1942 it 
was about 500,000. This loss was due to death in war and to Allied and Axis 
campaigns. According to the 1973 census, Libya had a population of slightly 
more than two million. However, by 1993 it was estimated to have risen to 
more than four million (National Authority for Information and Documentation 
1994, p. 16).
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Owing to its strategic location in both North Africa and the Middle East, 
Libya was subject to wave after wave of military invasions, which were to 
continue until 1942. The Phoenicians, Numedians, Ptolemies, the Byzantine 
Empire, Vandals, Romans, and Greeks all had at one time or another, settled on 
the coast of Libya (Habib, 1979). As a result, numerous cities were built along 
the coast. Present-day ruins tell the stories of civilisations which had flourished 
previously around the Mediterranean Sea. The majority of the population came 
to the country in several waves of migrants from the Arabian peninsula in the 
seventh, ninth, and eleventh centuries A.D,. Arabs came to Libya carrying with 
them their Arabic language and their way of life as well as the Islamic religion. 
They dominated the country and integrated into Libyan society. Thus Libya 
became an Arabic Islamic state. In 1551, Libya become a part of the Ottoman 
Empire, remaining so until 1911 (First, 1975; Wright, 1969).
The Italians were the last of the invaders. Italy started its occupation of 
Libya in October 1911, and was only displaced after the Allies won the Second 
World War, but Libya came under the British and French military 
administrations in 1942.
Libya became an independent state through the United Nation’s 
Resolution of 24 December 1951. The new nation became a monarchy ruled by 
King Idris whose political leadership derived from his role as a leader of the 
religious order established by his family under the name of the Senssi Order. 
On the eve of Independence, the King started negotiating with both the British 
and the American military authorities. In 1953-1954, Libya was tied by 
military treaties to both Britain and the United States in exchange for less than 
$10 million annually. In 1958 oil was first discovered in Libya, and by 1962 oil 
exports started in commercial quantities. Since then profound changes took 
place in the Libyan economy.
In September 1969, a group of young revolutionary officers overthrew the 
monarchy, became political leaders and announced a republican form of
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government. Subsequently, fundamental changes occurred in the Libyan 
economy as the result of a combination of external and internal factors. The 
socialist tendencies of the revolutionaries, the vagaries of the oil market, the 
instability of the administrative institutions, the ambitions of the leadership and 
the confrontation with Western countries have all left their marks on the 
Libyan economy.
IV-3 The Libyan Economy Before Oil (A case of Backwardness and Stagnation) 
As the term is commonly defined, Libya, on the eve of Independence in 1952, 
possessed most of the salient features of an under-developed economy. These 
included a very low per-capita income, a chronic deficit in government budget 
and balance of payments, a high rate of illiteracy, a high degree of resource 
immobility, an unequal distribution of income and wealth, a stagnant 
agricultural sector, and low productivity of labour. Broadly speaking it is 
sufficient to say that nearly any indicator of economic development that one 
chooses could illustrate that Libya at the time of independence was one of the 
poorest and most backward nations in the world.
In 1952, officials of the British administration estimated the per-capita 
income in Tripolitania at $30 to $40 per annum. This income was subject to 
fluctuation; it tended to fall in drought years and rise in good crop years. In 
1952, no reliable tax records existed for Cyrenaica or the Fezzan, but officials 
estimated per capita income at $35 for these territories (Lindberg, 1952, p.32) 
Given this low per-capita income, one would expect the levels of 
nutrition and health to be severely low. In 1952 Libya's birth rate was 5.3% p.a. 
The natural rate of population was kept down to 1.1% by a death rate of 4.2% 
which reflected an extremely low health standard (Higgins, 1953,p. 4)
The amount of monetised activity in the Libyan economy also pointed to 
the low level of development. The rural sector comprised more than 90% of the 
active population. Wages were paid in kind, in money or a mixture of the two.
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Payment in kind was extensive, especially for indentured labour and for 
seasonal activities. The JEBBAD (drawers of water) was one example of 
indentured labour also, the harvesting of cereals, weaving of wool and stock- 
tending involved payments in kind fixed by tradition. Money wage payments 
were mainly confined to the cities or the Italian agricultural schemes (ibid, p. 
86).
The Libyan balance of payments ran heavy deficits from 1952 to 1960. 
The value of Libya's imports of goods and services was about 50% of its own 
GNP. The World Bank Report noted that this was an extraordinarily high 
proportion matched by few other countries of the world. Less than 20% of the 
foreign exchange proceeds necessary to pay for these imports was obtained 
from the sale of Libyan merchandise exports, while the remainder came from 
invisible exports, mainly from the military expenditure of foreign governments 
and foreign aid. This unearned income was enough to cover the imports, and 
Libya was able to make additions of $25.2 million to its foreign exchange 
reserves.1/
Furthermore, the available data suggested that, at the time of 
Independence, Libya did not have the stock of human capital to launch the 
economy on to the path of self-sustained growth. Not only was the stock of 
human capital deficient, but there was a lack of educational institutions to 
augment the supply of manpower resources. Some of the human resource 
problems were inherited from the past, but many of them were related to social 
and cultural factors which inhibited the proper utilisation of existing resources 
and production of new resources. In 1936, it was estimated that 95% of the 
population was illiterate. Between 1939 and 1940, merely 9,646 students 
attended public schools and only 282 of these were enrolled in secondary 
schools (Lindberg, ibid., p.7).
1 During the 1950’s over 50% of the country imports were consumer goods. In 1954, imports of food, clothing, 
footwear, textiles and clearing materials reached more than 57% of the total imports, while the remainder 43% 
were petroleum, rubber tires, machinery and household appliances.
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By 1950-1951 the educational situation had improved somewhat. 
According to the official census figures of 1954, 81% of the total population 
was illiterate. Between 1954 and 1964, there had been a significant increase in 
the number of students attending schools, but the census figures of 1964 
reported that over 73% of the Libyan citizens were still illiterate. Functional 
illiteracy was probably higher than the above proportion. In 1964, only 5.2% of 
the population had completed primary school or more education.
In addition to that, before the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 
1962, Libya was deficient in capital. Except for a very few wealthy families, 
the accumulated capital stock of the Libyan population consisted mainly of 
livestock, hand tools and some primitive housing. Even this simple capital 
stock suffered depletion during the Second World War (Higgins, ibid., p. 6). 
The severe shortage of capital precluded any development of Libyan-owned 
industry. Handicrafts were the only other field of economic activity outside of 
agriculture which was controlled by Libyans. In the early 1950’s, it was 
estimated that only 3% of the entire income of Tripoli city was earned by hand- 
weavers. A United Nations report on Libya stated that the introduction of 
simple spinning wheels would result in the unemployment of hundreds of poor 
workers who were dependent on hand-spinning for basic income (ibid. p. 61)
Furthermore, according to a closer study, even before the discovery of oil 
the Libyan economy exhibited characteristics of dualism. A modem sector 
developed during the Italian occupation. Before this took place, no real 
industrial sector existed in Libya. The industries that were established by the 
Italians were based on agriculture or on the breeding and utilisation of sea 
products. Under ideal conditions, the presence of the Italian modem sector 
could have been a positive influence for Libya's development by providing a 
demonstration effect for Libyan entrepreneurs. In practice, the Italian presence 
created a dual economy. The dualism was technological, regional and social. 
The Italian modem sector consisted of relatively large-scale and capital-
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intensive agriculture and manufacturing activities, together with the various 
services associated with these activities. The traditional sector consisted of 
small-scale, labour-intensive, technologically backward and low productivity 
agriculture. This technological dualism produced a regional dualism. The 
modem sector was confined to Tripoli and, to a lesser extent, Benghazi. In the 
rural areas, the World Bank reported that: "Most Libyans still lead a very 
simple life. Their diet is plain, their wants are limited, they have very limited 
knowledge of the twentieth-century technology and tribal conditions are 
strong" (IBRD, 1958, p. 18).
Technological and regional dualism tended to interact to produce a 
vicious circle of under-development. This produced a non-integrated economy 
which relegated a large proportion of the population to live in rural poverty.
The Libyan agricultural sector faced severe problems. As mentioned so 
much of the country is desert. Only around 2% of the land is arable. 
Nevertheless, at the time of Independence, over 73% of the Libyan active 
population was engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry and these 
activities encountered extraordinary difficulties, the main one of which was the 
unpredictable and inadequate rainfall, then there were the primitive methods of 
production and the lack of credit facilities. Added to that a tribal land tenure 
system and extended family structure had reduced individual incentives to 
either expand arable land or improve yields on existing acres in agricultural 
use.
At the macro-economic levels the available sources suggested that the 
pre-oil period witnessed a fourfold increase in gross domestic product (Fearly, 
1972). This increase was due exclusively to the rents paid by the United States 
and Great Britain for the use of the military base, and to technical assistance 
granted by the United Nations and Western countries.
According to the 1958 Census, the agricultural sector contributed an 
estimated 26% of the gross domestic product and the industrial sector share
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was 11%. However, by 1958 the value added by the industrial sector had 
reached about L f 15,695,000 of which 61% was from manufacturing. (See 
Tables IV -1 &. IV-2). In addition and according to the 1962 Census, by 1960 
more than 60% of the total active population was still engaged in agriculture 
and animal husbandry activities, and between 35% and 40% in services, 
manufacturing and construction. The per-capita income in agriculture at that 
time was only L£ 19 per year, while in non-agricultural activities it amounted 
to about L£ 35 per year
In short, when Libya became independent in late 1951, it was one of the 
most backward and poorest countries in the world. After almost three thousand 
years of foreign domination and due to a general acceptance of a rigid social 
system, the country was very ill-equipped to solve the many problems of 
economic growth and sustained development. Until the discovery of oil, in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, Libya had been economically stagnant. In 1953, 
Benjamin Higgine observed that if  Libya can be brought to a state of sustained 
growth, there is hope for every country of the world. The Report pinpointed 
that the problems the country encountered then were a lack of livestock, the 
absence of educated and technical people, low purchasing power, limited 
foreign trade, a chronic state of deficit in budget and balance of payments, and 
a low rate of saving.
Table IV-1
Industrial Origin of GDP in Libya 1958 (L£.Million, at 1958 constant factor cost)
Value
million
Share
(%)
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 13.6 26.1
Petroleum, Mining & Quarrying 3.6 6.9
Manufacturing & Repairing 6 11.5
Construction 1.8 3.4
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.8 1.5
Transport, Storage & Communication 2.9 5.6
Wholesale & Retail Trade 7.3 14
Banking, Insurance, Dwelling & Social Services 9.5 18.2
Public Administrative Services 6.7 12.8
Total 52.2 100
Source: BIRD, The Economic development of Libya, 1960, P. 294 (in Arabic)
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Table IV-2
Value Added & Number of Employees in Manufacturing Industries in Libya 1958
Value Added (%) of Number of (%) of
(L£..000) Total Employees Total
Crude Oil & Natural Gas 3449 36.1 3254 19.5
Mining & Quarrying 120 1.3 400 2.4
Food, Soft Drink, & Tobacco 2932 30.7 4272 25.7
Textiles, Clothing & Footwear 654 6.8 2255 13.5
Woodworks & Furniture 283 3.0 899 5.4
Paper, Printing & Publishing 232 2.4 374 2.2
Leather & Rubber (exc.: footwear) 79 0.8 190 1.1
Chemical Coal & Non-Metallic Products 178 1.9 526 3.2
Basic Metals 1150 12.0 4137 24.8
Other 480 5.0 344 2.1
Total Manufacturing Value Added 9557 60.9 16651 62.7
Mining & Quarrying Value Added 3569 22.7 3654 13.7
Construction Value Added 1808 11.5 5244 19.8
Electricity Value added 761 4.9 1008 3.8
Total Industrial Activities Value Added 15695 100 26557 100
Source: Kingdom of Libya, Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract 1964.
IV-4 The New Era of Capital Surplus and Economic Development.
The exporting of the first shipment of Libyan crude oil in September 1961, 
marked the beginning of a new era in the economic history of Libya. The era of 
capital-surplus and rapid growth. Until the discovery of oil in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, there was no economic sector in Libya with adequate 
production and visible resources that could have been expected to raise the 
standard of living markedly and alter the serious economic and foreign trade 
imbalances. But by 1962, this picture had changed dramatically and since then 
profound structural changes have taken place in the Libyan economy. The 
country had managed to achieve a vertical take-off from being a small regional 
trading post to becoming an affluent metropolitan state of international 
prominence, with high rates of per-capita income, savings, and a high and 
relatively stable growth rate, as well as a well-developed infrastructure and 
social welfare system. In what follows, we shall examine closely the oil sector 
and these changes in detail.
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IV-4-1 Development of Oil Production, Price, Exports and Revenues.
Oil production dates back to 1958 when the Libyan Government first granted a 
concession to foreign oil companies for the exploration, production and 
marketing of oil. However, the first shipment o f oil from the country did not 
take place until nearly 5 years after this first concession was granted. Oil 
exports started in 1962 and the level of production in that year was 182,3,000 
barrels a day. This figure rose to 3,318,000 barrels a day in 1970, then declined 
to 1,790,000 and 1,387,000 by 1980 and 1990 respectively.
The decline in production during the 1970s was the direct outcome of 
government restrictions on the production of oil companies, which aimed to 
prevent over-production and to force the companies to agree to higher taxes 
and new contractual arrangements. The decline in the later years, particularly 
after 1982, was due to the decline in OPEC quotas and also to the later 
confrontation with Western countries.
Accordingly, the first few years of oil production 1962-1969 witnessed a 
high rate of increase in oil exports in both quantitative and monetary terms, 
registered at about 50% and 47%p.a. respectively. Subsequently, the annual 
rates of increase in oil exports, in quantitative terms, fluctuated with a 
downward bias but the value of oil exports continued to rise. The most 
remarkable increase had taken place during the first oil boom period of 1973- 
1974 when it increased at 62% p.a.
As to the oil prices, the available data reveals that Libya's oil price during 
the first oil exporting period of 1962-1969 was almost fixed at a low level, and 
increased at 33% p.a. over the oil price shock period of 1973-1982, The big 
jump in the oil price had taken place during 1973-1974 (increasing at 87% p.a.) 
and during 1980-82 (increasing at 6.4% p.a.), while the oil price growth rate 
was negative over the post-oil price shock period of 1983-1990. Accordingly, 
oil revenues increased substantially during the boom period. Between 1973- 
1974 oil revenue had increased at 62% p.a., but since 1982 oil revenues had
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fluctuated with a downward trend. Table IV-3 below depicts the trends in oil 
production, export, price, and revenue in Libya over the period of 1962-1990.
Table IV-3
Growth of Oil Production, Exports, Price and Revenues, in Libya 1962-1990
1962- 1970- 1973- 1975- 1980- 1983-
1969 1972 1974 1979 1982 1990
Crude Oil Production (000,b/d)“ 48.4 -9.7 -16.5 7.3 -17.5 3.6
Volume of Exports (000,b/d)*** 49.9 -9.5 -11.1 6.4 -19.8 2.5
Value of Oil Exports (LD.,000) 46.6 12.2 62.2 10.5 4.1 -6.5
Official Selling Price (US/b) 0.0 18.1 87.0 27.7 6.4 -4.6
Monetary Revenues (US$ Million) 72.6 10.7 62.2 20.0 -1.0 -4.0
Source: Calculated from: OPEC, yearly statistical Bulletin, and Petroleum Press Service, Middle East Economic
Digest, Arab Oil and Gas Directory 1994, National Authority for Information & Documentation, The
Results of the Annual Survey of the Petroleum Industry, yearly analytical and statistical series, various issues and
Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, various issues
Notes: ** Crude Oil Exports by Destination
*** Average Marsa El-Briga Selling Price
IV-4 -2 The Structure of the Libyan Economy 1962-1990.
As already mentioned, the year 1962 signalled a turning point in the history of 
Libya, clearly representing the dividing line between the oil and the pre-oil 
eras, because it was in this year that the first shipment of oil was made from 
the country. Since then Libya’s economy has undergone and is undergoing 
major structural changes. Change has taken place in all fields: economic, 
political and social. For analytical purposes it may be convenient to divide the 
period during which the economy experienced changes into sub-periods. 
Starting in 1962 one can systematically recognise three sub-periods:
1 1962-1969, from the discovery of oil in commercial quantities to the 
Revolution in 1969. This period was one of rapid economic growth in Libyan 
history.
2 1970-1982, a period of sustained accumulation following the massive 
injection of oil windfall gained from the two oil booms of 1973-1974 and 
1980-1982.
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3 1983-1990, a period of economic slowdown following the sharp decline in 
oil prices, the appearance of economic bottlenecks and the political 
confrontation with Western countries.
1962-1969 This period was the first oil exporting period. The structure of 
the Libyan economy and its nature during this period can be described as 
dualistic because there existed a large agricultural sector and an active, modem 
industrial sector. But 1962-1969 was the first oil exporting period and oil was 
Libya’s main natural resource. So the Libyan economy was an oil dual 
economy. In such an economy the oil sector and export origin are regarded as 
one sector, with the rest of the national economy aggregated together and 
regarded as the other sector.
Libya's economic growth rate during this period was one of the highest growth 
rates in the world. The gross national product (GNP) had increased at an 
average growth rate of nearly 20% p.a. For the same period per-capita GNP (in 
real terms) increased at an average rate of nearly 16% p.a., with gross domestic 
product (GDP) increasing at an average rate of 22.6% p.a. Furthermore, gross 
fixed investment had increased at an average rate of 15.6% p.a. with the share 
in non-oil GDP reaching 63%
At the sectoral level, the most remarkable increase was in mining and 
quarrying (including crude oil) 46.7% p.a.. Construction was growing at a 
remarkable 19.9% p.a., transport and communication 16.6% p.a., services 
gathering 13.4% p.a. and trade at 12.7% p.a. However, with the exception of 
the mining and construction sectors, the share of all the other economic sectors 
in aggregate output had decreased. But the decrease in agriculture and 
manufacturing was relatively more than that in the services sector. Many 
factors accounted for this. One was the internal migration of agricultural 
workers leaving the rural areas to seek higher earnings in the construction, 
transport and communication and social services sectors which were centred in
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the urban areas. Then there was the limited absorptive capacity of the 
economy, the lack of infrastructure and the small size of the population.
1970-1982. During this period the new government directed its efforts to 
the oil sector. It insisted on the correction of the Libyan oil price which was 
undervalued compared to similar crude oil exported from other countries. Due 
to this effort and the contribution of other factors (such as the devaluation of 
the US dollar, the October 1973 War and its aftermath, and the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution) oil prices had increased sharply. The correction of the posted oil 
price system combined with new government social and economic tendencies 
and the relative improvement in the economic infrastructure, gave rise to more 
investment in construction, transport, and light industries and the establishment 
of plants to convert a part of the domestic petroleum production. Consequently, 
the period of 1970-1982 witnessed a rapid growth of real investment. The gross 
fixed investment had increased at an average annual rate of 14.5% p.a., with an 
average annual share in the non-oil GDP accounted for as 58%. For the same 
period GNP had increased at an average rate of 14.6% p.a., and gross domestic 
product GDP and per-capita GNP had increased at an average rate of 12.6% 
p.a., and 10.4% p.a. respectively.
At the sectoral level the most remarkable increase had been in the 
manufacturing sector which grew at an average rate of 18.6% p.a. This was 
followed by transport and communication at 18% p.a.; construction at 15% 
p.a.; trade 17% p.a.; mining 14.3% p.a., services at 14% p.a. and agriculture at 
4.6% p.a., However, the share of the productive sectors - agriculture and 
manufacturing - in total GDP compared with that for services, construction, 
trade and transport and communication was relatively very low.
1983-1990 During this period major transformation in Libya’s state and 
society had taken place and several features of the economic bottlenecks had 
become clearly visible: There was a shortage of technical and skilled labour for 
the advanced public sector and the lack of, and instability of, administrative
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institutions and instability in the oil market combined with the political crisis. 
Consequently, the period witnessed a sharp decrease in economic growth rates. 
Gross fixed investment growth rate during this period was negative, and also 
both GNP and GDP growth rates had been negative. However, at the sectoral 
level there was a significant increase in the productive sectors value added. The 
value added by the agriculture sector (in real terms) increased at an average 
rate of 11.8% p.a. followed by manufacturing at 7% p.a., services 2.7% p.a., 
Furthermore, in 1990, the sector share occupied by agriculture was 7.1% and 
that of manufacturing was 7.2%. Both these sectors had more than doubled 
within eight years.
For the entire period under investigation, 1962-1990, GDP had increased 
at an average rate of 11.8% p.a. Most of this growth was accounted for by the 
oil sector and no less than 50.8% of the country’s GDP was generated within 
that sector. In contrast the agricultural sector, which contributed around 22.6% 
of GDP in 1962, had decreased its contribution to 7% by 1990. However, up 
until 1986, the agricultural sector's contribution to GDP was not more than 5%, 
while manufacturing and all other sectors had more than trebled within the 
three decades. For the same period real gross fixed investment increased at an 
average rate of 9.1% with the share in non-oil GDP reaching 54.9% (See 
Tables IV-4, IV-5 & IV-6 and Figure IV-1).
Table IV-4
Annual Growth Rates of the Libyan Economy by Sectors, In Real Terms 1962-1990
1962 1970 1983 1962
1969 1982 1990 1990
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 22.6 13.2 -2.5 11.8
Agriculture Forestry & Fishing 4.1 4.6 11.8 6.70
Mining & Quarrying (Incl. crude oil) 46.7 14.3 -7.8 17.8
Manufacturing 8.4 18.6 7 13.0
Construction 19.9 15.3 -1.8 12.0
Transport & Communication 16.6 18.1 -0.4 13.1
Wholesale & Retail Trade 12.7 17 -2.1 10.9
Services Gathering 13.4 14.0 2.7 11.1
Source: Calculated from, Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, & Monthly Bulletin, various issues., and
National Authorities for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical series, various issues
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Table IV-5
Libya's Economic Growth 1962-1990 (% Change)
Average Annual Growth Rates During
1962 1970 1983 1962
1969 1982 1990 1990
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 22.6 12.6 -2.5 11.6
Gross National Product (GNP) 20 14.6 -2.1 11.9
Gross Fixed Investment (GFI) 15.6 14.5 -7.1 9.1
Per-Capita GNP 16.2 10.4 -5.9 7.9
Export of Goods and Sen/ices 31.7 12.4 -0.4 14.7
Import of Goods and Services 10.3 18.4 -7.1 9.5
Private Consumption 6.7 14.1 -3.3 7.5
Consumption Per-Capita 3.3 9.9 -7.1 7.9
Government Consumption 21.6 16.8 -2.6 13.2
Population 3.2 4.2 4.0 3.9
Source: As for Table III-4
Table tV-6
Sectoral Shares in Real GDP (Selective years, 1962-1990
GDP
Agriculture 
Forestry & 
Fishing
Mining 
Quarrying 
(Incl. oil)
Manufacturing Construction
Transport & 
Communication
Wholesale 
and Retail 
Trade OtherServices
1962 100.0 22.5 18.6 4.0 13.8 4.0 7.2 299
1964 100.0 114 45.7 2.4 12.4 3.3 4.9 19.9
1966 100.0 9.4 50.5 1.9 13.1 3.1 4.4 17.7
1968 100.0 6.3 57.0 1.6 13.0 3.9 3.8 15.4
1970 100.0 5.2 60.2 1.6 9.4 2.9 3.7 17.1
1972 100.0 5.2 51.1 1.6 12.6 5.0 5.2 19.3
1974 100.0 4.0 77.3 1.7 15.2 4.9 5.8 17.7
1976 100.0 3.3 56.6 1.8 11.9 4.0 5.4 17.0
1978 100.0 3.1 51.3 2.6 12.5 4.5 5.9 20.2
1980 100.0 1.6 64.7 2.1 9.1 3.3 4.7 14.5
1982 100.0 1.9 49.6 3.3 12.5 4.7 6.5 21.4
1984 100.0 3.0 40.9 4.8 10.7 5.4 7.5 27.8
1986 100.0 3.4 43.6 4.8 10.9 4.9 5.8 26.6
1988 100.0 5.2 28.1 6.9 13.1 5.9 6.4 34.4
1990 100.0 7.1 26.0 7.2 13.2 5.9 6.7 33.8
Source: As for Table III-4
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Figure IV-1
Development of Real GNP, GFI & GDP In Libya 1962-1990
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Source: Appendix AV-1
IV-5 Factor Inputs, Productivity Growth and Technical Progress
The preceding discussion suggests that the periods with the highest growth 
rates are the first oil period of 1962-1969 and the oil price shock period of 
1970-1982, but growth rates during the oil price shock period of 1970-1982 
were relatively sluggish. While growth rates during the post- boom period were 
either negative or considerably lower. The negative and lower growth rates 
during that period reflect an era of political instability and poor adjustment to 
the reversal of the boom conditions. The rapid growth rates during the periods 
of 1962-1969 and 1970-1982, were mainly attributable to the rapid growth in 
factor input, while technical changes seems insignificant. In the following few 
sections factor inputs will be examined in great detail.
IV-5-1 Investment and the Accumulation Process 
IV-5-1-1 The Expansion of the Banking System
Before the 1969 Revolution most of the Libyan financial institutions were 
subsidiaries of foreign institutions, mainly foreign banks. Following the 
Libyanisation of the Libyan banking system in December 1970 the financial 
institutions in Libya consisted of two types of institutions: i) Commercial banks
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and ii) Specialised credit institutions. The specialised credit institutions 
comprise the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB), the Agriculture Bank, 
(ADB), the Savings and Real Estate Bank (SREB), and the Development Bank 
(NDB). In addition to that there are two non-bank financial institutions. These 
are the Pension and Social Security Institution (PSSI) and the Libyan Insurance 
Company (LIC).
The Central Bank (Bank of Libya) provides direct credit to the 
government institutions and liquidity credit to commercial banks. The Bank of 
Libya is also equipped with the usual monetary instruments. It is the sole issuer 
of currency, it re-discounts bills for banks, administers gold and foreign 
exchange reserves, regulates all financial institutions, sets up the level and 
structure of interest rates and controls the quantity and quality of bank credit.
The rapid growth rates over the period 1962-1982 involved a rapid 
expansion in bank credits to the private sector. Table IV-7 shows that bank 
credit to the private sector had increased (in real terms) at an average rate of 
15.6% p.a. and 21.5% p.a. respectively over the two oil boom periods. In the 
meantime the share of currency in total money supply (Mi) had declined from 
50% in 1965 to 27.5% in 1982. However, the rapid increase of bank credits to 
the private sector and the declining share of currency in total money supply did 
not merely reflect the fast expansion of the banking system and its use in the 
economy, but also attributed to the growth of the net public sector debt and an 
increase of net foreign assets as well as to the government polices to control 
money supply.
With regard to the use of bank credits, the available data reveals that 
during the first oil exporting period most of the bank credits were used to 
finance trade, construction and government building. While during the period 
of 1970-1982 most bank credits were used to finance agriculture manufacturing 
and construction. This was signified by the expansion of commercial banking
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credits to the productive sectors and the establishment of the Agriculture, 
Development, Savings and Real Estate Banks.
Table IV-8 shows the value of commercial bank assets, deposits, and 
credit during the selective years 1965-1990 and their growth before and after 
they are deflated by the general cost of living index (at 1975 constant price). It 
reveals that the value of commercial bank total assets and deposits had 
increased (in real terms) during the first oil exporting period of 1965-1969 at 
an average rate of 10% and 1.0% p.a. respectively, and bank credit at 15% 
p.a.,. Whereas, during the oil price shock period of 1970-1982, bank assets had 
grown at an average rate of 51% p.a., bank deposits at 43% p.a. and bank credit 
at 23% p.a. While, during the post boom period of 1983-1990, the growth rates 
were negative.
The fastest rate of increase of commercial credit during the whole period 
was in manufacturing whose share in total commercial credit increased from 
2.4% in 1965 to 21.8% in 1982, while it decreased to 10.3% in 1990. Over the 
same periods the share of agriculture in total commercial credit had increased 
from 2.5% in 1965 to 9.2% in 1982. The share of agriculture declined to 4.6% 
in 1990. The increase of the agricultural and manufacturing sector shares in 
total commercial credit over the two boom periods, reflected the Central Bank's 
monetaiy policy which was to expand lending for the productive sectors and 
increase the credit availability for both sectors at low interest rates.
IV-5-1-2 The Accumulation Process
Throughout the period under investigation interest rates were fixed by law 
which permitted commercial banks to charge 7% on investment loans. The real 
rate of return on savings as well as the cost of borrowing was negative 
throughout the whole period.
Furthermore, with a constant increase in the oil revenues and negative 
impact of interest rates, gross fixed capital formation (GCFF) had increased
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significantly during the two oil boom periods. It increased at an average annual 
rate of 22.9% during the 1962-1969 period, and at an average rate of 19% p.a. 
during the period of 1970-1982. During the post boom period of 1983-1990 the 
growth rate was negative. The share of GFCF in total GDP was 30.5% during 
the period of 1962-1969, while for the subsequent periods of 1970-1982 and 
1983-1988 it averaged at about 25% and 20.7% respectively (See Table IV-9).
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Table 7
Changes in Money Supply and Factors Effecting It 1962-1990 (LD 000,000)
Annual Growth 
1962 1970 1983-
1965 1970 1973 1975 1980 1982 1988 1990 1969 1982 1990
Net Claims on the Public Sector -17.9 -282 -194.1 256.4 705.0 1120.9 1327 4669.7 -23.0 47.0 38.0
Net Claims on the Private Sector 35.2 95.9 277.6 645.3 1141.5 1585.8 2361 2560.1 23.5 28.5 7.1
Net Foreign Assets 89.2 573.7 654.6 772.2 4504.2 2312.9 1228 1564.9 34.0 26.0 -0.7
Money Supply 66.8 241.1 514.0 867.6 2891.0 3232.3 3012 4452.2 28.3 24.6 5.4
Deflated Figures 1976 Constant Price
Net Claims on the Public Sector -24.0 -277.0 -172.0 256.0 382.0 479.0 376.0 1201.0 -28.0 29.0 30.0
Net Claims on the Private Sector 47.7 94.4 246.1 645.3 618.0 677.1 668.1 658.3 15.6 21.5 0.5
Net Foreign Assets 120.9 5647 580.3 772.2 2439.0 987.6 347.6 402.4 25 17.8 -6.9
Money Supply 90.5 237.3 455.7 867.6 1565.0 1380 852.2 1145 19.8 17 -1.0
Currency (%) of Money Supply 50.3 46.6 39.4 39.9 56.9 27.5 29.90 32.80
Source: Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series and Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Table 8
Growth of Commercial Banking (End of Year 000 LD)
1965 1970 1973 1978 1980 1983 1988 1990
Annual Growth Rate 
62/69 70/82 83/90
Total Assets 106.0 261.0 1,399.2 3,413.3 1,334 8 6,7648 7,138.0 7,160 17.1 60.5 1.2
Total Deposit 18.6 33.7 168.8 940.7 1,944.5 1,356.6 2,542.6 1,154 6.8 50.6 3.9
Total Credit 35.2 96.2 240.9 926.0 132.1 2,208.1 2,316.6 2,533 22.0 29.8 2.1
Value & Growth at 1975 Prices
Total Assets 143.6 257 1,240.4 2,469.8 722.70 2,649.8 2,0188 1,841 10.4 51 4 -5.4
Total Deposit 25.2 33.2 112.8 680.7 1,052.8 523.8 719.5 296.8 1.0 42.5 -3.2
Total Credit 47.7 94.7 213.6 670 71.5 852.6 655.5 651.4 15.1 22.6 -4.0
Source: Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, and monthly Bulletin various issues 1968 -1994.
Table IV-9
Average Annual Growth of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1962-1988
1962- 1970- 1983-
1969 1982 1988
Average Annual Increase in Real GFCF 22.9 19.0 -7.0
GFCF as a Percentage of GDP 30.5 25.2 20.7
Source: Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning, Economic & Social Indicators, 1984. p. 20 -  28, and National Authority 
for Information & Documentation, yearly statistical series 1990-1994, p. 57-58
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IV-5-1-3 Public Sector Investment
Public sector investment in Libya comprised of mainly two types of 
investment: External investment (which is mainly a monetary investment), 
conducted by the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) and the Libyan Foreign 
Investment Company (LFIC), and internal investment, which comprises the 
development investment and part of the ordinary expenditure.
Starting in 1962, when oil was first discovered in commercial quantities, 
the government of Libya adopted serious development programmes within the 
framework of Development Plans. Table IV -10 shows the distribution of the 
actual development expenditure among the various economic sectors during the 
period of 1962-1990. It reveals that during the period of 1962-1969 the total 
actual development expenditure amounted to about LD. 562 million. More than 
56% of this expenditure was spent upon economic infrastructure (transport and 
communication, electricity, gas and water, housing and construction) and 
26.2% went to services, 11.8% to agriculture and 5.1% to manufacturing. The 
share of commodity producing sectors (traded sectors) in the total actual 
expenditure amounted to 16.9% while the remaining 83.1% was spent on the 
non-commodity producing sectors (non-traded sectors).
During the period of 1970-1982 there was an apparent shift in the sectoral 
distribution of investment expenditure laying great emphasis on the 
manufacturing and agriculture sectors. The actual development expenditure 
over this period reached about LD. 16417 million. The highest priority was 
given to agriculture-which received 19.5% of total actual expenditure. This was 
followed by manufacturing 15.8%, transport and communication 14.3%, 
construction 11.4%, and electricity 10%, while the remaining 29% was divided 
among other social services. The share of the traded sectors in the total actual 
expenditure reached around 39.4%, compared to 16.9% for the previous 
period, while the share of the non-traded sectors was 60.6%, compared to 
83.1% for the preceding period. For the post-boom period of 1983-1990 the
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share of the traded sectors declined slightly to 28.5%. This decline was mainly 
due to the decline of the oil price and to political instability which interrupted 
the development programmes. Development expenditure during this period was 
directed into completing unfinished projects.
A similar conclusion can be obtained from Table IV -11 which gives 
sectoral share in the gross fixed capital formation GFCF for the time frame set 
stated above. During the period of 1962-1969 the share of the traded sectors in 
GFCF was 54.4%, of which 47% was in mining, oil and natural gas and the 
remaining 7.4% was in agriculture and manufacturing combined. In the non- 
traded sectors the share was 45.6%, of which 32.4% was in infrastructure 
(transport, electricity, gas and water, building and construction). For the 1970- 
1982 period, the share of the traded sectors in GFCF was 30.9% of which 14% 
was in manufacturing and 13% in agriculture. This represented a four-fold 
increase since the previous period. In the meantime the share of the non-traded 
sectors was 69% of which 20.2% was in services, 19.6% in transport, 16.3% in 
construction, and 13% in electricity and water. For the post-boom period of 
1983-1988 the share of both traded and non-traded sectors decreased slightly to 
39% and 61% respectively. The most remarkable decline in this period had 
been in construction and services, which decreased from 16.3% and 20.2%, to 
12.2% and 17.5% respectively. For the same periods the share of the 
manufacturing and agriculture sectors had increased to 17% and 13% 
respectively.
The preceding discussion so far has shown that during the 1962-1969 
period, planning strategy was directed to the reconstruction of the defective and 
poor economy through intensifying investment into developing the country’s 
infrastructure and services. This embraced education, health, transport and 
communication, construction and electricity. Then during the second and third 
periods from 1970 right through to 1986 the Government’s strategy was aimed 
at reducing the dependence upon oil as the main source of income. It
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concentrated on diversifying the economic base and reinforcing self-sufficiency 
thr ough industrialisation and increasing agricultural production.
III-5-1-4 Private Sector Investment
Regarding private sector investment the available data indicates that throughout 
the period under study private investment was insignificant. Private investment 
was concentrated in trade and construction during the 1963-1969 period and in 
productive sectors, mainly agriculture and manufacturing as well as 
construction, during the period of 1960-1982. The share of public sector 
investment in the total investment throughout the period under investigation 
was more than 85% (Development Bank, 1988, 25-31). This large share of 
state investment gave the Government great influence in directing investment 
into the different sectors. Government ability to influence investment behaviour 
arose from its status as a major investor, which emanated from its position as 
the main recipient for the oil revenues. Since government investment in the 
productive sectors was stimulated further after the Development Plan of 1973- 
1975, the investment during the two oil boom periods was relatively more 
balanced than would have been envisaged by the Dutch Disease Model.
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Table 10
Distribution of Investment by Economic Sectors 1962-1990 (LD, 000,000)
1963-1969 1970-1982 1983-1990 1963-1990
Value (%) Value (%) Value (%) Value (%)
Commodity Producing Sectors 95.1 16.9 6467.1 39.4 3510.1 28.5 10072 34.4
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 665 11.8 3242.0 19.7 1360.8 11.1 4669.3 15.9
Mining & Quarrying (Incl., Oil & Gas) _ _ 629.2 3.8 325.0 2.6 954.3 3.3
Manufacturing 26.6 5.1 2595.9 15.8 1824 14.8 4448.8 15.2
Non-Commodity Producing Sectors 466.9 83.1 9950.2 60.6 8802.0 71.5 19219 65.6
Electricity & Energy 58.3 10.4 1655.0 10.0 1031.1 8.4 2744 4 9.4
Transport & Communication 95.4 17.0 2346.0 14.3 1774.9 14.4 4216.3 14.4
Municipals & Public Utilities 64.3 8.2 1602.0 9.8 1494.8 12.1 3143.1 10.7
Education, Training & Sport 48.1 8.6 1177.5 7.2 644.9 5.2 1870.5 6.4
Public Health 16.9 3.0 527.2 3.2 389.9 3.2 933.7 3.2
Information and Culture 6.6 1.2 178.2 1.1 91.7 0.7 276.5 0.9
Labour & Social Affairs 20.3 3.5 153.0 0.9 139.6 1.1 312.9 1.1
Housing & Construction 165.8 29.5 1869.5 11.4 3224 26.2 5059.3 17.3
Tourism, Economy & Planning 9.5 1.7 411.3 2.5 211.1 1.7 631.9 2.2
Other Services 30.5 0.2 30.7 0.1
Totai Investment 562 100 16417 100 12312 100 29292 100
Source: Ministry of Planning Economic and Social Indicators, (ibid.), National Authority for Information & Documentation, 
and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series and monthly Bulletin, various issues 1967-1995
Table IV-11
Sectoral Shares in Gross Fixed Capital Formation 1962-1988 (% of Total)
1962- 1970- 1983-
1969 1982 1988
Commodity Producing Goods Sectors 54.4 30.9 39.0
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 3.7 12.7 13.1
Mining (incl., oil & Natural gas ) 47.2 4.1 9.0
Manufacturing 3.5 14.1 16.9
Non-Commodity Producing Goods Sectors 45.6 69.1 61.0
Electricity, Gas & Water 7.9 13.0 12.7
Construction & Dwellings 12.5 16.3 12.2
Transport & Communication 12.0 19.6 18.6
Services Gathering 13.2 20.2 17.5
Grand Total 100 100 100
Source: Kingdom of Libya, Ministry of Planning, Five-year Economic and Social Development Plan, 1963-1968, 
Economic & Social Indicators, (ibid.), p. 20- 23, and National Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly 
statistical series various issues
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IV-5-2 Labour Force 
IV-5-2-l.The Nature of the Labour Market
Libya shares several labour market characteristics with other capital-rich states 
in the Arab region. These include: i) the high population growth rate, ii) the 
high level of under 20 years-old age group, iii) the high level of enrolment in 
educational institutions iv) her national labour force (divided between nationals 
and non-nationals) is relatively small v) the national participation rate is low as 
few females work in modem sector activities, and vi) the high share of 
immigrant labour. We will now briefly examine the relative contribution each 
of these features made to the development of the labour force in Libya
The population of Libya preceding the discovery and exportation of oil in 
1962 was relatively small, estimated at about 1,088,800 in 1954 and about
1,451,000 in 1962 with most of the inhabitants being indigenous Libyans and 
only about 3% non-Libyan. However, over almost three decades (from the 
early-Sixties through to the late-Eighties) the country had experienced a 
phenomenal population explosion. The main factors responsible for this were: 
i) the high natural growth rate of Libyans and ii) the influx of immigration
By far the main cause of the population explosion was the high natural 
growth rate of Libyans. The available data on population indicates that, during 
the period under investigation, Libya’s population growth rate had been at an 
average rate of nearly 4% per annum- one of the highest in the world. One 
contributory factor for the Libyan population explosion was the decline in the 
mortality rate among infants and adults due to the public provision of medical 
health and services on an extensive scale. The second and perhaps the most 
important factor was the influx of immigration into the country following the 
discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1962. In the first place the vast oil 
revenues accming solely to the state made it possible for the latter to embark 
on large-scale development projects providing basic infrastructure such as 
electricity, water supply, street and road-building and other public building and
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construction works. The Libyan labour force was not adequate for the 
fulfilment of the national needs because it lacked the necessary skills and 
technical knowledge. It is also doubtful if it was adequate in terms of size. 
Consequently, the government had to attract foreign skilled labour, offering 
them generous remuneration. Other immigrants had been attracted into Libya 
by the prospect of a building and construction boom: thousands of semi-skilled 
labourers, Arab and non-Arabs, fell into this category.
Table IV -12 shows the population explosion experienced by Libya. The 
estimate of total population for 1962 is fixed at 1,451,000. Over the period of 
1970-1982 the number of Libyans and non-Libyans had both been growing at 
an average annual rate of 4% and 21% p.a. respectively. While, during the 
period 1983-1990 the rate of increase of the non-Libyan population was 
negative and that for the Libyan population continued to increase at the same 
rate of 4.1% p.a.
Regarding the ratio of the under 20 year-old age group in the Libyan total 
population, examination of the population age structure (See Table IV -13), 
revealed that the share of under 20s in the Libyan total population between 
1973-1990 was about 60 per cent but in 1964 only 49% of the population was 
in this age group. This is very high compared with more advanced nations such 
as France (32.2%), United States (46%), Jordan (53.3%) and Lebanon (51%) 
(Zagallai, 1973). A large proportion of this age group, combined with the 
compulsory education policy, resulted in a high level of enrolment in 
educational institutions.
Table IV -14 shows the number of enrolled students, their growth rates 
and their shares in the total population from 1970 to 1990, and the total number 
of students below 15 years old and over, as a percentage of total students. It 
reveals that the total number of students, as a proportion of total Libyan 
population, had increased from 19% in 1970 to 32% in 1990. The share of the 
students below 15 years old in the total number of students was 95% in 1970
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and decreased to 83% by 1990, while the share for students 15 years old and 
over was relatively low. This implies that the higher rate of enrolment was in 
the primary and secondary levels, and this naturally delayed their ability to join 
the labour market.
The available data shows that the number of females getting employment 
was growing at about the same rate as males. The figures show a growth rate of 
around 4% p.a. for both sexes during the periods 1954-1964 and 1973-1984. 
(National Authority for Information and Documentation, 1994, p., 16). But 
even though the female participation in total population had been growing 
substantially and the education gap between males and females had sharply 
declined, the female participation in both total labour force and domestically 
employed population was very low. This relatively low female participation is 
attributed to the social system and the nature of the work, its capacity, and its 
location. So most Libyan females had been engaged in teaching, health 
services, administrative and other clerical work. These kinds of work either 
attained the full employment point (as in the education sector) or were located 
outside the big cities. All the government institutions and financial companies 
had been moved outside the main cities. In addition to that, the official figures 
on employment do not include those who were working in the agricultural 
sector as unpaid family workers. Those working privately in weaving and 
textiles or as private teachers or nurses. The available statistics show that the 
female share in the total labour had increased from 6.4% in 1972 to 11% in 
1985, while the share of males had declined from 94% in 1972 to 89% in 1985 
(See Table IV-15).
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Table IV-12
Libyan Population by Libyan and Non-Libyan 1962-1990
Number (000)
Annua! Growth Rates 
1962 1970 1983 
1969 1982 19901964 1970 1973 1978 1980 1984 1990
Total Population 1560 2006 2348.8 3014 3245 8 3643 4380.0 3.3 5.5 2.0
Libyan 1511 1922 2146.0 2598 2804.6 3231 4177.2 3.2 4.1 4.1
Non-Libyan 49 84.0 202.8 416.5 441.2 411.5 202.8 8.7 21.1 -13.0
Libyan as (%) of total 96.9 95.8 91.4 86.2 86.4 88.7 95.4
Non-Libyan as (%) of total 3.1 4.2 8.6 13.8 13.6 11.3 4.6
Source: Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators, 1984, and National Authority for Information and Documentation 
yearly statistical series, various issues.
Table 13
Libyan Population by Sex and Age Groups 1973-1990 (Percentage of Total)
1973 1984 1988 1990
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
0-9 18.9 18.6 37.5 17.8 17.2 34.9 18.5 18.1 36.6 18.7 18.1 36.7
10.-19 12.8 12.4 25.2 13.4 13.0 26.4 12.2 11.8 240 12.1 11.9 23.9
20-29 6.8 6.5 13.3 7.3 6.9 14.3 7.7 7.3 15.0 7.9 7.5 15.4
30-64 10.5 10.3 20.8 10.7 10.1 20.8 11.4 10.7 22.1 11.2 10.5 21.7
65 & over 1.7 1.5 3.2 1.8 1.8 3.6 1.1 1.2 2.3 1.1 1.2 2.3
Total share 50.7 49.3 100 51.0 49.0 100.0 50.9 49.1 100.0 50.9 49.1 100.0
Source: Calculated from, National Authority for Information and Documentation yearly statistical series, 
various issues, and Census and Statistical Department, statistical abstract, 1973 to1982.
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Table 14
Evolution of Educational Enrolment in Libya 1970-1990
Academic Years Annual Average
1969
1970
1972
1973
1975 1979 
1977 1980
1982
1983
1985
1986
1989
1990
1970
1980
1981
1990
Total number of Students 366.5 540.4 736.3 958.9 1092 1245.5 1375.7 10.2 3.7
Total Student as (%) of Total Population 19.1 25.2 30.6 34.2 34.6 37.0 33.2 30.6 35
Students below 15 years old (% of total) 94.7 93.8 92.3 90.0 87.1 85.1 83.2 9.6 2.9
Student over 15 years (% of total) 5.3 6.2 7.7 10.0 12.9 14.9 16 8 17.5 9.4
Source: Calculated from, Economic and Social Indicators, ibid., pp. 54-59, and National Authority for Information and
Documentation, yearly statistical series, various issues
Note: All figures did not include, military institutions students and scholarships students.
Table IV-15
Distribution of Domestic and Total Labour Force by Sex in Libya 1972-1986
1972 1975 1978 1980 1983 1985
Average
1972/85
Males as a percentage of Total labour Force 93.6 94.8 94.5 92.2 92.9 88.9 928
Females as a percentage of Total labour Force 6.4 5.2 5.5 7.8 7.1 11.1 7.2
Total Labour Force 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Males as a percentage of Domestic Labour Force 92.4 92.2 91.8 88.9 87.5 85.8 89.8
Females as Percentage of Domestic labour Force 7.6 7.8 8.2 11.1 12.5 14.2 10.2
Total Domestic Employment 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Calculated from: National Authority for Information and Documentation yearly statistical series, various issues, 
and Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators 1970-1983 (Tripoli, February 1984, pp. 5 to 10)
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As noted earlier, the first few years of the oil era witnessed the beginnings of 
the influx of immigration which then continued at an increasing rate into the 
next few decades. Consequently, the presence of a high proportion of imported 
labour in the total labour force soon became very apparent. Between 1970 and 
1982 the share of foreign labour in the total employed population had 
quadrupled. This corresponded to 6.1% in the preceding period of 1962-1969 
and 22.4% during the post-boom period of 1983-1990.
IV-5-2-2 Labour Supply.
The total number of the economically active population in Libya (defined as 
those in the 15-65 age group in 1990 was 1,018,600. This number had nearly 
trebled itself since 1962. There had been an average growth rate of more than 
4% p.a. to reach this level. In 1962, the labour force amounted to 24.5% of the 
total population, and in 1990 it was the same. But there had been an increase in 
the inactive population over these three decades who were either over 65 years 
old or who could not work because they were students or in military service. 
There had also been a rise in female participation in total population but a 
relatively low female content in the labour force
Tables IV-16 & IV -17 and Figures IV-2 and IV-3 show the size of the 
employed population from 1962 to 1990 in terms of Libyan and non-Libyan 
and its growth and distribution among the major economic sectors. They reveal 
that during the period 1962-1969 the total labour force had increased from
356,000 in 1962 to 414,600 in 1969, at an average growth rate of 1.9% p.a. in 
less than 93.9% of the labour force in 1962 was Libyan and by 1969 the 
Libyan content within the total labour force had been growing at an average 
rate of 1.2% p.a. However, during the same period the content of non-Libyans 
within the total labour force had been increasing at 10 times this rate.
During the period of 1970-1982, the total labour force continued to grow 
at an average rate of 7.8% p.a. But by the end of the period in 1982 the
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proportion of Libyan labour force in the total labour force had dropped to 
54.3%. The total number of the labour force remained virtually unchanged 
throughout the rest of the decade to 1990. The growth rate had been only 0.5% 
p.a. However, the share of Libyans employed in the workforce compared with 
foreign labour had grown by 1990 to 86.3%. The main reason for this was the 
1985 self-sufficiency policy. Labour growth had also been affected by the 
latest confrontation crisis with Western countries, by the ending of the 
development programmes and the rebuilding of the private sector.
Taking the entire period under investigation 1962-1990 the domestic 
employed population occupied an average annual share in the total labour force 
amounting to 81.8%.
As to how labour force within the various economic activities was 
distributed, observation reveals that before the discovery of oil the agricultural 
sector in Libya was the most important labour absorbing sector. Although this 
situation changed slightly following the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities in 1962, it seems that the agricultural sector was still the most 
important labour absorbing sector, particularly when taking into consideration 
those engaged in agricultural activities as a second occupation and those who 
partook in these activities as unpaid family work. However, the official figures 
on employment indicate that the agricultural sector share of total employed 
population had declined substantially since 1962. It decreased from 40.9% in 
1962 to 30.2% in 1969 and to 18.6% in 1990. Several factors were responsible 
for this. There was the substantial increase in the number of agricultural 
workers seeking higher earnings in the construction and service sectors centred 
in the urban areas. Then there were such things as the undeveloped agricultural 
products market, the lack of water resources, the imbalances of the 
development expenditure (particularly during the period of 1962-1969), and the 
domination of the public sector.
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Following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the construction 
and electricity sectors were the leading sectors in absorbing labour. Their 
combined share in overall employment had increased from 10.6% in 1962 to 
18.2% in 1990. During the first oil exporting period of 1962-1969, construction 
and electricity employment had increased at an average rate of 10.8% p.a.,. 
This rate more than doubled during the boom period of 1970-1982, and settled 
at an average growth rate of 21.8% p.a. during the post-boom period of 1983- 
1990. This meant an average sustained growth rate during the whole period of 
1962-1990 of 19.8% p.a. This high increase was mainly attributable to the huge 
investment programmes in infrastructure.
The transport and communication sector was the second important labour 
absorbing sector. Its share in overall employment had increased from 
approximately 6.3% over the period of 1962-1969 to 8.3% and 8.2% during 
1970-1982 and 1983-1990 respectively with a remarkable increase in 1971 
reaching 9.1%.
Moreover, for the entire period under study (1962-1990), the transport 
and communication sector share in overall employment reached about 8%. 
Once again, the reasons for absorbing labour at this relatively higher rate in 
both the construction and electricity and the transport and communication 
sectors can be explained by the vast investment in infrastructure. Then of 
course, employment in the manufacturing sector had increased at an average 
rate of 5.7% p.a. during 1962-1990, with a remarkable growth rate during the 
boom period of 1970-1982 reaching 10.9% p.a. The share of manufacturing in 
overall employment had decreased though from 6.7% in 1962 to 4.7% in 1970, 
but rose to 7.1% in 1980 with a further increase to 9.8% by 1990.
As has already been mentioned, the relatively low share of manufacturing 
employment in the total labour force reflects the position of high level shortage 
in domestic manpower as well as revealing the relatively capital-intensive 
features of the manufacturing sector.
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In contrast, during the period of 1962-1969 services sector employment 
had increased at an average rate of 5.7% p.a. with an annual share in total 
labour force averaging at about 35.7%, whilst, during the period 1970-1982 it 
grew at the rate of 6.5% p.a. with an average share in overall employment 
reaching 40.2%. But during the period of 1983-1990 it grew at only 1.6% p.a. 
with an almost unchanged average share in overall employment. For the whole 
period of 1962-1990 service sector employment grew at an average rate of only 
5% p.a. with an average annual participation rate in overall employed 
population amounting to about 40%.
The oil sector-the booming sector-was the less important labour absorbing 
sector. Its share in overall employment decreased from 3.6% in 1962 to 1.7% 
in 1990.
In conclusion, the share of the commodity producing sectors in the total 
labour force had decreased from 51.7% in 1962 to 28.9% in 1980 and then 
increased slightly to 30.8% by 1990. Whereas the share of the non-commodity 
producing sectors in the total employed population had increased from 48.3% 
in 1962 to 71% in 1980, but declined back slightly to 69% in 1990. The 
relatively higher share of the non-commodity producing sectors has three main 
causes: the first was that the initial development programmes called for a high 
proportion of the labour force to be occupied in infrastructure activities 
(electricity, transport and construction) which to some extent seemed to be 
productive sectors. The second cause was that, as in most SPE-LDCs, the 
manufacturing sector (and partly the agriculture sector) in Libya are primarily 
capital-intensive sectors, and thirdly the official figures on employment in the 
agriculture sector are not reliable, since they include only registered 
employees.
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Table 16
Trends in Growth of Libyan Labour Force 1962-1990
1962
1969
Annual Growth Rate 
1970 1983 
1982 1990
1962
19901968 1970 1975 1980 1988 1990
Population (000) 1803.0 2006.0 2683.1 3245.8 4220.0 4380.0 3.3 5.5 2.0 4.1
Total Labour Force 400.5 433.5 677.1 813.0 927.6 1019.0 1.9 7.8 -0.5 4.0
Participation Rate (%) 22.2 21.6 25.2 25.0 22.0 23.3 23 27.4 28.8 27.5
Domestic Labour 369.3 383.5 454.1 533.0 824.6 879.4 1.2 3.6 5.2 3.5
Foreign Labour 31.2 50.0 223.0 280.0 103.0 139.2 12.3 22.6 -10.7 10.9
Share of Domestic Labour (%) 92.2 88.5 67.1 65.6 88.9 86.3 -0.7 -3.8 6.4 -0.1
Share of Foreign Labour (%) 7.8 11.5 32.9 34.4 11.1 13.7 10.1 13.5 -11.5 5.9
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators,1962-1983 (ibid.), National Authority for Information 
and Documentation, yearly statistical series, various issues, and Ministry of Planning and Finance, Distribution 
of Total Labour Force by Kind of Economic Activities 1970-1994, unpublished statistical series 1996.
Table IV-17
Sectoral Distribution of Total Employment in Libya 1962-1990
Annual Growth
Workers in thousands Share in Total (%) 1962 1970 1983 1962
1962 1970 1980 1990 1962 1970 1980 1990 1969 1982 1990 1990
Commodity Producing Sectors 184.1 160.4 234.6 313.7 51.7 37.0 28.9 30.8 -1.9 4.1 2.3 1.0
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 145.7 126.0 153 4 188.9 40.9 29.1 18.9 18.5 -1.9 2.3 1.5 1.0
Instruction of Oil & Natural Gas 12.9 10.0 13.7 16.9 3.6 2.3 1.7 1.7 -3.1 2.7 2.7 3.1
Mining and Quarrying 1.7 4.0 9.5 8.5 0.5 0.9 1.2 0.8 10.9 8.2 -1.3 6.5
Manufacturing 23.8 20.4 58.0 99.4 6.7 4.7 7.1 9.7 -2.5 10.9 4.9 5.7
Non-Commodity Producing Sectors 171.9 273.1 5784 705.3 48.3 63.0 71.1 69.2 5.2 9.5 -1.3 5.5
Electricity, Gas & Water 5.3 8.4 19.7 28.5 1.5 1.9 2.4 2.8 5.5 8.5 3.2 6.4
Construction 32.4 49 173.0 157.1 9.1 11.3 21.3 15.4 3.0 18.0 -11.6 5.9
Transport and Communication 22.4 34.9 71.7 82.3 6.3 8.1 8.8 8.1 5.2 7.8 -0.5 9.4
Services Gathering 112 180.8 314.0 437.4 31.5 41.7 38.6 42.9 5.7 6.5 3.8 5.7
Total Labour Force 356.0 433.5 813.0 1019.0 100 100 100 100 1.9 7.8 -0.5 4.0
Source : As for Table 111-16.
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Figure IV-2
Distribution of Labour Force by Libyan & Non-Libyan 62-90 (000)
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Figure IV-3
Sectoral Share in Total Labour force 1962-1990
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IV-5-3 Productivity Growth and Technical Progress
The preceding exposition shows that the size of the economically active 
population in Libya had grown at an average rate of 4%p.a. over almost three 
decades. This sustained level of growth was due to a high ratio of imported 
labour and a high population growth rate. For almost the same period gross 
capital formation had grown at an average rate of nearly 23% p.a. The most 
remarkable increase in both the labour supply and gross capital formation 
occurred during the oil price shock periods of 1973-1974 and 1980-1982.2/ 
However, growth rates in this latter sense do not necessarily imply equivalent 
increase in output per unit of labour nor output per capita. In what follows 
partial and total productivity growth will be discussed in detail.
Productivity is usually measured as a ratio of output to inputs. So there 
are as many indices of productivity as there are factors of production.
However, the most commonly used are the partial productivity' indices of
labour and capital and the total or multifactors productivity index. The former 
indices are simply the average products of labour or capital, while the latter, 
often referred to as residual or the index of technical progress, is defined as
output per unit of capital and labour combined.
However, the two measures are not entirely adequate either because of 
they do not take into consideration changes relating to other factors (the partial 
productivity indices) or because of data and measurement difficulties (the 
multifactors productivity index).
The experiences of the oil-exporting less developed countries revealed 
that during the boom periods resources (especially capital) are absorbed with 
rapid speed and this rapidity always coincided with serious institutional 
bottlenecks and administrative problems. In the case of Libya this was either 
because of the failure of the government, which undertook more than 80% of 
total investment to choose the right technology and required skills, or because
2/ Capital stock is estimated using a 1:1 ratio of capital stock to GDP in the base year 1970 , deflating GFCF 
AND adding and subtracting forward and backward
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of the sluggish change in the socio-economic structure as a whole. Under these 
circumstances the two measures will be used to measure productivity gains in 
Libya but the results should be treated with caution.
Table IV-18 shows labour productivity (real value added per worker) 
during the period of 1962-1990. It indicates that labour productivity had 
steadily grown at an average rate of 20.5% p.a. during the first oil exporting 
period of 1962-1969, and at an average rate of 5.3 %p.a. over the oil price 
shock period of 1970-1982, while it was negative during the post-boom period 
of 1983-1990.
The estimation of capital productivity however, during this whole period, 
is more problematic. This is not merely because of the difficulty of defining 
and measuring capital, but also because of the dependence upon measurements 
of different factors which are complex. One such factor being government 
policies involve the mixing of capital and labour (i.e., the capital-labour ratio) 
in the production process. A high proportion of government investment during 
the period under study was placed in large capital intensive projects. The 
measure used is the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR)3/. The results 
shown in Table IV-19 indicates that capital absorption seems to have been 
efficient during the boom period of 1973-1982, with an ICOR value of -0.1 It is 
especially the period of rapid capital intensification of 1975-1982, that has a 
low ICOR. What this is effectively saying is that if the ICOR measure is to be 
given any significance then Libya seemed to be efficient in utilising of capital.
For total factor productivity growth (TFPG) estimations a homogenous 
production function with constant returns to scale is used. Factor shares are 
used as weights upon the assumption that factor elasticities are represented by 
factor shares. The results given in Table IV-20 reveal that TFP growth was
? / The concept of (ICOR) is based on the Harrod-Domar Model of growth that accounts only for capital as input 
Symbolically. AY = pAK Where Y is GDP, K is capital stock (net of depreciation, and p = AY/ AK or the 
inverse of ICOR. Then AY/ Y = P(AK/ K) or ICOR = (AY/ Y) / (AY/ Y). thus ICOR is a quotient the num erator 
of which is the ratio of investment to GDP. And the denominator was legged by one year from the numerator’s 
period.
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negative over the period of the pre-boom period of 1969-1972. This negative 
value can be explained by the production disruption induced by political 
changes which were linked with the revolution. During the boom period output 
growth was mainly putdown to factors inputs while TFP was negative over the 
post-boom period of 1983-1990. The negative value for this period can be 
explained by both the production disruption, and the moderate growth rates of 
factor inputs. Generally speaking, productivity gains in Libya seem to be 
insignificant during the boom period despite Libya's access to imported 
technology. The failure of productivity to grow can be explained partly by the 
economy’s limited absorptive capacity and partly by the failure to get the right 
technology. These TFP growth results, however, are not in line with the 
calculated ICOR, whose low value over 1973-1982 is indicative of efficient 
utilisation of capital.
Table IV-18
Growth of Labour Productivity (Value added per worker at 1980 prices)
Annual Average Growth Rate
Value Added Per Worker 1962 1970 1983 1962
1962 1965 1970 1973 1975 1978 1980 1985 1988 1990 1969 1982 1990 1990
1.1 2.7 4.4 5.7 6.7 7.6 12.6 8.1 6.2 6.1 20.5 5.3 -1.4 7.9
Source: Calculated from National Authority for Information and Documentation yearly statistical series, 
and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series and Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Table IV-19
Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR)
Annual Average
1968 1970 1974 1976 1978 1980 1986 1990
1962
1972
1973
1978
1973
1982
1983
1990
1962
1990
0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.8 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 1.2 0.6
Source: Calculated from National Authority for Information and Documentation yearly statistical series, 1994-96 
and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series and Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
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Table IV-20
Factor Input and Output Growth for the Libyan Economy 1969-1990
Output Labour Capital Residual
1969-1972 10.5 19.3 5.3 -14.2
1973-1982 15.9 13.6 10.9 -8.1
1983-1990 -1.0 -1.8 5.3 -4.5
1973-1990 8.8 9.0 7.9 -8.1
Source : Calculated from National Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical series , various issues
and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series and Monthly Bulletin various issues.
IV-6 Sectoral Shifts
As in most developed and developing countries services sectors in Libya had 
been the largest sectors in the economy. This is not only because of their 
relatively easy expansion capabilities, but also because the conditions imposed 
by the development process had necessitated the further expansion of these
sectors.
Table IV-21 and Figure IV-4 show the sectoral distribution of aggregate 
output and employment during the period of 1962-1990. It indicates that the 
services sectors share in aggregate output amounted to 59.8% in 1962, dropped 
to nearly 32.5% in 1970 but by the following first oil price shock of 1973-1974 
it had grown again but only to 42.8%.In the meantime, employment in the 
services sectors rose steadily from 48.3% in 1962 to 63% in 1970 and 72.8% in 
1975. According to international standards these shares are very high.
Although the manufacturing and agricultural sectors had received 
absolutely huge financial allocations during the Seventies, their contribution in 
aggregate output had declined from 5.8% in 1962 to 1.8% in 1975. So many 
reasons were responsible for this position. Certainly the scarcity of water and 
arable land, the shortage of raw materials and the lack of skilled and technical 
labour did not help. But then there was also the absence of administrative 
institutions, the limited absorptive capacity of the economy, the smallness of 
the domestic market supremely the government policy. The Government had
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nationalised the private sector and gave little priority to industry in the early 
period. The high priority placed on industry was introduced later in the 
transformation plan which was launched in 1976.
For almost the same reasons, the share of the agricultural sector in both 
output and employment had declined sharply during the same period. Its share 
in aggregate output had declined from 9.6% in 1962 to 2.3% in 1975, and 
employment which was 40.9% in 1962, had also declined to 19.7% in 1975. 
However, it must be mentioned that the fluctuation in the relative shares of the 
various economic sectors which automatically reduced the share taken by the 
commodity producing sectors in the overall gross output did not necessarily 
indicate a reduction in absolute output of the latter.
Table IV-21
Contribution to GDP and Employment by Major Economic Sectors 1S62-19S0
Percentage Shares
Sectoral Shares in GDP 
(at 1970 constant price) 1962 1970 1973 1975 1980 1983 1987 1990
1962
1972
1973
1975
1980
1982
1983
1990
Agriculture 9.6 2.6 2.8 2.3 1.6 3.6 5.2 5.5 4.3 2.2 2.1 4.5
Manufacturing 5.8 1.7 2 1.8 2.1 3.6 6.5 7.8 2.6 1.8 2.7 5.9
Services Gathering 59.8 32.5 42.8 42.1 31.6 45.9 58.4 59 40 39.5 38.8 54.2
Mining (incl., Crude Oil) 24.8 63.2 52.4 53.8 60.3 47.2 29.9 27.7 53.1 56.5 56.3 35.4
Sectoral Shares in Employment
Agriculture 40.9 29.1 24 19.7 18.9 14.7 19.7 18.6 34 21.8 17.2 18.6
Manufacturing 6.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 7.1 6.8 8.7 9.8 5.4 4.8 6.9 8.7
Services Gathering 48.3 63 68.4 72.8 71.1 76.4 69.3 69.1 57 70.7 73.2 70.4
Mining (incl. Crude Oil) 4.1 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 3.6 2.7 2.7 2.3
Source: Calculated from Economic and Social indicators (1983-64) and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series 
and Monthly Bulletin, various issues, and National Authority for Information & Documentation (ibid.)
IV-6-1 The Dutch Disease Counterfactual
In this section the counterfactual to the Dutch Disease is established. The 
necessity and difficulty of this task are related to the continuous shifts in the 
structure of production because of the de-industrialisation in developed 
economies, and industrialisation in developing economies. The task is 
particularly difficult for Libya mainly because Libya has a demonstrably
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atypical structure for a developing country, with a very large services sector 
and a small agricultural sector. Its structure, therefore, cannot be compared 
with other developing economies at similar stages of development, and some 
ingenuity is required in determining the "what would have been" scenario.
Bearing this in mind, the counterfactual will be established in two stages. 
First, the historical trends of sectoral growth and the share in non-oil output for 
the period preceding the boom years, i.e. 1962-1972 are established (An 
exponential growth rate is assumed). Second, these historical patterns are 
projected into the boom and post-boom periods in this way establishing the 
counterfactual. The result is then compared with the actual pattern of sectoral 
development to see what this says about the economy's response to the boom 
conditions insofar as the relative price changes had impact on the supply 
response in the different sectors. Because the Theory makes a distinction 
between traded and non-traded sectors, the analysis will be organised along 
these lines which is, admittedly, arbitrary.
Figure IV-5 shows the results. For the traded goods sector, agriculture's 
share during the boom period was lower than expected (shown by the trend 
line) and the manufacturing share was significantly higher than expected. 
Results for the non-traded goods sectors are equally mixed, with construction 
performing better than anticipated and other non-traded worse. Not too much 
significance should be attached to the actual magnitude of deviation between 
the sectors but importance should be placed on their order of magnitude 
because of the qualifications made to establishing the counterfactual discussed 
above. All that needs to be noted really is that sectoral shifts do not entirely 
accord with the predictions of the Dutch Disease. In Libya the traded sectors 
are comprised of manufacturing, agriculture and non-oil mining and the Theory 
predicts a decline in the output and employment of these and an increase in the 
share of the non-traded goods sectors, which is largely made up of services.
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Figure 1V-4
Sectoral Shares in Aggregate Output 1962-1990
Agriculture
40 • • ❖  • - Mining (incl, 
Crude oil)
— • — - Manufacturing
Construction
Transport & 
Communication
 Non-traded
CN
CT)
Figure VI-6 
Sectoral Share in Non-Oil GOP 
Actual & Counterfactual 1962-1990
 Non-traded Actual
Construction Actual
—  - Manufacturing 4  Mining 
Actual 
“  Agriculture Actual
Manufacturing Trend
 Agricultue Trend
30
Construction Trend
- —  Non-traded Trend
126
CHAPTER V 
A N  EMPIRICAL INVESTIGA TION INTO THE 
DUTCH DISEASE IN  LIB YA
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V-l Introduction
Having surveyed the salient developments of the Libyan economy during the 
period 1962-1990, the discussion will now turn to the specific analysis of the 
changes that coincided with the oil prices shock period o f 1973-1982. The 
hypothesis that the sudden inflow of foreign exchange funds may alter the 
structure of prices and, consequently, the structure of production and 
employment in favour of the non-tradable goods sectors and to the disfavour of 
the tradable ones will be examined. However, certain warning signals should 
be flashed at the outset.
First, the distinction between traded and non-traded sectors is not tenable 
without some generalisation. The sectors which are assumed to be tradables are 
manufacturing, mining and agriculture, and the non-tradables are electricity 
and water, banking and insurance, construction, trade and storage, transport 
and communication and social services-even though a closer look at the second 
category (non-tradables) reveals that, part of each is actually tradable. This 
applies to electricity and water and transport and communication. In other 
words, since there is great difficulty in assessing the tradable content and 
consequently its share of the respective sector’s production and employment, 
the discussion will focus on whole sectors assuming them to be totally 
tradables or non-tradables. Secondly, with regard to the resource movement 
effect, the analysis will be in terms of labour shifts from tradables to non­
tradables. This movement is considered as a proxy for the Dutch Disease, 
although it could encompass a far wider definition. The analysis will focus on 
the changes in the main labour market variables, but it must be borne in mind 
that such a method does not take certain other considerations to task. Foremost 
among these is the shift toward more capital-intensive techniques. Where, the 
increase in both labour imports and the shift in medium and small scale 
industries to capital-intensive techniques in the face of labour shortages and the 
pursuit of cheaper costs obscures the overall picture of domestic labour
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mobility. In agriculture, for instance, new techniques were introduced and the 
shortage in domestic agricultural labour supply was offset by unskilled foreign 
labour. Paradoxically however, the shift to more modem techniques created 
demand for skilled and technical labour in both agriculture and agriculture- 
supporting industries such as plastic and metallic irrigation pipes, green plastic 
houses, pumps, chemical fertilisers, irrigation pivots etc. There are also other 
socio-economic and socio-political considerations which complicate the 
analysis, such as the effect of production and price subsidies on both the prices 
and wage levels and price and wage control policy. So there are many dynamic 
forces which render the analysis more ambiguous.
In view of all these warning factors we shall start the analysis by 
examining the nature, magnitude, and volatility of the foreign exchange 
earnings (Section II). Section III paves the way for measuring the Disease by 
overviewing stylised facts regarding structural change and the general trends of 
those changes in Libya. Section IV constructs a 20-year Dutch Disease index 
for Libya libelling a counter-factual analysis. Finally Section V investigates the 
mechanisms through which the boom effects are transmitted into the economy.
V-2 The Windfalls
As already mentioned, the Libyan economy grew at an impressive annual rate 
between 1970 and 1983 averaging about 13% p.a. in real terms. This 
impressive growth was associated with three major developments: firstly, the 
increase of foreign earnings from petroleum exports, secondly, an alteration of 
the structure of production and employment and thirdly the implementation of 
a self-sufficient central planning development strategy. However, it can be 
argued that these windfalls were a costly opportunity because they were not 
utilised in a way that would have laid the foundations for sustainable growth or 
made the economy less vulnerable to external shocks. Indeed, the observed 
high growth does not reflect the whole picture but actually conceals an
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unfavourable adverse development, namely the emergence of an unfavourable 
structural change which resulted in an increase in the dependence upon 
revenues from oil that were volatile and had a large rental component. This 
situation can be argued to be that of a Dutch Disease. An implicit feature of 
this unfavourable change was a significant drop in the share of the tradable 
sectors in the economy. During that period, the share of agriculture and 
manufacturing in real GDP declined from 5.2% in 1970 to 1.9% in 1982 and 
the balance of non-oil trade deficit widened despite the increase in the overall 
trade balance surplus. For the same period oil revenue (in real terms) had more 
than trebled. In 1974 alone it increased by more than 70%. In 1979, with 
further oil price increase, the value of oil revenue grew at nearly 67%. But with 
the fall in oil prices since 1982 oil revenue had fluctuated with a downward 
trend.
Table V-l indicates the absolute and relative value of oil exports (as 
ratios to the GDP, exports and imports). It reveals that the ratio of oil earnings 
to total GDP has always been significant in the Libyan economy but increased 
noticeably in 1973 when it constituted 67% of total GDP and, again, in 1978 
when it peaked at 70.8%. Subsequently the ratio declined steadily afterward 
and in 1990 it constituted 22% of the total GDP. As a ratio to exports and 
imports oil earnings averaged 96% and 242% p.a. respectively over the period 
of 1973-1982, corresponding to 94% and 241% p.a., for the pre-boom period 
1962-1972, and 72% and 142% p.a., for the post-boom period of 1983-1990.
Table V-2 shows the effect that these windfalls had on the balance of 
payments. The current account balance is dominated by merchandise, 
unrequited transfer and services balances, the former consist of oil and non-oil 
exports. Thus, with an increase in oil revenue the current account position and 
consequently the overall balance had improved further over the period 1965- 
1980, with the exception of 1973 and 1975. The deficit during these two years 
was mainly due to the increase in imports and invisible transactions. Over the
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period of 1981-1988, with the exception of 1985 and 1986, the current account 
balance and consequently the overall balance were both in deficit. 
Furthermore, Libya's stock of foreign assets was growing substantially during 
almost the entire period and especially during the boom periods. However, the 
expansion of foreign reserves in the economy from 240.3 billion in 1970 to 
360.5 billion in 1980 was not associated with any significant investment 
abroad, so it is safe to say that the economy was not sterilised from the foreign 
exchange effect.
Table V-1
Growth of Oil Windfalls in Libya, 1962-1990
1962 1968 1970 1973 1975 1978 1980 1983 1985 1987 1990
Value of Oil Exports in (LD.000) 45.0 564.9 741.1 1461.7 2525.3 3889 6 6486.4 3454.2 2577.6 1338.8 1739.5
As a Ratio to GDP (%) 28.9 52.7 57.5 67.0 68.0 70.8 63.4 42.4 32.0 19.8 22.7
As a Ratio to Total Exports (%) 91.8 99.9 99.9 97.1 99.4 98.6 999 95.5 70.7 56.4 46.5
As a Ratio to Total Imports (%) 61.3 245.4 374.3 270.7 240.8 285.2 323.3 193.5 207.7 104.8 115.2
Source: Calculated from: Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, and Monthly Bulletin, various issues, and National Authority 
for Information and Documentation, Yearly statistical series 1989-94.
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Table V-2
Summary of Libya's Balance of Payments, 1967-1993, (LD 000.000)
Balance
of
Trade
Services
Balance
Net 
T ransfer 
Payments
Net of 
Current 
Account
Net
Capital
Account
Net 
Errors, & 
Omissions
Overall
Balance
1966 211.7 -610.1 -13.4 -411.8 -10.7 4.9 -417.6
1967 248.2 -189.2 -43.2 15.8 4.3 -5.8 14.3
1968 435.2 -299.6 -45.4 90.2 -23.9 -12.3 54.0
1969 499.4 -324.3 -58.0 117.1 42.7 -23.3 136.5
1970 589.2 -302.9 -56.6 229.7 46.9 -36.3 240.3
1971 597.7 -269.8 -48.8 279.1 49.7 -19.1 309.7
1972 946.4 -367.6 -50.9 527.9 70.3 -7.8 590.4
1973 1132.5 -506.2 -59.9 566.4 107.3 -305.0 368.7
1974 1215.8 -670.6 -29.8 515.4 -122.4 -26.8 366.2
1975 1550.8 -588.3 -57.8 904.7 -307.5 -77.0 520.2
1976 2676.5 -767.0 -60.6 1848.9 -376.4 -46.5 1426.0
1977 1761.2 -777.7 -72.9 910.6 -438.8 -18.6 453.2
1978 1067.1 -731.0 -16.2 319.9 -325.1 -54.0 -59.2
1979 1472.3 -455.9 -61.6 954.8 -236.5 -76.7 641.6
1980 746.0 -331.8 -155.2 259.0 -535.6 -83.9 -360.5
1981 153.1 -418.2 -4048 -669.9 -302.5 -77.2 -1049.6
1982 806.8 -762.3 -495.7 -451.2 -191.9 22.5 -620.6
1983 997.9 -821.2 -622.4 -445.7 -112.5 -47.8 -606.0
1984 561.0 -575.7 -357.0 -371.7 -85.2 -27.7 -484.6
1985 1361 6 -520 1 -227.0 614.5 93.6 -11.4 696.7
1986 434.7 -323.2 -153.3 -14.8 62.1 37.6 84.9
1987 107.6 -345.8 -119.0 -357.2 50.0 30.5 -276.7
1988 -31.1 -523.9 -152.6 -707.6 1.6 114.5 -591.5
1989 229.2 -410.3 -146.1 -327.2 436.6 -30.0 794
1990 1069.5 -320.0 -136.2 613.3 -284.9 -15.2 313.2
1991 721.6 - 377.8 - 154.2 189.6 -125.6 76.8 140.8
1992 808.1 - 296.1 - 95.5 416.5 276.0 -118.4 574.1
1993 -44.1 - 194.9 - 45.0 - 284.0 239.5 -53.3 -97.8
Source: Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, and Monthly Bulletin, various issues, United Nations 
International Financial Statistics^ various issues, and National Authority for Information and Documentation, 
yearly statistical series, various issues.
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V-3 Structural Transformation 
V-3-1 Introduction
Structural change is an important aspect of economic development. Economic 
development is usually defined as a process of transformation and growth. It is 
believed that neither structural transformation nor growth are exclusive of each 
other but rather that they include each other. Furthermore, structural change 
has important implications for external equilibrium because products of the 
different sectors vary in tradability and it has implications in this connection 
for the substantiality of growth and employment levels.
V-3-2 Source and Patterns of Structural Transformation
Structural transformation is attributed to various factors.1/ These however, can 
be broadly divided into demand-side and supply-side features. On the demand- 
side income elasticities of demand for the products of different sectors vary 
according to Engel's Law. Consequently, as income increases, demand shifts 
from primary to secondary and eventually to tertiary products. A similar trend 
occurs in intermediate demand because modem technology is associated with 
high fabrication which leads to the expansion of manufacturing at the expense 
of the primary sectors. On the supply-side it has been observed that growth in 
total factor productivity is higher in manufacturing than in agriculture. This 
leads to the eventual rise of the share of manufacturing in GDP in relation to 
the agriculture. Another supply-side factor is that while there are limitations to 
the supply of new land, which restricts the growth of agriculture, the supply of 
capital is flexible and this results in a more elastic supply of factors for 
manufacturing relative to agriculture. Manufacturing is expected to benefit 
from this more than services because manufacturing is usually more labour 
intensive than the former. Because of this, when labour is expanding rapidly it 
usually "jumps" directly to services, bypassing manufacturing.
1 /This section draws on Chenery (1975 and 1979); Chenery and Syrquin (1986); and Syequin (1989)
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Furthermore, increasing specialisation leads to the transfer of production 
of many services to specialist firms where formerly may of these things had 
been produced in the commodity sectors and this leads to an "empirical" 
expansion of services. In addition to the above factors, policies advocated by
governments as well as structural and institutional factors do have an important
#  ^
impact on patterns of structural change too. /
Despite the variety of factors influencing structural change, a general 
stylised pattern has been observed, which relates structural change to the 
growth of per-capita income. This pattern is believed to hold with a significant 
degree of consistency and formed Chenery's stylised pattern of structural 
change. The main feature of this pattern is that, as per-capita income grows, the 
relative share of industry' in GDP expands at the expense of the share of the 
primary sector. Then, after reaching a higher per-capita income, the share of 
services starts to expand at the expense of the share taken by the other sectors. 
This stylised pattern of structural change is widely accepted and was confirmed 
by the extensive empirical work done by many economists, led by Chenery and 
Syrquin.
V-4 Structural Change and the Dutch Disease in Libya.
As mentioned earlier the high growth of the Libyan economy during the boom 
period of 1973-1982 was associated with great structural change. Indeed, 
during the period 1973-1982, the share of agriculture in real GDP dropped 
from about 2.8% to 1.6% and the share of manufacturing stagnated at about 
2%, with a moderate decline in the middle of the period. On the other hand, the 
shares of construction, electricity, and services, especially transport and 
communication and trade and finance, increased significantly. In short, there
2/ The trade and exchange rate regimes are to important policy spheres them directly influence the pattern of 
structural changes. Labour immigration also plays an important role. Ideology can have great impact. The bias 
of socialist against services is one example. Resource endowments and the size of the economy also have a 
significant impact. For more details about these issues, see Chenery (1975 and 1979); and Chenery and Syrqin 
(1986); and Syrqin (1989).
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was an expansion in the share of the non-tradable sectors and a contraction in 
the share of tradables (excluding oil). Similar trends were observed in the 
structure of the non-booming economy, taken as GDP excluding oil.
The above trends however, are not in themselves sufficient to be indictors 
of the occurrence of Dutch Disease, but should first be compared with the 
standardised pattern of structural change as defined by Chenery and Syrquin.
In a recent study conducted by Syrquin (1989) / structural change was 
investigated in a hundred countries and regressions were run to estimate the 
changes in the shares of different sectors in GDP associated with changes in 
per-capita income.4/ The recent findings concerning countries in the upper- 
middle income group, to which Libya belongs5/ are reported in the Table (V-3) 
compound with an estimation of the Syrquin equation for Libya.6/
Table V-3
Estimated Change (percentage points) in Shares in Real GOP Corresponding to each 1% 
increase in Per-Capita Income in the Upper-Middle income Countries 1967-1989
The Group's Average Libya
Agriculture -0.11 -0.21
Manufacturing 0.06 0.03
Total Tradables -0.05 -0.18
Source: Syrquin (1989), particularly for Column 1, and Column 2 are estimated figures 
obtained by running a regression to the Syrquin equation against Libyan data 
(See Footnote 6 for the methodology)
The comparison of these results with the group's averages did not show a 
strong indication of Dutch Disease in the case of Libya. Although the 
parameter for manufacturing was positive for Libya it was less than the group's
V  This study by Syrquin is unique because it separates manufacturing from construction and electricity rather 
than taking industry as a whole like in early studies and also because it uses more updated data. We therefore 
start our analysis from the results of this study rather than from Chenery and Syrquin (1975) as Gelb (1985) did.
4/ These regressions were run using available data for each country within the period 1950-1983. The years used 
for each country varied between 11 and 34 years. Libya is not includes in this study but the study indicates that 
Libya and Saudi Arabia had shown the same patterns of oil-exporting countries (Algeria, Iran, Iraq) (See 
Syrquin, 1989 p. 38 and note 4 p. 51)
V The classification of the countries was in accordance with that given in the 1986 World Development Report.
0 The estimated equation in Syrquin (1989) took the form Y =a + pinX. Where, Y is the share of the sector in 
GDP, and X is per-capita income The general results of the study confirm the stylised patterns especially in 
agriculture (more than 90% of the countries) but less strongly in manufacturing (about 70% of the countries). In 
some countries (Algeria, Congo, Egypt, Iran and Iraq) and also Libya and Saudi Arabia inverse signs of the 
estimated parameters were observed and according to Syrquin this an indication of the Dutch Disease.
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average. As to agriculture, the parameter for Libya was about 50% lower than 
that of the group's average. In general, the results show that each 1% increase 
in per-capita income was associated with a 0.18 percentage point decline in the 
share of tradables in GDP in Libya compared with a decline of a 0.05 
percentage point for the upper-middle income countries as a group.
Indeed, there is a reservation due that structural change depends to a great 
extent on structural characteristics: resource endowment, the size of the 
economy and government policies. This, however, should not distract from the 
previously mentioned fact that a stylised pattern has been widely accepted as 
the general case and was found to be proven empirically. The above 
reservation, therefore, does not undermine the validity of the analysis below 
which aims to measure the deviation from the general case and investigate the 
reasons that could explain it.
V-4-1 Quantifying the Disease.
A formal methodology to construct an index for the Dutch Disease was 
developed by Gelb and associates (1988). In this methodology Gelb attempts to 
isolate structural changes due to the Dutch Disease from the stylised trends 
which are associated with growth in per-capita income. Following the tradition 
in the Dutch Disease literature, Gelb divides the economy into three sectors, 
the booming sector, the non-tradable sector, and the tradables. The latter 
includes both agriculture and manufacturing. After excluding the booming 
sector from the economy, Gelb calculated the deviation of the share of the 
tradable sector in the economy from its stylised share according to Chenery and
n
Syrquin (1975) and uses this deviation as an index for the Dutch Disease /. In
7 The reason for excluding the booming sector from the economy before constructing the mdex is that the 
dramatic growth of the sector will lead to the decline of the share of all other sectors in GDP, including that of 
tradables. By excluding the booming sector this problem is neutralised. Therefore, the equation Gelb uses to 
construct a Dutch Disease Index is: DD = (AGRn + MANn) - (AGRf + MANf ) where,
DD is the Dutch Disease Index. And AGR & MAN are the shares of agriculture and manufacturing in non-oil 
GDP respectively (all in real terms) and the subscripts (N and F) are the standardised and actual shares 
respectively.
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this section an attempt will be made to quantify the Disease in Libya by 
constructing an index for it along the above lines for the period 1962-1990. 
The behaviour of the index along the years will be noted, compared with 
before, during and after the boom, and related to the relevant variables (such as 
the real wages, domestic absorption and the real exchange rate).
In the counter-factual scenario, however, we will construct separate 
indices for manufacturing and agriculture before adding them up to obtain the 
Gelb overall Dutch Disease index. This should be helpful in highlighting the 
sub-trends in the tradable sector. We will also calculate the so-called 
"incremental indices" which show the divergence of each year's sectoral growth 
rates from the stylised growth rates. These incremental indices are most helpful 
in examining the determinants of the Dutch Disease phenomenon.
First, by applying Gelb's methodology and calculating the stylised shares 
of manufacturing and agriculture in non-oil GDP we will proceed to construct 
the index. This is done by using the stylised growth rates of those sectors 
corresponding to a 1% growth of GDP, and then applying them to the observed 
GDP growth in the Libyan economy. The difference between the counter- 
factual and the factual shares of the tradable sectors in non-oil GDP are then 
the Dutch Disease index.
The results are reported in Table V-4. A positive index indicates the 
occurrence of the Disease, while a negative index means a healthier than 
average position (as far as the Dutch Disease is concerned). The index is 
represented as an aggregate of both manufacturing and agriculture as well as 
taking them separately in order to provide more information and to facilitate 
analysis.
V-4-1-1 The Manufacturing Index.
It is obvious from Table V-4 below that, until the early Seventies, the index for 
manufacturing was positive, indicating a low^er share for the manufacturing
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sector in non-oil GDP than the upper-middle income countries average. The 
main reasons behind that were the insufficiency and shortages of skilled labour 
and the emphasis of the development policy on infrastructure. The index even 
showed a deteriorated trend reflecting a decrease in the degree of 
industrialisation.This situation changed entirely after the early Seventies. 
Starting from 1972, the index for manufacturing showed a continued steady 
improvement, reflecting a gradual increase in the degree of industrialisation 
and, by 1990, the index reached a remarkable -7.5.
V-4-1-2 The Agriculture Index
With regard to agriculture, the index showed a fluctuating trend from as early 
as 1963 up to the late Seventies. While the index deteriorated between 1976 
and 1982. The deterioration during this period was mainly due to the self- 
sufficiency policy which prevented agriculture from the use of foreign workers 
and was also the result of the import-substitution industrialisation policies 
adopted then, which made agriculture the least favoured sector of all. It is 
important to mention that this deterioration in the relative size of agriculture 
occurred despite the intensive public investment in irrigation and land 
reclamation. However, this situation had changed favourably since 1983 and 
trends continued, although increasingly, thereafter.
The above trends in the Dutch Disease sub-indices for manufacturing and 
agriculture are reflected in the overall Dutch Disease index. The index was 
increasing slowly during the Sixties from -0.4 in 1963 to 0.3 by 1970. But it 
improved remarkably over the boom period of 1973-1982 and continued to 
improve during the subsequent period.
138
Table V-4
Dutch Disease Indices for Libya 1963-1990
Agriculture Manufacturing General Index Incremental Indices
DD1 DD2 DD* DD1 DD2 DD*
1963 -0.40 0.00 -0.40 -0.40 0.00 -0.40
1964 2.10 0.20 2.30 2.50 0.2 2.70
1965 -1.20 1.00 -0.20 -3.30 0.80 -2.50
1966 0.20 0.70 0.90 1.40 -0.30 1.10
1967 0.30 0.90 1.20 0.10 0.20 0.30
1968 1.50 0.60 2.10 1.20 -0.30 0.90
1969 -0.10 0.50 0.40 -1.60 -0.10 -1.70
1970 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.40 -0.50 -0.10
1971 2.10 0.00 2.10 1.80 0.00 1.80
1972 0.60 -0.10 0.50 -1.50 -0.10 -1.60
1973 -1.20 -0.40 -1.60 -1.80 0.30 -2.10
1974 1.20 -0.40 0.80 2.40 0.00 2.40
1975 -0.50 -0.80 -1.30 -1.70 -0.40 -2.10
1976 0.30 -1.30 -1.00 0.80 -0.50 0.30
1977 0.60 -2.10 -1.50 0.30 -0.80 -0.50
1978 0.10 -2.60 -2.50 -0.50 -0.50 -1.00
1979 0.50 -3.50 -3.00 0.40 -0.90 -0.50
1980 0.80 -3.50 -2.70 0.30 0.00 0.30
1981 0.50 -3.50 -3.00 -0.30 0.00 -0.30
1982 0.80 -4.30 -3.50 0.30 -0.80 -0.50
1983 -1.10 -4 60 -5.70 -1.90 -0.30 -2.20
1984 -1.30 -5.60 -6.90 -0.20 -1.00 -1.20
1985 -2.30 -5.50 -7.80 -1.00 0.10 -0 90
1986 -2.90 -6.10 -9.00 -0.60 -0.60 -1.20
1987 -3.90 -6.40 -10.30 -1.00 -0.3 -1.30
1988 -4.60 -7.20 -11.80 -0.70 -0.8 -1.50
1989 -5.80 -740 -13.20 -1.20 -0.20 -1.40
1990 -7.50 -7 50 -15.00 -1.70 -0.10 -1.80
Source: Calculated from Tables of Appendix AIV-1 (see Text for methodology)
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V-5 Transmission Mechanisms
By tradition the Dutch Disease Model presented in Chapter II suggests that the 
main transmission mechanisms of the Disease are the resource movement 
effect and the spending effect. This section attempts to examine how the boom 
transmitted into the rest of the economy in the case of Libya.
V-5-1 Income Effect
Although the first few years of the oil era witnessed the initial influx of 
immigration into Libya, the massive increase in foreign labour coming into the 
country coincided with the vastly growing oil wealth following a sudden 
increase in oil prices during the Seventies and early Eighties. Many reasons 
accounted for this. Chiefly the huge increase in oil revenues accruing solely to 
the State made it possible for the Government to embark on large-scale 
developmental projects providing basic infrastructure such as electricity, street 
and road building, public building construction, etc. The Libyan labour force 
was not adequate for the current needs of these public projects because it 
lacked the skills and technical knowledge that were necessary. It is certainly 
doubtful that it was adequate in terms of size. Consequently the Government 
had to attract foreign workers, offering them generous remuneration. Other 
immigration had been attracted to Libya by the prospect of a building and 
construction boom and thousands of semi-skilled labourers, Arabs and non- 
Arabs, fell into this category.
On the other hand the increase in oil prices was also associated with 
rural-urban migration. The inflow of rural population into big cities (especially 
into Tripoli and Benghazi) during the Seventies coincided with the rapid build­
up of government civil and military services and the boom in the construction 
sector in these cities. This movement deprived the agriculture sector of 
manpower, and thus contributed partly to the foreign labour inflow into the 
country.
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The available data on the foreign labour working in Libya suggested that, 
during the Seventies demand for labour had been overtaking its supply. Table 
V-5 demonstrates that while the demand for labour had increased from 163,000 
workers in 1975 to a total of 1,062,000 workers in 1985, the supply of labour 
had increased from 109,000 workers in 1975 to 678,400 in 1985. This implies 
that the gap between the demand for and the supply of labour had increased 
from 54,000 workers in 1975 to 383,000 workers in 1985 (i.e., the gap had 
increased by more than 709%).
Table V-6 reveals that, between 1970-73, foreign labour inflow increased 
by nearly 31.9% p.a., and between 1976-79 the annual rate o f growth of 
foreign labour averaged at about 30.2%, while it started to decline in the 
subsequent years, particularly from 1980. Hence it could be said that the most 
intense period of foreign labour influx coincided with the elevation of the 
boom period in Libya. The share of foreign workers in the Libyan labour force 
had increased from 22% in 1973 to 34.4%in 1980, but declined to 13.7%% in 
1990.
Regarding the distribution of foreign labour among economic sectors, the 
available statistical figures reveal that the leading sector throughout the boom 
period of 1973-1982 was construction and this was followed by social services, 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing, extraction of oil and natural gas, 
transport and communication, wholesale and retail trade, electricity and water 
and finance insurance and banking services (see Table V-7). However, since 
the official figures on foreign employment did not include unregistered 
workers, the overall percentage in reality could have had a downward bias. 
This downward bias would naturally be expected to be high in both the 
agriculture and the manufacturing sectors, where the ratio of unregistered 
foreign labour in these two sectors was relatively high.
The concentration of foreign labour in construction and agriculture, both 
of which were labour-intensive, is an indication of the high ratio of semi-
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skilled workers within the foreign labour in Libya. Functional classifications 
for foreign labour working in Libya (Table V-8), show that the ratio of 
professional technical workers to total foreign labour working in Libya in 1971 
was 10.2% declining to 6.3% in 1980. The ratio of administrative and 
managerial workers to total foreign labour was 20% in 1971 decreasing to 
4.3% in 1980, while covering the same years the same ratio for semi-skilled 
workers declined from 62% in 1971 to 40%, in 1980.
Furthermore, it is important to note that, by the mid to late Eighties, it had 
become apparent that foreign labour had started to compete with the domestic 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers, which were becoming relatively abundant 
in the economy. So many of these were available following the dismissal of 
considerable numbers of them from the military services and because of the 
suspending of development programmes and the transformation from the public 
to the private sector. This raised the magnitude of unemployment in those 
sectors employing such skills and consequently unemployment in the economy 
as a whole. There were several reasons for the continuance of the immigration 
of foreign labour into the country despite the existence of unemployment. One 
reason lay in the difference between the working conditions accepted by the 
foreign workers and those of the domestic workers. Other reasons were the 
Government's open border policy, its weak labour legislation and virtually non­
existent trade unions. Then there was the public employment policy which had 
formerly guaranteed employment to all Libyans willing to work, regardless of 
their qualifications or demand for their services. But this policy had been 
abandoned, so this was clearly another reason for the rise of unemployment.
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Table V-5
Growth of Demand for and Supply of Labour 1975-1986
1975 1980 1985
Growth Rates (%) 
1975- 1980 
1980 1985
1975-
1985
Demand for Labour 163.0 303.6 1062 86.3 250.0 551.0
Supply of Labour 109.0 143.0 678.4 31.2 374.0 522.0
Shortage of Labour 54.0 160.6 383.0 197.4 138.0 609.0
Source: Ministry of Planning, the Three-Year Economic Development Plan, of 1973-75, the and Five- Year Economic and 
Social Transformation Plans of 1976-80 & 1981-85. and , Economic and Social indicators, ibid
Table V-6
Growth of Foreign and National Labour in Libya 1970-1990
Average annual Growth Rates
1970
Number of Workers 
1973 1975 1980 1985 1990
1970
1973
1973
1975
1975
1980
1980
1985
1985
1990
1-Total Libyan Labour force 433.5 538.1 677.1 812.8 895.C 1019 6.8 11.5 5.0 2.8 0.2
2- National Workers 383.5 419.7 454.1 5328 700.0 879 3.1 3.7 3.4 4.8 5.3
3-Foreign Workers 50.0 118.4 223.0 280.0 195.0 139.2 31.9 30.2 9.3 1.0 -11
4- Percentage of National Workers 88.5 78.0 67.1 65.6 78.2 86.3
5-Percentage of Foreign Workers 11.5 22.0 32.9 34.4 21.8 13.7
Source: As for Table 5
Table V-7
Sectoral Distribution of Foreign Labour In Libya 1970-1990
Annual Growth Rates
Number of Workers (000) Percentage of total (%) 1970 1973 1983
1973 1978 1982 1985 1990 1973 1978 1982 1985 1990 1972 1982 1990
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 14.0 29.0 29.2 25.0 10.3 11.8 11.5 8.8 12.8 7.4 2.9 14.5 -3.4
Instruction of Oil & Natural Gas 3.0 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.5 2.5 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.7 1.3 4.1 13.1
Mining & Manufacturing 11.0 22 39.4 17 11.8 9.3 8.7 12 8.7 8.4 7.9 13.1 -4.3
Electricity Water 1.0 5.0 4.5 3.0 1.4 0.9 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.0 21.7 26 6 -10.6
Construction 58.0 122.0 170.5 107 89.8 49.2 48.4 51.7 54.9 64.6 19.9 20.1 -4.8
Wholesale & Retail Trade 4.0 5.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 3.4 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 18.1 1122 28.6
Transport & Communication 2.0 8.0 11.6 4.0 2.0 1.7 3.2 3.5 2.1 1.4 23.3 25.4 -14
Finance, Insurance & Banking 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 18.1 8.6 87
Administrative & Social Services 24.0 58.0 69.1 35.0 20.8 20.3 23.0 21.0 17.9 15.0 31.2 13.4 -9.1
Total 118.0 252.0 329.6 1950 139.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.
Source: As for Table 5
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Table V-8
Foreign Skilled Labour in Libya Classified According to Occupations 1971-1980
Number of Workers (000) Percentage of Total (%)
1971 1973 1975 1977 1980 1971 1973 1975 1977 1980
Professional, Technical & Related Workers 6.5 12.0 16.1 19.2 17.5 10.2 10.7 7.2 7.2 6.3
Administrative & Managerial Workers 12.9 15.5 24.5 27.1 12.2 20.2 13.1 11.0 10.2 4.3
Clerical and Related Workers 3.0 4.2 6.2 5.2 0.5 4.7 3.5 2.8 2.0 0.2
Semi-Skilled Workers 39.6 50.4 95.3 120.3 112.1 61.8 42.7 42.7 45.2 40.0
Unclassified Workers 2.0 35.9 81.0 94.2 137.7 3.1 30.4 36.3 35.4 49.2
Total 64.0 118.0 223.0 266.0 280.0 100 100 100 100 100
Source : Socialist People Libyan Arab Jamahirya, Secretary of Planning, Libyan and Foreigners during 1970-1985,
(In Arabic, Tripoli, 1987, Tables, PP. 68-69), IMF, Recent Economic Development in Libya, a report reported by Staff 
Mission 1972, Particularly for domestic skilled labour force in 1972., and Socialist People Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 
National Authority for Information & Documentation, yearly statistical series, ibid.
V-5-1-1 Wages
During the period between 1970 and 1990, wages in Libya had undergone a 
great deal of adjustment. Commercial companies in Libya paid wages 
consisting of a basic wage plus increments which were applicable to the 
workers and to the job. These increments could be any or all of the following 
allowances:
1 Family Allowance: This allowance provided an additional set sum to be 
added to the basic wage of the worker for each of his dependants and was 
usually payable monthly. It was usually only granted to male employees over 
18 years old and excluded working wives.
2 Specialisation Allowance. This allowance was originally payable only to 
certain employees with particular rare skills, but it soon became part and parcel 
of the make-up of every salary and was calculated as a percentage which 
depended on the level of attainment reached and the rarity of the skill.
3 Housing Allowance. This was a fixed monthly amount of provision for each 
dependant as an alternative to housing, and like Family Allowance, it was 
given only to male employees and excluded working wives.
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4 Hardship Allowance: This was a special allowance given to jobs in out-of- 
town or remote areas-such as those of oil-fields workers. The allowance varied 
according to the location of the assignment.
5 End of Work Compensation and Pensions. The Libyan Government had a 
pension plan for permanent employees. Those employed on a contractual basis 
were compensated at the end of their periods of work according to the terms of 
their contracts. If end of work compensation was not specified, labour law 
dictated the minimum amount to be granted. However, most private companies 
paid a moth's salary for every year worked.
There were other kinds of allowances too. Such as for overtime done, 
provision for a cut in working hours during certain times, travelling allowance 
and so on.
A survey of foreign employees wages undertaken by the Industrial 
Research Centre (IRC) and the Department of Economic of the University of 
El-Fath 1987, showed that in both the public and private sectors more than 
70% of foreign workers enjoyed wage rates equal to or higher than those of 
Libyans. For example, The informal average wage for a farm worker in 1987 
was about LD 8 per day, while the informal average wage in a contracting 
industry or a small business such as confectionery manufacture, car repairs 
etc., was about LD 10 per day. The attractive rates of pay were one of the main 
reasons for the intensification of immigration.
Regarding the wage levels, the survey of wage movement, conducted by 
the National Authority for Information and Documentation (NAFD) in 1990, 
revealed that the average medium wage in the public sector remained almost 
unchanged for both females and males over the period from 1975-1985 and it 
also showed that the wage differentials between professional and technical 
workers on the one hand and skilled and semi-skilled workers on the other 
were generally narrowing. But it revealed too that the differential between the 
skilled and semi-skilled group and the unskilled workers was wider. In contrast
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the wages of unskilled workers in the private sector improved relative to their 
colleagues in the public sector.
Furthermore, in distinguishing the wage levels in Libya with those in 
relevant and neighbouring countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Tunisia and Algeria the wage levels in Libya during the boom were slightly 
lower than those of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and much were higher than those 
of Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria.
Assessment of whether those wage levels were competitive or not 
requires the measurement of wage cost per unit of production. In other words, 
it requires taking into consideration labour productivity. Table V-9 gives the 
measurements of the unit cost of labour for Libya during the period of 1963- 
1985. It reveals that the rate at which labour productivity grew exceeded that of 
wage growth for most economic sectors particularly during the boom period 
with the exception of the agricultural sector. This growth led to a remarkable 
decline in their unit labour cost and consequently for the economy as a whole. 
In agriculture, however, the rapid rise in wages was associated with a 
significant decline in labour productivity and thus rising wage unit cost in this 
sector.
Additionally two main observations may be made with respect to these 
results. Firstly, since the proportion of foreign labour was highest in services, 
construction and agriculture and lowest in mining and manufacturing it seems 
that there was no apparent relationship between the increase of foreign labour 
and change in the unit wage cost within these sectors. Thus it is quite safe to 
say that immigration had not restored what is so called in Corden’s Model the 
true real wage to its pre-boom level. Secondly, Libya’s traded goods seemed to 
be competitive since there was a significant gain in labour productivity which 
reduced unit wage cost in most sectors during the boom.
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Table V-9
Average Annual Growth Rates of Real Wages, Labour Productivity and Unit Wage Cost in Libya 1970-1990
Real Wage per Worker Labour Productivity Unit Wage Cost
1970
1972
1973
1982
1983 1973 
1990 1990
1970
1972
1973 1983 
1982 1990
1973
1990
1970 1973 1983 
1972 1982 1990
1973
1990
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -22.13 13.38 -2.67 6.25 9.62 -0.17 13.2 5.77 -31.75 13.55 -15.88 0.48
Mining & Quarry (Inc. Crude oil) 4.09 8.51 -5.53 2.36 2.54 11.18 -8.01 2.65 1.55 -2.67 2.48 -0.29
Manufacturing 11.95 6.19 0.02 0.35 5.48 7.34 3.81 5.77 6.47 -1.15 -3.79 -5.42
Electricity, Gas & Water 19.51 1.07 -1.46 -0.06 10.75 9.96 7.05 7.56 8.76 -8.89 -8.51 -7.62
Construction 6.69 -3.56 4.98 0.23 7.65 -1.4 11.23 4.22 -0.96 -2.16 -6.25 -3.99
Transport & Communication 6.93 -1.43 -5.89 -3.41 28 48 3.98 0.80 2.57 -21.55 -5.41 -6.69 -5.98
Wholesale & Retail Trade 12.43 8.95 1.14 5.48 17.22 10.98 -1.20 5.57 17.22 -2.03 2.34 -0.09
Finance, Business & Insurance 5.60 -4.05 -4.76 -4.37 46.65 4.96 -1.70 26.80 -41.05 -9.01 -3.06 -31.17
Services Gathering 3.16 1.52 -5.56 -1.63 6.51 5.29 0.81 7.42 -3.35 -3.77 -6.37 -9.05
Total 14.83 1.14 -5.32 -1.73 5.05 7.87 -1.43 2.62 9.78 -6.73 -3.89 -4.35
Source: Calculated from, Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, and Monthly Bulletin various issues, and National Authority 
For Information and Documentation yearly statistical series various issues. For Labour and Wages Ministry of Planning, Economic 
and Social Indicators 1962-1983 (Tripoli- February 1984), and Structure of Employment in Libya 1971-1994, Unpublished 
Statistical Series March 1995.and National Accounts various issues 1962-1996 
Note 1/=(Change in real wage per worker) - (Change in labour productivity).
V-5-2 The Spending Effect
V-5-2-1. Public Spending.
The Libyan Government is the channel through which the oil revenues are fed 
into the economy. Thus the pattern by which these revenues are distributed 
among the various sectors of the economy will have a crucial impact on its 
development and on the distribution of income. Officially, since 1973, oil 
revenues have been divided between the ordinary or current and development 
or capital budgets by a ratio of 30% to 70% respectively.
Ordinary or current budget covers the expenses on goods and services 
including salaries and wages paid to civil servants as well as transfer and 
subsidies to the householder sector, whereas development or capital budget 
covers the expenses relating to public expenditure on infrastructure and 
investment in manufacturing, agriculture, and social services.
As far as the Dutch Disease Model is concerned government spending 
during a boom will favour non-traded goods sectors and disfavour traded goods
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sectors. What follows is an attempt to examine this presentation against the 
Libyan experience.
Table V-10 illustrates the fact that total government spending over the 
period of 1963-1990, as a ratio of GDP, was very significant in Libya, with an 
average of 33% for 1963-90. There are distinct periods, however, when this 
ratio has actually been higher than this: 1973-1982, 36.2% and 1983-1990, 
34%. The remarkably high ratio in the former period was largely due to an 
increase in capital expenditure. But, in the latter period it was mainly due to 
both an increase in current expenditure and a decline in GDP. Between 1973 
and 1982 the total of actual government spending (at current prices) grew at an 
average rate of 21.3% p.a., which surpassed growth in GDP of 19.9% both at 
current prices, hi real terms, this growth depicts 6.4% p.a., which outstripped 
growth in GDP of 5% p.a.
Turning now to the ratio of capital and current expenditures in total 
government spending, capital expenditure was relatively larger than current 
expenditure throughout the period under investigation, with the exception of 
the 1963-1968 period. The share of capital expenditure in total government 
spending became gradually higher during the oil price shock period of 1973- 
1982, and stood at 68.1% at that time. This demonstrates a considerable gain 
from its pre-boom level of 49.6% and post-boom position of 49.2% during 
1983-1990. This reveals that the rate of growth in government capital 
expenditure had been faster than that of current expenditure (32.1% and 19.5% 
p.a., respectively over the period of 1973-1982). These trends changed in the 
post-boom period of 1983-1990. Capital expenditure growth rate during this 
period was negative while, current expenditure continued to grow at an average 
of 3.4% p.a.
Table V - l l  shows the distribution of current expenditure during the 
period of 1970-1986. It reveals that the share of wages and salaries in GDP had 
increased from 5.5% (41.6% of current spending) in 1970 to 9.9% (62.2% of
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current spending) in 1986, whilst the shares of civil services and the other 
items in both GDP and current spending had declined. The remarkable increase 
in the share of wages in both GDP and total current spending (GCS) during the 
boom period of 1973-1982 was a direct outcome of extensive expansion in the 
civil and social services. Table V-12 shows that the leading sector absorbing 
current expenditure throughout the period under investigation was education 
and training followed by health and social security and law and order and 
protective services.
Table V-10
Trends In Government Expenditure 1963-1990 (In Current Prices)
Annual Growth Rates Percentage of Total Percentage to GDP
1963 1969 1973 
1968 1972 1982
1983
1990
1963
1990
1963 1969 1973 1983 
1968 1972 1982 1990
1963
1990
1963 1969 1973 1983 
1968 1972 1982 1990
1963
1990
Current Expenditure 19.7 20.6 19.5 3.4 15.1 62.8 50.4 31.9 50.8 46.6 17.9 14.1 11.6 17.0 14.9
Capital Expenditure 55.5 35.0 23.1 -6.9 23.2 37.2 49.6 68.1 49.2 53.4 11.0 14.7 24.6 17.0 18.1
Total Expenditure 30.1 26.8 21.3 -3.0 17.2 100 100 100 100 100 28.9 28.8 36.2 34.0 33.0
GDP 30.0 13.3 19.9 -1.2 15.1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, various issues, Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators, ibid and 
National Authority for Information & Documentation, ibid
Table V-11
Government Current Expenditure by Kind of Spending 1970-1986 ( Ratios of GDP & total GCS)
In Percentage of GDP In Percentage of Total
1970 1974 1979 1986 1970 1974 1979 1986
Total Current Expenditure 13.7 11.5 8.7 15.9 100 100 100 100
Civil Service 4.0 2.5 1.9 3.1 29.3 21.6 22.1 19.5
Wages and Salaries 5.7 6.2 5.4 9.9 41.6 54.0 61.7 62.2
Other\ 1 4.0 2.8 1.4 2.9 29.2 24.4 16.2 183
Source: Calculated from Central Bank of Libya, Monthly Bulletin, various issues., and Audit Department, 
yearly statistical series, various issues.
Note: 1- includes, subsidies, transfers & spending on public ceremonies and celebrations, etc.
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Table V-12
Distribution of General Government Expenditure by Sectors (Selective Years at Current Prices)
Percentage of GDP Percentage of Total GGE
1973 1975 1985 1990 1973 1975 1985 1990
Total General Expenditure 13.4 15.6 14.7 19.4 100 100 100 100
Law Order and Protective Services 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.5 9.2 7.9 0.9 2.4
Civil Services 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.8 2.1
Foreign Liaisons 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.5 1.9 2.0
Local Authorities n.a. n.a. 10.7 13.8 n.a. n.a. 72.5 71.1
Education, Sport & Training 1.9 3.1 1.1 1.4 14.3 20 7.6 7.1
Health & Social Security 1.2 1.6 0.7 0.9 9.3 10.2 4.5 4.9
Housing & Public Utilities 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.1 1.8 0.8 0.3 0.4
Transport & Communication 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 3.6 2.7 1.2 0.7
Agriculture, Forestry & Sea Wealth 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 2.5 2.5 0.8 0.4
Mining, industry & Energy 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.5
Economic, Trade & Finance 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.9 2.7 1.8 0.9 4.7
Other 7.3 8.1 1.0 0.7 54.6 51.7 0.9 3.7
Source: As for Table 10
With regard to the distribution of development expenditure among economic 
sectors, the available data (See Table V-13) reveals that during the period of 
1973-1986 there had been a significant shift in investment distribution towards 
commodity-producing sectors compared with that of the preceding period of 
1970-1972. The share of the commodity-producing sectors in the total 
development expenditure had increased from 36.6% in the pre-boom period of 
1970-1972 to 44% in the First Plan period of 1973-1975, and declined 
subsequently to 41% and 35.5% in the Second and Third Plan periods of 1976- 
1980 and 1981-1986 respectively. In contrast the share of the non-commodity 
producing sectors had decreased from 50.5% in the pre-boom period of 1970- 
1972 to 43.2% in the First Plan period of 1973-1975 and increased to 45.6% 
and to 48.5% over the subsequent Plan periods of 1976-1980 and 1981-1986 
respectively. In the meantime, the share of public and social services increased 
only by 1% over the First and Second Plan periods of 1973-1975 and 1976- 
1980, but had increased by 4.7 %  in the Third Plan period of 1981-1986. 
Investment in agriculture had increased by more than 20% of the actual total
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capital expenditure over almost all Plan periods. While, the share of the 
manufacturing sector in the actual total capital expenditure had increased from 
11% in 1970-1972 to 19.4% in the Third Plan period of 1981-1986. Whereas 
the most remarkable change in non-traded sector investment was the decline in 
the share of construction and housing from 30.5% in the First Plan period of 
1973-1975 to 22.4% in the Third Plan period of 1981-1986.
However, despite the relatively small change in the share of public and 
social services over almost all Plan periods, expenditure behaviour does not 
seem to differ from many other economies, where the increase in internal funds 
continually led to an expansion of spending on social services. This is 
particularly so when taking into consideration the volume of investment in each 
plan.
The Libyan story, was not only that the Government particularly wished 
to develop the commodity-producing sectors, but also to develop both the non­
commodity producing sectors and social services too. As a result it increased 
spending on transport, construction and education as well as health and other
social services.
Moreover, the available data on public investment revealed that a large 
proportion of public investment made during the period of 1973-1987 was 
earmarked for large-scale capital-intensive projects. But implementation of 
these projects was so severely obstructed by fundamental institutional 
economic bottlenecks that they substantially reduced the pristine social benefits 
that these projects originally had to offer. Rampant corruption and the shortage 
of technical and skilled labour were chiefly responsible for these problems, 
together with the lack of efficient organisation and management and inaccuracy 
in the statistical data on the economy.
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Table V-13
Sectoral Distribution of Actual Capital Expenditure, 1970-1986, (Value in Million LD. Share, (%) in total).
1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1980 1981-1986
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
Commodity Producing Sector 289.6 36.6 968.5 44.0 3379.5 41.0 4167.9 35.5
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 135.9 17.2 560.8 25.5 1739.2 21.1 1624.0 13.8
Mining (incl., Oil & Natural Gas Instruction) 63.7 8.0 138.2 6.3 363.6 4.4 265.3 2.3
Manufacturing 90.0 11.4 269.5 12.2 1276.7 15.5 2278.6 19.4
Non-Commodity Producing Sector 399.1 50.5 951.7 43.2 3767.6 45.6 5688.3 48.3
Electricity, Energy & Water 80.3 10.2 212.2 9.6 1053.2 12.8 1075.8 9.1
Construction & Housing 241.0 30.5 513.3 23.3 1588.8 19.2 2639.0 22.4
Transport & Communication 77.8 9.8 226.2 10.3 1125.6 13.6 1973.5 16.8
Social & Public Services Sector 102.3 12.9 282.8 12.8 1112.1 13.4 1906.4 16.2
Education & Training 54.3 6.9 174.8 7.9 481.9 5.8 910.0 7.7
Health & Social Security 26.0 3.3 62.9 2.9 272.9 3.3 467.2 4.0
Other sen/ices 22.0 2.7 45.1 2.0 357.3 4.3 529.2 4.5
Total Investment 791.0 100 2203 100 8259.2 100 11762.6 100
Source: Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning, Economic & Social Indicators 1970-83, (Tripoli, February, 84, PP. 15 to 18), 
Socialist People Libyan Arab Jamahirya, National Authority for Information & Documentation yearly statistical series , various issues, 
and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series and Monthly Bulletins, various issues.
V-5-3-1 Private Spending
The increase in oil price was also associated with an increase in private 
spending. A study conducted by the Department of Statistics of the Ministry of 
Planning on household spending in 1989, showed that, with the advent of the 
oil boom, the accumulated wealth of the household had increased substantially, 
and a large proportion of this wealth had been confined to improving the 
general standard of living. This was consumer spending rather than leading to 
any significant contribution in re-structuring of production potential. The chief 
findings of this study indicate that more than 80% of household income went 
into increased consumption, mainly food items, clothing and consumer 
durables, while the remaining 20% was directed to investing in housing (either 
renovation, repairs or construction) and in small business.
On the macro-level the available data (See Table V-14) indicates that the 
most important area of private sector venture during the boom was housing and 
this accounted for more than 40% of total private investment in all Plans. This
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was followed by transport and communication 18.3%, oil and natural gas 
extraction 15.6%, agriculture 7.7%, and manufacturing 5.5%.
Broadly speaking, it is safe to say that private spending seems to be much 
more balanced than would have been envisaged by the Dutch Disease Theory, 
since investment in productive activities was undertaken and this indicates that 
such activities were still relatively profitable under booming conditions, which 
is contrary to the Theory’s predictions.
Table V-14
Sectoral Shares in Private Investment 1973-1985 (LO. Million at 1974 Constant Price)
1973-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1973-1985
(%)
Value Share Value
(%)
Share
(%)
Value Share
(%)
Value Share
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 25.0 6.7 65.0 6.2 126.0 9.2 216.0 7.7
Oil and Natural Gas Extraction 150.0 40.4 155.0 14.6 132.0 9.7 437.0 15.6
Mining 3.0 0.8 100 0.9 15.0 1.1 28.0 1.0
Manufacturing 20.0 5.4 35.0 3.3 98.0 7.2 153.0 5.5
Construction 15.0 4 40.0 3.8 88.0 6.4 143.0 5.1
Wholesale and Retail Trade 7.0 1.9 15.0 1.4 15.0 1.1 37.0 1.3
Transport, Storage and Communication 25.0 6.7 280.0 26.4 206.0 15.1 511.0 18.3
Housing 115.0 30.9 430.0 40.5 620.0 45.4 1165.0 41.6
Social and Administrative Services 12.0 3.2 31.0 2.9 66.0 4.8 109.0 3.9
TOTAL 372.0 100.0 1061.0 100.0 1366.0 100 2799.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of Planning, The Three Year Economic and Social Development Plan of 1973-75, and the Five-Year Economic 
and Social Transformation Plans of 1976-1980, & of 1981-1985
V-6 Relative Prices, Real Exchange Rate and Terms of Trade
The Libyan economy represented an ideal pattern for an open economy facing 
a state of structural dis-equilibrium. This circumstance arose from the nature of 
its economic resources and the patterns of their use and also from its socio­
political environment.
This dis-equilibrium was displayed directly by its inability to diversify its 
economic base and by its persistent dependence on the oil as the main source 
of income to finance investment and pay for its imports. The unbalanced
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position also reflected indirectly upon the structure of capital, the volume and 
role of foreign trade and consequently, on Libya's foreign exchange policy.
V-6-1 Development of the Libyan Foreign Exchange Policy
Libya has continuously maintained a conservative foreign exchange policy. 
While being a member of the Sterling Zone, it clung to the one-to-one 
relationship between the Libyan pound and sterling until 1967. After quitting 
the Zone and joining the dollar bandwagon Libya's foreign exchange policy 
was solemnly observed. Money supply was controlled and exogenously 
determined by changes in the stock of foreign reserves. As the economy 
became increasingly monetised, the factors affecting money supply increased 
in number and their relationship to the money supply became more complex.
In order to glean some sort of understanding about the development of 
this monetary system and Libya's management of foreign exchange, it is 
appropriate here to divide the period into main sub-periods during which the 
monetary system underwent several changes.
The first of these sub-periods encompasses the pre-Independence period: 
the period up to 1956.
This period is marked by the presence of the three currencies that were in 
common use at the time, each circulating in its territory within Libya and with 
its own monetary system.
During the Italian Occupation of Libya, the Italian Lira-the metropolitan Lira- 
circulated freely in all these territories.
After the conquest of Cyrenaica region the British introduced the 
Egyptian pound and, in what had formerly been known as Tripolitania, they 
brought in the military authority pound.
In the area previously known as the Fezzan, the French administration 
introduced the Algerian franc. Bartering was also prevalent and popular in 
remote areas of Libya.
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Monetary matters were dealt with by a preparatory currency committee 
consisting of representatives of Libya, Britain, Italy and Egypt.
The second period comprises the post-independence period: the period 
spanning 1956 to 1995 and from the outset Libya was no longer a multi- 
currencied country. It now had only one currency- the Libyan pound (later the 
Libyan Dinnar).
This period in the history of Libya's monetary system lends itself to 
division into three more sub-periods:
1956-1967: During this time, as already mentioned, Libya belonged to the 
Sterling Zone and the Libyan pound was at par with the pound sterling, (i.e. 
L£. LOO = £.1.00).
When Britain devalued the pound sterling by 14% in 1967, the sterling 
share in Libya's total foreign assets and gold reserves was small in comparison 
with dollars, gold and fund assets (Central Bank of Libya, 1975). However, 
Libya decided not to devalue its own currency, thereby raising its already 
overvalued level by almost 3 chillinges.
1967-1986: Following Britain's currency devaluation in 1967, the Libyan 
Dinnar was detached from the pound sterling and pegged instead to the US 
dollar and consequently, gold at a value of L£ 1.00 = USS 2.88
However, after the breakdown of Breton Woods and due to the 
devaluation of the US dollar in 1971 and its further decline in 1973, the value 
of the Libyan dinnar had increased by 60 cents against the American dollar. In 
other words, LD1.00 = US$3. It remained stable through both oil price shocks 
essentially because of the glut of the foreign exchange which followed them 
and the rate stayed unchanged till 1986.
1986-1995 : Following serious concern about the de-stabilisation of the 
currency arising from the collapse of the oil price and the sharp fall in oil 
revenues, it was decided to take steps to insulate the Libyan dinnar from the 
effects of negative fluctuations in the value of the US dollar, the whims of the
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international financial markets and the resultant deficit in the balance of 
payments. Therefore it was pegged to the SDR.
The parity value was LD 1.00 = SDR 2.88 ± 7.5. However, this action 
automatically devalued the LD relative to the US dollar by 4.2%. Because of 
fluctuations in the value of the American dollar in the world markets, an 
adjustment of ± 10.65% was made in 1992 to Libya's registered official 
exchange rate. The exchange value of 1.00LD relative to the 1.00 unit of SDR 
then reached 0.3942.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Agreement permits a member 
country to adjust its official registered exchange rate more than once if it 
deems it necessary to do so and international fluctuations made it necessary to 
do this twice in 1993 .
An adjustment of ± 13.5% caused the exchange rate to increase to 0.3964 
LD to 1.00 unit SDR and after adjustment toards the end of the year of ± 16% 
resulted in a value of 0.41428 LD.
By the end of 1993 the rate of exchange of the Libyan dinnar had 
decreased from LD1.00 = US$3.40 in 1986 to US$3.25 and by the close of 
1994 its value relative to SDR had dropped from 0.2934 LD in 1986 to 0.35399 
LD.
Commenting upon the pattern of these monetary events, it can be said that up 
to the middle of the 1980's Libya had kept to a fixed exchange rate strategy but 
after 1986, in practice, it was hardly pursued at all.
The substantial decline in oil prices and the use of Libya's foreign 
reserves to prop up its financial commitments and to pay for imports were 
certainly at the root of, if  not totally responsible for, the rapidly increased 
demand for foreign currencies and, of course, the constant attrition of foreign 
reserves. The freezing of these same financial assets was another reason why 
the fixed exchange rate strategy was not followed.
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The circumstances of this period spawned two other Libyan exchange 
rates running concurrently with the official exchange rate- the so-called 
commercial exchange rate where in 1994 l.OOLd = 1.00S and the black market 
exchange rate which ranged between 3.50 LD and 3.25 LD to the US S.
V-6 2 Real Exchange Rate and Relative Prices
In the Dutch Disease literature the most commonly used measure of relative 
price change is the real effective exchange rate, which is the composite index 
of trade-weighted bilateral nominal exchange rates with major trading partners, 
adjusted by the ratio of inflation in the domestic economy to inflation in the 
respective trading partners’ economies.
Table V-15 shows the trade and imports and export-weighted real 
effective exchange rate (REER) for Libya over the period of 1971-1990. It 
shows that most of the appreciation during the boom period took place between 
1973-1978, as the import-weighted real effective exchange rate had appreciated 
by 14%, and the trade-weighted real effective exchange rate by 15%. Apart 
from minor fluctuations, the real effective exchange rate remained stable 
during the period from 1978 to the end of the boom in 1983. But it started 
depreciating slowly in the subsequent periods. The appreciation of Libya's 
import-weighted real effective exchange rate appears to have been moderate 
compared with those of some other countries. The chief reasons for this appear 
to be the heavy subsidies on important food items and the control of domestic 
prices. Domestic price control had started in 1977.
The REER had been developed in an international economic context but 
it may not be an accurate measure of relative price changes in the economy for 
the same reasons that make the law of one price not operable all the time. It 
must be stated that the REER miscalculates the true degree of inflation in the 
domestic economy because it includes both traded and non-traded goods in the 
measurement.
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Other means can be used to measure the change in relative prices. Export 
and import prices are obvious examples of proxies for traded goods. The 
structure of exports and imports determines which is more appropriate. In the 
Libyan case the high import penetration (an average of more than 80% of GDP 
over the period of 1970-1982) meant that the imports covered a wider range of 
goods than did exports which were concentrated in crude oil. The implication 
of this concentration is that oil revenue was subjected to fluctuations which 
were irrelevant to the Dutch Disease Theory, making imports a better measure 
of traded goods' prices. The cost of living index is a far better measure to use 
for non-traded goods and is easy to construct. This measure is also suitable 
because it combines traded as well as non-traded goods.
In the case of Libya, the level of dis-aggregation of price data allowed for the 
construction of a non-traded goods price index composed of seven items: 
foodstuffs (48.2%),housing services (12.2%), education (11%), medical care 
(4.3%), clothing (8.9%) and other personal expenses (3.2%). The weights used 
are in accordance with the dis-aggregated GCL data available from the 
National Authority for Information and Documentation and the Central Bank of 
Libya.
Table V-16 shows indices of some aggregate price series. The indices are 
for both traded and non-traded goods. In Table V-17 these indices are 
converted to relative price form, by using the appropriate indices, and setting 
1975 at 100 (see also Figure V -l). The indices for import and export prices 
have declined significantly relative to the consumer price index over the period 
of 1973-1982. The decline is more pronounced when the cost of living for non- 
traded goods (GCLn) is used rather than the general cost of living (GCL). 
Prices of manufacturing and agriculture, in terms of non-traded goods, have 
also declined, as did the ratio of agriculture prices to GCL involving a 
diminishing farmers’ real income. It is worth noting that the real effective 
exchange rate REER index gives lower rates of decline of traded to non-traded
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goods than other indices (because of its inclusion of both traded and non-traded 
goods in its measurement of domestic inflation.
Table V-15
Real Effective Exchange Rate for Libya , 1971-1990 (LD. per $us)
Import REER Index Export REER Index Trade REER Index
Weighted 1971=100 Weighted 1971=100 Weighted 1971=100
1971 35.21 100 34.06 100 34.40 100
1972 34.75 99 33.93 100 34.15 99
1973 36.43 104 36.28 107 36 33 106
1974 37.68 107 37.23 109 37.36 109
1975 29.41 84 29.01 85 29.12 85
1976 22.32 63 22.13 65 22.19 65
1977 25.45 72 24.84 73 25.01 73
1978 30.14 86 29.46 87 29.63 86
1979 35.25 100 34.36 101 34.57 101
1980 39.98 114 38.70 114 38.99 113
1981 34.65 98 34.06 100 34.19 99
1982 31.67 90 31.30 92 31.38 91
1983 29.54 84 29.27 86 29.32 85
1984 25.70 73 25.93 76 25.86 75
1985 34.54 98 34.07 100 34.17 99
1986 35.85 102 35.82 105 35.79 104
1987 55.99 159 58.31 171 58.00 169
1988 57.80 164 59.25 174 58.93 171
1989 53.84 153 56 11 165 55.60 162
1990 64.20 182 66.39 195 65.96 192
Change between
1971-75 -16% -15% -15%
1973-82 -14% -15% -15%
1983-90 98% 109% 107%
1971-90 82% 95% 92%
Source: Calculated from Tables AV-1 to AV-10 in Appendix AV-1
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Table V-16
Aggregate Price Indices for Libya 1976-1990 (1975=100)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Export Prices ( EP) 100 83 68 66 46 46 59 62 60 62 55 35 35 32 32 32
Import Prices (IP) 100 89 91 88 94 118 135 147 155 125 118 112 108 115 135 166
Manufacturing (MP) 100 110 120 125 160 166 193 208 212 215 222 225 235 242 276 318
Agricultural (AP) 100 125 132 140 186 192 220 239 256 285 278 266 261 287 325 366
General (GCL) 100 109 123 138 170 212 221 234 245 291 318 328 343 353 368 389
GCL for housing (GCLh) 100 115 138 186 227 268 298 321 341 216 225 228 228 233 238 246
Traded good Goods (PT) 100 118 133 156 192 225 236 267 291 253 268 277 282 281 284 294
Non-Traded Goods (PN) 100 113 128 136 187 195 228 254 284 332 368 378 397 414 419 454
Source: Calculated from Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series and Monthly Bulletin various issues 1967-1994, National 
Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical series 1990-1995, and Ministry of Planning, National Accounts 1962-93
Table V-17
Selected Relative Price indices in Libya 1976-1990 (1975=100)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
EP/MP 100 76 57 52.0 31 28 31 30 28 29 24 16 15 13 12 11
IP/MP 100 81 76 70 62 71 75 70 65 67 63 48 49 48 60 69
AP/PN 100 111 103 103 100 99 96 94 90 86 76 70 66 69 78 81
REER 100 76 87 103 119 136 118 108 100 87 117 122 190 197 183 218
MP/PN 100 97 94 92 86 85 85 82 75 65 61 60 59 59 65 70
EP/GCL 100 76 55 45 27 22 27 27 23 21 17 11 10 9 9 8
IP/GCLh 100 77 66 47 41 44 45 46 46 58 52 49 47 49 58 68
PN/PT 100 96 96 87 97 87 97 95 98 131 137 137 141 147 148 145
Source: Calculated from Table VI-16
Figure V-1
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V-6-3 The Trade Regime
Until almost the late Eighties, the State maintained a monopoly over external 
trade. But since the early Nineties, the private sector has been allowed to 
participate in the trade activity. However, the import business remained more 
attractive than export. The situation, however, has been improving. Regulations 
and procedures are being simplified to encourage the growth of those non- 
traditional exports which are still lagging as is made clear by the deteriorating 
balance of non-oil trade position.
Libya has always had a complex system of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
Although such protection makes private investment more profitable in the short 
run, it is argued that in the long run it creates various welfare and efficiency 
losses. The impact of such policies however, depends largely on the level and 
the design of tariffs and other barriers. The system in Libya has been very 
complicated. Effective protection and, therefore, resource costs were found to 
vaiy between the private and public sectors and sometimes even between firms 
operating in the same sector.
Well designed protection, however, still has some considerable support in 
the literature. Hansen (1991) presented an empirical support for the argument 
of infant-industry protection, as he noted that the Egyptians protected new 
industries such as textiles, food processing and beverages and these became 
increasingly competitive industries. This argument was also supported by many 
others including the World Bank (1983). Shemana (1987, p. 22) goes as far as 
suggesting that, without protection, the entire period of 1970-1980 probably 
would have been characterised by the importation of final goods and the de­
industrialisation of the manufacturing sector that already existed.
V-6-3-1 The Impact of Relative Price changes on Commodity Trade.
Right through the period of 1973-1990 foreign trade persistently took a large 
percentage of Libya's gross domestic product. But although this presented a
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general upward trend, the volume of Libya's export business was more 
restrained. During this period exports actually expanded by 264% and this was 
due to a sharp rise in the oil price in the Seventies. The circumstances provided 
enabled improvement in the balance of payments and the welcome relaxation 
of the earlier constraint on foreign exchange and facilitated real increase in 
national income. These two developments intensified overall activity within the 
economy and government strategy encouraged the productive sectors within 
both agriculture and manufacturing.
Table V-18 illustrates how the balance of the effect of commodity trade 
during 1973-82 was affected by the growth in overall economic activity. There 
was a severe deterioration in non-mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
directly due to the inability of these sectors to satisfy demand. But the mineral 
alternatives suffered a depression because of the solid growth in oil sector 
imports.
Trade in machinery and transport equipment however, was vigorous and 
significant. Intensified activity within the economy increased demand for 
foreign manufactures and stimulated more imports. The demand for these was 
encouraged still further because of bottlenecks arising out of this inability to 
meet demand (see Table V-19).
This big increase in imports therefore definitely did not mean that the 
boom put increased pressure on domestic production through relative price 
changes as asserted by the Dutch Disease Model. This observation clearly 
claims that the impact that a sudden change in foreign exchange windfalls may 
have on the structure of an economy depends on more than just relative price 
changes and the additional agents in the picture come within both the macro 
and micro categories of economic effects. For the moment we shall simply 
present the suggested hypothesis and leave it till the following chapters to enter 
into more detail.
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At the macro-level the constraint on foreign exchange was relieved by 
changes in its availability and this had two important results. Firstly, imported 
raw, intermediate and capital inputs to production were made available and 
these were likely to incorporate better technologies than those in use before the 
boom. Secondly, the more abundant foreign exchange enabled the expansion of 
overall economic activity which naturally improved income and therefore 
employment.
If it had happened that the economy had been in a situation of idle capacity 
just prior to the boom, the expansion of economic activity would have allowed 
the increasing utilisation of capacity and the benefits from economies of scale 
where these existed, thereby increasing productivity and ultimately the 
competitiveness of exports.
At the micro-level, the increase in total national income, of course, 
increased demand for all products. The pattern of demand growth depends very 
much on the stage of development of the particular country. For countries in 
the primary stage of development (e.g. Libya in the early Seventies) the 
increase in demand for manufactured goods may be very considerable. 
Changes in the pattern of demand will therefore have great impact on the 
substructure of production and resources will naturally be directed into those 
areas where it needs to be to meet the fast escalating demand. The growth of 
production in any area will increase its productivity even further. Such 
increases would have been enhanced if the growth of domestic demand 
coincided with the growth in demand for exported goods.
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Table V-18
Trends in Libya’s Commodity Trade, 1868-80 (Net Exports as a % of GDP)
Annual Average
Value as a (%) of GDP 1968 1973 1983
1968 1970 1973 1978 1980 1982 1985 1990 1972 1982 1990
Food & Live Animals -2.6 -3.1 -3.9 -3.7 -3.3 -3.6 -2.3 -3.9 -2.83 -3.60 -3.24
Beverages & Tobacco -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.17 -0.10 -0.58
Crude Materials & Inedible (exc.., Fuels) -0.4 -0.3 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.39 -0.58 -0.28
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants & Related Materials 61.6 64.8 54.2 53.0 63.2 51.2 44.4 46.0 60.68 57.19 39.50
Animal Fats and Vegetable Oils -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.20 -0.31 -0.37
Chemical & Petrochemical Products -1.1 -0.9 1.0 -0.6 -1.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 -0.99 -0.78 -0.18
Manufactured Goods Classified chiefly by Materials -5.9 -3.3 -6.3 -5.4 -4.7 -6.9 -3.3 -4.3 -4.33 -5.90 -4.60
Machinery & Transport Equipment -7.5 -4.6 -8.4 -10.3 -7.5 -9.4 -6.1 -6.8 -6.42 -8.63 -7.60
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles -2.9 -2.4 -3.0 -3.5 -2.1 -3.4 -1.9 -1.8 -2.71 -2.92 -2.77
Commodities not Classified According to Kind n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.1 -0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net Export (Total as % of GDP) 40.8 50.0 30.1 28.5 43.8 27.1 30.2 29.1 42.90 32.90 18.44
Trade Ratio. ** 83.8 80.7 79.6 78.1 83.0 77.9 60.4 68.5 79.70 78.90 59.71
Source: Calculated from, Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators, & National Authority for Information and 
Documentation yearly statistical series, various issues.
Note: Trade Ratio is defined as "The ratio of the sum of exports + imports to GDP" (See Peter Lloyd (1968), p.24). This 
Ratio is supposed to indicate the extent of a particular country's dependence on foreign trade Symbolically:
TR. = (X + M) / Y*100, where X is exports, M is imports and Y is GDP
Table V-19
Composition of Imports 1968-1880 (Current Prices)
Annuai Average
Value as a (%) of Total 1968 1973 1983
1968 1970 1973 1975 1978 1980 1982 1988 1990 1972 1982 1990
Food & Live Animals 12.0 19.9 10.8 15.4 15.1 16.9 14.2 13.3 20.6 15.8 15.5 16.0
Beverages & Tobacco 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.4
Crude Materials & Inedible (exc.., Fuels) 2.3 1.8 4.5 2.7 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.2 2.1 2.3 2.5 1.5
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants & Related Materials 3.0 3.2 2.0 2.0 0.8 0.7 1.5 0.3 0.3 3.0 1.3 0.6
Animal Fats and Vegetable Oils 0.8 0.4 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.1 1.3 1.8
Chemical and Petrochemical Products 5.2 5.8 3.9 3.7 3.1 5.4 3.9 7.9 6.8 5.4 4.0 7.0
Manufactured Goods Classified chiefly by Materials 27.3 21.4 25.4 29.2 21.8 24.2 25.1 17.9 23.8 23.3 25.3 22.4
Machinery & Transport Equipment 35.0 29.7 34.0 34.3 41.6 38.0 41.0 38.7 34.6 33.5 37.2 36.5
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 13.4 15.7 12.3 11.1 14.1 10.7 11.0 18.4 9.4 14.7 12.6 13.2
Commodities not Classified According to Kind 0.1 1.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 n.a. n.a. 0.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100. 100. 100.
Source: As for Table V-18
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To conclude, the increases in oil prices in 1973/1974 and 1979 created 
booming conditions in Libya as the country's foreign exchange earnings 
expanded very rapidly after each shock. The boom effects were transmitted to 
the rest of the economy via the spending and income effects, while government 
spending and the subsidy on commodity sectors mitigated these effects.
The general movement of prices in the economy, as measured by the 
change in terms of trade between traded and non-traded sectors, was as would 
have been expected by the Dutch Disease Model (which would have favoured 
the non-tradables and disfavoured of tradables), albeit more moderately than 
experienced by many other developing economies under similar conditions. 
However, commodity producing sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) 
managed to expand during the boom period in response to the rapid rise in 
demand induced by the rise in income.
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PART II: THE DUTCH DISEASE AND  
THE SECTORAL SHIFTS:
166
CHAPTER VI
A N  INVESTIGA TION INTO THE PERFORM ANCE OF  
THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR  
UNDER BOOM ING CONDITIONS IN  LIBYA
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VI-1 Introduction
A period of exceptional boom was generated in Libya following the oil price 
increases of the Seventies and early Eighties as the previous chapter clearly 
showed. The Government revenues resulting from these increases were 
gigantic. The Libyan real exchange rate rose very considerably and the 
spending effect and the resources movement were both remarkable.
This chapter deals solely with agriculture and, of course, particularly with 
Libya's agricultural performance during this boom period.
Between 1973 and 1982, Libya's agricultural output grew by an average 
rate of 4.6% p.a. and employment in the industry grew at an average rate of 
2.3% p.a. This is completely contradictory to the expectation of the Dutch 
Disease Model which presumes a contraction in the output and employment of 
the traded goods sector.
This growth in the agricultural sector of Libya during the boom is 
particularly interesting especially when it is remembered that there were a 
number of separate factors that constrained its supply response. There was first 
the country's narrow physical resource base. Then there were the historical 
developments which evolved a structure within agriculture which was 
unhelpful to the making of large profits in general farming activities. Then 
there were the institutional factors which did not help agriculture - such as 
research and extension services and organisational issues.
This chapter seeks to offer a reasonable answer as to why this divergence 
between the Model and the Libyan experience should occur. Section Two 
actually consists of a discussion upon whether or not the Dutch Disease Model 
can be usefully applied for the analysis of agricultural performance in 
developing economies. However, despite the possibility that there may be 
circumstances included by the Model to explain Libya's agricultural 
performance, the main thing to be deduced after examining this question is that 
indeed the answer lies somewhere else - specifically in the technological
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progress that was made by the agricultural sector during the boom. It was this 
that provided Libya with the basis for production with higher profit.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three further sections. Section 
Three deals with Libya's general agricultural performance. Section Four is 
concerned with a quantitative analysis of the agricultural sector's input and 
output growth, relative price changes, production cost and profitability. Section 
Five presents a conclusion.
VI-2 Applicability of the Dutch Disease Model for Developing Economies.
The controversy concerning the relevance or reliability of the Dutch Disease 
Model and whether or not it can usefully be applied to the analysis of 
developing economies has been a matter that has persisted for more than 
twenty years and there has been much written upon it.
As has been asserted, the Dutch Disease Theory is a static model 
developed from within the general equilibrium framework of an open industrial 
economy to analyse the intersectoral movements originating either from a new 
resource discovery or a great increase in the price of an exportable commodity. 
The focus of the Model is upon the manufacturing sector.
Although there might not be grounds for radical criticism or controversy 
when applying the Dutch Disease Model to examine the intersectoral changes 
in industrialised economies, certain inconsistencies do arise when the Model is 
used to analyse developing economies experiences with booms. Clearly these 
inconsistencies inherently affect the capability and scope of the Model's 
applicability and they constitute the basis for the ongoing debate upon it.
Before dallying further upon this matter it is important to mention that 
many of the advocate's of the Dutch Disease Theory, principally led by Corden 
(1984), have addressed these inconsistencies: particularly those concerned with 
the enclave nature of the booming sector and its constituent products and the 
make-up of the tradable sector.
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It should be mentioned that the enclave nature of the booming sector 
simply means that the spending effect will predominate. Results from a number 
of close studies have shown that it is certainly not a phenomenon exclusive to 
developing economies and that it does not seriously divert the analysis.
Regarding the nature of booming sector products - it goes without saying 
that the tradable sector need not only produce exportable goods but can also 
produce importable goods provided that they are as equally saleable as imports 
and can be perfect substitutes for them. However, if exclusive tariffs and 
volume restrictions are placed on traded goods their prices will be determined 
domestically rather than internationally and therefore they effectively become 
non-tradables.
Turning finally to the constituents of the traded goods sector, it could be 
said that because the sector does not only include manufacturing goods but also 
agricultural goods, that these too should be considered.
The leading questions here would be to what extent would the behaviour 
of agricultural products mirror those of manufactures and do the historical and 
social factors have the same effect on each of their structures?
These matters have recently been debated widely in development 
literature so there is no need to dwell upon them here. All that need be said is 
that, for reasons allied with the methods o f utilising factors of production, 
factors mobility and the differing influences of the socio-economic variables, 
there is a very different response to the profit squeeze in agricultural concerns 
than in manufacturing companies. This becomes more conspicuous if the 
analysis is conducted with the aid of the decomposition of the tradable sector 
model. This underlines the significance of using the dynamic analysis to 
examine the mechanisms through which the boom effects are relayed in 
agricultural economies. (Scherr, 1989). For example, much evidence from 
closer studies on the experiences of agricultural economies with booms has 
revealed that the production of peasant farms had expanded during the boom
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whilst that of commercial ones contracted (Majd, 1991) and this was just as the 
Dutch Disease Model had predicted.
It can also be added that Corden (1984) dealt with a number of similar 
cases. He observed that variations could occur in the performance of some non­
booming industries within the tradable sector and that some could actually 
expand while the sector as a whole was contracting. He explained this by 
means of the factor intensities theory which states that under booming 
conditions, the industries which are comparatively capital-intensive and labour- 
extensive will be free to expand, whilst those which are labour-intensive and 
capital-extensive will contract as a result of labour movement from the tradable 
sector to the booming sector (the resource movement effect) and also because 
of the re-structuring of capital and labour within the tradable sector.
But the factor intensities theory could be extended to include an 
expanding tradable sector too if it was more capital -intensive than services- 
provided that the overall stock of capital and labour in the economy did not 
change (the Paradox Model) and they were both mobile within the two sectors 
(Corden, 1984: 363)
Regrettably though the factor intensities theory does not explain 
contraction in agriculture either compared with commercial operations or of the 
whole sector. There are several reasons for this. First of all it not at all easy to 
see clearly whether the decline in agriculture comparative to other sectors in 
developing economies is due to the Dutch Disease or simply a symptom of 
normal decline in economies that are developing compensated by the growth of 
industry. Because it is not easy to ascertain the counterfactual of the Dutch 
Disease for agricultural performance in developing economies it is just as 
difficult to say that its contraction is directly due to the Dutch Disease or to 
suggest that it is due to more permanent causes. Second, the Dutch Disease 
Model assumes that the sector (and the economy) has a fixed stock of capital 
and this is a very uncertain position for developing economies under booming
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conditions just as much as if  they were quantity-constrained in capital markets 
prior to the boom. Third and probably most important is that the reason why 
peasant farming made more profit may not only have been how intensely 
factors were employed but the method by which this was done. It probable that 
the peasant farms were more labour-intensive than the commercial ones and if 
they were more capital-intensive the likelihood is that they may have been 
unable to redirect their resources anywhere else because of the immobility of 
their capital.
Another reason for the predominantly successful persistence of peasant 
farms under booming conditions was their ability to employ family labour and 
to engage in quite different work concurrent with working on the farms. It is 
also true to say that peasant farmers may bear greater reductions in profits than 
their commercial counterparts before they decide to move into other more 
profitable types of production.
Government polices and institutional factors also play a major role in this. 
Trade and prices policies especially have enormous effect as does the amount 
and quality of public investment in the traded goods sector. This was 
highlighted by Gelb (1986) in his comparative studies of Indonesia, Iran, 
Nigeria, Algeria, Ecuador, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago and by Scherr 
(1989) in her examination of Mexico, Nigeria and Indonesia.
There are other analytical problems encountered which beset the Dutch 
Disease Model's usefulness to examine the response of the agricultural sector 
under booming conditions. The most outstanding of these is the difficulty of 
segregating the resource movement of the boom from normal rural-urban 
migration and while this problem exists it is impossible to test the ability of the 
Model's accuracy in this respect.
Another problem concerns the difficulty of distinguishing the spending 
effect of the boom from government spending because of the familiar 
inclination of government spending towards urban development. Increases in
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government spending may only have come about as a result of the boom 
whereas government spending in urban areas may have gone on for some time 
prior to the boom and could be expected to continue regardless of the boom 
and may even be increased in these areas regardless of the boom too. So the 
problems for analysis arising from this are very apparent.
This urban partiality will not only affect agriculture but also 
manufacturing. Cheaper imports resulting from the boom may eliminate a large 
number of import-substitutes and the government may feel obliged to make 
industrial acquisitions. The government may also feel it necessary to increase 
its spending by investing in agriculture and manufacturing to protect both 
sectors. The outcome of this would be pressure on tradables generally but the 
Dutch Disease Theory would not recognise this. It would see only the 
adjustment imposed on a smaller part of the traded goods sector - simply those 
that are unprotected. It is not inherent to the Dutch Disease Model to allow for 
change. Analysis is only feasible through the assumption of fixed coefficients 
o f production. Therefore government spending is only significant where it 
affects the non-traded sector and ultimately alters relative prices. But if  the 
concept of fixed technical coefficients is omitted it can be seen how 
government spending, endorsing and incorporating technological changes, can 
alter the result from that forecast by the Model.
With these problems concerning the Dutch Disease Model in mind, it 
would seem that the structuralist theories may be more appropriate when 
dealing with developing economies. These theories presume that the torrent of 
extra money coming into the economy from the boom would end two of the 
fundamental constraints afflicting developing economies: namely, the 
unavailability of foreign exchange and the savings constraint. This could 
explain the common appearance of a dormant growth sector in developing 
economies. This is made conspicuously obvious in those economies that 
benefit from cheap imports as a consequence of currency appreciation during
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the boom period. The readily accessible abundance of foreign exchange will 
help in bringing developed technology into the economy. Technological 
advances then usually work themselves out through increased productivity 
which, in turn, reduces costs and increases profit (Karshenas, 1990) and a good 
step for government to take to promote this would be for it to invest in basic 
technology. Therefore taking the government sector and technological change 
out of the analysis may yield misleading and incorrect results about the 
performance of the traded sector and, in countries where the government takes 
a large part of the resource revenue subsequent to huge windfall gains, it would 
seriously undermine the possibility that any accurate assessment could be made 
from the findings of the theory of adjustment (Gelb, 1981).
The ultimate deciding factor emanating from the pressure on the tradable 
sector is profitability. The Dutch Disease Model does not allow for analysis of 
the cost function which individual producers face or its change over the course 
of time because of changes in other producers prices or changes in the 
technology of production. Therefore the Dutch Disease Model should be 
combined with both micro and macro-analysis.
Macro-analysis of the boom illustrates the rise in the cost of labour and 
other non-traded inputs as putting the pressure on profits in the traded goods 
sector. But because firms differ widely in their use of inputs, rates of return on 
investment, etc., it is very unlikely that a whole sector would lose its 
competitiveness. It is therefore valuable to research unit costs across firms and 
note their movements during the boom. The Heckscher Diagram is a very 
suitable analytical mechanism to use to do this. It was used to study Sweden's 
economic problems of 1918 which were caused by foreign competition. 
Heckscher demonstrated that, with non-flexible capital, such diagrams remain 
quite stable from one year to another and that they reveal the firms about to be 
forced out by cost increases or product price decreases (Forsund, 1981). If 
technical developments occur and capital is malleable then the diagrams do
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become more complex and less stable. But to answer the question: how do 
changes in prices, costs and technology during a boom change a firm's 
profitability? the problem for any analyst would be to say that frankly nothing 
short of a specifically sectoral input-output mix for the traded sector as a whole 
and for the main industries within it would answer it.
VI-3 The Performance of Agriculture 1973-1990
VI-3-1 Growth Trends
As mentioned already, before the discovery of oil the Libyan economy was 
predominantly an agricultural economy. Sedentary farming was practised 
wherever possible but much of the farming was nomadic.
Poor soil and inadequate water sources had been a fact of life for the 
people of Libya for millennia. Production was almost merely subsistent. But, 
since the discovery and exportation of oil in commercial quantities in the early 
1960s, Libya started changing into an economy which produced other 
commodities and services. Consequently, agriculture's share in GDP steadily 
declined, reaching 9.8% in the early Seventies. During the oil price shock 
period of 1973-1982, agriculture's share in GDP became very much more 
reduced and had sunk to 3.1% in the early Eighties. Historical trends in the 
sector's growth and share in aggregate output and total employment are given 
in Table V I-1 below.
Table VI-1
Agriculture and GDP Growth Rates and Contribution of Agriculture to GDP and Employment 1962-90
Average Annual Growth Rates Agriculture’s Share (Period Average) in
GDP Agriculture GDP Employment
1962-1972 19.0 4.4 9.8 34.2
1973-1982 13.5 2.5 3.1 20.3
1983-1990 -2.5 14.9 4.5 18.6
1962-1990 11.2 6.7 6.0 25.1
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators (ibid.) and National Authority 
for Information and Documentation (ibid.) several issues.
Note: See Appendix AV-1 for aggregate output deflators.
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It is obvious from Table V I-1 above that agriculture's share during the boom 
period of 1973-1982 was far below its share during the pre-boom period. This 
relative decline in the agricultural sector share may be interpreted as an 
indication of the Dutch Disease, but it should be mentioned that there are many 
other considerations that could line-up against this conclusion. First of all, 
considering the limited supply base of the sector, a 2.5% p.a. growth over the 
boom period is largely significant, implying an increase of 136% in the sector's 
output. This also compares impressively with almost the rest of the world 
during the same period V Second, and perhaps most importantly, since the 
Dutch Disease Model is concerned with the overall performance of the 
tradables, without taking into consideration factor self-efficiency (the 
proportion of agricultural products that are produced and consumed 
domestically), it seems that the behaviour of agriculture in Libya during the 
boom period does not coincide with the Theory's predictions, so long as a 
significant increase in agricultural production had taken place during that 
period.
VI-3-2 Domestic Consumption of Agricultural Products
With the advent of a boom as already stated, per-capita income will increase 
rapidly and so will the demand for both traded and non-traded goods and, 
consequently, the spending on them. Due to the currency appreciation and the 
absence of any intervention, imports become cheap relative to domestically 
produced products. Inevitably, a high proportion of this increasing demand will 
be taken up by these imports. However, even though this relationship is very 
pronounced with regard to manufactured goods, it does not appear to be 
conspicuous for food and agricultural goods because of the low income and 
price elasticities of demand compared to those for manufactures.
1 According to the World Bank Development Report of 1983, the average annual growth of agricultural output 
for low-income, middle-income and developed economies was 2.3% p.a. , 3% p.a., and 1.8% p.a. respectively 
over 1970-1980 (World Bank, 1983)
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The impact of the increase in per-capita income on the demand for food 
in Libya is shown in Table (VI-2). The most remarkable changes were 
observed for cereals, eggs, meat, milk and other dairy products, whose per- 
capita consumption more than doubled, while the per-capita consumption of 
sugar, coffee, tea and cocoa had increased by 18% and 27% respectively. Libya 
does not produce rice, sugar, coffee, tea or cocoa and has a low elasticity of 
supply for cereals. The ratio of imports to domestic consumption during the 
boom period averaged 100% for sugar, tea, coffee and cocoa, and 90% for 
cereals (see Table VI-3). This means that a sizeable portion of the increased 
income was spent on food imports. Meanwhile, the income elasticity of 
demand for fruits and vegetables, which have a high elasticity of supply, was 
low. During nearly the entire period under investigation -namely 1973-1990 - 
the production of all vegetables and fruit had increased substantially and, since 
the early Eighties, almost all vegetables and fruit produced domestically 
achieved surplus, and this surplus was processed.
Libya was traditionally self-sufficient in seasonal fruit and vegetables, 
while it also imported some other types of agricultural products. This was and 
has persisted to be the case before and after the boom with one qualification 
and that is that the self-sufficiency factor (the ratio of domestic production to 
consumption) increased for almost all agricultural products. This is evidenced 
by the remarkable increase in production of almost all agricultural products. 
Even so, agricultural imports had continued to increase and the deficit gap 
continued to widen (see Tables AVI-1-7, AVI-1-8 and AVI-1-9 in Appendix 
AVI-1). Between 1973 and 1982 the trade deficit in agricultural products - the 
main components of which are cereals - increased nearly fourfold, reflecting 
both a substantial increase in domestic demand and low agricultural exports. 
However, it should be mentioned here that the decline in exports during this 
period was not merely an outcome of a decrease in production but was a
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reflection of government policy which aimed to manufacture the surplus of 
domestic agricultural products as well as to have control of external trade.
Table VI-2
Per-Capita Consumption of Agricultural Goods (K/annum) 1975-90
Percentage Change
(Kg/annum) 1975 1982 1975
1975 1982 1985 1990 1982 1985 1990
Cereals 118.17 232.42 200.46 181.54 96.68 -13.75 53.63
Wheat Flour 100.00 212.90 180.50 159.76 112.9 -15.22 59.75
Rice 18.17 19.52 19.96 21.78 7.43 2.25 19.87
Vegetables 2427 244.9 245.4 227.54 0.89 0.20 -6.26
Fruit & Citrus 81.12 82.51 83.09 102.72 1.71 0.70 83.04
Meat 21.32 28.16 30.01 30.76 32.08 6.57 44.28
Milk & Dairy Products 15.83 19.06 30.21 57.23 20.40 58.5 261.50
Eggs (mn) 69.07 112.2 178.04 144.58 62.44 58.68 109.30
Sugar 48.93 57.88 45.51 50.12 18.29 -21.40 2.43
Coffee, Tea and Cocoa 2.62 3.33 4.30 4.58 27.10 29.13 74.81
Source: Ministry of Planning, An Analytical Statistical Study on Per-Capita Consumption in Libya 
1975-1985, pp. 18-19, & Economic and Social Indicators, various issues, and National Authority 
for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical series particularly for the period 1985-1990.
Table VI-3
Imports, Production and Consumption of Major Agricultural Commodities ( Average 1973 -  1984)
Consumption Production Imports
Production/
Consumption
Imports/
Consumption
Cereals 727.2 255.4 653.6 35.12 89 88
Vegetables 462.2 542.5 35.3 117.36 7.64
Fruit & Citrus 185.2 152.6 32.6 82.40 17.60
Meat 54.0 43.4 10.6 80.37 19.63
Milk & Dairy Products 140.1 89.8 50.3 64.10 35.90
Sugar 65.6 0.0 65.6 0.00 100.00
Coffee, Tea and Cocoa 13.2 0.0 13.2 0.00 100.00
Source: As for Table VI-2
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VI-4 Factor Input and Output Growth.
VI-4-1 Arable Land
Despite the absence of accurate and reliable data, the information in existence 
for the 1950's suggests that the amount of arable land available had decidedly 
declined during that decade. But, due to agricultural development and land 
reclamation programmes which were begun in the early 1960's, the position 
considerably improved from then on and it continued that way into the late 
1980's - with a particularly remarkable increase in total area of land available 
for cultivation during the boom years of 1973-1982.
The total agricultural area in Libya had increased from 10,100 hectares in 
1970, to 14,615 hectares in 1975 and 16,149 hectares by 1990. Around 11% of 
this total was arable land whilst the remainder was divided between land under 
permanent crops, forest and woodland, meadows and pasture (see Table VI-4).
Table VI-4
Development of Land Use in Libya 1966-1990 (1000ha)
1970
Type of Land (ha) 
1980 1985 1990
Percentage of Total 
1970 1980 1985 1990
Average
1966
1972
Annual Growth 
1973 1983 
1982 1990
Total Land in Use 10100 15680 16087 16145 5.7 8.9 9.1 9.2 5.30 1.30 0.20
Arable Land 2375 1753 1787 1805 23.5 11.2 11.1 11.2 -3.70 0.20 0.30
Land under Permanent Crops 142 327 340 350 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 17.40 0.60 0.90
Permanent Meadows & Pastures 7050 13000 13300 13300 69.8 82.9 82.7 82.4 8.30 1.50 0.10
Forest and Woodland 533 600 660 690 5.30 3.80 4.1 4.2 1.10 1.40 1.40
Wasteland 165854 160274 159877 159809 94.3 91.1 90.9 90.8 -0.30 -0.10 -0.10
Total Land 175954 175954 175954 175954 100. 100. 100. 100.
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Unpublished Agricultural Statistical Reports, various issues
The available evidence regarding land prices highlights the fact that the 
increase of these in Libya stands as a paramount example of how relative 
prices, under booming conditions, change in favour of the non-traded goods. 
Although there are no official figures on the subject there are several indicators 
suggesting increases ranging from 100% to 1000%, depending on the location,
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with the higher increases relating to central city areas within and adjacent to 
Tripoli and Benghazi.
These increases were the direct outcome of two important factors. Firstly, 
the rise in per-capita income in the Seventies which generated an increase in 
spending on building and construction and led to an increase in the demand for 
land and consequently a rapid rise in land prices. Secondly, non-agricultural 
private enterprise was abolished after 1976. The way that this eventually 
affected investment in agriculture is hard to assess but it can be said that the 
sharp increases in land prices increased agricultural production costs.
When summing up it is safe to say that despite modest expansion in the 
total agricultural land available, the boom period witnessed a substantial 
improvement in agricultural technology in the method of irrigation, the use of 
fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides as well as in seeds. These inputs and 
techniques created substantial increases in the yield per hectare cultivated, and 
enabled farmers to change the cropping pattern which had customary in 
traditional rain-fed farming and undertake more remunerative propositions.
VI-4-2 Labour Supply.
As in most oil exporting countries before the discovery of oil, the agricultural 
sector in Libya was the first most important labour absorbing sector. However, 
since the discovery and exportation of oil in the early Sixties, it became 
apparent that there had been a permanent decline in the share of the agricultural 
sector within the total employed population. Between 1962 and 1982, the 
labour force in agriculture declined from about one-third to less than one-tenth 
of the total employment. This decline took place while the total labour force in 
Libya grew at 2.3% p.a. The main reasons behind this were the increase in 
rural-urban migration and the vast investment programmes. As a result, labour 
immigration increased from the early Seventies to almost the mid-Eighties. The
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number of foreign workers employed in agriculture rose from 14,000 in 1973 
to 29,200 in 1982 - an increase of nearly 15% p.a..
Labour shortages appeared to have had different consequences for 
government projects and private farming activities. Where government projects 
relied more on foreign labour the majority of foreign labour went to the public 
agricultural projects.
But it is important to note that despite the decline in the number of 
Libyans employed in the agricultural sector, there had been an increase in total 
agricultural employment as a result of the immigration of non-Libyans. The 
corollary of the above is that the private farming sub-sector bore the full brunt 
of the decline in the number of workers employed in agriculture as a whole, 
and that the decline of labour in that sub-sector was more serious than the 
official employment figures suggested. The resource movement was very 
serious for the private farming sub-sector, while it was largely alleviated by 
labour immigration in the public agricultural sub-sector. This seems to be due 
to the government employment policy which prevented the private farming 
sub-sector benefiting from foreign labour rather than being due to the low 
productivity of private farming activity.
Generally speaking however, since output from the whole sector 
expanded during the boom period, it is safe to conclude that pro- 
agriculturalisation rather than de-agriculturalisation had taken place. This result 
is interesting, because labour immigration on its own would not have enabled 
this outcome to occur. Whereas according to the Dutch Disease Model 
predictions, (namely the Paradox Model), so long as there is any spending 
effect in the economy which would be enlarged by immigration workers' 
spending, real appreciation and higher wages would not be entirely countered 
by labour immigration and some de-industrialisation would be inevitable 
(Corden, 1984). In other words, immigration could only increase output in the
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lagging sector relative to its pre-boom levels, but it would not restore it to its 
pre-boom levels nor to increase it in any way.
VI-4-3 Capital.
There are generally speaking, two categories of farming in Libya, distinguished 
from each other by the amount of investment allocated to production. Irrigated 
farming projects produced examples of the relatively high capital input crops, 
while rain-fed field crops required a relatively low capital input. Since an 
important proportion of agricultural investment during the boom period took 
place in the coastal area, this gave agricultural production a permanent dual 
structure. Over the entire period under study, the areas cultivated in coastal 
areas accounted for no more than 15% of the country's total cultivated arable 
land, but produced an amazing 80% of Libya's total agricultural production.
Government agricultural investment took the form of public large-scale 
rain-fed projects as well as artificially irrigated ones. Investment in small-scale 
irrigated farming projects and plastic agriculture was financed mainly by the 
private sector.
The importance of government investment in agriculture arose from the 
fact that it could relieve the impact of additional spending on non-traded goods. 
If government investment embodies technological change, the supply responses 
of the sector will be altered through the effect of productivity. This effect is as 
real as the spending effect and yet it cannot be accounted for in the Dutch 
Disease Model because the Model abstracts from the government sector, and 
omits the impact of technological changes. To the extent that government 
investment generates private investment, taking only government investment 
into consideration understates the degree to which the spending effect is 
alleviated by investment. (This is especially true if private investment involves 
a multiplier effect). Accordingly, both sources of investment in agriculture 
should be considered.
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The available data on capital fixed formation revealed that investment in 
agriculture over the boom period of 1973-1982 was 12.9% of the total 
investment in all sectors of the economy and about 65% of this was 
concentrated in irrigation farming alone. Most of this was financed by the 
government. A laudable accompaniment of this public investment in agriculture 
was the fast introduction and absorption of advanced technologies, especially 
in irrigation fanning and agriculture under plastic, as well as the utilisation of 
chemical fertilisation and disease-controlling techniques by both the public and 
the private sectors (Secretariat of Agriculture, 1988 p.315).
Over the same period private sector investment in agriculture accounted 
for about 5 .7% of total private investment, or 1.2% overall of combined private 
and public investment. The significance of these figures for private investment 
in agriculture during the boom period stems from the low share of agriculture 
in GDP. Where the share of agriculture in GDP during the boom period 
averaged 3.1%, in real terms, compared with 39.9% for services which 
received about 69.3% of total investment. Part of this investment would indeed 
have benefited agriculture. It must be emphasised that the level of private 
sector involvement in the sector is quite unprecedented. From about LD 7 
million over the period 1973-1975, private investment in agriculture rose to LD 
15 million over 1976-1980 and furthermore to over LD 45 million in the 
subsequent Plan Period of 1981-1985 (the Economic and Social 
Transformation Plans between 1973-1985).
Government investment in basic technology precipitated private 
investment. This can be deduced from the fact that private investment was 
directed towards increasing inputs per unit of cultivated land (vertical 
expansion) and adopting more advanced farming techniques. These types of 
investment were encouraged by the reduction in risk-associated farming and 
permitted the use of other embodied technologies such as fertilisers, pesticides, 
and improved seeds through their complementary relationships. The available
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data on irrigated areas shows that the total of irrigated area had increased by 
24.2% over the period 1973-1985. A total of 27,934 hectares had been irrigated 
during the first three-year Plan Period of 1973-1975, 93,690 hectares during 
the first five-year Economic and Social Transformation Plan Period of 1976- 
1980 and 66,331 hectares during the second five-year Economic and Social 
Transformation Plan Period of 1981-1985. Accordingly, cropping intensity had 
increased substantially.
At this point two very important questions present themselves. The first 
concerns the extent to which agricultural investment could have contributed to 
the increase in agricultural output per hectare of cultivated land in Libya and 
the second concerns how this investment stimulated other improvements in 
cultural practices, thereby further increasing land productivity. To answer the 
first question we compare the increase in the irrigated area under vegetables 
with the change in output per hectare. Table VI-5 reveals with sufficient 
significance the existence of an interrelationship between irrigation and yield: 
The increase in the former is associated with an increase in the latter. 
Comparisons with rain-fed crops reveal a certain distinction in output per 
cultivated hectare between irrigated and rain-fed crops and leaving no question 
about the superiority of irrigated agriculture in terms of productivity in Libya.
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Table VI-6
Irrigation and Land Productivity for Vegetables and Fruit Production, 1973-1984
Irrigated 
Area (000,ha)
Ratio of Total 
Area under 
Cropping
Yield (ton/ha) 
Irrigated Rain-fed
1973 190 61.3 31.2 4.9
1974 195 62.3 33.4 5.5
1975 200 63.5 34.6 6.4
1976 205 64.5 36.6 6.6
1977 210 65.6 36.0 6.9
1978 215 66.6 33.8 6.7
1979 220 67.7 33.8 7.1
1980 225 68.8 36.4 8.1
1981 225 68.8 36.9 8.1
1982 227 69.4 42.9 9.7
1983 230 69.7 45.4 10.4
1984 232 69.3 43.9 9.9
Source: Calculated from the Agricultural and Land Reclamation Secretariat, (May 1981) 
Statistical Data on the Agricultural Sector between 1966-1980, Tripoli., Agricultural 
Ministry, of (Feb 1985) Report., and National Authority for Information and Documentation 
yearly statistical series, various issues.
With regard to the second question concerning how agricultural investment 
stimulated other improvements, indeed the impact of irrigation on land 
productivity goes beyond the straightforward matter of increasing water 
availability and the reliability of its supply. The advent of irrigation made the 
adoption of more modem techniques possible, not only because of the 
technical factors but also because of financial reasons. The increase in 
productivity increased farmers income and thus enabled more investment in 
farming technologies and the introduction of another crop, thereby increasing 
cropping intensity. These factors combined to enable production at different 
input-output combinations and at higher productivity.
Furthermore, with the help of empirical analysis, many economists have 
argued for the existence of successive levels of productivity-increase each in 
step with the intensifying role irrigation plays: first in stabilising harvest 
fluctuations, second in making possible the introduction of another crop and
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finally by facilitating the introduction of more advanced farming techniques 
and improved inputs.
The Libyan case does not differ much from this notion, where the 
introduction of improved seed varieties and the increased application of 
fertilisers and manure and other improved farming techniques occurred 
simultaneously with the improvement in irrigation. This was because of the 
integrated development techniques adopted by both the public and the private 
sectors.
VI-4-4 Agricultural Output.
Despite the moderate increase in the cultivated land and the relative smallness 
of the agricultural share in the labour force, the increase in capital- with its 
ensuing increase in productivity - gave agriculture enough drive to increase its 
production from LD 60 million in 1973, to LD 99.7 million in 1976 and then to 
LD 193 million by 1982. This represented a growth of 2.2% p.a. over 1973- 
1982, although the performances of some products were highly variable and 
even sometimes insufficient. The total volume of outputs of major agricultural 
products are given in Table VI-6 for the period 1968-1991. Over the period of 
1973-1982, vegetable output increased by 11.3% p.a. and fruit output by 6.3% 
p.a. However, despite the remarkable increase in the production of wheat - 
which increased by nearly 30.5% p.a.- total cereals output showed a 9.4% 
decline, while meat, milk and eggs outputs had increased by 13.5% p.a., 7.7% 
p.a. and 25.5% p.a. respectively.
There are both supply-side and demand-side factors responsible for 
agricultural performance in Libya. On the demand side, because of the boom 
demand in the domestic market was buoyant and the prices of agricultural 
products continued to rise, leading to an increase in agricultural production. On 
the supply-side, investment in large and small agricultural projects by both the 
Government and the private sector during the Sixties and later, yielded high
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returns during the boom period. This was enhanced by the use of high 
agricultural technology and agrochemical inputs and improved irrigation 
methods. Output growth was very rapid, particularly that of certain products 
(such as tomatoes, cucumber, potato, onion, watermelon and fruit) which 
occupied more than 80% of the total irrigated land area in Libya.
Although the picture on the supply-side changed fundamentally during 
the second half of the Eighties, agricultural production continued to increase at 
almost the same pace. Where, since the mid-Eighties, it became apparent that 
public investment in agriculture had come to a standstill, most of the public 
agricultural projects were either halted or totally demolished. Government 
subsidy on agricultural equipment, fertilisers and agrochemical input and 
output prices were also cut off. However, the gap between domestic supply and 
demand was narrowed further. The rapid increase in production during this 
period can be attributed to the crucial increase in demand enhanced by the 
introduction of more liberal trade and also to the open border policy which 
encouraged exports and consequently production. The source just cited 
however refuted the argument that the upward exchange rate of the Libyan 
Dinar and the high cost of Libyan agricultural labour, relative to regional 
labour costs, rendered Libyan produce more expensive. Yet once trade 
constraints had relaxed and the open door policy had started, agricultural 
exports increased and led to further expansion in almost all agricultural 
products.
This implies the importance of demand factors together with relative price 
changes in determining farmers incomes, which in turn highlights the limitation 
of the neo-classical approach in general and the Dutch Disease Theory in 
particular which considered supply-side factors when demand conditions are 
far from stable. Also, it indicates that, despite the currency appreciation and the 
relatively high level of wages, the production costs of some agricultural 
products in Libya seem moderate, especially when compared with those for
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neighbouring countries (mainly Egypt Algeria and Tunisia). This was because 
of considerable gains in labour productivity (see Table VI-7). The last point 
cannot be over-emphasised in relation to the Dutch Disease analysis where the 
wage differentiation between Holland and Germany was the definition that 
Corden (1983: 441) used for currency appreciation, implying that it was the 
main mechanism through which the squeeze on the Dutch exports was effected.
Therefore it is true to say that the reasons for the expansion of 
agricultural production in Libya may not be found in a Dutch Disease analysis 
because it does not allow for productivity changes and technical coefficients 
are assumed constant. This ends the discussion upon the performance of 
agriculture during the boom period.
Table VI-6
Change in Agricultural Production 1968-1991
Production (000MT) Annual Growth Rate Share in Total Agri. Crops
1968 1973 1983 1968 1973 1983 1968 1973 1983
1972 1982 1991 1972 1982 1991 1972 1982 1991
Cereals Total 978.4 2614 3094 3.0 17.8 2.7 29.4 20.8 18.4
Wheat 216.9 1024 1503 17.1 30.2 3.6
Barley 223.2 1402 1466 38.4 232 16.6
Maize 6.3 10.6 9.6 5.7 -2.2 0.4
Legumes 72.6 176.9 115 10.8 -3.5 1.5
Vegetables Total 1129 5903 8674 9.1 11.3 5.5 33.9 46.9 51.7
Potatoes 77.6 1054 1262 21.0 45.5 7.5
T omatoes 648 1445 1603 1.0 4.0 -0.1
Water Melons 175.3 1430 1280 28.2 11.6 2.7
Dry Onions 111.1 939 1107 22.2 13.5 9.3
Other 116.8 1035 3422 32.1 24.8 10.9
Fruit Trees Total 1224 4063 5019 1.4 6.3 2.8 36.7 32.3 29.9
Fruit & Citrus 492.2 1637 2426 4.2 6.9 2.0
Olives 389.2 1384 1456 19.9 9.0 3.1
Almonds 17.3 49.5 52.1 7.7 5.0 1.2
Dates 293.3 796.4 784 4.2 2.1 4.5
Grapes 31.8 197 210.7 -0.9 14.2 8.4
All Agricultural Crops 3331 12419 16760 3.0 8.5 4.0 100 100 100
Meat (Red & White) 185.9 869.1 1349 5.7 13.5 5.8
Milk 173.8 915.3 1914 4.4 7.7 11.5
Eggs (Mn.) 248 2256 4781 4.7 25.5 7.6
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators 1970-1983, (ibid) 
and National Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical series, various issues.
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Table V1-7
Productivity Growth and Labour/ Capital Ration in Agriculture 1961-1991
Malmquist Index of TFP Annual % Growth Rate Factor Ratio 
L /Kstart Finish Malmquist Efficiency Technical
Libya 0.44 1.95 5.96 3.9 2.5 0.01
Egypt 1.00 1.08 0.48 0.0 0.4 1.92
Tunisia 0.89 1.80 3.78 0.6 2.8 0.08
Algeria 0.88 1.75 2.65 -0.29 2.1 0.07
Source : Adopted from Angela, L., and Colin, T.,(1997), Total Factor Productivity and the Effects of R&D 
in African Agriculture, Journal of International Development, Vol,9, No,4, 529-37
VI-5 Changes in Agricultural Prices
The Dutch Disease Model predicts a decline in the return to the specific factor 
in the lagging sector, which is translated as a decrease in profitability. This is 
because the rise in the wage rate is relative to producers prices which, induced 
by the resource movement effect, crowds profitability in that sector in absolute 
terms. If profitability also falls in relative terms, resources will, in the medium 
term, move out of the traded sector and into the non-traded sector.
How changes in input prices affect resource allocation, however, depends 
not only upon the relative changes in input and output prices in a static manner, 
but also on the change in the technical coefficient of inputs, which ultimately 
disrupts the existing input-output relationship. Thus a dynamic analysis is 
necessaiy to explore the interrelationship between changes in prices, costs and 
profitability.
In doing so, a primary well-known general function cost is used to 
determine the farming sector net profit. According to this function, net 
producers’ profit, n, can be expressed in terms of total revenue R, and total cost 
C, as follows:
7i — R-C (1)
Using the broad definitions of both R and C, equation (1) can be rewritten as:
n = Q.P - (F + L + M) (2)
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Where F, L and M, stand for fixed, labour, and material costs respectively. 
This equation can also be given in terms of unit costs as:
7 r = p - ( f + l  + m)  (3)
Equation (3), implies that change in profit per unit n  depends on changes in 
both labour and material costs / and m and on the producer’s pricesp
First it is necessary to examine how changes in labour cost and the prices 
of material inputs influence change in variable cost, taking changes in input- 
output coefficients into consideration. Changes in producers’ prices will then 
be looked at and related them to unit cost changes to arrive at an indicator of 
profit margins. To facilitate the analysis, wheat and barley will be taken as 
representative of field fanning production, tomatoes, potato, and dry-onion will 
represent vegetables and citrus will represent fruit.
Tables AVI-2-1 to AVI-2-3 in appendix AVII-2 show the cost structure 
for major agricultural crops in Libya in 1975, 1977 and 1980. Table AVI-2-4 
shows the average cost of major agricultural crops 1975-1980, while Table 
AVI-2-5 gives the technical coefficients of production for the period 1975- 
1980. Based on the cost shares, the tables suggest that fruit and vegetables 
were more labour-intensive than cereals, although all enterprises were more 
capital-intensive in 1980 than in 1975 because of the resource movement. 
Material inputs for vegetables and fruit increased significantly over the period, 
due to the adoption of modernised techniques and were more significant in the 
production of fruit and vegetables than in the production of cereals.
But before we precede any further, we need to look at changes in the 
prices of these inputs, to see how they may have effected changes in the cost of 
production.
Prices paid by farmers for material input in Libya were generally 
determined by the Government for most crop production input. This included 
fertilisers and other agro-chemicals as well as investment items such as plastic 
greenhouses, irrigation equipment and agricultural machinery. With few
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exceptions agricultural inputs were provided by the National Organisation for 
Agricultural Equipment (NOAE), and distributed through the agricultural co­
operative organisations at subsidised prices.
Table VI-8 shows the changes in prices paid by farmers for some 
agricultural inputs during the period of 1975-1980. It reveals that the overall 
increase in the prices of all these inputs was quite modest, showing, as it does, 
the average increase in price for fertilisers to be 7.4%, seeds 5.8%, materials 
4.6% and most remarkable of all - pesticides at only 2.6% increase over the 
five-year period. The general price level in the economy increased at 10.3% 
over the same period, meaning that all these costs fell in real terms. More 
importantly, according to Ministry of Agriculture, prices received by farmers 
for crops had increased at 8.9% over 1975-1980. Taking 1975 as the base year, 
the purchasing power of farmers - in relation to fertilisers - therefore increased 
at nearly 1.5% p.a., pesticides at about 6% p.a., and seeds at 3% p.a.. The same 
general picture, however, does not apply to machinery wduch, despite being 
imported, experienced a price increase of 25% p.a., which was much faster 
than the rate of output price increase. This may partly explain the position of 
near stagnation in the adoption of machinery in agriculture during the early - 
Seventies.
Table VI-8
Index of Prices Paid by Farmers 1976-1980 (1976=100)
Land Machinery Fertilisers Seeds Pesticides Material Wages
1975 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0
1976 113 106 66 110 104 86.5 125.0
1977 125 113 58 112 85 78.3 148.0
1978 140 118 82 125 63 88.0 175.0
1979 157 122 115 128 86 111.0 218.0
1980 178 275 125 140 106 124.0 245.0
Annual Growth 10.2% 24.6% 7.4% 5.8% 2.60% 4.6% 16.4%
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Annual Reports, various issues, and National Authority for Information and 
Documentation yearly statistical series, several issues, and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, and monthly 
Bulletin, various issues.
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The relatively high share of land (63%) in the total cost of production of wheat 
and barley compared with that of vegetables and fruit (10% and 18% 
respectively, see Tables AVI-4 and AVI-5 in Appendix AVI-1) means that the 
change in relative prices must have squeezed wheat much more than the other 
two crop-types. The same is true for machinery (5% for wheat, 1% for both 
tomato, and citrus). The low level of land input per unit output for fruit and 
vegetables, relative to cereals, may alleviate very considerably the effect of 
wage increases.
The other factor which must be considered is producers prices. Generally 
these prices can be affected either directly, through specific policies, or 
indirectly via macro-economic policies. However, given that there is no 
explicitly stated government policy for agricultural prices and that agricultural 
prices change continuously and even sometimes erratically, it is not 
analytically useful to follow them in detail. Therefore the discussion will be 
rather stylised.
Broadly, Libya's macro-economic policies had been designed to protect 
domestic producers from cheap imports, while pricing policies had the purpose 
of supporting income by ensuring an adequate net return, and stimulating 
production to improve self-sufficiency. The focus of the pricing policy had 
been on field crops, the bulk of which were imported.
Because agricultural land and the income from agriculture production 
were both exempt from tax agriculture was, in effect, subsidised. The sector 
was, however, taxed indirectly through currency appreciation. Appreciation 
reduced farm profit margins because it raised the prices of some agricultural 
inputs such as labour and land relative to their output prices and made 
competing imports cheaper. Over the period 1970-1980 real currency 
appreciation, as measured by REER, amounted to 14%.
More directly, cereals were taxed from 1973-1976 when the controlled 
price offered to local producers was below international market prices. For
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instance, the percentage ratio of the domestic producers price of wheat 
compared with the imported c.i.f. price, (or the nominal protection coefficient), 
increased by more than 20% over this period. This was magnified by the 
Government's full monopoly over cereal imports. This policy had changed 
dramatically in the subsequent period where after 1976, external trade came 
entirely under government control, and a heavy subsidy policy was followed on 
the domestic production of cereals in particular.
The Government also supported producers’ prices for many other 
agricultural products. Floor prices were paid for agricultural crops either to 
produce a minimum return to growers during certain periods, or as a means to 
stimulate production. Incentive prices were also paid temporarily to stimulate 
the adoption of appropriate production technology.
Such policies, combined with the Government monopoly over external 
agricultural trade, were very successful in increasing Libya's production of 
almost all agricultural products and kept domestic prices for almost all 
agricultural commodities generally high. This more than compensated for the 
appreciation of the exchange rate during the oil boom period, which would 
otherwise have worked as a subsidy to imports.
At the local level, those policies combined with the high demand trend 
during the boom period had been reflected in an increase in the wholesale 
prices of 6.5% p.a. for cereals, 19.9% p.a. for vegetables and 14.4% for fruit 
over the period of 1975-1980.
Integrating changes in input and output prices, and taking changes of 
input-output relationship into consideration, a composite index of profitability 
(price/cost ratio) has been constructed (see Table VI-9).
It is obvious from Table VI-9 below that the favourable price/cost ratios 
had been for vegetables and fruit. These were a direct outcome from both an 
increase in output prices resulting from buoyant demand during the boom, and
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a reduction in the costs of production associated with increased labour 
productivity.
Table VI-10 shows the yield per hectare of some agricultural crops for 
selected years between 1973 and 1990. It reveals that both vegetables and fruit 
yields, expressed in terms of tons per hectare, increased much faster than for 
cereals (mainly wheat and barley). How this affected labour productivity 
however depended on changes in employment in each category. When 
employment declined, the increase in land productivity would have been 
expected to be magnified when expressed in terms of labour productivity. Of 
course the reverse is true. A closer analysis of resources movement suggests 
that broadly speaking, employment declined in rain-fed farming and increased 
slightly in irrigated farming. But even allowing for this factor it is unlikely that 
productivity results would have changed significantly, since capital was 
increased to a large extent in vegetables and fruit enterprises, while labour was 
increased only slightly. This argument is difficult to support with historical 
data, since a breakdown of labour productivity by enterprise is not available. 
But, other routes to the same result may be possible. Evidence from empirical 
analysis on some vegetable products using different farming techniques shows 
that a move from traditional farming to modem high input farming techniques 
resulted in substantial gains. This analysis is summarised in Table VI-11, 
which shows that a move from traditional open-field cultivation to modem 
farming methods, such as cultivation under plastic as well as using high input 
production techniques, reduced the cost of production and increased the profit 
margin for almost all considered crops. Since this move away from traditional 
to modem farming techniques had been the apparent trend for fruit and 
vegetables but not for field crops, we would expect the effect of increasing 
land productivity on reducing per unit production cost to be highly conspicuous 
in regard to vegetables and fruit but not in case of field crops.
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Table VI-9
Composite Index of Price/Cost Ratio
Cereals Vegetables Fruit
1975 100% 100% 100%
1976 121% 176% 154%
1977 114% 181% 197%
1978 104% 219% 158%
1979 101% 186% 152%
1980 81% 179% 136%
Source: Calculated from Tables in Appendix AVI-2
Table 10
Trends in the Yield of Crops in Libya (ton/hectare)
1975 1980 1985 1990
Wheat 0.76 0.52 0.71 1.23
Barely 0.61 0.25 0.33 0.48
Tomato 7.08 14.69 14.75 8.88
Onion-dry 8.02 13.00 17.83 20.00
Water Melon 11.40 12.12 12.78 13.81
Oranges 13.61 14.02 14.15 23.71
Lemon 6.60 8.14 11.59 16.94
Source: Calculated from National Authority for Information & Documentation, yearly statistical
series, various issues.
Table VI-11
Comparison of Profitability under Tradition & Modem Farming Techniques
Yield
(ton/ha)
Price
(LD/ton)
GR
(LD/ton)
ATC
(LD/ton)
Net. Profit 
(LD/ton)
Under Advanced Farming Techniques
Cucumber 90 214 19.3 11.5 7.8
T omatoes 145 124 18 11.4 6.6
Green 55 110 6.1 2.5 3.6
Pepper
Eggplant 54 98 5.3 2.8 2.5
Potatoes 25 145 3.6 1.8 1.8
Under Traditional Farming Techniques
Cucumber 40 214 8.6 5.2 3.4
T omatoes 52 124 6.5 2.6 3.9
Green Paper 20 110 2.2 0.9 1.3
Eggplant 27 98 2.7 1.2 1.5
Potatoes 18 145 2.6 1.3 1.3
Source: Agricultural Research Center (ARC), Unpublished Working Papers 1984.
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VI-6 Concluding Perspectives
The foregoing exposition so far has established that a systematic examination 
of agriculture's performance during the boom period in Libya gives results that 
contradict the expected outcome of the Dutch Disease Core Model, since 
agricultural output increased substantially in absolute terms and one would also 
conclude that the Dutch Disease was not evident in the agricultural sector of 
Libya.
However, it should be mentioned that there are two arguments by which 
this outcome may be inconsistent with the Dutch Disease Extended Model, 
both of which are based upon the notion of factor intensity. The first is the 
Paradox Model: which states that if both capital and labour are mobile across 
agriculture and the non-traded sector and if agriculture is relatively better 
endowed with capital then the movement of labour out of agriculture and the 
non-traded sector to the booming sector will lead to an expansion of 
agriculture, on account of its relative capital-intensity, and a contraction of the 
non-traded sector resulting from its labour-intensity. The spending effect will 
have a counter-balancing effect, but no pro-agriculturalisation is possible. 
Agriculture is more capital-intensive than construction or any other services 
activity. The Paradox Model in theory may therefore be accepted as an 
explanation of the performance of the sector as a whole.
The second argument is that if agriculture is composed of industries that 
employ factors with different intensities, then the movement of labour out of 
the sector leads a reorganisation of capital and labour in favour of the capital- 
intensive industries whose outputs expand. Since the technical coefficients for 
agricultural production in vegetables and fruit (1975) were relatively more 
labour-intensive than cereals, yet the output of both vegetables and fruit 
expanded significantly. This evidence contradicts the Extended Model of the 
Dutch Disease and the notion upon which it is built.
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Critical analysis of production in the sector shows technical coefficients 
to be changing during the boom period, because new techniques of production 
embodying technological change had been adopted. Evidence obtained from 
such analysis suggests that technological advances increased productivity and 
therefore profitability in the production of vegetables and fruit. It is highly 
plausible that this was mainly responsible for the continued increase in supply, 
while the expansion of demand ensured no excess supply was created, thus 
maintaining a high level of profitability in the sector. This is a more plausible 
explanation for the divergence from the Core Model expectations than the 
Paradox Model assumptions.
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CHAPTER VII
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR  
UNDER BOOMING CONDITIONS IN LIB YA
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VII-I Introduction.
During the boom period of 1973-1982 and in the terms of the Dutch Disease 
Model industrialisation took place in Libya not de-industrialisation. Some 
manufacturing expansion is to be expected in developing countries during a 
boom period but in Libya's case the expansion had been large and definitely 
not in keeping with the expectations of the Dutch Disease Model for that 
reason.
The previous chapter asserted that the growth of agriculture was mainly 
due to the technological progress facilitated by the heavy investment in the 
sector. This chapter sets out to prove that this was not the only cause but that 
there was another - namely the fast expansion of the domestic market for 
manufactures which made possible the innovation of more sophisticated 
methods of production that allowed dynamic economies of scale to operate. All 
these factors accelerated the growth of productivity which far outweighed the 
retardant effects of relative price changes. So the chapter will illustrate that the 
productivity growth of Libya's manufacturing industries was the reason why 
the Libyan case did not match the Dutch Disease Model forecast.
The rest of this chapter is arranged with Section Two dealing with 
whether or not the Dutch Disease Model is suitable for the study of the 
manufacturing sector performance in industrialising booming economies. The 
market forces, organisational structure and government policies which shaped 
manufacturing in Libya are covered in Section Three. Section Four discusses 
Libya's general manufacturing performance and decomposes the demand for 
manufactures to domestic demand and expansion import - substitution. Section 
Five deals with manufacturing growth in the specific quantitative terms of 
factors input, output and productivity growth. Section Six constructs a system 
for the setting up of profitability indices, embracing trends in the relative prices 
of input, output and productivity growth. Section Seven provides an estimation
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of profitability in some manufacturing companies in Libya and Section Eight 
discusses the conclusion.
VI1-2 Industrialisation and the Dutch Disease. A Theoretical Approach
The Dutch Disease Model does not totally preclude industrialisation. There are 
circumstances where it can become possible within the tenets of the theoiy - as 
described by the Heckscher-Ohlin Model. This states that if the capital and 
labour within an economy are fixed and the manufacturing sector is more 
capital-intensive than the services sector the resource movement will draw 
labour from both manufacturing and services into the booming sector thereby 
making both sectors more capital-intensive, depressing output in the more 
labour-intensive sectors and encouraging growth in output of the more capital- 
intensive sectors. This will be buffered by the spending effect, which increases 
the price of services relative to manufacturing. (Rybczynski, 1955)
The same phenomenon can also happen if different industries within the 
manufacturing sector utilise factors in varied proportions. In such a case the 
relatively more capital-intensive industries will grow even if output in the 
overall sector is reduced.
There are veiy tangible as well as theoretical difficulties connected with 
this explanation. Obtaining relevant and accurate information relating to the 
manufacturing sectors of developing countries is often far from easy if not 
impossible. How can the relative capital-intensity of the manufacturing sector 
of an economy be ascertained if the data on capital stock is at best restricted 
and often non-existent? Theoretically the notion of capital-intensity for the 
overall manufacturing sector means little when the usual picture of the 
manufacturing sector of any given country includes both the highly labour- 
intensive industries such as clothing, footwear and leather tanning and highly 
capital-intensive industries such as petroleum-refining and chemicals. In just 
the same way the non-traded sector can include telecommunications as well as
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petty trading. However, these disparities within the overall manufacturing 
sector do allow the Heckscer-Ohlin Model to be tested. But varied factor- 
intensities do not provide the whole answer as to why industrialisation as 
opposed to de-industrialisation occurred in Libya. More conspicuous to Libya's 
case was the web of connected supply-demand effects inherent to the 
development of industrialisation which were boosted by the boom from the 
mid-Seventies to the mid-Eighties. The relatively more capital-intensive 
industries in Libya generally performed better than the labour-intensive ones 
under these conditions.
In times of boom capital is abundant and makes for rapid capital 
accumulation. The demand for manufactured goods rises and there is notable 
increase in per-capita income. All these elements, working together, bring 
about intensifying industrialisation. The speedy rise in per-capita income is 
economically good because it keeps manufacturing capital fully employed, 
productivity efficiency levels maintained and sustains output. Whereas a 
developing economy without boom and with low per-capita income is more 
than likely to be functioning with the problems associated with excess supply.
Manufacturing productivity and its growth rate are far more likely to rise 
under conditions of boom than without it because of the prevailing optimistic 
demand under conditions which expand the size of the market. The two most 
important mechanisms through which demand affects the growth rate of 
productivity are increased capacity utilisation and economies of scale.
Any developing economy which is freshly experiencing booming 
conditions can increase its output and progress steadily towards the utilisation 
of its full capacity state without losing competitiveness even in those sectors 
disadvantaged by international price movements. This is because while 
production is rising the unit costs of production are diminishing due to better 
production efficiency. The spending effect would decrease the prices of 
tradables compared with non-tradables but the rise in productivity could more
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than redress this. The presence of unemployed labour prior to the boom would 
reduce the effect of the resource movement because the booming sector would 
be absorbing the idle resource. The presumption of the full employment of 
resources at all times, both before and during the boom, which is intrinsic to 
the Dutch Disease theory, does not sit comfortably with this. (Corden 1984).
A large market can also help to increase efficiency by enabling the use of 
methods and technologies that could never have been incorporated until per- 
capita incomes were high enough to expand the market sufficiently to make 
their use cost-effective.
The latest technologies that were in use in American manufacturing could 
not be adopted and used in many European economies until after their own per- 
capita incomes, together with markets, had risen enough to afford them and 
when the disproportionate allocation of purchasing power was made to 
products where existing methods of mass-production could be adopted with a 
higher than average reduction in unit costs. (Denison, 1967:237). The 
possibility of adopting American technologies moved substantially nearer too 
when capital became abundant in Europe, since American technology had 
developed originally in an environment where capital was more abundant.
In developing economies, with their low per-capita incomes and small 
markets, economies of scale should yield substantial gains in efficiency 
through greater specialisation. As per-capita spending rises, the extent of these 
gains in efficiency depends directly upon how this spending is distributed 
among different products and fluctuating consumption patterns have a lot to do 
with differences in growth rates. The smaller the existing market the larger the 
gains will be from economies of scale as the market grows when other things 
remain unchanged. But the relevance of these changes will not matter if the 
growth of markets is not matched by changes in technical expertise and 
management (ibid,)
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As Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall and Allyn Young have all pointed out, 
economies of scale should not be examined purely in a static mode because 
both static and dynamic factors act together to cause profits to increase when 
production is increased. Because economies of scale also include inputs such 
as new entrepreneurs as well as new technology and "leaming-by-doing" 
methods of production which are not only drawn from a single industry but 
also from a general industrial expansion these should all be regarded together 
as an integrated whole. (Matthews, 1982: 275). The statistical basis of the 
hypothesis concerning the relationship between the growth rate of productivity 
and the growth rate of production is known as Verdoom's Law. As has been 
said the Dutch Disease Theory is a neo-classical theoiy and cannot very easily 
cope with increasing returns within its precepts of perfect competition and 
marginal productivity and factor pricing for this reason.
The prominence of demand extends beyond the level of per-capita income 
and income elasticities to embrace total demand for consumer goods. The 
precipitated increase in domestic purchasing power might be permitted to 
exceed a consumption threshold in the economy where the income available for 
consumer goods, particularly manufactures, is enlarged. This has two 
immediate results. Firstly, it initiates a rapid rise in gross profits which, as 
internal financing in firms becomes viable, will more than likely encourage 
additional investment in the sector. Secondly, if the demand pull is veiy large 
some of it can be expected to overflow into domestic production which enjoys 
natural protection against imports.
It is worth remembering that, if consumers do not mind domestically 
produced products may not need to be perfect substitutes for imports. In many 
developing economies with lower per-capita incomes than in developed ones 
consumers are content to buy lower quality domestic products so as long as 
they are cheaper than imports. This is equivalent to saying that the elasticity of 
substitution between domestically-produced and imported goods is lower than
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that predicated by the Dutch Disease Theory, which presumes perfect 
substitution. In such a case the law of one price does not apply and 
domestically produced tradables may be capable of competing in their own 
markets.
If a boom is regional rather than unilateral then a multi-country 
theoretical model in lieu of a single-country one would be required to predict 
the outcome of the performance of the tradables. In such an instance the 
demand pull will be magnified by the other economies involved. The demand 
for domestic exports from neighbouring countries will multiply the effect of 
domestic demand and unfavourable price effects will be depressed because 
differential inflation will be less than otherwise.
However, the supply response of manufacturing can be affected by 
factors other than demand but which are intrinsically related to the boom 
conditions. The two most important of these are the abundance of foreign 
exchange and the change in relative prices. Both these things are consistent 
with the importing of new technology in the shape of plant, other equipment 
and management skills - all aiding technological progress and helping to 
increase productivity by advancing production frontiers. They are also 
consistent with the import of improved intermediate inputs to production and 
thus increasing productivity through improving production efficiency.
Government policies, of course, also have a major effect upon the 
performance of manufacturing. The governments of most developing countries 
do not just sit back and watch the process of industrialisation take place, they 
endeavour to direct its course through an overt development strategy. Because 
this strategy so often places the emphasis on increasing the share of industry in 
the national output, it creates unbalanced growth. Government consumption 
and investment behaviour which determines the final demand will also affect 
the structure and output of manufacturing by means of the customary inter­
industry links particularly if it directly receives the foreign exchange windfalls.
204
Trade policies too have a bearing. It is well established that when foreign 
exchange is abundant imports will rise fast and this fast increase can have two 
opposite end-results. On the one hand it will stiffen competition to the 
domestic products and therefore aggravate the inter-sectoral effects of relative 
price changes, but on the other hand this increased competition can induce 
better efficiency in manufacturing output.
Then there is the fact of pricing policies. The oil price shock of the 1970's 
caused price control policies to be adopted in the majority of non-booming 
developed economies in order to protect industrial production and the 
consumer whilst, due to the high rate of inflation in the booming economies, 
price controls were also imposed and extended to manufactured goods thus 
intensifying price fluctuations against tradables. This relative price effect could 
be relieved if the government encouraged investment in manufacturing by 
providing exemption from income and profit tax and tariffs.
In conclusion, there are three main limitations making the Dutch Disease 
Model difficult to apply to the study of the manufacturing performance of 
developing economies. Firstly, the Model's assumption of fixed technical 
coefficients of production. Secondly, with the exclusion of the allowance for 
elasticities of demand to work themselves out in the model, it ignores the 
demand effects of increasing productivity which changes technical coefficients 
of production and can greatly affect supply conditions and thirdly, the Model 
omits to take into account government action.
If there is to be an economic model with which to study the short to 
medium effects of favourable exogenous shocks on the production structure of 
industrialising economies it must include all the above aspects because they 
need to be carefully considered in any study. Yet, at the present time not one 
model exists, including the Dutch Disease Model, which by itself alone, can do 
this. This chapter demonstrates that an analysis which embodies all the above­
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mentioned considerations necessarily has to be multi-faceted to such a degree 
that consistently sustaining an integrated analysis is tenuous.
VI1-3 The Manufacturing Sector in Libya: An Overview
In most developing countries, industry has been recognised as the most 
favourable, the most attractive sector for economic development. Governments 
have turned to industrial development to generate higher income for their 
people, to provide much needed employment, open up markets for primary 
products and relieve foreign exchange constraints through import-substitution. 
They look to industrial development to generate new sources of revenues for 
them and they look to it to build economic independence and a deep sense of 
national pride. However, whether or not a country achieves these wonderful 
benefits - which are the dreams of modem industrialisation - depends upon 
many things. It depends upon the historical development of the country 
concerned and its economic and social environment. It depends on whether or 
not it adopts reasonable polices in line with these objectives and whether or not 
it makes sensible choices. Finally, that country may possess the capability to 
develop industrialisation to its most desirable level but in reality its attainment 
will rely heavily upon how efficiently this is brought about.
The industrialisation process in Libya encountered many major 
obstructions. The leading one was its small domestic market, both in expanse 
and depth, which called for a strong export performance to achieve economies 
of scale in production. Then there was the lack of skilled manpower and 
technical know-how and the absence of domestically available raw materials 
on which to base production other than gas and crude oil. These combined 
disadvantages had the effect of increasing production costs and reducing 
profitability.
During the oil price shock period of 1973-1982, Libya's manufacturing 
sector suffered from the well-versed adverse intersectoral effects of the
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increasing prices of inputs and declining prices of output relative to that of 
services. A situation further exacerbated by increasing demand for imported 
goods, enhanced by the abundance of foreign exchange availability.
At the same time, the manufacturing sector in Libya enjoyed several 
advantages, facilitating increases in industrial productivity and reductions in 
production costs. These included the improvement in physical infrastructure 
such as means of communication, electricity and the establishment of the 
Industrial Research Centre (IRC). Also the massive inflow of foreign exchange 
ensured further ready access to imported required inputs and better technology.
The boom's favourable effects (namely, the relief of the foreign exchange 
constraints and gains from improved infrastructure) combined with government 
policy appear to have succeeded in reversing the adverse intersectoral effects. 
This was evidenced by the impressive growth of manufacturing output.
Before the analysis of trends, a comment concerning policy and 
institutional framework that governed the growth of the manufacturing sector 
in Libya is necessary.
As in almost all planned economies, the Libyan Government intervened 
both directly and indirectly in nearly every aspect of economic life including 
manufacturing activities. In addition to direct government ownership in 
manufacturing - which amounted to 25% of all manufacturing ownership in 
1976- the Government also had indirect influence upon private assets in other 
manufacturing enterprises through its licensing policy, through the control of 
prices and its control of internal and external trade.
It's general policies were framed to enhance the contribution of industry 
in the national income. These included investment encouragement, investment 
licensing and the control of external trade. Since the early Sixties, great 
attention was concentrated on developing the industrial sector and huge 
government investment was earmarked for that. Projects for large-scale plants 
were embarked upon and private investment in manufacturing enterprises was
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strongly encouraged. The Government offered several types of inducement to 
private investors. There was income tax relief, tariff exemption for imported 
fixed assets, and social security benefits for industrial and manufacturing 
projects particularly if they were planned to meet the national goals. But many 
closer studies of the growth of the manufacturing sector in Libya found that the 
effect of these inducements was minimal. More influential was the direct effect 
of investment licensing and the granting of monopoly rights which were 
pursued so effectively during the Sixties and early Seventies. Tobacco 
products, wool weaving, leather tanning and petroleum refining all enjoyed 
monopoly rights and competing imports were banned since the early Sixties. 
Monopoly rights had been based upon the idea that these industries enjoyed 
economies of scale of which they would have been deprived in the presence of 
competition given Libya's small market during the pre-boom period. Investment 
licenses for many prospective manufacturing enterprises were refused to 
applicants for those reasons. But regulating the market in this way came to a 
halt after the first oil boom because the fast expansion of domestic demand 
enlarged the market. But monopoly rights continued in force. Where licenses 
were granted the Government was able to dictate output prices and these were 
usually higher than free trade import prices. After the early Seventies the 
Government imposed a price control policy on almost all manufactured goods 
but the effect of this, in aggregate terms, was negligible.
The single most effective policy to influence profitability in 
manufacturing in Libya was without doubt trade regulation. During the pre-oil 
price shock period import substitution was pursued explicitly. The effective 
rate of protection was about 66% and this was large enough to convert many 
otherwise unprofitable enterprises into profitable ones by increasing their value 
added. In addition to this, quantitative restrictions and outright import bans 
were also quite common. Restrictive trade policy was tightened further during
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the first half of the Seventies and by 1977 the Government controlled all 
external trade.
Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements were a common policy tool 
adopted by the Government too to encourage industrial improvement. Some of 
those agreements were quite effective in doing this, notably those with Arab 
and former East European countries. Although these agreements were mostly 
entered into in the Sixties and early Seventies, their status changed 
considerably following the boom. The opportunities for Libya to benefit from 
foreign trade were enhanced further following the massive injection of foreign 
exchange created by the boom.
Summing up, it would seem that although the highly restrictive 
Government polices became pronounced only after 1976, it is clear that the 
planned industrial strategy of the Government during the boom period was the 
chief explanatory factor for manufacturing performance during that time for the 
reasons mentioned above.
VII-3-1 Industrial Development
As already mentioned, by the time of its independence in the late 1950's, Libya 
was deficient in capital, except for a very few wealthy families. The 
accumulated capital stock of the Libyan population consisted mainly of 
livestock, hand tools and private housing. Even this capital had suffered 
depletion during the Second World War (Higgins, 1953: 6).
This lack of capital precluded any development of Libyan owned 
industry. Apart from agriculture the only other field of industrial activity 
controlled by Libyans was handicrafts. In the early 1950's, it was estimated that 
$ 300,000 or 3% of the entire income of Tripoli was earned by hand-weavers 
(ibid., 60). Most of the cloth output was produced in the home in extremely 
crude conditions. A United Nations report on Libya stated that the introduction 
of simple spinning wheels would result in the unemployment of hundreds of
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poor workers who where dependent on hand spinning for their basic income 
(ibid, 61). In fact, before the Italian Occupation took place, no real industry 
existed in Libya except small-scale handicrafts.
The industries established by the Italians were based on agriculture or on 
the breeding and utilisation of sea products. According to a 1938 industrial 
census there were 789 manufacturing establishments operating in Libya; of 
which 639 were owned and controlled by the Italians and 150 were owned by 
Libyans and non-Italian foreigners 2/. Italian factories employed twenty 
thousand workers V. Libyans also faced competition from the Italian skilled 
workers. The 1938 industrial census indicated that there were 5,239 
handicraftsmen (skilled workers) in Libya, and of this total 1,939 were Italian.
Industrial capital, and its control, changed very little from 1939 to 1956. 
Most of the post-Cyrenaican (the Eastern region) factories were destroyed 
during the Second World War, and the departure of the Italian communities 
from the region between 1940-1942 further reduced the industrial activity 
there. However, a significant amount of Italian plants in Tripoli survived the 
war. In the post-World War II period, nearly all of the major industries in 
Tripoli were still controlled by the Italians. By 1956, manufacturing industries 
employed between fifteen thousand and twenty thousand workers. The 
factories that then existed operated on a small scale. In 1956 the average size of 
each factory, measured in terms of employment, was only about five workers 
per factory. Only twenty-five factories employed more than fifty full-time 
workers.
Following the discoveiy of oil in commercial quantities in the early 
1960's, attention was, as has been stated, focused on developing the industrial 
sector. Under the first five-year Economic and Social Development Plan of 
1963-1968 the Government allocated about 7 million Libyan pounds, or 2.4%
' A 1935 census indicated that Greeks and Jews owned 21% of the industrial and commercial enterprises.
' Twenty thousand workers would present 2% of the total population (see the Italian Empire: Libya , 1940, pp. 
60-78) ’
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of the total development expenditure, for industrial credits. This provided an 
industrial research centre, an industrial estate bank and some funding for 
training in industry. Additionally it introduced some protective measures such 
as import restrictions and tax exemptions in order to encourage local industry 
to compete with imported commodities. The relatively small allocation 
however, was a sensible decision because the industrial sector's absorptive 
capacity was extremely limited. Four factors caused a low rate of return in the 
industrial sector. Firstly, native Libyans had not yet acquired the necessary 
managerial skills to operate a substantial number of industrial enterprises. The 
Italian Occupation resulted in the fact that most of the entrepreneurial and 
managerial positions were held by Italian nationals. Furthermore, the Italians 
had supplied most of the skilled workers before World War II and the situation 
tended to peipetuate itself into the 1960's. When the oil wealth appeared, the 
absence of industrial skills caused the Libyan businessmen to prefer to invest 
their money in trade or real estate, which offered quick, safe, and relatively 
high earnings 4/ Secondly, the extremely backward state of agriculture and 
variable marketable surpluses placed a constraint on the growth of the existing 
food-processing industry. Thirdly, the lack of known minerals, apart from oil 
and gypsum, was another factor that inhibited industrial development. Mineral- 
based industries were confined to the manufacture of building materials. 
Fourthly, the size and nature of the domestic market represented a barrier to the 
development of many types of industries. The market was small because of 
limited numbers and because of the uneven distribution of the people among 
the main settled regions. The market was further divided by the social and 
economic differences between the nomadic, settled rural and urban population.
Nevertheless, since the early 1960's it was veiy clear that government 
policy was one of encouraging the private sector to develop the industrial 
sector, by providing loans and technical information for private investors. In
1 During the late 1950's and early 1960's, the price of real estate rose rapidly, (see IBRD, 1960, p. 185)
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1964 there were 7,954 manufacturing companies, employing 27,118 workers in 
both large and small establishments. Table V II-1 shows that, in the same year,
11,106 people were employed in 622 companies, each one employing more 
than 5 people. Furthermore, according to the industrial census of 1964, more 
than 56% of the large establishments were located in the Tripoli region. 
Benghazi and Khoms are the only two regions that had a considerable number 
of large manufacturing establishments other than Tripoli.
The major growing manufacturing groups were food manufacturing - 
including tomato processing, canning of vegetables and fruit, soft drinks, 
tobacco, wood, furniture and textiles. These industries represented 35% of all 
establishments and 29% of industrial employment in large establishments. 
Table VII-1 also illustrates those small industrial establishments which 
employed less than five persons. In 1964 the total number of small 
manufacturing establishments was 7,332 engaging 16,012 workers. 53% of 
these small companies and about 57% of workers were in the Muisurta region 
and 21% establishments were in the Tripoli region. The main industry of these 
small establishments was the manufacture of textiles, with 2,860 
establishments comprising 39% of the total number of employed workers. The 
second largest industry of these small companies was food manufacture - 
comprising 15% of all small establishments and 13% of the workforce. The 
relatively minor importance of the manufacturing sector is shown by the fact 
that, in 1964, it contributed only 3.2% to the Libyan GNP, while the petroleum 
sector contributed a massive 54%.
During the 1970's clearly more attention was paid to the development of 
the public industrial sector. In 1970 the National Public Organisation of 
Industrialisation was established as the major organ for implementing the 
public sector's industrial development plans. Moreover, after the initial years of 
the Revolution, government intervention and investment in the industrial sector 
greatly increased. Under the 1973-1975 Economic and Social Development
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Plan, for example, nearly 13% of the Plan's investment was devoted to the 
industrial sector. LD. 329 million was allocated to fund 74 industrial projects 
in the pursuit of increasing the contribution of industrial production in the 
national income. The Government considered that the advance of nations was 
due to their level of industrialisation and so as to achieve these objectives it 
concentrated its efforts on food manufacturing to provide domestic food 
products to reduce the import of food products which was a major economic 
problem for Libya particularly after the discovery of oil and, incidentally, still 
is today. Also, emphasis was given to producing building materials in order to 
meet the country's current demand at the time and to lay the basis for further 
development programmes. Finally, the chemical-processing industry was to be 
expanded too, since it was closely associated with the oil industry. 
Consequently, investment in light industry was increased from LD 15 million 
in 1970 to LD 210,200 million in 1979. Although this strategy was enhanced 
further in the subsequent Development Plans of 1976-1980 and 1981-1985 as 
has been mentioned earlier, there had been a remarkable change in government 
policy since the early-Eighties to favour heavy industry. The total investment 
in heavy industry between 1980-1985 reached LD 2060.3 million, while the 
total investment in light industry was only 595.7 million. Table V1I-2 shows 
how these changes occurred.
However, the available data reveals that of the 74 industrial factories 
projected in the 1973-1975 Development Plan by the end of the Plan period 
only 24 had been built. Nine of these were for food manufacture, five for 
textiles and footwear, five for cement and building materials, three for metal 
products and electrical machinery, one for wood and paper products and one 
was a refining project. The total number of projects planned for the subsequent 
Development Plan period of 1976-1980 was doubled to 148, out of which only 
56 industrial establishments had been built and completed by the end of that 
Plan period.
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The delay was actually due to many reasons. The paramount one was the 
fact that factories had to be imported and built by foreign companies and this 
took several years to be completed, and there were also reasons relating to the 
lack of the administrative institutions, to corruption and "red tape".
As to the role of the private sector in industrial development, the available 
data on the legal status of manufacturing establishments shows that, in the late 
Sixties and early seventies 35.5% of large manufacturing establishments were 
under individual ownership, followed by 32.2% of establishments in 
partnership. The small manufacturing sector was mainly under individual and 
family-run proprietorship. Private factories remained in operation until the 
second half of the 1970's, (see Table VII-3), but private ownership was 
severely restricted following the guidelines of the so-called Green Book of 
1976, which stated that private ownership led to exploitation through wages, 
rent and profit and had to be abolished. Then, in September 1978, workers in 
both the private and public industrial sectors were encouraged to take over the 
factories that they were working in. So, since that year, workers were told they 
were partners not wage earners, and set up workers committees to supervise all 
the administrative functions. By 1979, most private ownership had been 
abolished.
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Table VII-1
Structure of Industrial Sector in Libya 1964
Output (LD., 000)
Establishments Employment Gross Share Value Share
Number (%) Number (%) Output (%) Added (%)
Large Establishments 911 11.1 30021 65.2 270.7 98.1 171 86 98.6
Petroleum Mining 45 0.5 9662 21.0 238.18 86.3 155.0 88.9
Stone Quarrying 79 1.0 720 1.6 0.535 0.2 0.38 0.2
Manufacturing Industries 622 7.5 11106 24.1 20.28 7.4 10.075 5.8
Construction 153 1.9 7593 16.5 9.182 3.3 5.135 3.0
Electricity & Gas 12 0.2 940 2.0 2.567 0.9 1.274 0.7
Small Establishments 7337 88.9 16012 34.8 5.234 1.9 2.42 1.4
Total 8248 100 46033 100 276.0 100 174.28 100
Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey and Industrial Census 1964
Table VII-1-a
Manufacturing Establishments in Libya 1964
Large Employing more than 5 Workers Small Employing 1 to 5 Workers
Num. of 
Estabs,
(%) of 
Total
Total
Workers
(%) of 
Total
Num. of 
Estabs,
(%) of 
Total
Total
Workers
(%) of 
Total
Food Manufacturing 107 17.2 1713 15.4 _
Beverages 32 5.1 562 5.1 1092 14.9 2144 13.4
Textiles 19 3.1 565 5.1 2860 39.0 6752 42.2
Footwear 24 3.9 74 0.7 224 3.1 268 1.7
Manufacture of Wood 27 4.3 427 3.8 436 5.9 960 6.0
Furniture Fittings 16 2.6 124 1.1
Printing and Publishing 19 3.1 658 5.9
Rubber Products 3 0.5 19 0.2
Chemical Products 138 22.1 1699 15.3 492 6.7 896 5.6
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 92 14 8 1877 16.9 116 1.6 328 2.0
Metal Products 21 3.4 286 2.6 184 2.5 292 1.8
Machinery 5 0.8 60 0.5 0
Electrical Machinery 4 0.6 288 2.6 108 1.5 180 1.1
Transport Equipment 99 15.9 1584 14.3 372 5.1 800 5.0
Others 16 2.6 1170 10.5 1448 19.7 3392 21.2
Total 622 100 11106 100 7332 100 16012 100
Source: Kingdom of Libya, Ministry of National Economic, Statistical Department, Industrial Survey, Tripoli, 1964.
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Table VII-2
Development of Planned and Actual Government Investment 1963-1990 (LD.000,000)
Total Investment Light Industries Heavy Industries (%) of Total
Plann., Actual Exc. (%) Plann., Actual Exc. (%) Plann., Actual Exc. (%) Light Heavy
1963 0.5 0.1 20% 0.5 0.1 20% 100%
1964 1.3 0.1 7.7% 1.3 0.1 7.7% 100%
1965 4.3 0.6 14.0% 4.3 0.6 14.0% 100%
1966 5.8 2.0 34.5% 5.8 2.0 34.5% 100%
1967 5.3 4.7 88.7% 5.3 4.7 88.7% 100%
1968 7.7 7.4 96.1% 7.7 7.4 96.1% 100%
1969 7.7 6.3 81.8% 7.7 6.3 81.8% 100%
1970 21.8 15.0 68.8% 21.8 15.0 68.8% 100%
1971 32.1 29.0 90.3% 32.1 29.0 90.3% 100%
1972 68.1 65.1 95.6% 68.1 65.1 95.6% 100%
1973 79.7 62.5 78 4% 79.7 62.5 78.4% 100%
1974 110.9 107.0 96.5% 110.9 107.0 96.5% 100%
1975 129.7 100.0 77.1 % 129.7 100.0 77.1% 100%
1976 199.4 165.5 83% 199 4 165.5 83% 100%
1977 194.7 160.7 82.5% 194.7 160.7 82.5% 100%
1978 226.3 157.1 69.4% 226.3 157.1 69.4% 100%
1979 203.4 210.2 103% 203.4 210.2 103% 100%
1980 614.9 583.2 94 8% 180.9 173.2 95.7% 434.0 410.0 945% 29.7% 70.3%
1981 727.1 530.9 73.0% 197.1 128.5 65.2% 5300 402 4 75.9% 24.2% 75.8%
1982 475.9 409.7 86.1% 124.4 113.2 91.0% 351.5 296.5 844% 27.6% 72 4%
1983 494.9 455.7 92.1% 94.9 70.8 74.6% 400.0 384.9 69.2% 15.5% 84.5%
1984 460 4 381.5 82.9% 85.4 65.0 76.1 % 375.0 316.5 84.4% 17.0% 83.0%
1985 365.0 306.1 83.9% 64.8 56.1 866% 300.2 250.0 83.3% 18 3% 81.7%
1986 270.0 211.6 78.4% 498 30.1 60.4% 220.2 181.5 82.4% 14.2% 85.8%
1987 273.0 166.1 60 8% 57.2 18.8 32.9% 215.8 147.3 68.3% 11.3% 88.7%
1988 240.0 134.5 56 0% 47.6 15.6 32.8% 192.4 118.9 61.8% 11.6% 88.4%
1989 189.0 106.8 56.5% 35.3 2.4 6.8% 153.7 104 4 67.9% 2.2% 97 8%
1990 _ 142.1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Source: Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators various issues, and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical 
series, various issues
Table VII-3
Distribution of Large Manufacturing Establishments according to their Legal Status 1967-1979
Number of Establishments Percentage of Total
1967 1971 1973 1976 1979 1967 1971 1973 1977 1979
Individual Ownership 65 80 93 103 18 35.5 36.2 38.7 36.3 12.3
Partnership 59 69 64 72 9 32.2 31.2 26.7 25.4 6.2
Joint Stock Corporations 38 32 26 25 21 20.8 14.5 10.8 8.8 14.4
Government Corporations 9 25 47 71 98 4.9 11.3 19.6 25.0 67.1
Not Recorded 12 15 10 13 6.6 6.8 4.2 4.6
Total 183 221 240 284 146 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey and Industrial Censuses, various issues
216
The exposition so far has established that since the discovery of oil in the early 
sixties there had been a steady increase in the size of the industrial sector in 
Libya. The remarkable expansion that developed coincided with the boom 
period, as the number of large industrial establishments increased from 1969 
establishments in the early Seventies to more than 5996 establishments in 
1980. Also employment in the manufacturing industry had increased from 
19.400 in 1969 to about 73,700 in 1982.
The major light industries established between 1973-1980, were those 
such as food processing, building materials and clothing which used local raw 
materials and employed the majority of the work force. According to El- 
Mehdawi (1981), food processing - which embraced olive-oil processing, milk 
products, tomato canning, fish canning, sweets, flavour and animal fodder - 
actually employed about half the total manufacturing labour force.
On the other hand, the heavy industrialisation programmes were begun 
during the 1976-1980 Development Plan. During this Plan capital investment 
in public sector manufacturing increased and reached about LD. 1737 million 
or 24.8% of the total planned investment. Between 1981 and 1985 actual 
investment in heavy industry alone totalled LD 1715,5 million. This included 
establishing the Abu-Khammash chemical complex employing about 1,000 
workers, the ammonia plant at Marsa el-Brega producing one thousand tons a 
day and employing 675 people, a methanol plant producing 660,000 tons a year 
and employing about 175 workers and the Urea plant which was designed to 
produce around 330,000 tons p.a. and employed about 375 workers. In the oil 
industry two oil refineries at Ras Lanuf and El-Zawiya started production by 
the end of the 1976-1980 Plan period. These refineries were estimated to 
employ more than 700 workers. In addition to them the 1976-1980 Plan 
allocated more than LD 220 million for the development of the cement and 
building materials sector.
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During the Plan period of 1981-1985 more emphasis was placed on the 
development of the heavy industries. The biggest establishment by the end of 
the Plan was the iron and steel complex, which employed more than 600 
people and produced about 2,753 tons per annum.
The full picture of Libya's industrial development during the period 1967- 
1998 is summarised in Appendix AVII-1. This reveals the major industrial 
establishments and their share in total manufacturing employment Gross value 
added and gross manufacturing output.
VII-4 The Performance of Manufacturing Under Booming Conditions 
VI1-4-1 Growth Trends.
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that from the early Sixties until the 
mid-Eighties the Libyan economy went through a planned and strictly 
industrialising process. Whilst, in relative terms, the share of the agricultural 
sector in both aggregate output and total employment had declined, the share of 
industry over a wider range (mining, manufacturing, construction and public 
utilities) had tended to rise.
During the boom period of 1973-1982 the share of the manufacturing 
sector in both aggregate output and employment had increased substantially. In 
1970 manufacturing was contributing 1.7% to aggregate output but by 1982 it 
had increased to 4% and likewise its contribution to total employment 
increased from 4.7% in 1970 to 6.8% in 1982. This amounts to saying that the 
manufacturing sector had unambiguously experienced industrialisation rather 
than de-industrialisation.
The available data indicates that the value added by manufacturing 
including mining (except crude petroleum), had grown at an average rate of 
19.5% p.a. over the period 1973-1982 compared to an average growth rate of 
11.5% p.a. over the pre-boonr period of 1962-1972, and the average rate of 
only 5.8% p.a. over the post-boom period of 1983-1990. Table VII-4 and
218
Figure VII-1 summarise the manufacturing sector's performance during each of 
these three distinct periods.
Table VII-4
Manufacturing's Growth Trends and Contribution to GDP and Employment 1962-1990/**
Average Annual Growth Rates 
GDP Manufacturing
Manufacturing's Share (Period Average) in 
GDP Employment
1962-1972 19.0 11.5 2.33 6.33
1973-1982 13.5 19.5 2.76 6.90
1983-1990 -2.5 5.8 6.34 9 56
1962-1990 11.2 13.1 3.71 7.68
Source: Calculated from, Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators (ibid.) and National Authority for 
Information and Documentation (ibid.) , various issues.
Note: **/ including mining except extraction of oil and gas
Figure VII-1
Libya's Manufacturing Output and Employment 1965-1990
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The expansion in manufacturing was experienced over a wide range of 
industries, as can be seen from Tables VII-5 and VII-6. In terms of contribution 
to growth (the addition of the total value added attributed to the industry 
concerned), the industries displaying outstanding performances during the 
boom were petroleum refining 41.8%, food products 11.9%, non-metallic 
minerals 11%, fabricated metal 9.8%, industrial chemicals 9.4%, textiles and 
wearing apparel 5%, footwear and leather products 5%. On the other hand, 
tobacco, beverages, paper and publishing and furniture and wood products all 
of which were relatively more labour-intensive in Libya but they had either not 
contributed so much or had experienced declines.
In the post-boom period the growth patterns for many industries were 
reversed. Most industries that had experienced rapid growth during the boom 
period performed badly after it or even declined (with the exception of 
petroleum refining and industrial chemicals), but some of the industries that 
suffered during the boom period exhibited improvement immediately following 
the boom. But over the period 1983-1992 the sector as a whole managed to 
grow at 8.1% p.a. As can be seen, Libya's manufacturing industries performed 
well during the boom, sluggishly in the post-boom period, but overall did not 
decline. The foregoing clearly suggests that manufacturing performance during 
the boom was the outcome of distinct economic conditions which were 
apparently reversed in the post-boom period.
Compared with other countries experiences, Libya's manufacturing 
experience during the boom and post-boom periods was closer to those of 
Indonesia and Jordan in which the manufacturing sector performed well during 
the boom, albeit under relatively high effective rates of protection, and 
sluggishly in the post-boom period, but did not decline in those countries 
either. While in Iran, although the manufacturing sector growth rate was quite 
remarkable soon after the boom took place in 1973, it showed a tendency to 
decline from 1977 onward. Jazayri, (1988) explains this in terms of rising costs
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and the decline in the relative prices of tradables to non-tradables (the Dutch 
Disease effects). Nigeria's experience revealed that the manufacturing sector 
had expanded rapidly over the boom period of 1973-1982, but started to 
contract from 1982. The availability of cheap imports in the boom period and 
their scarcity in the post-boom period led to this outcome in Nigeria (Struthers, 
1990).
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that all the above industrialising 
economies experienced industrialisation rather than de-industrialisation under 
booming conditions. This fact runs counter to both what the Dutch Disease 
Model predicts, and to the experiences of industrial economies with booms (for 
instance the experiences of Holland, the UK and Norway). This leads to saying 
that whether industrialisation or de-industrialisation takes place under booming 
conditions depends to a large extent, on many other factors, technological gap, 
per-capita income level and the degree of industrialisation when the boom 
takes place being undoubtedly the main ones.
Table VII-5
Growth and Contribution to Growth of Value Added in Manufacturing Industries 1965-1992
Annual Growth Rates Contribution to Growth 1/
1965
1972
1973 1983 
1982 1992
1965
1992
1965 1973 
1972 1982
1983
1992
1965
1992
300 Total Manufacturing 11.4 24.8 8.1 15.0 100% 100% 100% 100%
311-12 Food Products 11.5 29.5 4.8 15.5 10.3 11.9 4.1 7.8
313 Beverages 2.6 16.5 17.6 12.9 0.6 1.7 7.6 4.6
314 Tobacco 20.7 11.0 4.2 11.3 47.0 4.6 -4.2 3.3
321-22 Textiles (Incl. Wearing Apparel) 4.0 37.2 9.5 17.8 -0.1 5.1 4.1 4.8
323-24 Lather Products & Footwear 51.5 65.0 4.4 39.5 0.7 5.1 2.2 3.2
331-32 Wood Products & Furniture 9.1 37.2 5.3 17.8 1.4 3.6 1.4 2.2
341-42 Paper, Printing & Publishing 9.6 18.6 9.6 12.9 1.9 1.1 1.4 1.2
351 Chemical Products 20.7 37.7 15.7 25.0 6.3 9.4 26.3 17.4
335 Petroleum Refining 21.5 8.2 10.4 41.8 33.8 34.2
369 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 10.3 33.9 -2.9 14.0 4.6 11.1 -4.8 2.8
(371-372) Basic metal Products 77.8 78.8 78.6 0.7 16.7 8.4
(381-385) Fabricated Metal 8.5 54.0 9.6 25.2 1.7 9.8 11.3 10.0
390 Other Manufacturing Industries 10.9 9.9 2.6 7.6 25.6 -5.9 0.1 -0.4
Source: Calculated From Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, Industrial Census and Statistical Abstract, various issues, and N< 
Authority for Information and Documentation, Statistical Book, various issues.
1/ Addition to total value added attributed to industry (V,2- Vii)/(V2-Vi), where V, is value added in industry ( i ) 
and V is total value added for the sector as a whole and 1&2 are the end years for the perspective period
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Table VII-6
Growth and C ontribution to  Growth of G ro ss Industrial O utput 1965-1992
Annual Percentage Growth Rates Contribution to Growth
1965
1972
1973
1982
1983
1992
1965
1992
1965 1973 
1972 1982
1983
1992
1965
1992
300 Total Manufacturing 14.4 35.3 9.8 20.2 100% 100% 100% 100%
311-12 Food Products 15.5 28.6 3.8 16.0 23.0 15.4 2.5 8.5
313 Beverages 13.0 22.8 19.0 18.6 4.9 1.3 4.8 3.1
314 Tobacco 21.7 13.2 3.2 12.0 32.6 3.6 -3.9 1.8
321-22 Textiles (Incl. Wearing Apparel) 11.4 43.4 10.1 22.3 3.7 4.2 2.7 3.6
323-24 Lather Products & Footwear 65.7 50.2 4.7 38.3 2.1 3.0 1.2 1.6
331-32 Wood Products & Furniture 28.6 32.8 9.8 23.4 4.3 2.7 1.2 1.8
341-42 Paper, Printing & Publishing 10.4 21.6 8.2 13.6 2.1 1.0 0.8 0.9
351 Chemical Products 9.6 33.3 15.1 19.9 7.8 10.3 22.6 16.3
335 Petroleum Refining 53.6 12.2 29.6 38.7 35.3 37.3
369 Non-metallic Mineral Products 30.7 33.4 2.5 21.6 14.0 10.0 0.7 4.6
(371-372) Basic Metal Products 9.4 15.9 91.9 41.2 3.1 0.3 18.0 9.6
(381 -385) Fabricated Metal 6.1 88.1 12.6 37.7 1.6 7.8 13.4 9.9
390 Other Manufacturing Industries 11.8 42.5 9.7 22.9 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.3
Source: As for Table VII-5
V711-4-2 Exports Expansion
Although the manufacturing sector in Libya had performed well in terms of 
both the number of industrial establishments and the manufacturing output 
during the boom period, its expansion was actually not associated with 
equivalent expansion in manufactured exports (apart from chemical and 
petrochemical exports). Many reasons were responsible for this outcome. The 
most prominent of these was that in order to pursue the development 
programmes in other sectors of the economy most of the industrial plants had 
been designed to satisfy the domestic demand both in terms of quantities and 
qualities. Government policy during the first years of the boom period was 
primarily confined to import substitution rather than to export encouragement. 
The dominance of the public sector in both internal and external trade and the 
protection policy pursued had to a great extent prevented the manufactured 
goods from being more competitive in the export markets.
Nevertheless, since the early Seventies, manufactured exports witnessed 
some sort of improvement (see Figure VII-2). In 1970, the value of
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manufactured export amounted to LD 0.7 million or about 0.1% of total 
exports, increased to LD 17.6 million in 1973 (or 2.9% of total exports), and 
further to LD 146.5 or 4.9%o of total exports in 1982 and to 680.6 million or 
22.4% of total exports in 1992 (Table VII-7). The annual rate of growth for 
manufactured exports amounted to 32.5% over the boom period of 1973-1982 
compared with 266% p.a. in the pre-boom period of 1970-1972 and 14.2% p.a. 
in the post-boom period of 1983-1996 (see Table VII-8).
Figure VII-2
Change in Real Manufacturing Output and Exports 
1971-1992 (LD, million)
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Source: Ministry’ of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators 1962-1983 February’ 1984 and 
National Authority for Information and Documentation, Economic and Social Indicators
various issues.
The largest contributor to Libyan export expansion was petroleum refining, 
which contributed no less than 63% to the total value of manufactured exports, 
followed by manufactured gas, whose contribution amounted to 17% and 
petrochemicals 11.3%. Just like manufacturing output, manufactured exports 
experienced serious fluctuations in the post-boom period, especially after 1987 
which was the period marked by political and economic problems. But even 
though the manufactured exports continued their upward trend. The most 
noticeable fluctuation was in petrochemical products and manufactured gas. 
The expansion of manufacturing exports led to a considerable change in the
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status of manufacturing exports, from that of a minor share which accounted 
for only 2.3% of the total manufacturing output in 1970 to that of a significant 
share of the national economy accounting for 19.2% in 1982 and 37% in 1992.
It should be mentioned here that, by the late Eighties, it became apparent 
that there had been a steady shift towards a trade liberalisation policy. 
Consequently, all manufactured exports in addition to chemical and 
petrochemical exports, witnessed a considerable improvement. This was 
enhanced further by introducing the so-called commercial exchange rate (1LD 
= 1$) and the acute devaluation in the value of the Libyan Dinnar corresponding 
to neighbouring countries currencies, particularly Tunisia and Egypt.
Table VII-7
Libya's Exports of Manufactures, Value and Ratio to Domestic Manufacturing Output 1970-1996
Value (000,000 LD Current Prices) Proportion of Domestic Output
1970 1973 1982 1992 1970 1973 1982 1992
Petroleum Refining 14 9 112.9 3696 23.7 14.8 20.1
Manufactured Gas 17.1 44.3 83.1 27.1 5.8 4.5
Chemicals Products 16.0 80.5 2.1 4.4
Petrochemicals 17.6 91.9 2 3 5.0
Other 0.7 2.7 _ 55.5 1.9 4.3 _ 3.0
Total Manufactured Exports 0.7 34.7 190.8 680.6 1.9 55.1 25.0 37.0
Total National Exports 841.8 1196 3909 3039
Ratio of Manufactured to Total 0.1 2.9 4.9 22.4
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators 1962-1996, and National Authority 
for Information and Documentation yearly statistical series, various issues.
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Table VII-8
Growth and C ontribution to  Growth of M anufacturing E xports 1970-1996
Annual Growth Rates Contribution to Growth (*)
1970 1973 1983 1972 
1972 1982 1996 1996
1970 1973 
1972 1982
1983
1996
1972
1996
Total Manufacturing 266.2 32.5 14.2 48.9 %100 %100 %100 %100
Petroleum Refining 81.9 19.1 40.3 15.24 62.74 78.24 73.50
Manufactured Gas 57.6 9.2 40.8 75.61 17.41 -2.37 4.81
Industrial Chemicals 21.1 20.6 23.1 10.24 17.35 13.73
Petrochemicals 9.5 11.27 5.10 6.99
Other 103.8 -13.7 328.1 176.6 9.15 -1.66 1.68 0.97
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators 1962-1996, and 
National Authority for Information and Documentation yearly statistical series, various issues.
(*)/ Addition to total value of exports attributed to the commodity, or (X/2 -xc)/(X2-X1)
Where x, ,is value of exports of commodity, X is value of total manufacturing exports, 
and 1 & 2 are end years of the period considered.
VII-4-3 Import Penetration
Following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the early Sixties as 
has been mentioned, national income increased rapidly and, with it, spending 
in both traded and non-traded goods. Because of the inadequate domestic 
supply of both traded and non-traded goods, the appreciation of the Libyan 
currency and fast expansion in the investment programmes, the demand for 
imports in general and for manufactured imports in particular increased 
dramatically, especially during the boom period of 1973-1982.
The impact of the increase in income on the demand for imported 
manufacturing goods is shown in Table VII-9. The most notable changes were 
observed for machinery and transport equipment whose share in total national 
imports increased from 19.8% in 1974 to more than 39% in 1980. This was 
followed by basic metal products, whose share in total national imports 
increased from 6% in 1974 to 18% in 1980. While all other categories of 
manufactured commodities seem to have presented a backward bias, in terms 
of their share in total national imports, during the boom period compared with 
both the pre-boom and post-boom periods. In terms of growth rates, the fastest
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observed growth rate was in wood and furniture, which increased at an average 
rate of 154.9% p.a. over the boom period of 1974-1981 corresponding to 6.5% 
p.a. during the pre-boom period of 1968-1972. This was followed by metal 
products which increased at an average rate of 107% p.a. during the boom 
period compared with almost 0.5% p.a. over the pre-boom period, machinery 
and transport equipment at 83% p.a., tobacco at 50% p.a., textiles and wearing 
apparel 46% and industrial chemicals 45% p.a. While, metal products, wood 
and furniture, food products, textiles and wearing apparel and non-metallic 
minerals were the leading sectors in terms of contribution to the growth (the 
addition of total manufacturing imports attributed to the items concerned) (see 
Table VII-10)
VII-4-4. Import Substitution
Import substitution must now be considered in order to reflect more accurately 
the impact of the boom on Libya's trading position. Import substitution can be 
measured as the change in the ratio of imports to total available supplies a la 
Chenery (1960), i.e.
A/l-2 = M 2 A/lL s J —I s ,  J ( 1)
Where M and S are imports and total supply respectively, and the subscripts (1 
and 2) denote successive time periods, and total supply (S) comprises both 
domestic production plus imports5/.
The plausible measurement to the import substitution that accounts for import spill-over effects would be 
based on input-output tables as follows
[I-A1Q+M=S 
0 + |I+ I)  'M =[I-A) 'S
Where S. M, Q are total supply, import and production respectively, and S= (M+Q) and I and A are the identity 
and input-output matrixes respectively. Calling [I-A]‘‘M = M* and [I-A]"'S= S* the import substitution can be 
defined as
IS‘,=( IW * ,/S \) - ( \ l \  ,/S 'u )
However, given that Input-Output Tables for Libya are not available using such methodology is thus impossible.
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The results of import substitution calculations are shown in Table V II-11. 
It depicts that the reverse of import substitution took place, i.e. there was an 
increased import penetration by more than 8% over the boom period of 1974-
1981 (or 1.06% p.a.), although some industries did partly succeed in 
substituting their imports. The increased import penetration for the sector as a 
whole is not surprising though, especially considering the abundance of foreign 
exchange, the currency appreciation by 14% and the huge expansion in 
investment programmes. Also because no import substitution took place during 
the pre-boom period or the early years of the boom period, despite the high 
degree of protection provided to the domestic industrial production, the fact 
that import penetration was kept down to such a low level between 1978 and
1982 and after can be regarded as a worthy achievement. If this proposition is 
accepted, then it follows that the domestic industries maintained and probably 
increased competitiveness under adverse booming conditions.
Furthermore a close examination of the manufactured trade balance 
shows that the most significant area in deficit over the period occurred in 
capital goods machinery and transport equipment which accounted for 48% of 
the manufactures trade deficit in 1980, against 43% in 1972 followed by basic 
metal products 22% in 1980 corresponding to 14% in 1972. This is to be 
expected because Libya was going through a rapid process of industrialisation, 
while her technological ability to produce capital goods was severely limited. 
The weak and rudimentary inter-industry linkages which ruled out the 
production of capital goods were the result of Libya's small market, coupled 
with the narrow range of domestic product lines during the Seventies (namely 
light industries). However, the picture changed considerably from 1980 
onward, when more attention was focused on establishing and developing the 
heavy industries.
The exposition thus so far has demonstrated that the domestic output of 
manufacturing grew substantially during the boom period in Libya, whilst
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imports substitution declined relatively slowly. In the following sections a 
quantitative account of the sector's growth in terms of factor input and 
productivity growth will be investigated.
Table VII-9
Participation of Manufacturing Imports in both Total Manufacturing and Total National Import 1968-1990.
Value ( LD.000) Percentage of TMI 1/ Percentage of TNI 21
1968 1974 1980 1990 1968 1974 1980 1990 1968 1974 1980 1990
Food Products 14.3 80.0 161 162.4 6.8 16.1 8.6 12.7 6.2 9.8 8.0 10.8
Beverages 0.8 0.1 2.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
Tobacco 1.4 3.0 8.7 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.0
Textiles & Wearing Apparel 21.5 41.0 89.4 52.7 10.2 8.3 4.8 4.1 9.4 5.0 4.5 3.5
Footwear & Lather Products 3.8 9.4 21.0 20.7 1.8 1.9 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.4
Wood & Furniture 7.1 20.3 84.4 50.5 3.4 4.1 4.5 3.9 3.1 2.5 4.2 3.3
Paper and Products 1.8 8.3 20.9 33.3 0.9 1.7 1.1 2.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 2.2
Industrial Chemicals 11.9 29.9 108.1 102.7 5.7 6.0 5.8 8.0 5.2 3.7 5.4 6.8
Rubber Products 2.9 5.7 19.6 20.1 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.3
Petroleum Refining 6.8 13.2 13.0 3.3 3.2 2.7 0.7 0.3 2.9 1.6 0.7 0.2
Non-Metallic Minerals 8.7 52.6 64.6 34.8 4.1 10.6 3.4 2.7 3.8 6.4 3.2 2.3
Metal Products 37.7 51.1 360.0 222.4 17.9 10.3 19.2 17.4 16 4 6.2 17.9 14.7
Machinery & Transport Equipment 84.3 161.9 787.9 565.1 40.1 32.7 42.0 44.1 36.6 19 8 39.3 37.4
Other 7.0 19.4 133.4 12.0 3.3 3.9 7.1 0.9 3.1 2.4 6.6 0.8
Total Manufacturing 210 496 1874 1281 100 100 100 100 91.3 60.6 93.4 848
Source : Calculated from Department of Statistics. External Trade Statistics, various issues, and National Authority for 
Information and Documentation, Economic and Social Indicators 1962-1969.: December 1997.
Table VII-10
Growth and Contribution to Growth of Manufacturing Imports 1968-1990
Annual Growth Rates Contribution to Growth
1968
1972
1972
1974
1974
1981
1981
1985
1985
1990
1968
1972
1972
1974
1974
1981
1981
1985
1985
1990
Food Products 16.1 70.2 29.0 -11.2 11.5 12.37 29.86 7.35 9.48 32.97
Beverages -19.5 0.0 -0.5 21.2 14.5 -0.77 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.09
Tobacco -3.7 51.7 50.2 -17.1 -12.9 -0.29 1.01 0.48 0.80 -0.66
Textiles & Wearing Apparel 17.3 0.7 46.4 -9.8 -5.6 20.07 0.44 6.02 5.84 -13.16
Footwear & Lather Products 9.6 21.6 35.5 -10.5 8.2 1.99 2.03 1.05 1.19 3.40
Wood & Furniture 6.5 38.4 154.9 -15.3 0.5 2.49 5.98 9.96 12.30 0.70
Paper and Products 13.8 56.0 15.0 10.3 6.4 1.37 2.88 0.40 -0.63 4.62
Industrial Chemicals 7.9 26.5 45.5 -7.7 8.3 5.08 7.27 4.31 3.30 16.99
Rubber Products 4.7 88.3 17.2 -9.2 6.5 0.74 5.27 0.72 0.95 2.79
Petroleum Refining 1.8 -7.6 -2.9 -5.1 -0.7 0.67 -0.92 -0.05 0.09 -0.08
Non-Metallic Minerals 16.9 75.7 33.2 -17.2 9.2 7.94 20.10 5.54 10.39 6.17
Metal Products 0.5 10.7 106.6 -11.3 5.8 1.10 6.82 17.25 16.40 28.58
Machinery & Transport Equipment 9.4 10.3 83.3 -9.3 1.5 42.49 21.01 42.72 34.77 22.69
Other 12.8 -9.4 161.6 -15.0 -7.6 4.86 -1.79 4.25 5.13 -5.06
Total Manufacturing 8.8 20.0 65.1 -10.9 3.1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.01
Source : Calculated from Department of Statistics. External Trade Statistics, various issues, National Authority for 
Information and Documentation, Economic & Social Indicators 1962-1969.: December 1997.
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Table VII-11
Growth Rates of Import Substitution in Manufacturing Industries 1972-19S0
1972
1974
1974
1981
1981
1985
1985
1990
Food Products 9.4 -7.19 -33.3 16.2
Beverages 1.2 -0.86 -1.0 1.0
Tobacco 6.8 8.41 -19.4 -3.7
Textiles & Wearing Apparel -1.3 -8.75 -16.5 -25.2
Footwear & Lather Products 2.9 -28.93 -21.9 8.6
Furniture & Wood Products -0.1 5.74 -15.5 -2.7
Paper and Publishing -1.2 -9.51 3.1 4.7
Industrial Chemicals -21.0 0.76 -31.0 -11.6
Petroleum Refining 49.83 -5.1 -0.9
Non-Metallic Products -1.2 -9.64 -20.8 5.2
Metal Products -3.0 6.48 -4.0 -24.4
Machinery & Transport Equipment -0.3 -1.43 -7.7 -8.3
Total Manufacturing 3.1 1.06 -26.0 -2.3
Source : Department of Statistics. External Trade Statistics, various issues for imports, & Industrial Survey 
and Industrial Census, various issues for value of goods produced, (see text for methodology)
Note: Value of Goods produced = (Gross output) - (receipts from re-sale + services rendered)
VI1-5 Factor Input and Productivity Growth 
V11-5-1 Factor Input
1- Labour
The preceding discussion in Chapters IV and V has shown that the most salient 
features of the Libyan labour market during the period in question were: i) a 
considerable resource movement (in terms of rural-urban migration) 
immediately following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the 
early Sixties, ii) a rapid labour absorption into all sectors of the economy 
during nearly the entire boom period of 1973-1982; and iii) the inflow of both 
skilled and unskilled foreign labour into the country from the early Seventies 
until the early Eighties. The boom had, therefore, two combined effects on 
labour input. On the one hand, the increase in economic activity led to a 
substantial increase in labour input quantities - thereby relieving labour 
shortage constraint - and on the other hand, this very same increase in 
economic activity combined with the abundance of foreign exchange led to a
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higher growth in the quality of national labour through increases in educational 
standards. This is shown by the steeper increase in the percentages of educated 
and skilled employees among the newly-recruited national employees. 
However, the data available on the labour supply in Libya does not provide for 
taking into account allowances for quality.
Labour input into manufacturing is shown in Figure VII-3 and the 
corresponding annual growth rates are shown in Figure V IM  and Table VII- 
12. They illustrate that the most rapid absorption of labour occurred during the 
oil boom period of 1973-1982 at 12% p.a. This is accounted for by the large 
number of small labour-intensive industries (i.e. footwear and leather products, 
textiles and wearing apparel and food manufactures, etc.) and the sparsity of 
very large capital-intensive projects (such as basic metal products, non-metallic 
minerals, and fertilisers -  classified under industrial chemicals).
Table VII-12
Growth and Contribution to Growth of Labour in Manufacturing Industries 1965-1992
Annual (%) Growth Rates Contribution to Growth 1/
1965 1973 1983 1965 1973 1983
1972 1982 1992 1972 1982 1992
Food Products 2.9 8.7 6.0 11.1 14.2 11.7
Beverages 3.3 7.8 2.5 5.1 4.0 1.6
Tobacco 5.1 0.7 0.9 42.9 0.3 0.5
Textiles & Wearing Apparel 4.6 31.8 9.6 7.6 25.9 18.5
Footwear and Leather Products 4.1 39.1 7.2 0.9 6.9 4.5
Furniture and Wood Products 12.4 8.5 1.0 11.3 3.6 0.1
Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.9 3.5 -1.5 1.1 1.0 -0.4
Industrial Chemicals -1.1 15.9 12.1 -2.4 8.8 13.2
Non-Metallic Metals 8.3 12.7 4.5 224 15.7 9.1
Basic Metal Products 0.8 53.5 4.4 0.0 19.6 7.4
Fabricated Metal Products 33.8
Total Large-Scale Industries 5.4 12.6 8.0 100% 100% 100%
Other Industries -2.5 12.9 1.0
Total Manufacturing -0.3 12.4 3.8
Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey, various issues particularly for the period 1965-
1980, National Authority for Information & Documentation, Social and Economic Indicators 1962-1996
For the total labour in the manufacturing sector and the private survey for the distribution of labour among large-
scale manufacturing industries 1980-1991
Note: 1/ Growth attributed to Industry or (Ll2-Ln) /(L2-LO where L, is labour in industry considered
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Figure VII-3 
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2- Capital
Capital stock, as discussed here, is taken to mean total fixed assets after 
allowing for depreciation (to give greater relative weight to investment of more 
recent date)6/. Annual data relating to the accumulation of capital as defined is 
charted in Figure VII-5, and the corresponding annual growth rates are shown 
in Figure VII-6. Growth rates during the particular period under study are given 
in Table VII-13. Comparing the boom period with the pre-boom and post-boom 
periods demonstrates that the growth rate in fixed capital during the boom 
period was markedly higher than in any other periods and that, within the boom 
period, there was a remarkable acceleration from 1980 onward which ran 
through the post-boom period to 1985.
This high rate of investment in manufacturing should be compared with 
its quite contrasting position in the pre-boom period when investment in the 
manufacturing industries was notably low because it was left to the private 
sector to invest in these industries. It could do very little to develop them then 
mainly because of a serious lack of infrastructure to assist such development 
wherever it may have been planned. The huge capital growth between 1979 
and 1985 remains higher than that of any other period. This was not a catching- 
up phenomenon, since it has no historical parallel.
The conditions of the boom were, to some extent, responsible for this 
exceedingly rapid capital accumulation and an important factor was probably 
the negative cost of borrowing. Inflation during the boom, measured in terms of 
the change in the general cost of living between 1970 and 1982, actually
0 Capital stock in manufacturing was obtained by taking the output capital ratio for 1973 * the value added for 
that year as equal s to capital stock value in 1973. Then deflating net fixed capital formation to 1973 prices and 
adding and subtracting it forward and backward gave an estimated capital stock for the whole period under 
investigation. Symbolically:
K,=kt+<H!k
( / + / )
Where K is capital stock, 0 and t are the base year here (1973) and current year, I is investment, d is 
depreciation (taken as 5% of value added) and f  is inflation rate measured in terms of increase in the cost of 
living
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averaged at 13.7% whereas the Central Bank of Libya had fixed the interest 
rate on investment loans at only 7% - thus yielding a negative real lending rate 
during this period of nearly 7%, compared with a positive lending rate of 3.2% 
over the pre-boom period. A second contributory factor was undoubtedly the 
huge inflow of funds which followed the oil price increases by early 1974. 
These large funds made money readily available to invest in the economy, 
further relieved the foreign exchange constraints and thus enabled the import of 
the capital goods which Libya did not produce. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, was the influence of government investment behaviour. Most of 
the investment decisions in Libya were made by the Government and without 
much influence from market signals. This is confirmed by the fact that whilst 
clear signs were plainly visible that demand was slowing down as early as 
1981, heavy government investment continued until late into 1985. The effect 
of government investment behaviour on capital accumulation can be seen from 
the high concentration of gross capital foimation in the natural resource-based 
industries which were largely government-financed: such industries as those 
involved in chemicals, non-metallic minerals and petroleum refining. Those 
industries accounted for a high proportion of the total gross capital formation in 
the manufacturing sector as a whole over the period 1973-1985. Petroleum 
refining was a monopoly in which the Government held shares, and both the 
chemicals and non-metallic mineral industries were dominated by one capital- 
intensive, government-owned enterprise.
It should be noted that, unlike the measure of labour / input, the measures 
of physical capital discussed above refer to capital stock but not to capital in 
use. The reason behind this is the non-existence of a continuous statistical 
series on the degree of utilisation equivalent to the unemployment percentage 
of labour. Therefore total factor productivity (TFP) calculated in the next 
section should be interpreted as to account purely for changes in capital
For Further discussion on the differentiation between economic and physical utilisation of capital see Matthews 
e ta l., 1982:151-159.
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utilisation, and not capital in use because capital in use is not included in the 
total factor input.
Table VII-13
Annual Growth Rates of Fixed Capital Stock in Manufacturing Industries 1965-1992
1966
1972
1973
1982
1983
1992
Food Products 6.5 20.2 3.1
Beverages 23.2 33.9 6.2
Tobacco 0.1 7.2 4.4
Textiles & Wearing Apparel 1.9 15.6 5.0
Footwear & Leather Products 17.9 44.5 8.2
Furniture & Wood Products 2.2 24.8 9.1
Paper & Publishing 3.9 32.1 7.1
Industrial Chemicals 2.4 6.6 3.6
Petroleum Refining 0.2 3.4
Non-metallic Minerals 5.0 16.2 11.0
Basic Metal Products 72.8 26.9
Fabricated Metal Products 0.2 3.2 7.3
Other Manufacturing 28.5 33.8 -0.6
All Manufacturing Excluding NRIs 5.0 25.5 3.2
All Manufacturing 4.2 22.7 2.6
Source: Calculated from Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey and Industrial Censuses, various issues; National 
Authority for Information and Documentation, Economic and Social Indicators, various issues and Private survey for 
the period of 1980-1992 
Note see Footnote (6) for methodology.
Figure VII-5
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Figure VII-6
Growth of Fixed Capital in Manufacturing Industries in 
Libya 1965-1992
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Because of its comprehensiveness TFP is far more important to the 
manufacturing sector and to the economy as a whole than partial productivity 
indices.
The growth of capital had exceeded that of labour by more than 10% p.a. 
over the boom period of 1973-1982 and, since output was expanding 
substantially, that would have meant a rapid growth in labour productivity. 
However, this growth reflected a rising capital-labour ratio rather than an 
increase in capital productivity (see Figures VII-7 and VII-8). Furthermore, the 
exceptionally high rate at which capital grew might have undermined capital 
productivity because of the associated institutional problems and the 
difficulties in choosing the right technology and this was further intensified by 
the serious shortages of skilled labour /. Thus a true index of productivity 
should reflect both labour and capital productivity, which was achieved by 
total factor inputs, or output per unit of input.
K Although it is to some extent true that highly mechanised industries would require less skilled than manual 
work, However, 111 the majority of Libyan industries, the limitation of a managerial and skilled manpower 
persent one of the main obstacles to the effectiveness of technology transfer.
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Figure VII-7
Labour Productivity in Manufacturing industries 
in Libya 1966-1992
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Figure VII-8
Capital Labour Ratio in Manufacturing Industries in Libya 1966-1992
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A sufficiently comprehensive index of total factor input would include both the 
direct and indirect inputs of all resources (i.e. comprising all externalities and 
unintended by-products, insofar as they affected measured output). The rate of 
growth of total factor inputs, so defined, would be little if this rate of growth 
was lower than the rate of growth of output. Any positive value for growth in 
total factor inputs must then be understood to be due to either errors of 
measurement, or to an increase in output resulting from the borrowing of 
innovations which were ultimately attributable to the inputs of scarce resources 
from countries other than the country considered. Since a statistical estimation 
of total factor input in its fullest sense is not a practical proposition, more 
restricted measures of it have to be used and the lines of division between it
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and total factor productivity (TFP) are bound to be discretionaiy (Matthews, 
1982: 200-201).
The most detailed use of a TFP index, as demonstrated above, is 
Denison's (1967), who was able to account for twenty three sources of 
American growth over 1950-1962, including a change in the age-sex 
composition of labour, hours worked, education levels, improvement of 
knowledge, economies of scale, cyclical effect of demand and the improved 
allocation of resources.
Other investigators of this subject, like Jorenson and Griliches, have 
adjusted both labour and capital inputs for efficiency changes and consequently 
have further minimised the residual (Kendrick, 1977: 18).
Kendrick (1977), on the other hand, has taken a different position. Instead 
of regulating input for quality or efficiency to narrow the measure of the 
omission, he measures inputs unadjusted so that the residual combines the 
entire change in productive efficiency. He then tries to quantify all the 
variables that explain productivity change. His approach will be adopted here 
for two reasons. One is that it is convenient, since no data on input quality or 
the efficiency of their use is available. The second reason is more to the point 
because our objective is not to quantify TFP but to show the impact of the 
boom conditions on the change in its value. To put it another way, our 
objective is to explore all boom-related changes in the residual, especially 
those of production efficiency, and then try to decompose them to show the 
different components of productivity change and their order of magnitude when 
this is possible.
When measuring TFP in manufacturing industries in Libya, a growth 
accounting approach similar to that used by Solow (1971) is used. According to 
this technique output growth can be divided into the growth of total factor 
inputs and the growth of TFP as follows:
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Where d denotes the average annual rate of change between two benchmark 
years, Q is output, L is labour, K is capital, A is TFP, and a  is a weighting term 
taken as equal to the average share of labour in income for the period 
considered.
This technique is based on two reasonable assumptions. They are that the 
production function exhibits constant returns to scale and the economy is 
competitive.
The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that if all inputs 
increase with equal proportion, output will increase with the same proportion, 
while the competitive economy assumption assures that the factors of 
production are paid their marginal products. In other words, this approach 
involves seeing what remains unexplained under this assumption.
However, despite the existence of valuable arguments which would 
justify this technique, it has come under a barrage of criticism on the basis that 
the underlying production function is not a stable function because there are 
large unexplained changes in it, which should be interpreted as measurement 
error rather than an indicator for technical progress (Griliches, 1971).
Instead Griliches suggested an alternative econometric approach which 
accounted for the differences between input and output as changes in the 
quality of inputs and economies of scale. However, despite the imperfections in 
the measurement of TFP growth, sustained learning at an industry-wide range 
should be reflected in the growth of measured TFP. The absence of an 
alternative framework for analysing the issues of growth and productivity 
makes it necessaiy to analyse the trend in TFP, while realising the limitations 
imposed by the methodological framework of the analysis.
In a few of these points, we have attempted to estimate TFP for some 
large-scale manufacturing industries using both officially published data and 
data gathered in a survey and both form an integral part of this study. The 
results are presented in Tables VII-14.
As seen in Table VII-14 all manufacturing industries experienced 6% p.a. 
growth in TFP over the boom period 1973-1982, compared with an average of 
3.9% p.a. in the pre-boom and of 2.3% p.a. in the post-boom period. Almost all 
industries that experienced a very high growth rate of output also experienced a 
substantial growth in TFP. Food products gained 14.7% p.a., beverages 4% p.a. 
tobacco 5.2% p.a., wood and furniture 21% p.a., paper, printing and publishing 
3.2% p.a., textiles (including wearing apparel) 11.7% p.a., leather products 
(including footwear) 25% p.a., chemicals 27% p.a. and non-minerals 21% p.a. 
These values may seem unreasonably high but, evidently, output growth in 
almost all these industries was even higher. Because idle capacity in the pre­
boom period was substantial one would expect this to be reflected in a very 
high TFP, but in fact capacity utilisation is unaccounted for in TFP. 
Conversely, those industries whose output declined or almost stagnated during 
the boom period experienced a rapid decline in TFP. There are few exceptions 
to this rule of association between output growth and productivity growth but 
notable amongst those exceptions are fabricated metals. Their output grew at 
54% p.a. but TFP declined at 7% p.a.
The conclusion drawn so far is that productivity increases were 
substantial in those industries that experienced rapid growth in output during 
the boom, which may explain their ability to resist a squeeze on profits 
stemming from adverse relative price movement and wage rises. This will be 
investigated further in section VII-5-2. The question addressed in the following 
section is whether productivity growth was related to the boom conditions or 
whether it was more autonomous.
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Table VII-14
Total Factor Productivity Growth for Large-Scale M anufacturing Industries in Libya 1965-1992_____________________
1965-1992 1973-1982 1983-1992
Output TFI TFP Output TFI TFP Output TFI TFP
Food Products 11.5 4.9 6.6 29.5 14.8 14.7 4.8 5.4 -0.6
Beverages 2.6 13.6 -11.0 16.5 12.5 4.0 17.6 4.4 13.2
Tobacco 20.7 1.2 19.5 11.0 5.8 5.2 4.2 3.6 0.6
Textiles & Wearing Apparel 4.0 3.5 0.5 37.2 25.5 11.7 9.5 7.8 1.7
Footwear & Leather Products 51.5 7.2 44.3 65.0 40.3 24.7 4.4 7.4 -3.0
Furniture & Wood Products 9.1 7.7 1.4 37.2 15.9 21.3 5.3 4.6 0.7
Paper & Publishing 9.6 2.1 7.5 18.6 15.4 3.2 9.6 2 7.6
Industrial Chemicals 20.7 1.0 19.7 37.7 10.3 27.4 15.7 7.1 8.6
Petroleum Refining 21.5 16.5 5.0 8.2 18.6 -10.4
Non-Metallic Minerals 10.3 7.9 2.4 33.9 13.1 20.8 -2.9 5.3 -8.2
Basic Metal Products 77.8 58.6 19.2 78.8 10.2 68.6
Fabricated Metal Products 8.5 12.6 -4.1 54.0 61.2 -7.2 9.6 6.8 2.8
Other Manufacturing 10.9 10.6 0.3 9.9 21.9 -12 2.6 0.3 2.9
All Manufacturing 11.4 7.5 3.9 24.8 18.8 6.0 8.1 5.8 2.3
Source: Calculated from Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey and Industrial Censuses, various issues; National Authority for 
Information and Documentation, Economic and Social Indicators, various issues and private survey for the period 1980-1992
VII-5-2-1 Source of Productivity Growth
There have been several presumptions advanced in the literature on the 
possible sources of TFP change and these include output growth, trade 
liberalisation, relief of foreign exchange constraints and economies of scale but 
these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Indeed they may all be true but it 
must also be said that their assumed effects need not necessarily be 
independent of one another.
A correlation analysis is conducted on some important manufacturing 
variables in order to examine which of these hypotheses was relevant to the 
manufacturing sector in Libya during the period under study. In addition to 
TFP change, these included factor input and output growth, the ratio of 
exported output to total output, wage levels, capital intensities and the relative 
prices of tradables to non-tradables (see Table AVII-2-1 for variables 
definitions). The results of this analysis are given in Tables AVII-2-2 and 
AVII-2-3 in Appendix AVII-2. Even though using such a simple analytical 
approach does not make it possible to distinguish precisely which hypothesis
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was applicable and it does not make it feasible to ascertain the direction of 
causes, it does reveal the areas which do deserve further attention.
The most noteworthy aspects of Table AVII-2-2 are the existence of a 
strong correlation between productivity change and output growth, and the 
flimsy correlation between productivity change and the other variables 
considered. The same is not true for output growth, which does not seem to be 
affected by wage levels or capital intensities, all of which have been suggested 
by the Dutch Disease Model as an explanation for tradables performance.
This outcome supports the existence of dynamic economies of scale 
associated with output expansion. In other words, it maintains the existence of 
a positive and linear relationship between productivity growth and output 
growth (Verdoom's law). Symbolically this relationship can be expressed as:
P = a + /3*q (3)
Where P and q are productivity and output growth rates respectively and 
a  and (3 are constants, and (3> 0. Estimating (3 using (OLS) and across the three 
periods (given in Table VII-15) gave the following results:
p= 1.99 + 0.4q (2)
(0.941) (3.366). R2 = 0.919
With = 0.919, a significant relationship between productivity and output 
growth can be said to exist. This means Verdoom's Law was functioning in the 
context of Libya's manufacturing industries. However, whatever way the cause 
is operating, whether it was from output to productivity or vice-versa, is a 
subject of intensive debate and controversy in the literature. (See for instance, 
Kaldor and Rowthom, 1975). Though there is no doubt that, under exceptional 
circumstances, output growth can occur exogenously as underlined by Kaldor,
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this notion did not totally fit the case of Libya, where productivity increases 
raised output not only through their effect on relative prices but also through 
increasing profits, encouraging investment and stimulating domestic demand 
for industrial goods. Under those circumstances, the impact of dynamic 
economies of scale cannot be distinguished from other effects using such a 
simple model, but it requires a simultaneous model (Rowthom, 1975), “though 
whether one could be constructed satisfactorily for comparison over a long 
period of time is problematical” (Matthews et al., 1982).
The presence of a strong relationship between output growth and 
productivity change in Libya is more readily obvious when examining the level 
of domestic demand and the constraints encountered by the utilisation of 
productive capacity in an efficient manner, particularly during the pre-boom 
and post-boom periods.
Libya's population in 1970 was 1,963,000 and its GDP per-capita at that 
time stood at LD 656. By 1982 GDP per-capita had grown by an average of 
12.6% p.a. to a remarkable LD 2444, but had fallen to LD 1773 by 1992. This 
decrease represents an annual decline of 2.7% p.a., .The constraint on growth 
induced by small market conditions is well recognised in development 
literature, and leads many economists to advocate an export-led growth 
approach as an economic strategy for development, since it mitigates this 
particular constraint and allows for economies of scale. Although this strategy 
had been adopted in Libya as early as 1976, its impact in enlarging 
manufacturing product markets, apart from carbohydrate industries, was very 
limited. Nevertheless, in terms of the manufacturing sector as a whole, it is safe 
to say that the effect of this strategy combined with that of bilateral trade 
agreements explains the export growth of 32.5% and the modest enlargement 
of Libya's product markets. The potential effect of cyclical changes in demand 
on productivity change should thus be evident since the rate of utilisation of
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fixed plant and overhead labour rises or falls significantly and changes 
production efficiencies and consequently influences the level of output.
The argument that Libya's economic resources were less-utilised in the 
pre-boom and post-boom periods is supported by the relative smallness of the 
Libyan domestic labour force which was engaged in manufacturing industries 
compared with other sectors of the economy. It was also confirmed by the 
unemployment figures. The unemployment rate was 2.8% in 1972, 1.7% in 
1981, and 3.1% in 1992. According to the 1972 industrial survey, the idle 
capacity of fixed plant and machinery in manufacturing was substantial in most 
manufacturing industries and averaged around 56% (Department of Statistics, 
1973). This was mainly due to the smallness of the commodity markets and to 
the lack of capital from the private sector which had the responsibility of 
developing the manufacturing sector at that time. This situation continued to 
exist even into the first few years of the first boom penod, because the inactive 
capacity was still considerable (Department of Statistics, 1975). A closer study 
of industrial capacity utilisation in the post-boom period conducted by the 
Industrial Research Centre (IRC) in 1987 revealed that only about 50% of total 
installed capacity in the sector as a whole was actually being used (ICR, 1989). 
This large capacity under utilisation can be attributed to the rapid capital build­
up after the second oil boom (at 23.4% p.a. between 1979-1982), on the 
assumption that the oil prices would remain high. However, the decline of the 
oil prices in the early Eighties led to a sudden reversal of the boom which in 
turn led to a huge contraction in investment and consequently to a downfall in 
commodity production for Libyan manufactures.
The intervening years between 1971 and 1987 cover the period during the 
boom for which no data on capacity utilisation is available (see Appendix 
AVII-3 for an estimation). One piece of evidence, however, allows for the 
suggestion that the level of demand revealed various degrees of capital 
utilisation during the boom compared with the pre-boom and post-boom
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periods. The measure adopted here relied on the assumption that the slower the 
demand the larger the overhead per unit of output is incurred by enterprises. 
Therefore, the ratio of fixed to total cost should approximately reveal the 
degree to which accessible capacity was being utilised.
The results over the three distinct periods are shown in Table (VII-15) 
which demonstrates that the ratio for the boom period was slightly lower than 
that of the pre-boom period, but significantly lower than that of the post-boom 
period. This is consistent with the observation that although plant capacity 
under-utilisation in the pre-boom and post-boom periods were, to a large 
extent, of similar magnitudes, the rate of growth of output in the pre-boom 
period was higher than that of the post-boom period (the average annual rate of 
growth was 11.4% p.a. for the pre-boom period and 8.1% p a. for the post­
boom period). Output fluctuations were far less conspicuous in the pre-boom 
period than in the post-boom period and labour overhead (e.g. financial 
management) would therefore be expected to be lower in the pre-boom period 
than in the post-boom period.
T ab le  VII-15
Ratio of Fixed to Total Costs for 16 Manufacturing Factories in Libya, 1971-1990
1971 1973 1983
1972 1982 1990
37.3 35.6 44.4
Source: Ministry of Industry, production follow- up reports, various issues, and private survey. 
Note: These figures are unweighted average.
Capacity utilisation has been adjusted at the sector level to show the order of 
magnitude of the contribution to TFP made by cyclical effects. So rates of 
capacity utilisation obtained for the period 1964 and 1993, are used to adjust 
for capital input and the TFP recalculated. The results are given in Table (VII- 
16). The smallest distinction of 0.6% p.a. between adjusted and unadjusted
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TFP took place in the boom period and the largest difference took place in the 
post-boom period at 5% p.a. This is because the boom period represents a 
period when resources were being highly utilised. After capacity is adjusted 
for, the 7.3% p.a. growth in TFP during the post-boom period of 1983-1992 
was an indicator of the sector's potential productivity growth under conditions 
of buoyant demand.
These counterfactual figures show the significant effect on output growth 
of cyclical changes associated with the boom conditions. An increase in the 
levels of capacity utilisation during the boom period increased output per unit 
of input, or, on the contrary, reduced input per unit of output.
T ab le  VII-16
Total Factor Productivity Growth (Annual (%) Growth Rate)
1966
1972
1973
1982
1983
1992
TFP 3.9 6.0 2.3
Adjusted TFP 8.8 6.6 7.3
Difference 4.9 0.6 5.0
Source: Table VI1-15, and Appendix AVII-3
Quite apart from the impact of business cycles, a portion of the rise in TFP 
during the boom period compared with the pre-boom period, is still not 
accounted for. One of the possible explanations for this rise is economies of 
scale. A closer extensive study conducted by the IRC in 1987 had shown that, 
in the pre-boom period, the actual plant size of many firms fell short of the 
efficient size of plant. In the same period the Government's industrial str ategy 
was aligned to control market structure through restrictive investment licensing 
policy, where market size was thought to be a constraint. Investment licensing 
policy withheld growth on the pretext of market saturation. In the cases where 
market size was a binding constraint investment was not forthcoming,
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monopoly rights were granted (tobacco and petroleum refining etc.) and 
competing imports were restricted or totally banned.
Making allowances for the fact that the data available did not allow for 
empirical analysis to isolate economies of scale's effects on growth, it is 
sufficient to say that economies of scale had made a significant contribution to 
increasing the output per unit input through greater specialisation and dealing 
with larger units.
More important, perhaps, is the impact of a larger market on the 
application of techniques that could not have been adopted until per-capita 
incomes were sufficient enough to provide a market justifying the cost of their 
use. This is what happened in Japan where many known techniques could not 
be adopted prior to the boom because of Japans' small markets and its lack of 
capital. It had also occurred in many European economies in the post-war 
period when they adopted American technology.
As incomes rose very rapidly and capital was abundantly available in the 
Libyan economy, many advanced techniques were transferred to Libya. Since 
most of these transferred techniques were developed in economies with more 
capital available than in Libya, an alteration in the capital-labour ratios in 
favour of capital was inevitable. This was enhanced by the relative price 
change (i.e. when capital became relatively cheaper and labour relatively more 
expensive during the boom compared with the pre-boom period).
In addition to the growth of income and output, the boom may allow other 
factors to increase TFP, namely foreign exchange availability and the strong 
value of domestic currency. Both these factors are consistent with rapid 
advances in technological knowledge and permit more production with the 
same inputs. This is especially true under conditions of rising demand, because 
it is easier to innovate when adding to capacity than it is when replacing 
capacity.
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Technological progress should however be distinguished from efficiency 
improvement, in which known technology is applied to production, even 
though the two are not systematically distinguishable either in theory or in 
practice. Technological progress is the change in the best practice production 
function frontier. However, all other types of productivity change- for example 
"leaming-by-doing", diffusion of new technological knowledge and the short- 
run adjustment to shocks external to enterprises, which all change techniques 
of production from average to the best-practice introduced - simply result in 
increasing technical efficiency. But there is growing evidence that the 
productivity gain due to technological mastery may be substantial in 
developing economies and may actually outgrow gains from technological 
progress. Nevertheless, under the conditions of abundant foreign exchange, 
technological progress is also expected to import positive TFP change with 
capital growing substantially during the boom and it is to be readily expected 
that tangible technology transfer did take place in Libyan manufacturing. 
Closer inquiries into this possibility show that such transfer had in fact taken 
the form of purchases of imported equipment and plant machinery but 
managerial assistance was, on occasions, also imported.
TFP is usually aggregated into technical progress and technical efficiency 
by applying operation research methods using frontier estimates parametrically 
01 non-parametrically and it would be most desirable to do this but available 
data prevents it.
When adjustment is made for cyclical changes the trend towards a rising 
TFP reflects the secular forces underlying productivity advance. Decidedly this 
would include intangible investment designed to improve the quality and 
efficiency of tangible human and non-human factors such as, for example, 
investment in education, labour training, etc., which became embodied in the 
work-force and capital goods.
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This view has come back into vogue again as shown in more recent 
literature that examines the effect on the growth of externalities associated with 
investment in human and capital resources. The emphasis in this literature is on 
the accumulation of knowledge which becomes endogenous to the growth 
process as intangible capital goods, while, at the same time, exhibiting 
increasing returns to scale (Lucas, 1993).
The previous comment suggests that rising demand and the availability of 
relatively cheap foreign exchange during the boom created conditions that were 
conducive to productivity growth through increases in technical efficiency and 
technological progress and yet neither can be accommodated in the Dutch 
Disease Model. But it is precisely these kinds of changes and the effects they 
have upon unit costs and profitability that explain the performance of 
manufacturing under booming conditions.
VII-6 Relative Prices and Profitability
The Dutch Disease Theory depicts the effect of relative price changes on 
production structure through changes in profitability.
In absolute terms profitability is squeezed in the traded goods sector as 
the result of rises in wages and other non-traded inputs relative to producers 
prices. If it so happens that the traded goods sector is more labour-intensive 
than the non-traded goods sector, then a rise in wages will be certain to reduce 
profitability in the traded goods sector by more than it does in services in the 
medium term. As a result of this resources will be redeployed from tradables 
into non-tradables and naturally, a decline in tradables output occurs. This is 
particularly true if the resource movement effect dominates the spending effect.
In the light of this it is customary for the Dutch Disease literature to test 
the degree of the squeeze on tradables by the use of a general index of the 
relative prices of tradables to non-tradables.
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The fact that there had been a faster rate of wages increase in the 
Netherlands compared with Germany was made pivotal to the argument of de­
industrialisation by the advocates of the Dutch Disease Theory. Corden asserts 
that the divergent rise in production cost crowded profits in Dutch 
manufacturing because output prices were exogenously determined and 
therefore did not change in the Netherlands relative to Germany. More 
universally, REER has consistently been used in traditional Dutch Disease 
literature as an indicator of competitiveness.
However, the REER index and other similar indices of tradables to non­
tradables prices are actually quite crude measures of competitiveness and 
profitability, and could be very misleading if applied to booming developing 
economies. The shortcoming of these indices stems from three main causes. 
Firstly, they do not accurately take into account the structure of production cost 
within the denominator, because they either deflate output price by one 
variable only, namely wages, or by a general cluster of domestic prices. 
Secondly, the implicit assumption underlying these measures is that the fixed 
technical coefficient of production disregards growth in productivity which 
may rise from increased technical efficiency, or from technological progress or 
indeed from externalities associated with investment in the sector 01 in its 
supporting infrastructure. Thirdly, these indices are proxies for profit margins 
and provide no information on total profits, which may be rising even when 
profit margins are falling.
This all amounts to saying that better indicators of profitability are those 
which consider the relationship between profits, input and output prices and 
productivity change. Symbolically this can be shown as follow:
7F=P- x  Wf  + m + — 
a (4)'
° This equation is similar to that produced in previous chapter section VI-5.
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Where n  is the change in unit profit, and p, a, f  w, m stand for changes in 
output price, labour productivity, fixed costs, per hour wages, and material 
costs respectively. This equation implies that changes in unit profits n  is 
directly proportional to change in output prices, P, and labour productivity, a , 
and inversely to change in fixed costs, f, per hour wages, w and material costs, 
m. an expression similar to that devised for labour can be devised for material 
so that productivity is accounted for, which will be done in the following 
sections.
VII-6-1 Relative Price Movement for Libya's 
Manufactures Under Booming Conditions
This section will first consider the changes of manufacturing output prices 
relative to non-tradable prices, to demonstrate that manufactures did suffer 
from adverse terms of trade in relation to non-tradable sectors over the boom 
period. It will then turn to investigate the movement of manufacturing output 
prices relative to input prices, taking into consideration productivity growth. 
This will be done on large-scale manufacturing industries, with the result that 
the indices obtained are industry-specific.
The purpose of this disaggregation is to investigate the causes underlying 
the differential performance of various industries to see why some industries 
were expanded during the boom period while many others were contracted. 
The main reasons for these divergent performances may have been differences 
of productivity growth or relative prices or both of these things.
As regards output prices, the available data has shown that export and 
import prices had deteriorated relative to non-traded prices over the boom 
period. From the mid-Seventies the growth of manufactures, export and import 
prices had generally lagged behind domestic wholesale prices with the result 
that, by 1983, the ratios of the unit value of imports and exports to the 
domestic wholesale prices had declined by 11% and 19% respectively. By
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1987 the import and export ratios were at only 77% and 61% of their 1976 
levels. This meant that the competition which domestic products encountered 
from imports had persisted well beyond the boom period, as the Government 
did not adjust for currency over devaluation.
It should be added however, that even though the overall indices had 
shown a downward trend over the boom period, the same was not true for 
many sub-sector industries (see Figures VII-9 and VII-10 and Tables VII-17 
and VII-18)
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Figure VII-9
Prices Indexes for M anufactures in Libya 1970-1995
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Figure: VII-10 
Relative Price Movement for Manufactures in Libya 
1970-1995
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252
Ta
ble
 
VI
I-1
7
Ra
tio
 
of 
Un
it 
Va
lue
 
of 
Ex
po
rts
 
to 
W
ho
le
sa
le 
Pr
ice
 
Ind
ex
 
for
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
In
du
st
rie
s 
19
70
-9
2
CD i n  
CD iQ  00  
c o  ™  i n
c o  °
00  £ 2  oo  
o o  “ 2 i n
o o
cm  'T  o  
c d  8  t o
^  CM ®
»— • CM
t  9  I D
£  CO
i"- •
o  ®  5
«  °> O) 
5  ^  CD
'V  ^  TT o o m 
CM i n  F  
CM CM ^
i "  (n
CM ID  S  
CM CM 0 0
™  ^  c o
CO OO „n  n  5M M 1"
(O (O 
CO CO 
CM CM
CO OO 
O ' CM
CM CM
0 0  CO 
-- O’ 
t o  c o
^  "  CD
ID  O  
r- 1 0 ( 0
^  o  o
c o  o o  
■'t i-~
^  CM M’ 
S  CD CD ™ oo oo
CO ^  
OO CM
in  
i n  m
w
3 5  CD 
D  O  CD
j =  E  i
d) CD 3
a t  £  o
p  _  ro
s S 11 3 i
ni ~Q —
CL £  <
co 5
I k .= o 
>
£  V XJ -O 
(D C
s
s
o c o CO CO CO q n - CD N - C~- 0 0 GO CM CO o c o CO
c o
o o
CD
CD
0 0 CM CM 8 r^ . o
CD
OO
0 0
OO
o o
o o 4
0 0
LO § o o c o
co '
o o
* T~ T” * *
h~ CMCOCMCMT - CDCDM" t- c o T- M" o T - i n
i nfv. CM0 0 i dCO 8 8 8 OOOOCMN- 8 8 CMCO r-o m - i n 8 CDCO 8,f” T—T—
CMq CDO o CDCMCMCM T-
r^- S 8 8 s CM1^- CDcb00
CO i n l*» t^ - CM T -
d
CO 8
d
c -
o
c -
CM
N -
d
r^-
M- CO M- r r O M ;
c b
CO F :
CD
CO
c d
CO 8
o o
i n
CD M"
i n
c d
CO £
CM
0 0
c b
CO
CO CO CM CM CM o o CO CO
o o
CD
o o
CD
o o
CD
c d
CO
c b
0 0 8
CO
CO
o :
o o
c b
i n
O o CM CM o O ' O ' CD
c d
0 0
c o
0 0
c b
CD
c b
CO
d
CM CMO '
c d
CO
o o
CD
c b
CO
CO c o CD O ' o o CM c ~
c b
CD
c b
CD s CMCO i n c dOO o1 i o
in  co ins OO CD * -  CD ^
c o  n  c o  i n  N
CO OO CO O  ( 0
i n  o  i n  c o  ^
I—  O  CM CM ^
CO I D  OO N  k
O ’ CO CO CO CDO  -  CD ^  _  _T f m i n ' - ' : tN|m ,f l0 ^ ^ lC , n N C O m O I T t 0 0 C M O n t.
S ^ S r3' Tl' ^ § o ^ a)CT)^ m L n o S Cs,S a) Lnc DCOh;
i n  CD CD CD CO i n  CD
m - oo s  i n
N  4  CM M- O
L  n  OO S  CM
^  ' f  in  in  'J
in  CD CO M - ooN C O C O (P ® N (' ’ _i n T C m ^ t ^ L C M n i C O O O O O i n O l r - o o n c O O l ' t O O M ’
^  CO CO CO CO 00 I D O i n c O r - N N M - C O ' - M - N O l O
t-
CM CM CMT— L_J I " -  I " -  I N  L N E-J ▼— T— V. N N VN QQ
0 (po)0) roi ncq^r ; i ni no) t ^o) (p(pqcocqi / )NN
O  O  O  O  O  CM
o o o o t t - - o ^ O ) o o o o f f l i o o ) ( o CN'}, O N a ) ()0o i ^
CO O  CM in  LO CO
g  CM CD CO CO cb
CD
^  c-iri-JJI^Z^^ICDoo
CD LO i n  CO CD O ' a
^' § § n  s  g 8 g
CD CM CD 
CM c b  
CD CD
■ CD ■ M"s s' g si
^ S O M ' M ' ( M O p ) » - T. r
_  o  c d  i n  i n  o  
5  N  J -  o  o  c
CO — _^ CO O ;
O ' O 'CM CD
c -
CD o
CO CO CD h ~ q  co co ^
^  CD ^ CD
q  q
O' O'
i n * - o o CO CD C - in o r^ - o o c n o
O ' i n CD CD CM ■o i n o CM o o 8
CN j r
h - o o o o CD CD CD CD CD CD
86
 
3
10
4 
7
9
8
.1
9
8
.7
Z 
8
6
1
0
6
.4
1
2
0
.2
6 
8
9 o oo 7
7
.0
7
7
.0 C -
O "
0 0
o o o o o o o o o o o O
8
o
o
o
o 8 8 8 8 8
o
o 8 8
o
o
*“ T” T _ T _ T~ r _ , _
O ' f ' - CM CM CD CD o o o o
CM
CD 8
CD
o o
h -
o
CM
O
CM
O c bc -
i n
o
CM
O
CM
O 5
o T - CD CD o o O - c - c o CD CD CM
s
CM
8 O o 8 o
c b
CO
c b
05 8 8
CO q q CM CM O ' i n c n o o c n c n c -
c b
o o
i n o
CM O 'o o
O '
o o
d c b
o o
CM
CO
c n
CD
CM
CD
CM
CD
o
h ~
CD CO S  CO co in  oo cd
O  CM r -  ^
o o o o o o o o o o o
O  CM 0 0  0 0  r -  ^
cr’ cMooc n P 0 o- r ^  
8 l S f i ; 2 § g CO CM ^  CD CD
CM ^  ^
cb
N - q  ■«- 
i n  i n  c d
T~ T- cn cn ■<- CD cn cn cn
CM
1^
CM
f"-
o
CO in
o ;
o o
o
CD
o
CD
CM
CO
q q c~ CD CO N CD CD CD
CD
in
CM
CO 4
CD
CO
0 0
1 -^
o o
r -
o
in
o o c - t '~ h - o o o o CD
c b
CO
CD
CO
c b
i n
CD
i n 4
c o
CO $
o o
CO
CM
i n
CD CM CM CM CM
^  r- xf Tf I f  t
O ’ o
CM T -
CO CO CM
■^ r cd
c f  M ; t  M ; c o  i n
c b  c b  c b  c b  c b  ■»-
S N i n ^ l C D C D C D C D C O O O C O C O N O l
O O f - C D i n C D C D C D C D C M C M
i/) m D)
- 5  in 
o V
S 3Q- "o
uO) . o aj § OJ
CD CD
§ i
J  E
E Q- -  0 -
c  0 1  3  J S
I  U J
E  £  a) ai a:
O  CD O  —
CD
g 1
rc cl
o  __  CD CD
U J
-c
a .  c p  (/) .£
ro ,-j r  u o r  *2 3
C -  “ F-  CD n  V
.  £r
O  CD
D O 
C  CD
5i 5 I  i  £  I  ?  I  S I  !  22 £ £ * a > s e o E S . c 3 q
IL £D I- h<D >  CD— >  -1 ID C  "2 <D ou. i  i  £  o. z o  CD CD CO CD
■u U J  03^ -c ^
CD O  CD ^  O  c a  c 2  c — V- CO
0 ^ 2u rCD t z  —5 o <
IT)
<N
If one wishes to compare the input prices of various industries and take into 
consideration the structure of their production costs too it is necessary to 
construct indices for those industries. A perusal of Figure VII-11 below is 
enough to make this need quite obvious. But the construction of such indices 
presents a daunting task.
Figure VII-11 spans the pre-boom, boom and post-boom periods and 
displays the distribution of total cost over labour, material inputs and other 
costs for landmark years.
The share taken up by labour within total production cost was an average 
of 20%. Material inputs occupied a 62% share. Because of Libya's limited 
natural resources a large volume of material inputs had to be imported and the 
only exceptions to this were cement and petrochemical industries. Directly 
imported material accounted for 74% of the total material inputs in 1980 and it 
is likely that a sizeable part of the remaining 26% was also imported. The 
remaining 18% share of total production cost was composed of several items 
embracing-among others- transport, electricity and water within their 
grouping..
Figure VII-11
Structure of Variable Production Cost in Manufacturing Industries in Libya
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It can be seen clearly from what has been said above that it was not wages but 
changes in input prices that had the predominating effect on the production 
costs of Libyan manufacturing industries.
It is equally clear that the currency appreciation created by the boom had 
reduced material prices by vastly increasing the power of manufactures to buy 
imported inputs.
Because of the overwhelming extent of material inputs and their ultimate 
effect upon profitability the need for carefully constructed indices is very 
apparent.
In constructing a composite index of input prices for individual industries, 
the total costs have been allocated to three main input categories. These are: i) 
labour input, ii) imported material input and iii) locally purchased material 
input. Taking the weights of each input for individual industries from the 1980 
Industrial Census then gives a Laspeyres Index with the following structure:
A, =
';1 9 8 0  F j t
j \ 9 m P  jo
(5)
Where p t is the composite input price for industry / at time t, Cj0 is the cost
share of input j  in the year (1980), Pj is the price of input j  and 0 and t are the 
first year and the current year in the series, respectively.
To deal with the movement in input prices Pj several indices have been 
constructed:
A wholesale price index has been made for locally purchased material 
inputs and an index of unit value of imports created for imported materials.
An index of the wage rate has also been constructed for labour input. This 
has been derived by taking the total wage bill in various industries and dividing
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it by the number of workers in each respective industry. See Tables AV1I-4-1, 
AVII-4-2 and, AVII-4-3 respectively, in the Appendix AVII-4.
These indices enabled a composite index of input prices for single 
industries to be constructed. See Table AVII-4-4 in Appendix AVII-4. Relating 
this index to the index of unit value of exports gives an approximation of the 
change in profitability. Final results are shown in Table VII- 19. For the sectors 
as a whole, the price index of profitability declined by 19% over the period of 
1973-1982, it remained stable over 1983-1985, but continued its decline 
thereafter, with a noticeable drop in 1990 following the early 1990 devaluation 
of the Libyan dinnar as import prices increased substantially. For most of the 
exportable industries however, the index had an upward trend over the boom 
period. This was practically the case for chemicals and petrochemicals, all of 
which achieved a rapid rate of growth in exports during the boom. In all of 
these industries input costs were largely accounted for by imported material. 
Setting aside the rapid rise in wages there is no doubt that the high content of 
imports within industrial production costs greatly benefited those industries 
during the boom as the price of imports became so relatively cheap.
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This result would definitely not have been predicted by the Dutch Disease 
measures of profitability, which deflate the unit value of exports by domestic 
wholesale prices (Table VII-19 above) or by wages, and invariably find the 
profitability of traded goods to have contracted during the boom period. In fact 
deflating by wages gives erroneous results for Libya as shown in Table VII-20. 
Over 1976-1982 the wage based index shows profitability to have declined by 
56%, as opposed to only 19% according to a total cost based index of 
profitability, which is an enormous difference. Thus the wage-based index 
would have wiped out the performance of manufacturing industries in Libya 
during the boom, when in fact we know that most of them prospered very well.
In short, including the price of imports in the profitability deflator yields 
results that are contradictory y to Dutch Disease wisdom precisely because the 
boom period leads to relative price changes in favour of imports and the higher 
the import content in production costs the less profitability is squeezed.
For industrialised economies, deflating by import prices is less important 
because the import content of their production costs is likely to be much lower 
than it is for an industrialising economy, due to their highly developed inter­
industry structure of production. A wage rise in a developed economy becomes 
a deciding factor in export competitiveness under boom conditions. The same 
is not true of developing economies, as was the case for Libya.
So far the analysis has abstracted from any growth in output per unit input 
which would lower unit production costs and increase profitability. To address 
the issue of productivity growth in measuring profitability, a quantity index of 
profitability has been constructed. Similar to the price index of profitability, the 
inputs considered in the quantity index of profitability were quantity of labour 
(number of employees) and the quantity of material input (imported material 
deflated by the unit value of imports. The resultant index is a Laspeyres Index 
with the following structure;
258
Where O, is the composite quantity index for industry / at time t, Cjo is the
cost share of input j  in the year (1980), qj is the quantity of input j  and 0 and t 
are the first year and the current year in the series respectively. The results 
from this are shown in Table VII-21.
For the sector as a whole, the index rose by 23% over the period 1976- 
1982 and for exportable industries (chemicals and petroleum refining) it 
indicates a substantial gain in productivity.
Combining the price index with the quantity index gives an accurate 
measure of the relative change between output prices and the production costs 
of manufacturing over time on a per unit basis. Table VII-22 shows that 
profitability had increased in all the sectors where both output and exports 
expanded during the boom.
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It should be mentioned though that this combined index measures the 
profit margin, and therefore only reflects the supply-side effects on 
profitability. However, the effect of demand pull on investment decision is 
worth investigating further and this can be done by constructing an indicator of 
total profit and simply deflating total revenue by a domestic price index, such 
as the consumer price index. Such an indicator is shown in Figure VII-12.
Figure VII-12 
Total Profits in Manufacturing Industries 
in Libya 1965-1992
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It is meaningless to try to measure profitability in large-scale industries by 
taking those industries en-bloc. That is something quite obvious and it would 
be a waste of time to do so. Large industries naturally consist of firms of wide 
diversity in their size, number of employees, techniques of production, styles 
of management, efficiency and so on. So clearly profitability is only 
meaningful when applied to individual businesses.
The index of profitability shown above would have been completely 
unnecessary had data on profitability for Libya existed at all but it does not.
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VII-7 Conclusion
The preceding discourse has revealed quite plainly that -  because of the boom- 
the Libyan manufacturing sector achieved remarkable growth.
Starting from a very humble beginning it grew at an average rate of 
19.5% p.a. in real terms.
Manufacturing exports, emerging from an almost negligible base, grew at 
a the truly astonishing rate of 35.5% p.a.
However, at the same time, import substitution declined distinctly slowly 
in relation to currency appreciation.
Libyan manufactures competed well not only in their own market but also 
internationally. As we have seen, there had been a marked increase in the share 
of manufactured exports in Libya's total national exports. Therefore there is no 
doubt that Libyan manufactures gained competitiveness during the boom 
period, and one would be led to suggest that they enjoyed favourable relative 
prices: for example, a weak currency in comparison to foreign trading partners 
creating declining wage rates. But findings are that price movement did not, in 
fact, favour tradables -  and this is precisely what the Dutch Disease Model 
predicts.
Investigation shows that there were substantial productivity gains in all 
manufacturing industries, especially chemicals and petrochemicals, and that 
these gains were achieved through technological changes and increased 
productivity.
A full, properly studied conclusion follows with strong comments to 
make about the Dutch Disease Model, a model which ascribes growth without 
considering output per unit of input either because all resources are assumed to 
be fully employed at all times or assumes no changes in production coefficients 
and accounts for no other factors. Therefore it follows it cannot be a very 
useful theoretical model.
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Subsequently, if price indicators are to be disregarded in favour of an 
examination of the effect of boom on the supply response of manufacturing at 
all, these indicators have to take into account productivity growth.
Another likely logical conclusion could be that the traditional price 
measures developed in Dutch Disease literature may be inefficient and 
misleading simply because they do not take into consideration production cost 
and productivity growth.
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMERY AND CONCLUSION
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This study constitutes an inquiry into the effects of oil price shocks on the 
growth and structural changes of an oil-exporting developing economy. Whilst 
it is based upon research conducted upon Libya, the conclusion may be of 
relevance to the experiences of other oil-exporting countries. Nevertheless, 
further research is needed before its findings can be generalised.
The study opens with a survey of literature on the Dutch Disease Theory 
and highlights its main limiting aspects in analysing the experiences of 
developing economies. These limitations directly concern the models 
assumptions, its static nature of analysis and failure to take into consideration 
some of the major underlying factors, such as the impact of the pre-boom 
economic conditions and productivity growth. We also review the experiences 
of a number of other countries' that underwent oil booms.
The investigation elaborates these points and establishes an alternative 
analytical approach to assess the impact of the Seventies oil price shock on the 
Libyan economy. This approach has three main elements. First, it challenges 
the Dutch Disease Theory's assumptions of macro-equilibrium with full 
employment, perfect factor markets, fixed national stock of both capital and 
labour and the immutability of technical conditions of production Second, it 
uses the Dutch Disease Model mechanisms, mainly the resource movement 
effect and the spending effect, to examine the effect of the oil boom on relative 
prices. Third, it takes into consideration the new structure of prices, demand 
and productivity growth on changing the technical conditions of production 
and thus the profitability of tradable sectors.
The study of Libya's experience begins with an extensive historical 
investigation into the growth rates and structural changes which have taken 
place in the Libyan economy over the three decades to 1990. The 
determination of the investigation within this time-frame is due to two main 
considerations, first the intention of the study is mainly to trace the changes in 
growth and structure of the Libyan economy during the oil price shock period
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between 1973 and 1982. Second, and perhaps most importantly, is that the data 
in the case of Libya is either inadequate or unreliable. However, it should be 
mentioned that the period under investigation has been extended throughout the 
study when it is possible.
The study reveals that before the discovery of oil, Libya possessed most 
of the salient features of an under-development economy. These included a 
very low per-capita income, a chronic deficit in the government budget and 
balance of payments, a high rate of illiteracy, a high degree of resources 
immobility, a stagnant agricultural sector and low productivity o f labour. This 
picture had changed dramatically with the advent of oil wealth in the early 
1960s which caused change to take place in all fields: political, social and 
economic. Since then the Libyan economy has undergone major structural 
changes.
Three distinct periods have been discerned within the oil period. In each 
of these periods, although sometimes overlapping, the growth rates and the 
source of growth of GDP, the labour force and the accumulation of capital 
were rapid and different in direction from one period to another.
During 1962-1969, the structure of the economy and its nature can be 
described as dualistic because there existed a large agricultural sector and an 
active, modem industrial sector. The main feature of such an economy is the 
coexistence of a large oil sector overwhelmingly dominating the economy as a 
financial source, export origin, and the main natural resource available to the 
country, with the rest of the economy grouped together and viewed as one 
sector.
Libya's economic growth rate during this period was one of the highest 
growth rates in the world. Its gross national product (GNP) had increased at an 
average of nearly 16% p.a. in real terms, with gross domestic product (GDP) 
and gross fixed investment increasing at an average of 22.6% and 15.6% p.a. 
respectively. The share of gross fixed investment in non-oil-GDP reached 63%.
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At the sectoral level, the most remarkable increase was in mining (including 
crude oil) which grew at 47% p.a., followed by construction at 20% p.a., 
transport and communications 17% p.a. and services gathering 13% p.a.
However, apart from the mining and construction sectors, the share of all 
other economic sectors in aggregate output showed a downward trend and the 
decline in the share of the productive sectors (manufacturing and agriculture) 
was relatively more that of services. This can be put down to the limited 
absorptive capacity of the economy, the lack of infrastructure, the small size of 
the population and the income effect generated by oil windfalls.
The rapid growth witnessed in this period kept its upward trend in the 
subsequent period of 1970-1982. This period witnessed a rapid growth rate in 
real investment (at 15% p.a.) with a 58% average annual share in the non-oil 
GDP following the massive injection of oil windfalls gained from the two oil 
booms of 1973/1974 and 1980/1982. Massive capital accumulation during this 
period led to remarkable structural changes in favour of the tradable sectors.
In terms of growth the most outstanding increase had been in 
manufacturing which grew at an average rate of 19% p.a., followed by 
transport and communication at 18% p.a., construction at 15% p.a., services at 
14% p.a. and agriculture at 5% p.a. But the shares of both agriculture and 
manufacturing compared with that of services were still very low. This 
situation totally changed in the post-boom period of 1983-1990. It was during 
this period that major transformation in Libya's state and society had taken 
place and several features of economic bottlenecks had become clearly visible. 
There was a shortage of technical and skilled labour for the advanced public 
sector and a marked impermanence and lack of administrative institutions in a 
climate of instability in the oil market and political crisis. Consequently the 
period witnessed a sharp fall in economic growth rates. The growth rates of 
investment, GNP and GDP during that period had been negative.
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However, at the sectoral level there was a significant increase in the 
productive sectors output both in terms of growth and share in aggregate 
output. In real terms agriculture and manufacturing output had grown at 12% 
and 7% p.a. respectively. By 1990 the sector share occupied by agriculture was 
7% and that of manufacturing was almost the same.
The study then proceeds to investigate factor inputs and productivity 
growth during the period 1962-1990.
With regard to investment the study shows that during 1962-1969 
planning strategy was directed to the regeneration of the poor and defective 
economy by means of intensifying investment into developing the country's 
infrastructure and services. But during the second period, from 1970 right 
through to i986, the Government's strategy was aimed at reducing the 
dependence upon oil as the main source of income. It concentrated on the 
diversification of the economic base and reinforcing Libya's self-sufficiency 
through industrialisation and increasing agriculture production.
The study also investigates the growth and structure of the Libyan labour 
force. It shows that the economically active population in Libya had grown at 
an average rate of 4% p.a. throughout 1962 to 1990 and how it was distributed 
among the various sectors.
Before 1962 the agriculture sector was the primary labour absorbing 
sector but after the discovery of oil the sector's share of the labour force 
dropped significantly and by 1990 it had declined by over 22%. But it ought to 
be mentioned here that this result should be treated with caution since the 
official figures on employment did not include those engaged in agricultural 
activities as a second occupation and those who partook in these activities as 
unpaid family work. Not only were the higher earnings created by the oil 
windfalls responsible for crowding out of labour from agricultural sector but 
also the lack of water resources, the undeveloped market for agricultural
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products, the imbalances of development expenditure during the period 1962- 
1969 and the domination of the public sector all contributed to this.
The construction and electricity sectors were the leading labour absorbing 
sectors. The total share of these two sectors combined had increased by more 
than 8% by 1990. Their combined growth had been at an average rate of 11% 
p.a. from 1962 to 1969 but the most remarkable leap took place during the oil 
shock period between 1973 and 1982 when their combined growth rate 
averaged at more than 22% p.a..
The second greatest labour absorbing sector was the transport and 
communications sector. The high increase that was attained in this sector was 
mainly due to the huge investment in infrastructure.
The story for manufacturing was that its share in overall employment had 
fallen by 2% between 1962 and 1970, but had increased by an average of 11% 
p.a. from 1970 to 1990. The relatively low share of manufacturing employment 
in overall employment can be explained by the manufacturing sector’s specific 
labour requirements and the domestic shortages in these requirements as well 
as the relatively capital-intensiveness of the sector.
Partial and total productivity growth is also measured over the pre-boom, 
boom and post-boom periods. With regard to labour productivity (real value 
added per worker), the study shows that labour productivity had grown at an 
average rate of 21% p.a. over the period 1962-1969 and at an average rate of 
5% p.a. over the period 1970-1982, while it was negative during the post-boom 
period. On the other hand capital productivity, as measured by the incremental 
capital output ratio (ICOR), indicates that Libya was efficient in the utilisation 
of capital during the boom period. However, due to the complexity of 
measuring capital this result should be treated with some caution.
Total factor productivity growth is also measured. The main finding there 
is that technical progress, as measured by total productivity gains in Libya, was 
insignificant despite the country's access to imported technology. The failure of
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total factor productivity to grow during the boom period was chiefly due to the 
economy's limited absorptive capacity and its failure to choose the right 
technology.
The study also discusses sectoral shifts and establishes the counterfactual 
to the Dutch Disease. The analysis shows that although the manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors received immense financial allocation during the seventies, 
their contribution in aggregate output had declined over the period of 1962- 
1975. This outcome was not related to the Dutch Disease but was mainly 
attributed to the scarcity of water resources and arable land, the shortages of 
raw material, the lack of skilled and managerial labour, the limited absorptive 
capacity of the economy, the smallness of the domestic market and 
Government policy toward the industrialisation process. This is explamed by 
the counterfactual to the Dutch Disease.
Chapter Five of the study especially focuses on the boom period and 
attempts to quantify Libya's experience of the Dutch Disease. The increases in 
oil prices in 1973/1974 and 1979 are shown to have created booming 
conditions in Libya as the country's foreign exchange earnings expanded very 
rapidly with each shock. These boom effects were transmitted into the 
economy via the resource movement and the spending effects, whilst 
government spending on tradable sectors mitigated these effects. The Dutch 
Disease index is calculated using Gelb's methodology.
With regard to manufacturing, the results show that up until the early 
seventies, the index for manufacturing showed a deteriorated trend reflecting a 
decrease in the degree of industrialisation. But this situation changed entirely 
since the early Seventies. Starting from 1972, the index for manufacturing 
shows a continued steady improvement, reflecting a gradual increase in the 
degree of industrialisation and, by 1990, the index reached its notable peak.
The results for agriculture show that the index of agriculture had 
deteriorated from as early as our data started (1963) up to the late Seventies
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despite the intensive investment in irrigation and land reclamation. However, 
the position changed favourably after 1983 and the trend continued thereafter.
The two Dutch Disease sub-indices are reflected in the overall Dutch 
Disease index. This index shows a gradual improvement in the degree of 
industrialisation throughout the boom period and the subsequent period.
An attempt is made to measure Libya's real effective exchange rate and 
relative price indices. The results indicate that the general movement of prices 
in the economy, as measured by the change in terms of trade between tradables 
and non-tradables, was as would have been expected by the Dutch Disease 
model, being in favour of the latter and against the former, albeit more 
moderately so than that experienced by many other developing economies 
under similar conditions.
The study then turns to investigate the agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors performances under booming conditions.
As has been said, before oil discovery the Libyan economy was 
predominantly an agricultural economy. However, with the advent of oil 
wealth Libya started changing into an economy which produced other 
commodities and services. Consequently, agriculture's share in GDP steadily 
declined. The most remarkable decline had occurred during the oil price shock 
period of 1973-1983, but this relative decline does not coincide with the Dutch 
Disease Theory prediction as long as a significant increase in agricultural 
production had taken place during that period.
The study also investigates the importance of demand factors, relative 
price changes and change in the technical coefficients of production in 
determining agricultural performance. It shows that because of the boom, 
demand within the domestic market in Libya was buoyant, and that the prices 
of agricultural products continued to rise and led to an increase in agricultural 
production. On the supply-side, investment in large and small agricultural 
projects by both the Government and the private sector during the Sixties and
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later, yielded high returns during the boom period. This was assisted by using 
high agricultural technology and agrochemical inputs and improving irrigation 
methods. It is also shown that even though the supply-side had changed 
entirely in the post-boom period the gap between domestic supply and demand 
had narrowed further. The increase in agricultural production during this period 
was mainly attributed to the crucial demand enhanced by the introduction of 
more liberal trading and to the open border policy. This encouraged exports 
and consequently production.
The study examines the manufacturing sector and industrial developments 
in Libya and discusses Government polices in relation to manufacturing and 
reveals that from the early Sixties until the mid-eighties the Libyan economy 
went through a planned industrialisation process. It shows that during the oil 
boom period of 1973-1982 the share of the industrial sector as a whole, in both 
aggregate output and total employment, had increased substantially. It grew at 
an average rate of 19.5% p.a. over the boom period compared to 12% p.a. in 
the pre-oil price shock period of 1962-1972 and 5.8% p.a. during the post­
boom period of 1983-1990. In terms of its contribution to the growth of the 
economy it is shown that the industries displaying outstanding performance 
during the boom period were petroleum refining at 42% followed by food 
products at 12%, non-minerals 11%, fabricated metal 10%, industrial 
chemicals 9% and textiles including wearing apparel 5%.
The examination reveals that manufacturing exports, which emerged from 
an almost negligible base prior to 1962, grew at the truly astonishing rate of 
35.5%p.a. However, at the same time, import substitution declined distinctly 
slowly in relation to currency appreciation.
The assessment then develops to include factor inputs and productivity 
growth. With regard to labour input it is shown that the most rapid absorption 
of labour in manufacturing occurred during the boom period of 1973-1982 at 
12% p.a. This was accounted for by the large number of small labour-intensive
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industries and the sparsity of very large capital-intensive projects. Dealing with 
capital inputs the study reveals that fixed capital growth during the boom 
period was markedly higher than in any other periods and that within the boom 
period there was a remarkable acceleration from 1980 onward which ran 
through the post-boom period to 1985.
Investigation also shows that there were substantial productivity gains in 
all manufacturing industries, especially chemicals and petrochemicals, and that 
these gains were achieved through technological progress and rising demand.
The study also examines relative price movements for Libya's 
manufactures under booming conditions and adopts an alternative methodology 
to the traditional price measures developed in Dutch Disease literature. This 
methodology takes into consideration production costs and productivity 
growth.
In the light of this study we can conclude that the problems encountered 
in the Libyan economy were not those predicted by the Dutch Disease but that 
they were more directly related to the efficiency of investment and government 
strategy toward the industrialisation process. Consequently, future research 
should include more dynamic analysis into the effects of government 
intervention and investment behaviour. It may also benefit from two issues that 
emerge from this study. One is the effect of the boom on relative prices and the 
other is the impact of the boom on pre-boom economic conditions that then 
alters the supply responses of the economic sectors.
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Appendix AIV-1-1 
Aggregated Economic Indicators for Libya
Table AIV-1-1
Gross Domestic product By Kind of Economic Activity Value & (%) Share 1962-1990 (LD Million, at Current Factor Cost)
Total
GDP
Agriculture 
Forestry & 
Fish. Share
Quarrying 
(In.Oil) Share
Manufactur.
Share
Transport and 
Communic. 
Share
Construction
Share
Wholesale & 
Retail Trade 
Share
Other
Servic. Share
1962 155.5 14.9 9.6 38.0 24.4 9.6 6.2 8.6 5.5 10.3 6.6 14.2 9.1 59.9 385
1963 235.3 15.1 6.4 99.6 42.3 10.6 4.5 11.3 4.8 12.7 5.4 16.7 7.1 69.3 29.5
1964 364.6 16.7 4.6 195.7 53.7 12.3 3.4 14.9 4.1 21.7 6.0 20.2 5.5 83.1 22.8
1965 492.1 25.2 5.1 270.1 54.9 13.6 2.8 18.5 3.8 34.9 7.1 25.1 5.1 104.7 21.3
1966 634.9 27.3 4.3 356.1 56.1 15.7 2.5 24.8 3.9 45.3 7.1 33.3 5.2 132.4 20.9
1967 747.8 30.9 4.1 402.5 53.8 17.7 2.4 31.6 4.2 66.2 8.9 35.6 4.8 163.3 21.8
1968 1072.6 334 3.1 648.6 60.5 21.5 2.0 39.3 3.7 89.2 8.3 45.5 4.2 195.1 18.2
1969 1223.0 37.4 3.1 754.7 61.7 22.3 1.8 40.8 3.3 87.1 7.1 48.5 4.0 232.2 19.0
1970 1288.3 33.1 2.6 812.6 63.1 24.2 1.9 43.2 3.4 87.8 6.8 47.0 3.6 240.4 18.7
1971 1586.5 33.0 2.1 922.7 58.2 32.1 2.0 87.2 5.5 116.8 7.4 75.6 4.8 319.1 20.1
1972 1753.0 43.6 2.5 920.6 52.5 41.4 2.4 100.5 5.7 182.8 10.4 95.8 5.5 368 3 21.0
1973 2182.7 60.0 2.7 1131.8 51.9 55.8 2.6 129.3 5.9 261.2 12.0 124.8 5.7 419.8 19.2
1974 3795.7 64.7 1.7 2385.3 62.8 70.5 1.9 155.0 4.1 376.6 9.9 184.3 4.9 5593 14.7
1975 3674.3 82.9 2.3 1961.1 53.4 86.2 2.4 175.8 4.8 343.7 9.4 224.6 6.1 800.0 21.8
1976 4768.1 99.7 2.1 2750.0 57.7 114.8 2.4 193.3 4.1 515.1 10.8 263.1 5.5 832.1 17.5
1977 5612.7 90.0 1.6 3275.9 58.4 153.2 2.7 220.1 3.9 602.0 10.7 292.0 5.2 979.5 17.5
1978 5496.1 122.1 2.2 2808.7 51.1 182 3.3 250.9 4.6 682.8 12.4 328.9 6.0 1121.0 20.4
1979 7603.0 140.4 1.8 4545.3 59.8 227.3 3.0 291.2 3.8 726.7 9.6 383.2 5.0 1289.0 17.0
1980 10237. 164.9 1.6 6571.9 64.2 262.7 2.6 335.3 3.3 935.7 9.1 481.7 4.7 1485.0 14.5
1981 9003.3 174.0 1.9 4756.5 52.8 298.9 3.3 420.0 4.7 1147. 12.7 535.0 5.9 1672.0 18.6
1982 8359.2 220.7 26 4040.3 48.3 326.6 3.9 403.3 4.8 1054 12.6 535.9 6.4 1779.0 21.3
1983 8139.5 272.2 3.3 3793.7 46.6 340 4.2 387.4 4.8 879.0 10.8 525.4 6.5 1942.0 23.9
1984 7521.7 266.4 3.5 2997.0 39.8 402.5 5.4 392.5 5.2 819.5 10.9 554.5 7.4 2090.0 27.8
1985 8050.2 283.2 3.5 3295.0 40.9 415.9 5.2 399.1 5 920.5 11.4 560.5 7.0 2176.0 27.0
1986 8402.4 320.0 3.8 3634.0 43.3 450.8 5.4 395 5 4.7 895.0 10.7 485.9 5.8 2221.0 26.4
1987 6751.4 348.5 5.2 1982.0 29.4 469 6.9 385.0 5.7 890.0 13.2 400.0 5.9 2277.0 33.7
1988 69049 366.5 5.3 1944.0 28.2 532 7.7 395.5 5.7 892.5 12.9 440.0 6.4 2334.0 33.8
1989 6781.5 395.5 5.8 1582.0 23.3 585.5 8.6 411.5 6.1 920.0 13.6 480.0 7.1 2407.0 35.5
1990 7672.0 423.5 5.5 2078.0 27.1 647 8.4 442.5 5.8 1021 13.3 517.5 6.7 2543.0 33.2
Source: Ministry of Planning Economic and Social Indicators, 1962-1983, Tripoli, February 1984, pp.25- 30, and National
Authority for Information and Documentation & Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series and monthly Bulletins, various 
issues.
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Table AIV-1-2
GDP deflator
GDP
Agriculture 
Forestry & 
Fishing
Mining 
Quarrying 
(Incl. oil) Manufacturing
T ransport 
and
Communication. Construction
Wholesale 
& Retail 
Trade
Other
Services
1962 39.0 16.6 52.0 56.8 53.7 18.7 49.4 50.2
1963 44.6 16.9 55.8 59.8 56.3 21.9 51.7 52.5
1964 48.0 19.3 56.6 62.5 59 23.1 54 54.8
1965 48.9 21.1 57.9 64.6 62 24.3 57 57.8
1966 52.7 24.1 58.7 65.2 67.1 28.7 62.2 62.2
1967 54.6 25.7 59.9 66.8 71.8 31.9 63.9 67
1968 58.9 29.3 62.7 68.5 74.5 37.7 65.6 69.4
1969 63.8 32.0 67.2 69.8 76.8 44 662 72.1
1970 66.9 33.2 70.3 71.5 78.4 48.5 66.9 73.2
1971 69.5 32.9 72 74.3 79.8 53.6 72.2 74.8
1972 70.0 33.5 72.7 77.8 80.5 58 74.1 76.1
1973 71.7 35.2 73.8 81.6 83.5 63 76.7 77.8
1974 80 43.1 82.9 84.6 84.4 66 84.2 844
1975 83.5 44.4 85.3 86.5 85.6 79.3 86.3 87.4
1976 86.4 55.5 888 90.5 87.7 78.2 88.6 88.6
1977 90.2 52.5 92.3 95.4 90.8 83.4 92.4 92.1
1978 93.2 66.5 93.9 98.7 94.2 92.8 94.7 94.2
1979 96.2 82.7 96.3 99.6 96.7 93.4 97.1 98.4
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 102.7 97.0 102.4 102.2 105.3 103.7 101.7 103.0
1982 105.5 145.6 104.2 104 107.2 106.2 104.1 105.0
1983 108.2 131.7 107.5 105.3 105.3 110.5 105.7 107.6
1984 110.8 132.2 109.4 110.6 106.3 113.3 109.1 110.9
1985 111.5 116 111.6 111.2 107.6 110.4 109.3 112.6
1986 114.7 127.6 115.4 115.1 109.8 112 113.7 1142
1987 118.1 127.2 121.2 119.5 112.9 114.2 116.6 116.7
1988 119.8 121.4 122.7 123.2 115.5 118 6 119.5 117.7
1989 120.8 111.2 125.5 127.9 117.9 119.4 122.1 118.8
1990 123.5 95.4 131.8 132.5 121.5 123.8 124.8 121.2
Source: Salem M. Mustfa._An Econometric Model of the Libya Economy 1962-1975, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
South Methodist University, 1979. & Abusneina, M. Abduljalil. Development Alternatives in Surplus Economy with
Skilled Labour Constrants : The Case of Libya, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1981, and Economic
Research Center, Garyonis University, Resturucture of the Libyan Economy, Unpublished Comprehensive Research 
1994.
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Table AIV-1-3
Libya's Real Economic Growth 19962-1990
GNP
Consumption
GFCF
National Trade
Population.
Per-capita
Govr. Private Export Import Consumption GNP
1962 383.3 87.2 369.2 64.40 161.5 3077 1451.0 254.4 264.2
1963 500.8 96.4 336.3 74.30 293.7 289.2 1504.0 223.6 333.0
1964 597.1 122.9 343.8 109.0 487.5 339.6 1560.0 220.4 382.8
1965 840.7 163.6 411.0 146.7 611.5 374.2 1617.0 254.2 519.9
1966 1005.5 203 480.1 191.2 702.1 423.1 1677.0 286.3 599.6
1967 1133.3 241.8 551.3 210.4 789.4 463.4 1739.0 317.0 651.7
1968 1434 327.7 602.7 289.7 1154 565.4 1803.0 334.3 795.3
1969 1581.5 402.8 600.3 315.2 1235 656.7 1869 0 321.2 846.2
1970 1602.8 388.6 693.6 242.7 1300 602.4 1922.0 3609 833.9
1971 1979.1 457.6 674.8 287.9 1403 627.3 1991.0 338.9 944.0
1972 2111.4 512.9 775.7 436.5 1426 788.6 2066.0 375.5 1022.0
1973 2600.7 648.5 980.5 636.2 1729 733.6 2146.0 456.9 1211.9
1974 4195.9 930 1158.8 979.4 3113 1785 2229.9 519.7 1881.7
1975 3921.3 1250 1429.9 1055 2459 1995 2316.5 617.3 1692.8
1976 4919.1 1372 1547.5 1226 3334 1934 2406.0 643.2 2044.5
1977 5649.3 1533 1660.8 1368 3834 2172 2499.7 664.4 2260.0
1978 5355.3 1816 1786.5 1532 3195 2361 2597.6 687.8 2061.6
1979 7395 2086 1969.9 1955 4991 2933 2699.1 729.8 2739.8
1980 9805.2 2351 2328.0 2230 6737 3399 2804.6 830.1 3496.1
1981 8361.5 2650 3044.8 2811 4740 4193 2915.2 1045 2868 2
1982 7540.5 2811 3207.6 2362 3891 3716 3030.3 1059 2488 4
1983 7165.9 2665 3192.1 2093 3423 3090 3150.7 1013 2274 4
1984 6466.3 2338 2792.6 2031 2992 2850 3240.0 861.9 1995.8
1985 7016.3 2352 2788.3 1628 2775 1983 3370.0 827.4 2082.0
1986 7191 9 2539 2755.8 1326 2120 1245 3520.0 782.9 2043.2
1987 5615 9 2857 2558 9 1460 1409 1345 3670.0 697.2 1530.2
1988 5636.3 1977 2517.2 1468 1348 1374 3820.0 659 1475.5
1989 5492.9 1992 2485.8 1462 1804 1615 3980.0 624.6 1380.1
1990 6101.9 2099 2429.8 1466 2603 1737 4150.0 585.5 1470.3
Source: As for Table AIV-1-2
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APPENDIX AV-1 
Real effective Exchange Rate
Measurement of Libya's Real Effective Exchange Rate
1- Tables AV-1 to AV-6 gives the direction of trade. These tables used to 
calculate the weights for Libya's trading partners, (value of trade with the 
country transacted in any specific year).
2- Table AV-7 shows the Nominal Exchange Rate (NER) for Libya's main 
trading partners in $US
3- Table AV-8 gives the Bilateral Nominal Exchange (BNER) rates by 
converts these currencies into a LD through the $US cross rate.
4- Table AV-9 depicts the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) for Libya and main 
trading partners.
5- Table AV-10 shows the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) which is the 
BNER multiplied by the respective of WPI of the domestic and trading 
partner’s economy as follows:
REER = BNER (LD/F Currency) * WPIF/ WPID 
where F and D refer to foreign and Libya respectively.
6- Table AV-11 gives the Import, export and trade weighted Real Effective 
Exchange Rate REER
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Table AV-1-1
Im ports (Value in LD. 000)
1971 1973 1975 1978 1980 1981 1984 1986 1988 1990
USA 17.30 28.60 41.90 85.20 126.20 155.20 0.00 0.00 18.70 18.90
UK 24.90 37.20 57.70 96.60 139.70 172.30 109.70 133.30 142.60 127.30
Japan 15.20 34.40 86.80 101.40 151.30 189.60 176.80 63.40 197.50 65.90
Germany 23.20 56.10 127.30 173.70 267.20 261.00 289.00 161.00 193.20 221.10
Italy 57.70 139.10 271.90 328.30 592.60 750.30 367.80 300.60 361.00 279.70
France 21.40 44.10 92.70 113.40 135.60 155.80 101.20 64.20 78.50 111.30
Spain 2.60 13.50 26.20 14.10 88.40 73.60 n.a. n.a 30.60 0.00
Greece 4.10 6.80 44.90 46.70 40.60 48.80 n.a. n.a 29.30 22.00
Turkey 0.90 3.60 8.20 17.30 15.80 56.40 42.90 48.20 60.70 78.30
Yugoslavia 4.50 10.70 15.40 21.20 24.20 38.40 0.00 0.00 26.70 20.20
Holland 7.60 13.10 21.50 85.00 37.60 52.30 49.80 57.70 55.00 84.50
Canada 0.40 3.10 2.00 1.80 12.70 15.30 n.a n.a 14.00 15.20
Bulgaria 2.70 4.30 29.00 12.90 25.10 26.80 n.a n.a 0.00 0.00
Sweden 2.10 590 9.30 11.10 24.50 35.80 n.a n.a 12.80 24.90
Romania 7.20 15.80 29.00 28.50 15.50 36.10 n.a n.a 0.00 0.00
Austria 1.10 790 7.30 18.50 29 60 50.70 n a n.a 21 80 29.30
Ireland 0.10 0.60 1.00 9.90 36.50 34.10 n.a n.a 12.70 0.00
Tunisia 8.20 6.30 13.20 16.10 15.00 18.40 n.a n.a 14.60 33.10
Other Countries 49.20 108.80 163.40 180.90 228.10 310.50 704.50 487.30 415.70 379.20
Total 250.4 539.9 1048.7 1362.6 2006.2 2481.40 1841.7 1315.7 1685.4 1510.9
Source : Calculated from, Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social lndicators( 1984 and 1994), and National 
Authority for Information and Documentation, 1990-94 and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series various issues
T ab le  AV-1-2
E x p o rts  (V alue in LD. 000)
1971 1973 1975 1978 1980 1981 1984 1986 1988 1990
USA 57.80 93.20 443.80 1158.0 2298 7 1263.70 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a
UK n.a n.a n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 32.30 66.80
Japan 3.00 13.30 68.70 4.30 87.80 97.20 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a
Germany 168.30 254.50 394.20 314.70 818.40 474.80 377.10 62.30 135.20 243.10
Italy 231.50 334.90 442.90 638.40 1202.3 1099.20 899.00 797.10 799.20 1792.5
France 119.60 63.60 74.80 159.50 178.80 168.50 428.10 208.00 250.70 320.50
Spain 41.10 21.50 104.00 182.60 319.30 307.00 228.90 308.90 127.70 344.50
Greece 0.01 24.50 2.70 13.30 213.50 232.20 134.20 129.70 144.80 165.10
Turkey 2.20 0.50 33.30 73.20 207.00 235.60 189.70 108.30 22.90 136.70
Yugoslavia 0.05 3.20 13.50 13.10 81.30 84.70 136.50 44.00 44.70 99.80
Holland 56.70 39.50 41.90 84.00 109.70 127.90 n.a. n.a. 96 104.70
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a
Bulgaria 0.23 0.00 2.80 10.40 27.50 69.2 n.a. n.a. 29.30 65.40
Sweden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Romania n.a. 16.10 20.60 63.30 126.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 65.30
Austria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tunisia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 19.50
Brazil 4.50 18.20 55.60 21.70 52.60 94.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a
Bahamas n.a. 45.60 89.50 18.50 324.60 42.60 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a
Other Countries 277.50 268.50 236.60 178.00 441.40 314.30 906.90 773.20 223.90 321.00
Source: As for Table VA-1-1
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Table AV-1-3
Trade (Value LD.OOO)
1971 1973 1975 1978 1980 1981 1984 1986 1988 1990
USA 75.10 121.80 485.70 1243.2 24249 1418.90 n.a. n.a. 18.70 18.90
UK 24.90 37.20 57.70 96.60 139.70 172.30 109.70 133.3 174.90 194.10
Japan 18.20 47.70 155.50 105.70 239.10 286.80 176.80 63.4 197.50 65.90
Germany 191.50 310.60 521.50 488.40 1085.6 735.80 666.10 223.3 328.40 464.20
Italy 289.20 474.00 714.80 966.70 1794.9 1849.50 1266.8 1097.7 1160.2 2072.2
France 141.00 107.70 167.50 272.90 314.40 324.30 529.30 172.2 329.20 431.80
Spain 43.70 35.00 130.20 196.70 407.70 380.60 228.90 308.9 158.30 344.50
Greece 4.10 31.30 47.60 60.00 254.10 281.00 134.20 129.7 174.10 187.10
Turkey 3.10 4.10 41.50 90.50 222.80 292.00 232.60 156.5 83.60 215.00
Yugoslavia 4.60 13.90 28.90 34.30 105.50 123.10 136.50 44.0 71.40 120.00
Holland 64.30 52.60 63.40 169.00 147.30 180.20 49.8 57.7 151.00 189.20
Canada 0.40 3.10 2.00 1.800 12.70 15.30 n.a. n.a. 14.00 15.20
Bulgaria 2.90 4.30 31.80 23.300 52.60 96.00 n.a. n.a. 29.30 65.40
Sweden 2.10 5.90 9.30 11.100 24.50 35.80 n.a. n.a. 12.80 24.90
Romania 7.20 31.90 49.60 91.800 141.80 36.10 n.a. n.a. 0.00 65.30
Austria 1.10 7.90 7.30 18.500 29.60 50.70 n.a. n.a. 21.80 29.30
Ireland 0.10 0.60 1.00 9.900 36.50 34.10 n.a. n.a. 12.70 0.00
Tunisia 8.20 6.30 13.20 16.100 15.00 18.40 n.a. n.a. 14.60 52.60
Brazil 4.50 18.20 55.60 21.700 52.60 94.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahamas n.a. 45.60 89 50 18.500 324.60 42.60 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Countries 326.70 377.30 400.00 358.90 669.50 624.80 1611.4 1360.5 639.60 700.20
Total 1212.9 1737.0 3073.6 4295.6 8495 4 7092.60 5142 1 3747.2 3592 1 5255.8
Source As for Table VA-1-1
T ab le  A V -1^
D irection  o f Im p o rts  (% o f to ta l)
1971 1973 1975 1978 1980 1981 1984 1986 1988 1990 Average Adjusted averag
USA 6.91 5.30 4.00 6.25 6.30 6.30 n.a. n.a. 1.10 1.30 3.75 4.79
UK 9.94 6.89 5.50 7.09 7.00 6.90 6.00 10.10 8.50 840 7.63 9.74
Japan 6.07 6 37 8.28 7.44 7.50 7.60 9.60 4.80 11.70 4.40 7.38 942
Germany 9.27 10.39 12.14 12.75 13.30 10.50 15.70 12 20 11.50 14.60 12.24 15.63
Italy 23.04 25.76 25.93 24.09 29.50 30.20 20.00 22.80 21.40 18.50 24.12 30.80
France 8.55 8.17 8.84 8.32 6.80 6.30 5.50 4.90 4.70 7.40 6.95 8.88
Spain 1.04 2.50 2.50 1.04 4.40 3.00 n.a. n.a. 1.80 n.a. 1.63 2.08
Greece 1.64 1.26 4.28 3.43 2.00 2.00 n.a. n.a. 1.70 1.50 1.78 2.27
Turkey 0.36 0.67 0.78 1.27 0.80 2.30 2.30 3.70 3.60 5.20 2.10 2.68
Yugoslavia 1.80 1.98 1.47 1.56 1.20 1.50 0.00 0.00 1.60 1.30 1.24 1.58
Holland 3.40 2.43 2.05 6.24 1.90 2.10 2.70 4.40 3.30 5.60 3.41 4.35
Canada 0.16 0.57 0.19 0.13 0.60 0.60 n.a. n.a. 0.80 1.00 0.41 0.52
Bulgaria 1.08 0.80 2.77 0.95 1.30 1.10 n.a. n.a. 0.00 n.a. 0.80 1.02
Sweden 0.84 1.09 0.89 0.82 1.20 1.40 n.a. n.a. 0.80 1.60 0.86 1.10
Romania 2.88 2.93 2.77 2.09 0.80 1.50 n.a. n.a. 0.00 0.00 1.30 1.66
Austria 0.44 1.46 0.70 1.36 1.50 2.00 n.a. n.a. 1.30 1.90 1.07 1.37
Ireland 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.73 1.80 1.40 n.a. n.a. 0.80 0.00 0.50 0.64
Tunisia 3.28 1.17 1.26 1.18 0.70 0.70 n.a. n.a. 0.90 2.20 1.14 1.46
Total 78.31 100.00
Source : Calculated from, Table VA-1-1
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Table AV-1-5
Direction of E xports (% of Total)
1971 1973 1975 1978 1980 1981 1984 1986 1988 1990 Average Adjusted a
USA 6.01 7.79 21.92 39.48 35.42 27.41 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.80 16.44
UK n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.69 1.78 0.35 0.42
Japan 0.31 1.11 3.39 0.15 1.35 2.11 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.84 1.00
Germany 17.49 21.26 19.47 10.73 12.61 10.30 11.43 2.56 7.09 6.49 11.94 14.22
Italy 24.05 27.98 21.87 21.77 18.53 23.84 27.24 32.78 41.92 47.87 28.79 34.29
France 12.43 5.31 3.69 5.44 2.76 3.65 12.97 8.55 13.15 8.56 7.65 9.11
Spain 4.27 1.80 5.14 6.23 4.92 6.66 6.94 12.70 6.70 9.20 6.46 7.70
Greece n.a 2.05 0.13 0.45 3.29 5.04 4.07 5.33 7.59 4.41 3.24 3.86
Turkey 0.23 0.04 1.65 2.50 3.19 5.11 5.75 4.45 1.20 3.65 2.78 3.31
Yugoslavia 0.01 0.27 0.67 0.45 1.25 1.84 4.14 1.81 2.34 2.66 1.54 1.83
Holland 5.89 3.30 2.07 2.86 1.69 2.77 n.a. n.a. 5.03 2.80 2.64 3.14
Brazil 0.47 1.52 2.75 0.75 0.81 2.05 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.84 1.00
Bulgaria 0.02 n.a 0.14 0.36 0.42 1.50 n.a. n.a. 1.54 1.75 0.57 0.68
Bahamas n.a. 4.91 5.00 0.67 3.37 0.99 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.49 1.77
Romania n.a. 1.35 1.02 2.16 1.95 1.95 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.74 1.02 1.22
Total 83 95 100.00
Source Calculated from, Table VA-1-2
Table AV-1-6
Direction of Trade (% of Total)
1971 1973 1975 1978 1980 1981 1984 1986 1988 1990 Average Adjusted Average
USA 6.19 7.01 15.80 28.94 28.54 20.01 n.a n.a 0.52 0.36 10.74 13.24
UK 2.05 2.14 1 88 2.25 1.64 2.43 2.13 3.56 4.87 3.69 2.66 3.28
Japan 1.50 2.75 5.06 2.46 2.81 4.04 3.44 1.69 5.50 1.25 3.05 3.76
Germany 15.8 17.88 16.97 11.37 12.78 10.37’ 12.95 5.96 9.14 8.83 12.20 15.04
Italy 238 23.84 23.26 22.50 21.13 26.08 24.64 29.29 32.30 39.43 26.63 32.83
France 11.6 6.20 5.45 6.35 3.70 4.57 10.29 4.60 9.17 8.22 7.02 8.65
Spain 3.60 2.02 4.24 4.58 4.80 5.37 4.45 8.24 4.41 6.55 4.83 5.95
Greece 0.34 1.80 1.55 1.40 2.99 3.96 2.61 3.46 4.85 3.56 2.65 3.27
Turkey 0.26 0.24 1.35 2.11 2.62 4.12 4.52 4.18 2.33 4.09 2.58 3.18
Yugoslavia 0.38 0.80 0.94 0.80 1.24 1.74 2.65 1.17 1.99 2.28 1.40 1.73
Holland 5.30 3.03 2.06 3.93 1.73 2.54 0.97 1.54 4.20 3.60 2.89 3.56
Canada 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.22 n.a n.a 0.39 0.29 0.14 0.17
Bulgaria 0.24 0.25 1.04 0.54 0.62 1.35 n.a n.a 0.82 1.24 0.61 0.75
Sweden 0.17 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.51 n.a n.a 0.36 0.47 0.27 0.33
Romania 0.59 1.84 1.61 2.14 1.67 0.51 n.a n.a 0.00 1.24 0.96 1.18
Austria 0.09 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.35 0.72 n.a n.a 0.61 0.56 0.35 0.43
Ireland 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.23 0.43 0.48 n.a n.a 0.35 n.a. 0.16 0.20
Tunisia 0.68 0.36 0.43 0.37 0.18 0.26 n.a n.a 0.41 1.00 0.37 0.46
Brazil 0.37 1.05 1.81 0.51 0.62 1.33 n.a n.a n.a. n.a. 0.57 0.70
Bahamas n.a. 2.63 2.91 0.43 3.8 0.60 n.a n.a n.a. n.a. 1.04 1.28
Total 81.12 100.0
Source :Calculated from, Table VA-1-3
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Table AV-1-7
Nominal E xchange R ates for L ibya's Main Trading P artn ers  1971-1990 ($USA / domestic Currency)
Libya USA UK Italy Germany France Greece Spain Japan Holland Turkey Tunisia Canada
1971 3.3722 1.0957 2.5525 0.0017 0.3060 0.0004 0.0333 0.0151 0.0032 0.3069 0.0704 2.0833 0.9978
1972 3.3052 1.0967 2.3481 0.0017 0.3124 0.1953 0.0333 0.0157 0.0033 0.3099 0.0704 2.0661 1.0044
1973 2.9679 1.2063 2.3232 0.0016 0.3700 0.2124 0.0333 0.0176 0.0036 0.3540 0.0704 2.2467 1.0042
1974 2.9679 1.2244 2.3486 0.0015 0.4150 0.2250 0.0337 0.0178 0.0033 0.3990 0.0714 2.4594 1.0089
1975 2.9679 1.1707 2.0235 0.0015 0.3813 0.2229 0.0333 0.0167 0.0033 0.3720 0.0658 2.3513 0.9839
1976 2.9679 1.1618 1.7024 0.0011 0.4233 0.2012 0.0281 0.0146 0.0034 0.4070 0.0599 2.3202 0.9909
1977 2.9679 1.2147 1.9060 0.0011 0.4751 0.2125 0.0270 0.0124 0.0042 0.4386 0.0515 2.4266 0.9909
1978 2.9679 1.3028 2.0345 0.0012 0.5470 0.2392 0.0282 0.0143 0.0061 0.5079 0.0395 2.4789 0.8432
1979 2.9679 1.3173 2.2240 0.0012 0.5775 0.2488 0.0278 0.0151 0.0042 0.5248 0.0282 2.5259 0.8561
1980 2.9679 1.2754 2.3850 0.0011 0.5105 0.2214 0.0261 0.0126 0.0049 0.4696 0.0111 2.3883 0.8370
1981 2.9679 1.1639 1.9080 0.0008 0.4435 0.1740 0.0215 0.0103 0.0045 0.4051 0.0075 1.9391 0 8432
1982 2.9679 1.1031 1.6145 0.0073 0.4173 0.1487 0.0174 0.0080 0.0043 0.3810 0.0054 1.6239 0.8134
1983 2.9679 1.0470 1.4506 0.0006 0.3671 0.1198 0.0142 0.0064 0.0043 0.3263 0.0035 1.3753 0.8036
1984 2.9679 0.9802 1.1565 0.0005 0.3177 0.1043 0.0101 0.0058 0.0040 0.2817 0.0022 1.1539 0.7568
1985 2.9679 1.0984 1.4445 0.0006 0.4063 0.1323 0.0068 0.0065 0.0040 0.3608 0.0017 1.321 0.7156
1986 3.1575 1.2332 1.4745 0.0007 0.5153 0.1549 0.0072 0.0076 0.0063 0.4562 0.0013 1.1902 0.7244
1987 2.9822 1.4187 1.8715 0.0009 0.6323 0.1873 0.0079 0.0092 0.0081 0.5626 0.9794 1.2855 0.7693
1988 2 8646 1.3457 1.8095 0.0008 0.5617 0.1650 0.0068 00088 0.0079 0.5001 0.5510 1.1130 0.8384
1989 2.9558 1.3142 1.6055 0.0008 0.5890 0.1728 0.0063 0.0091 0.0070 0.5221 0.4322 1.1055 0.8637
1990 2.8372 1.4227 1 9280 0.0009 0.6693 0.1950 0.0063 0.0103 0.0074 0.5917 0.3413 1.1567 0.8618
Source: IMF.IFS various issues 
Note: * in terms of SDR
Table AV-1-S
Bilateral Exchange Rates with Libya for Main Trading Partners 1971-1990 ($US Per Foreign Currency)
USA UK Italy Germany France Greece Spain Japan Holland Turkey Tunisia Canada
1971 0.3249 0.7569 0.0005 0.0907 0.0001 0.0099 0.0045 0.0009 0.0910 0.0209 0.6178 0.2959
1972 0.3318 0.7104 0.0005 0.0945 0.0591 0.0101 0.0048 0.0010 0.0938 0.0213 0.6251 0.3039
1973 0.4064 0.7828 0.0005 0.1247 0.0716 0.0112 0.0059 0.0012 0.1193 0.0237 0.7570 0.3384
1974 0.4125 0.7913 0.0005 0.1398 0.0758 0.0114 0.0060 0.0011 0.1344 0.0241 0.8287 0.3399
1975 0.3945 0.6818 0.0005 0.1285 0.0751 0.0112 0.0056 0.0011 0.1530 0.0222 0.7922 0.3315
1976 0.3915 0.5736 0.0004 0.1426 0.0678 0.0095 0.0049 0.0011 0.1371 0.0202 0.7818 0.3339
1977 0.4093 0.6422 0.0004 0.1601 0.0716 0.0091 0.0042 0.0014 0.1478 0.0174 0.8176 0.3339
1978 0.4349 0.6855 0.0004 0.1843 0.0806 0.0095 0.0048 0.0021 0.1711 0.0133 0.8352 0.2841
1979 0.4438 0.7494 0.0004 0.1946 0.0838 0.0094 0.0051 0.0014 0.1768 0.0095 0.8511 0.2885
1980 0.4297 0.8036 0.0004 0.1720 0.0746 0.0088 0.0042 0.0017 0.1582 0.0037 0.8047 0.2820
1981 0.3922 0.6429 0.0003 0.1494 0.0586 0.0072 0.0035 0.0015 0.1365 0.0025 0.6534 0.2841
1982 0.3717 0.5440 0.0025 0.1406 0.0501 0.0059 0.0027 0.0014 0.1284 0.0018 0.5472 0.2741
1983 0.3528 0.4888 0.0002 0.1237 0.0404 0.0048 0.0022 0.0014 0.1099 0.0012 0.4634 0.2708
1984 0.3303 0.3897 0.0002 0.1070 0.0351 0.0034 0.0020 0.0013 0.0949 0.0007 0.3888 0.2550
1985 0.3701 0.4867 0.0002 0.1369 0.0446 0.0023 0.0022 0.0013 0.1216 0.0006 0.4451 0.2411
1986 0.3906 0.4670 0.0002 0.1632 0.0491 0.0023 0.0024 0.0020 0.1445 0.0004 0.3769 0.2294
1987 0.4757 0.6276 0.0003 0.2120 0.0628 0.0026 0.0031 0.0027 0.1887 0.3284 0.4311 0.2580
1988 0.4698 0.6317 0.0003 0.1961 0.0576 0.0024 0.0031 0.0028 0.1746 0.1923 0.3885 0.2927
1989 0.4446 0.5432 0.0003 0.1993 0.0585 0.0021 0.0031 0.0024 0.1766 0.1462 0.3740 0.2922
1990 0.5014 0.6795 0.0003 0.2359 0.0687 0.0022 0.0036 0.0026 0.2086 0.1203 0.4077 0.3038
Source: IMF.IFS various issues
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Table AV-1-9
W holesale price index for Libya's Main trading P a rtners 1971-1990
Libya USA UK Italy Germany France Greece Spain Japan Holland Turkey Tunisia Canada
1971 33.0 42.4 30.3 24.8 64.1 46.9 24.4 30.9 48.0 53.0 5.5 54.3 47.5
1972 34.5 44.3 32.2 25.8 65.1 49.1 26.0 33.0 48.4 57.2 7.8 55.1 49.8
1973 40.2 50.1 34.5 30.1 68.4 56.3 31.7 26.4 56.0 61.7 9.4 58.0 53.5
1974 48.8 59.6 42.6 42.5 78.7 72.7 41.6 43.0 73.7 67.6 12.2 70.8 59.4
1975 65.6 65.0 52.4 49.1 82.3 68.6 45.0 46.9 75.9 74.6 13.5 76.8 65.8
1976 86.4 68.1 60.9 57.1 85.4 73.6 51.3 53.1 79.7 81.3 15.7 77.8 70.7
1977 96.2 72.2 72.0 66.5 87.7 77.7 58.3 63.8 81.2 86.6 19.4 81.6 76.4
1978 94.7 77.9 79.1 72.1 88.7 81.1 64.4 74.3 79.1 90.1 29.1 84.2 83.1
1979 96.4 87.6 87.7 83.4 93.0 91.9 77.9 85.1 84.9 93.9 47.9 90.3 90.8
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 102.7 109.1 109.6 116.6 107.8 117.7 126.0 115.6 101.4 106.7 136.0 112.6 112.4
1982 103.8 111.3 118.0 132.7 114.1 123.3 146.0 129.7 103.2 113.0 171.3 131.6 124.6
1983 104.8 112.7 124.4 145.7 115.8 135.9 174.9 148.2 100.9 115.5 223.8 140.3 131.9
1984 103.7 115.4 132.1 160.8 119.2 155.1 212.4 166.3 100.7 120.0 340.2 150.2 137.6
1985 100.2 114.9 139 4 182.6 121.9 161.3 256.1 179.5 99.6 122.7 477.1 161.0 143.1
1986 97.0 116.0 142.7 181.0 118.9 163.2 298.1 181.1 90.5 122.8 618.3 170.2 149.1
1987 95.5 120.4 147.3 185.7 115.9 166.3 327.5 182.7 87.1 122.0 816.3 174.7 155.5
1988 96.4 127.0 152.6 194.5 117.3 173.2 360.3 188.1 86.2 122.8 1391.2 197.4 161.8
1989 97.4 130.2 153.2 206.9 121.0 179.5 408.5 196.0 884 124.2 2281.5 211.8 169.8
1990 99.4 131.6 152.4 222.2 123.1 182.1 473.8 200.1 90.2 127.2 3474.7 225.0 178.0
Source: As for Table VA-1 -8
Table AV-1-10
Bilateral Real Exchange Rates for Libya's Main Trading Partners 1971-1990 (L.D Per Domestic Currency)
USA UK Italy Germany France Greece Spain Japan Holland Turkey Tunisia Canada
1971 0.4174 0.6950 0 6950 0.1762 0.0001 0.0073 0.0042 0 0013 0.1462 0 0035 1.0166 0.4259
1972 0.4261 0.6630 0.6630 0.1783 0.0841 0.0076 0.0046 0.0014 0.1555 0.0048 0.9983 0.4387
1973 0.5065 0.6718 0.6718 0.2122 0.1003 0.0088 0.0039 0.0017 0.1831 0.0055 1.0922 0.4504
1974 0.5038 0.6908 0.6908 0.2255 0.1129 0.0097 0.0053 0.0017 0.1862 0.0060 1.2023 0.4137
1975 0.3909 0.5446 0.5446 0.1612 0.0785 0.0077 0.0040 0.0013 0.1740 0.0046 0.9275 0.3325
1976 0.3086 0.4043 0.4043 0.1409 0.0578 0.0056 0.0030 0.0010 0.1290 0.0037 0.7040 0.2732
1977 0.3072 0.4806 0.4806 0.1460 0.0578 0.0055 0.0028 0.0012 0.1331 0.0035 0.6935 0.2652
1978 0.3577 0.5726 0.5726 0.1726 0.0690 0.0065 0.0038 0.0018 0.1628 0.0041 0.7426 0.2493
1979 0.4033 0.6818 0.6818 0.1877 0.0799 0.0076 0.0045 0.0012 0.1722 0.0047 0.7972 0.2717
1980 0.4297 0.8036 0.8036 0.1720 0.0746 0.0088 0.0042 0.0017 0.1582 0.0037 0.8047 0.2820
1981 0.4166 0.6861 0.6861 0.1568 0.0672 0.0088 0.0039 0.0015 0.1418 0.0033 0.7164 0.3109
1982 0.3986 0.6184 0.6184 0.1546 0.0595 0.0083 0.0034 0.0014 0.1398 0.0030 0.6938 0.3290
1983 0.3794 0.5802 0.5802 0.1367 0.0524 0.0080 0.0031 0.0013 0.1211 0.0026 0.6204 0.3408
1984 0.3676 0.4964 0.4964 0.1230 0.0525 0.0070 0.0032 0.0013 0.1098 0.0023 0.5631 0.3384
1985 0.4244 0.6771 0.6771 0.1665 0.0718 0.0059 0.0039 0.0013 0.1489 0.0029 0.7152 0.3443
1986 0.4671 0.6870 0.6870 0.2000 0.0826 0.0071 0.0045 0.0019 0.1829 0.0025 0.6613 0.3526
1987 0.5997 0.9680 0.9680 0.2573 0.1094 0.0089 0.0059 0.0025 0.2411 2.8070 0.7886 0.4201
1988 0.6189 1.0000 1.0000 0.2386 0.1035 0.0090 0.0060 0.0025 0.2224 2.7752 0.7955 0.4913
1989 0.5943 0.8544 0.8544 0.2476 0.1078 0.0088 0.0062 0.0022 0.2252 3.4246 0.8133 0.5094
1990 0.6638 1.0418 1.0418 0.2921 0.0259 0.0105 0.0072 0.0024 0.2669 4.2053 0.9229 0.5440
Source: Calculated from Tables V A -1 -8 & V A -1-9
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Table AV-1-11
Real Effective Exchange Rate for Libya , 1971-1990 (LD. per $US)
Import REER Index Export REER Index Trade REER Index
Weighted 1971=100 Weighted 1971=100 Weighted 1971=100
1971 35.21 100 34.06 100 34.40 100
1972 34.75 99 33.93 100 34.15 99
1973 36.43 104 36.26 107 36.33 106
1974 37.68 107 37.23 109 37.36 109
1975 29.41 84 29.01 85 29.12 85
1976 22.32 63 22.13 65 22.19 65
1977 25.45 72 24.84 73 25.01 73
1978 30.14 86 29.46 87 29.63 86
1979 35.25 100 34.36 101 34.57 101
1980 39.98 114 38.70 114 38.99 113
1981 34.65 98 34.06 100 34.19 99
1982 31.67 90 31.30 92 31.38 91
1983 29.54 84 29.27 86 29.32 85
1984 25.70 73 25.93 76 25.86 75
1985 34.54 98 34.07 100 34.17 99
1986 35.85 102 35.82 105 35.79 104
1987 55.99 159 58.31 171 58.00 169
1988 57.80 164 59.25 174 58.93 171
1989 53.84 153 56.11 165 55.60 162
1990 64.20 182 66.39 195 65.96 192
Change between
1971-1975 -16% -15% -15%
1973-1982 -14% -15% -15%
1983-1990 98% 109% 107%
1971-1990 82% 95% 92%
Source: Calculated from Tables AV-1-1 to AV-10
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Table AVI-1-3
Production  of Fish 1975-1985 (OOO.tons)
Tuna Other Total
1975 680 4803 5483
1976 799 4059 4858
1977 336 2046 2382
1978 977 4355 5332
1979 424 4500 4924
1980 398 5200 5598
1981 271 6418 6689
1982 160 7425 7585
1983 270 7588 7858
1984 274 4755 5029
1985 337 2755 3092
Source: Ministry of Planning, Economic Resources in Libya, Tripoli, 1986, p. 23.
Table AVI-1-4
Number of Major Fruit Brining Trees and their Rate of Production 1968-1984
Dates Olives Almonds
No, of Production No, of Production No, of Production
Tree Tons Avere.(kg/tree) Tree Tons Avere. (kg/tree) Tree Tons Avere.(kg/tree)
1968 5888 25880 4.4 3135 14.1 4.5 2639 5673 22
1969 5708 35691 6.3 3336 33 1 9.9 2531 5513 2.2
1970 6589 37873 58 3247 70 22 2547 3561 1.4
1971 7100 35600 5.0 3310 50.0 15.1 2395 6619 2.8
1975 4639 68149 14.7 7627 151 19.8 2081 4236 2.1
1976 4642 82396 178 7630 155.1 20.3 2093 5387 2.6
1977 4646 99623 21.4 7513 42 5.6 2105 4690 2.2
1978 4650 86523 18.6 7535 143.4 19 2114 5275 2.5
1979 4653 97694 21.0 7483 100 13.4 2114 5500 2.6
1980 4650 86523 18.6 7559 161 21.3 2114 5275 2.5
1981 3054 67449 22.1 7166 155.3 21.7 2031 14543 7.2
1982 3554 73500 20.7 73.1 2435
1983 4172 72400 17.4 8383 78.1 9.3 2567
1984 4216 74201 17.6 8383 82 9.8 2778
Source: Ministry of Planning, Economic Resources in Libya, Tripoli, 1986, pp. 15,16 and 17
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Table AVI-1.5
Developm ent of A gricultural S ubsidy  R ates
Rates of Agricultural Subsidy
1963-1974 1975-1984
Agricultural Agricultural
Individuals Associations Individuals Associations
Agrochemical 40% 
Pesticides 40% 
Agricultural Machinery 25% 
Water Projects 50% 
Animal Fodder’s 40% 
Bees Equipment 40% 
Other 50%
60%
60%
50%
60%
60%
60%
50%
40%
40%
25%
50%
40%
40%
50%
80%
60%
60%
50%
80%
80%
50%
Source: Agricultural Bank, Annual Report of 1975, No, 19, p. 63 Tripoli, 1975. 
Table AVI-1-6
Proposed Agricultural Improvement Objectives 1975-1980
Sub-Sector
By the End of 
1975
By the End of 
1980
Growth
Rate
Agricultural Land (000,ha) 719 1076 50
Irrigated Land (000, ha) 168 268 60
Dry Farming (000, ha) 551 808 47
Wheat (000, tons) 75 336 348
Barley (000, tons) 180 245 36
Vegetables (000, tons) 620 825 32
Fruits (000, tons) 141 255 81
Meat (000, tons) 46 98 133
Dairy Products (000, tons) 85 290.00 241
Eggs (000, tons) 9 28.00 211
Improved Cattle (000, heads) 19 92.00 384
Sheep (000,000, heads) 3 4.5 50
Honey (tons) 350 600 71
Poultry (000,000, Broiler Birds) 11 16 45
Source: Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Transformation Plan of 1976-1990, p. 10
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Table AVI-1-7
Composition of Food and Agricultural Imports, 1973 & 1982
1973 
Value (000,$) (%) of total
1982 
Value (000,$) (%) of total
Total Food and Agricultural Products 437.40 100.00 1466.6 100.00
Food and Live Animals 277.60 63.50 1068.2 72.80
Live Animals 44.80 10.20 297.20 20.30
Meat 10.10 2.30 50.50 3.40
Dairy Products and Eggs 28.90 6.60 85.10 5.80
Cereals 88.70 20.30 266.10 18.10
Vegetables and Fruit 34.80 8.00 85.90 5.90
Sugar and Honey 24.50 5.60 44.10 3.00
Coffee, Tea and Cocoa 22.00 5.00 86.80 5.90
Feeding Stuffs 21.30 4.90 137.40 9.40
Miscellaneous Food 2.50 0.60 15.10 1.00
Beverages and Tobacco 5.93 1.4 34.80 2.40
Beverages 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
Tobacco 5.90 1.40 34.80 2.40
Crude Materials 680 1.60 13.20 0.90
Hides and Skins 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Oil Seeds 0.50 0.10 2.30 0.20
Natural Rubber 0.90 0.20 0.20 0.00
Textiles Fibbers 0.30 0.10 0 90 0.10
Crude Materials 5.10 1.20 9.80 070
Animal Fat and Vegetables Oil 31.80 7.30 94.90 6.50
Animal Fat 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Fixed Vegetable Oils 31.40 7.20 92.50 6.30
Processed Oils 0.30 0.10 2.40 0.20
Fish and Fishery Products 3.40 0.80 16.00 1.10
Forest Products 78.80 18.00 120.30 8.20
Agricultural Requisites 33.10 7.60 98.20 6.70
Crude Fertilizers 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.01
Manufactured Fertilizers 8.00 1.80 7.30 0.50
Pesticides 4.70 1.20 6.10 0.40
Agricultural Machines 20.30 4.60 84.70 5.80
Total Agricultural Products 321.40 73.48 1211.1 82.60
Source: Calculated From National Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical series various issues
and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, and monthly Bulletin various issues
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Table AVI-1-8
Composition of Food and Agricultural Exports, 1973 & 1982
1973 
Value (000,$) (%) of total
1982 
Value (000,$) (%) of total
Total Food and Agricultural products 8.720 100.00 12.100 100.00
Food and Live Animals 0.150 1.72 0.000 0.00
Live Animals 0.030 0.34 0.000 0.00
Meat 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Dairy products and Eggs 0.010 0.11 0.000 0.00
Cereals 0.100 1.15 0.000 0.00
Vegetables and Fruit 0.002 0.02 0.000 0.00
Sugar and Honey 0.003 0.03 0.000 0.00
Coffee, Tea and Cocoa 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Feeding Stuffs 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Miscellaneous Food 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.00
Beverages and Tobacco 0.440 5.05 0.000 0.00
Beverages 0.004 0.05 0.000 0.00
Tobacco 0.040 0.46 0.000 0.00
Crude Materials 8.100 92.89 0.000 0.00
Hides and Skins 4.600 52.75 0.000 0.00
Oil Seeds 0.100 1.15 0.000 0.00
Naturai Rubber 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Textiles Fibbers 3.200 36.70 0.000 0.00
Crude Materials 0.20 2.29 0.000 0.00
Animal Fat and Vegetables Oil 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Animal Fat 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Fixed Vegetable Oils 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Processed Oils 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Fish and Fishery Products 0.030 0.34 0.000 0.00
Forest Products 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Agricultural Requisites 0.000 0.00 9.000 74.38
Crude Fertilizers 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Manufactured Fertilizers 0.000 0.00 3.100 25.62
Pesticides 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Agricultural Machines 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
Total Agricultural Products 8.300 95.18 12.100 100.00
Source: Ibid.
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Table AVI-1-9
Food and Agricultural Trade Balance, 1973 & 1982
1973 1982
Total Food and Agricultural products -428.7 1454.5
Food and Live Animals -277.5 1068.2
Live Animals -44.8 -297.2
Meat -10.1 -50.5
Dairy products and Eggs -28.9 -85.1
Cereals -88.6 -266 1
Vegetables and Fruit -34.8 -85.9
Sugar and Honey -24.5 -44.1
Coffee, Tea and Cocoa -22.0 -86.8
Feeding Stuffs -21.3 -137.4
Miscellaneous Food -2.5 -15.1
Beverages and Tobacco -5.5 -34.8
Beverages 0.0 0.0
Tobacco -5.9 -34.8
Crude Materials 1.3 -13.2
Hides and Skins 4.6 0.0
Oil Seeds -0.4 -2.3
Natural Rubber -0.9 -0.2
Textiles Fibbers 2.9 -0.9
Crude Materials -4.9 -9.8
Animal Fat and Vegetables Oil -31.8 -94 9
Animal Fat -0.1 0.0
Fixed Vegetable Oils -31.4 -92.5
Processed Oils -0.3 -2.4
Fish and Fishery Products -3.4 -16.0
Forest Products -78.8 -120.3
Agricultural Requisites -33.1 -89.2
Crude Fertilizers -0.1 -0.1
Manufactured Fertilizers -8.0 -4.2
Pesticides -4.7 -6.1
Agricultural Machines -20.3 -84.7
Total Agricultural Products -313.1 1199.0
Source: As Table VII-4
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Appendix AVI-2 
Index of Real Producers’ Prices of Agricultural 
Production in Libya 1975-1980
This appendix summarises the main steps followed in constructing an index of 
real producer's price. This index is obtained by deflating the wholesale price 
index (WPI) by a composite cost index for three groups of agricultural 
products: cereals, vegetables and fruit. In order to accommodate the impact of 
technology on productivity growth, we take technical coefficients of 
production into consideration.
In other words the total cost of production, C, for individual products, r, 
in respective years, n, can be expressed as a sum of input prices pi weighted by 
technical coefficients a in as follows:
Cin = E (p in . Oin) (1)
(1) An estimated average production cost for some agricultural products in 
Libya is available for the period 1970-1980 at 1975 constant prices, from the 
Department of Statistics and Agricultural Research Centre (Table AVI-2-1). 
These figures had been deflated using the general cost of living index (COL) at 
1975, thus establishing the real cost of production for the period 1975-1980 in 
1975 constant prices.
(2) Cost shares of inputs were taken as the technical coefficient of production 
a ,  considering 1975 as a base year (Table AVI-2-2)
(3) Input prices pjn for the same period are taken from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Reclamation statistical series various issues (Table AVI-
2-3).
(4) The total cost for single crops, C, can be then obtained according to the 
identity (1) above. (Table AVI-2-4).
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(5) Indexes for the main agricultural groups (cereals, vegetables, and fruit) 
were then constructed (Table AVI-2-5).
(6) Real producers prices can be then obtained by deflating the wholesale price 
index for agricultural commodities (Table AVI-2-6) by the composite cost 
index for the respective commodity group, (Table AVI-2-7).
Table AVI-2-1
Per Hectare Production Cost for some Agricultural Crops, in Libya 1975-1980 
(An Average at constant 1976 prices)
Land Machinery Material Water Labour Total
Wheat 120 9.4 17.57 27.5 16.45 190.42
Barely 120 9.4 16.87 27.37 17.45 190.59
Tomatoes 120 15.1 482.9 390.93 157.4 1165.8
Potatoes 120 13.67 352.3 205.4 113.17 804.04
Watermelon 120 35.87 632.1 565.33 503 87 1856.7
Citrus 120 7.3 195.4 229.7 97.0 647.90
Onion 120 5.67 164.8 51.5 59.83 401.30
Source: Calculated from Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics, various issues.
Table VI-2-2
Input Share in Production Cost For some Agricultural Crops in Libya, 1975-1980, (LD per hectare)
Land Machinery Materia
I
Water Labour Total
Wheat 0.63 005 0.09 0.14 0.09 1.00
Barely 0.63 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.09 1.00
Tomatoes 0.10 0.01 0.41 0.34 0.14 1.00
Potatoes 0.15 0.02 0.44 0.26 0.14 1.00
Watermelon 0.06 0.02 0.34 0.31 0.27 1.00
Citrus 0.18 0.01 0.30 0.36 0.15 1.00
Onion 0.30 0.01 0.41 0.13 0.15 1.00
Source: Calculated from Table VI-1
Table AVI-2-3
Index of Prices Paid by Farmers 1975-1980 (1975=100)
Land Machinery Fertilizers Seeds Pesticides Material Wages
1975 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0
1976 113 106 66 110 104 86.5 125.0
1977 125 113 58 112 85 78.3 148.0
1978 140 118 82 125 63 88.0 175.0
1979 157 122 115 128 86 111.0 218.0
1980 178 275 125 140 106 124.0 245.0
Annual Growth 10.2% 24.6% 7.4% 5.8% 2.60% 4.6% 16.4%
Source: Agricultural Research Center, National Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly 
statistical serious, several issues, and Central Bank of Libya, yearly statistical series, and monthly 
Bulletin, various issues
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Table AVI-2-4
C ost Index for Som e Agricultural C ro p s in Libya 1975-1980 (1975=100)
Wheat Barely Tomatoes Potatoes Onion Watermelon Citrus
1975 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1976 108 107.7 94.8 97.2 100.5 98.9 97.3
1977 116 115.8 93 96.5 103.1 100.7 97.5
1978 130 130.1 105.7 109.5 117 115.3 110.8
1979 150 150.1 130.6 134.2 140.9 142.8 135.5
1980 177 176.5 147.9 153.3 141.9 159.7 153.4
Source: Calculated from Tables AVI-3 and AVI-4.
Table AVI-2-5
Composite Cost Index for Groups of Agricultural Products (1975=100)
Cereals Vegetables Fruit
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0
1976 107.7 97.5 973
1977 115.8 97.5 97.5
1978 130.1 110.7 110.8
1979 150.1 135.2 135.5
1980 176.5 147.7 153.4
Source: Calculated from Tables AVI-4
Table AVI-2-6
Wholesale Price Index For Major Agricultural Products Groups 1975=100
Cereals Vegetables Fruit
1975 100 100 100
1976 130 172 150
1977 132 185 192
1978 135 242 205
1979 138 252 206
1980 142 264 208
Source: National Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical series 
various issues, and Central Bank of Libya, 1984, yearly statistical series 1970-1990
Table AVI-2-7
Index of Real Producers Prices 1975=100
Cereals Vegetables Fruit
1975 100% 100% 100%
1976 121% 57% 57%
1977 114% 53% 53%
1978 104% 45% 45%
1979 92% 54% 54%
1980 80% 56% 56%
Source: Calculated from Tables AVI-5 & 6
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APPINDEX VII-1 
Statistical Data for Manufacturing Industries in Libya
Table AVII-1-1
Definition Rem arks
Code Industry
311-312 Food products
313 Beverages
314 Tobacco
321-322 Textiles and Wearing Apparel
323-324 Footwear and Leather Products
331-332 Furniture and Wood Products
341-342 Paper, Printing and Publishing
351-352 Industrial Chemicals
353 Petroleum Refining
369 Non-Metallic Minerals
371-372 Basic Metal Products
381-385 Fabricated Metal Products
390 Other Manufacturing
300 All Manufacturing
Table AVII-1-2
Gross Output 1965-1992 (LD 000, at Current Factor Cost)
Code 311/12 313 314 321/22 323/24 331/32 341/42 351/52 353 369 371/72 381/85 390 300
1965 3681 1626 3122 905 50 357 690 2561 703 1053 1610 1022 17380
1966 5140 2140 4227 1010 60 898 560 2940 1090 1288 1830 440 21623
1967 6490 2260 6792 1249 141 891 825 3480 1400 1138 1180 211 26057
1968 7690 3170 8650 1540 110 898 928 4780 1580 1404 1730 172 32652
1969 7470 3970 8040 1800 210 830 963 5090 2270 1587 1980 210 34420
1970 8260 2170 9220 1974 355 1090 1051 5060 2520 1694 1890 277 35561
1971 10221 2252 11286 2011 200 1529 1211 4925 2899 1747 1809 499 40589
1972 11072 3218 13585 2107 753 1742 1390 5086 5217 2070 2150 1058 49448
1973 12823 4265 17077 2236 384 3172 1836 7294 6145 3487 3660 619 62998
1974 20806 5301 21146 3056 904 3739 2773 10535 12641 4096 4220 1561 90778
1975 26070 5590 30370 4710 1436 3832 3470 13660 15190 4315 5180 1645 115468
1976 32145 6744 33065 7196 2895 3943 4372 14458 16250 3704 3900 5788 134460
1977 33290 3200 33110 3283 3005 5435 4662 21641 63842 20390 3874 3970 6810 206512
1978 35578 3480 33405 4020 5687 7687 5808 23812 64921 22226 4473 4008 6983 222088
1979 46584 7885 36867 4921 7240 13432 5097 25744 75934 27527 3783 4110 6032 265156
1980 81408 8575 44471 14057 11923 23118 6876 37098 314542 43093 2233 33872 6612 627878
1981 95302 9667 50490 26274 17777 24860 7861 45157 350591 65204 3740 37013 7179 741115
1982 120683 13686 42953 31935 21508 22145 8975 79530 270973 76818 5656 58849 9547 763258
1983 137289 14602 72786 43009 19474 22205 10079 96429 362634 78143 13411 62713 6703 939477
1984 166044 14885 68745 34461 23514 16196 11194 121388 400558 77680 7400 77080 12171 1031316
1985 170297 13301 43077 35810 20492 18171 10323 111647 546025 63195 9354 70963 12774 1125429
1986 125343 12300 44423 54610 23552 8763 7448 122283 410308 43223 2490 84256 13574 952573
1987 125861 23126 50767 57881 24618 15323 9337 170331 466871 55678 3231 107182 33760 1143966
1988 146212 32275 55951 82801 28517 14791 10065 211240 345722 69029 4711 134668 34957 1170939
1989 139497 42733 66153 79264 23054 19373 11271 209623 389365 75802 19251 144789 19423 1239598
1990 149520 37732 35478 68044 21563 21416 11339 270741 535880 76310 101118 148769 16921 1494831
1991 140420 41616 31122 65935 26281 27580 14339 272934 510071 77748 143713 156020 12202 1519981
1992 160297 58794 36865 67500 30837 33869 17575 300948 681479 84877 176544 183717 8233 1841535
Source: Ministry of Planning Statistical Abstract, various issues, and National Authority for Information and Documentation 
yearly statistical series, various issues, and Private survey for the period 1980-1992
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Table VII-1-3
Value Added in M anufacturing Industries 1966-1992 (LD, 000 at C urrent Factor C o s t )
Code 311/12 313 314 321/22 323/24 331/32 341/42 351/52 353 369 371/72 381/85 390 300
1965 1400 1530 760 30 470 410 460 1020 600 5920 12600
1966 1430 1020 3160 330 20 245 340 1010 570 1050 5225 14400
1967 1199 1048 4868 401 9 441 508 1430 666 521 5309 16400
1968 1433 1281 3158 326 10 513 339 1014 573 1047 10306 20000
1969 2070 1530 5760 760 68 270 680 1970 880 900 5912 20800
1970 2190 960 6810 620 90 360 673 1840 1120 920 6917 22500
1971 2885 1300 8287 631 88 615 707 1905 1251 646 6185 24500
1972 3353 1810 8071 782 168 773 758 1364 2059 964 11898 32000
1973 3823 2503 6892 819 236 1020 389 2924 1789 1142 22263 43800
1974 6366 2623 11758 981 620 1242 1078 4731 4732 1586 19283 55000
1975 6960 2620 11830 1742 950 1082 1572 5520 5250 2465 25509 65500
1976 9280 2681 23285 1742 955 1222 2022 6139 7318 1884 34072 90600
1977 6730 3410 14370 1823 987 1815 2110 3760 8230 1616 79849 124700
1978 7016 2067 14844 1470 1055 6416 2181 2984 8796 9452 92419 148700
1979 8774 4649 14477 2732 4033 8156 2257 5649 12875 13252 81946 158800
1980 22550 4335 17120 5974 7154 9247 2407 12551 94363 16375 737 15242 2314 210369
1981 26399 4882 18996 11180 10666 9944 2751 17224 105177 24778 1234 16656 2513 252400
1982 33429 6846 17488 13588 12905 8858 3141 27367 81292 29191 1866 26482 3341 265794
1983 38029 7404 33981 18279 11684 8882 3528 33825 108790 29694 4426 28221 2346 329089
1984 45994 7450 36906 14105 14108 6478 3918 41344 120167 29518 2442 34686 4053 361169
1985 51089 6651 25465 14682 12500 7268 3612 37974 163807 25278 3087 32059 4254 387726
1986 37603 6150 23497 21844 14131 3505 2979 46384 123092 8645 722 26962 4751 320265
1987 37758 11563 26075 23152 14771 6129 3735 60331 140061 11136 937 34298 11766 381712
1988 43864 16137 32762 33120 17110 5916 4026 73524 103717 13806 1366 43094 12235 400677
1989 41849 21366 35642 31706 13832 7749 4508 71913 116809 15160 5583 46332 6798 419247
1990 44856 18866 19986 27218 12938 8566 4536 90956 160764 15262 29324 47606 5922 486800
1991 42126 20808 10858 26374 15769 11032 7537 92106 153021 15550 41677 49926 4271 491055
1992 48089 29397 19614 27000 18502 13548 7030 101905 204444 16975 51198 58789 2882 599373
Source: Ministry of Planning Statistical Abstract, various issues, and National Authority for Information and Documentation 
yearly statistical series, various issues, and Private survey for the period 1980-1992
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Table AVII-1-4
Distribution of Labour Am ong Manufac turing  Industries in Libya 1966-1992
Coded 311/12 313 314 321 323 331 341 351 369 371 380 300 Other Total
1965 1464 667 0 505 67 253 534 721 742 508 5461 18239 23700
1966 1474 686 837 525 69 269 548 721 719 508 6356 16744 23100
1967 1489 536 1120 547 71 250 557 620 718 512 6420 15580 22000
1968 1557 546 1122 555 70 250 524 627 760 639 6650 14150 20800
1969 1397 635 1129 572 70 245 520 629 850 667 6714 12686 19400
1970 1520 637 1135 620 86 394 481 627 1004 687 7191 13209 20400
1971 1904 645 1177 713 89 497 539 650 1140 534 7888 13512 21400
1972 1773 811 1201 718 91 570 566 654 1369 509 8262 14638 22900
1973 1948 902 1208 621 166 687 621 713 1738 507 9111 16789 25900
1974 2073 1341 1267 494 249 745 632 741 1878 436 9856 19444 29300
1975 2574 1289 1474 1057 686 771 746 818 2170 534 12119 20781 32900
1976 2675 1296 1496 1795 1058 787 789 861 2260 364 13381 24019 37400
1977 2678 1283 1354 1797 1462 807 785 634 2279 387 13466 28034 41500
1978 2624 1219 1347 1799 1465 887 782 634 2280 437 13474 33926 47400
1979 2699 1124 1236 1798 1233 987 782 766 2994 493 14112 38688 52800
1980 3463 1278 1251 1794 1106 1087 768 1518 2930 530 15725 42275 58000
1981 3680 1549 1251 4800 1280 1258 768 1856 3712 3200 23354 40646 64000
1982 4238 1548 1262 4825 1288 1273 784 2137 4275 3685 25315 48385 73700
1983 4333 1546 1261 6624 1406 1371 774 3012 4278 3688 28293 52207 80500
1984 4852 1573 1261 6772 1580 1384 756 3364 4581 3706 29829 42171 72000
1985 5274 1593 1264 8069 1864 1406 730 4097 4865 3741 32903 42097 75000
1986 5469 1606 1265 9612 2042 1426 709 4504 5214 3767 35614 41386 77000
1987 5752 1612 1266 10919 2280 1432 691 5038 5546 3833 38369 40631 79000
1988 6632 1617 1266 11452 2413 1467 638 5420 5704 3867 5745 46221 39579 85800
1989 6689 1698 1281 11598 2484 1415 628 5587 5896 3887 6726 47889 44311 92200
1990 6749 1685 1331 11627 2474 1384 672 5901 6403 4436 7272 49934 49466 99400
1991 7059 1809 1345 11545 2492 1384 678 6125 6229 5199 7332 51197 49903 1E+05
1992 7334 1974 1381 11378 2556 1397 673 6409 6612 5590 8680 53984 51416 1E+05
Source: Ministry of Planning Statistical Abstract, various issues, and National Authority for Information and Documentation 
yearly statistical series, various issues, and Private survey for the period 1980-1992
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Table AVII-1-5
Value of W age and Salary in Large-Scale M anufacturing Industries in Libya, 1965-1992 (LD, 000)
300 311/12 313 314 321/22 323/24 331/32 341/42 351/352 353 369 371/72 381/83 390 Total
1965 3010 662 323 270 13 160 325 200 535 443 79 6020
1966 3312 560 332 464 189 10 149 291 435 291 482 109 6624
1967 3940 702 371 805 233 30 154 346 401 369 459 70 7880
1968 4560 749 503 890 229 24 109 386 506 476 640 48 9120
1969 5324 860 551 989 312 36 162 479 575 559 731 70 1064
1970 5821 903 459 1113 356 74 224 492 728 677 709 86 1164
1971 6156 1242 540 988 373 60 289 385 759 821 613 86 1231
1972 7335 1395 633 1149 396 202 425 388 807 1227 631 82 1467
1973 8348 1502 833 1370 383 135 636 568 929 1294 622 76 1669
1974 11475 2090 1218 1520 718 422 801 828 1111 2029 653 85 2295
1975 15309 3101 1586 1873 1053 700 736 1159 1426 2677 830 168 3061
1976 18341 3469 1739 2182 1058 745 816 1190 1904 3373 832 1033 3668
1977 19348 3923 660 2206 1060 771 994 1195 2460 3924 847 1308 3869
1978 20080 4101 641 2930 1294 1124 1112 1202 1199 3788 854 1835 4016
1979 39406 5056 2164 3257 1260 1845 2380 1224 2796 4689 6740 175 6514 1306 7881
1980 69460 11861 3030 3113 3602 3935 6935 1264 6085 8207 12281 369 7621 1157 13892
1981 87253 13886 3413 3115 6740 5866 7458 1444 8490 8056 18583 617 8328 1257 17450
1982 107951 17584 4775 3181 8523 7098 6644 1649 13297 7462 21893 933 13241 1671 21590
1983 118790 20003 5150 4281 11461 6426 6662 1852 16334 7349 22271 1075 14111 1815 23758
1984 127598 24193 5178 5023 9897 7759 4859 2057 17723 8272 22139 1195 17343 1960 25519
1985 132328 25238 4589 4901 10277 7200 5451 1896 20692 12310 20324 1189 16144 2117 26465
1986 118375 13161 4030 9260 20756 8209 2300 1816 19222 12309 14751 983 9135 2443 23675
1987 139770 13297 7577 8264 22000 8222 4021 2277 22132 14006 19000 1276 11621 6077 27954
1988 148029 17789 5921 9170 15460 8109 4682 2277 29534 10372 22520 1188 14715 6292 29605
1989 169912 19580 8191 12657 16406 8609 4238 1500 30546 12070 25552 9222 17845 3496 33982
1990 188370 18554 8070 8562 20008 8124 3905 1500 34887 17148 26551 18837 19178 3046 37674
1991 198536 20378 9543 7346 20930 8646 4008 1639 37689 16832 26715 22338 20276 2196 39707
1992 210466 23121 12657 8663 16618 9391 3013 1662 37203 20444 25868 27996 22348 1482 42093
Source: Ministry of Planning Statistical Abstract, various issues, and National Authority for Information and Documentation 
yearly statistical series, various issues, and Private survey for the period 1980-1992
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Table AVII-1-6
Distribution of GFCF Betw een M anufacturing Industries 1966-1992 (LD Million at Purchasing  Value)
Code 311/12 313 314 321/22 323/24 331/32 341/42 351/52 353 369 371 381 390 Total
1966 2104 221 51 223 74 90 57 839 859 219 201 3962 8900
1967 1347 421 171 228 84 101 76 941 102 961 302 275 4532 9540
1968 1002 513 258 225 109 107 85 702 175 743 365 290 4044 8618
1969 1008 611 322 252 131 113 91 707 224 760 435 333 4418 9405
1970 987 626 334 255 135 112 103 693 233 749 445 338 4385 9397
1971 1343 984 515 1482 224 145 135 426 345 987 437 405 16711 24140
1972 2182 1157 1204 2921 810 347 206 445 437 2337 769 591 32253 45660
1973 2995 1356 1439 3550 1577 419 345 510 531 3250 1553 756 48067 66348
1974 8412 2894 1679 3913 1922 901 982 747 1016 3710 3553 1200 78110 109039
1975 10494 4979 2482 4590 2091 2626 1701 994 1236 3769 4698 1790 76301 117750
1976 12819 5329 3080 5345 2378 3433 2011 1575 1454 3822 5083 3231 105637 155196
1977 13141 6968 4106 5228 2979 3490 2351 1856 1580 3300 4643 3718 108420 161779
1978 13159 7414 4386 5162 3140 3486 2438 1928 1608 3126 4484 3840 108603 162774
1979 11996 7787 4963 8157 4833 2563 2715 2403 2159 3249 4697 4818 176793 237132
1980 12570 8155 5562 9560 5991 2819 3048 3481 2697 3646 4942 5565 303475 371509
1981 13185 9901 6586 10691 7810 5583 4535 5047 10075 17316 14171 18185 337526 460613
1982 13733 12999 8390 11131 9291 7249 4861 7888 13412 16540 13944 21359 241057 381854
1983 12624 12503 9592 12888 11033 8953 5250 9361 14531 18862 15586 22440 240094 393716
1984 12172 11236 9835 14719 13069 10872 5595 9129 16516 20573 18156 24369 244544 410785
1985 10126 9634 8724 10153 10163 9339 4450 7786 16317 21258 20695 25206 119954 273805
1986 8408 8085 6186 7438 5678 6599 3261 6410 13902 18787 20079 21169 81019 207022
1987 6586 6357 4557 5555 3693 4350 2285 4961 12165 16573 16321 17780 55424 156607
1988 5356 5131 4124 4569 3146 3340 1996 4014 10405 15198 15354 17417 53666 143717
1989 4084 3936 2884 3397 2156 1850 1216 3002 4992 10839 10230 14960 37179 100725
1990 2547 2459 1743 2100 1294 1007 694 1860 2495 6204 8563 12155 17826 60947
1991 1896 1833 1275 1556 942 689 490 1380 1603 3831 7179 10398 11532 44604
1992 1903 1818 1525 1578 1113 853 639 1396 3339 5788 8036 10526 22185 60701
Sources: As for Table: AVI 1-1-5
TableAVII-1-7
Number of Large Manufacturing Establishments and Number of Persons Engaged (End Year 1976-1981)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
Est. EM., Est. EM. Est. EM. Est. EM. Est. EM. Est. EM. Est. EM.
3112 Dairy Products 6 359 6 363 6 395
3113 Canning of Vegetables & Fruit 5 211 5 214 5 186 4 396 8 434 7 635 8 665
3117 Grain mill Products 4 331 5 461 6 541 6 536 5 515 6 744 7 886
3118 Macaroni 5 279 5 204 5 205 5 205 5 232 5 317 5 403
3121 Bakery Products 3 448 3 495 3 467
3128 Animal Feed 5 638 6 651 6 772
3134 Soft Drinks 6 1167 6 1038 6 963 6 1219 6 1062 6 1065 5 1318
3140 Tobacco 1 1466 1 1452 1 1354 1 1117 1 1237 1 1224 1 1253
3211 Spinning & Weaving of Textiles 6 338 5 273 6 303 6 352 9 1711 11 1648 11 2600
3411 Paper and products 2 72 2 65 2 30 2 32 1 23 1 35 1 25
3521 Paints, Varnishes & Lacquers 2 246 2 233 2 222 2 193 2 202 2 208 2 228
3523 Sop and Detergent materials 3 186 3 180 3 189 2 218 2 307 3 340 3 303
3631 Cement 2 836 2 357 2 357 4 1691 4 1951 4 2297 5 2737
3632 Cement Tiles 8 836 8 192 8 183 7 137 12 412 12 368 9 365
3691 Building Materials 2 365 2 328 2 407
Source: Ministry of Planning Statistical Abstract, various issues
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Table AVII-1-8-a
M anufacturing Output (In Physical te rm s 1970-1983]
PU 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Dairy products (000, T) 4.5 4.5 8.5 28.3 35.3 37.0 37.6 39.9 47.6 45.3 55.0
Grain Mill Products (000, T) 32.0 64.0 70.3 76.2 168 187 199.0 226.0 245.0 188 146 212 294 291
Macaroni (000, T) 31.5 31.5 30.5 283 433 45.1 44.3 48.7 50.0 56.5 59.7 61.6 65.0 72.8
Canning of Fish (000, T) 186 276 383 582 650 800 858 474 1109 662 1334 1752 1512 1081
Animal Feed (000, T) 24.7 34.5 55.0 57.0 148.0 230.0 212.0 263 263.5 349.0 348.0 581.0 649 774
Canning of Veg , & Fruit (000, T) 0.3 0.3 1.3 2.8 3.9 5.8 20.1 5.7 6.0 18.9 18.0 27.0 36.4 56.5
Olive Oil (000, T) _ _ _ 32.0 33.0 9.0 31.0 18.0 34.0 32.0 32.0 27.0
Confectionery (000, T) 3.6 7.0 8.0 8.0 10.4 12.5 7.5 9.7 15.8
Soft Drinks (000, T) 26 31.3 44.8 43.5 75.5 84.5 84.3 80.9 90 91.5 100 102.0 121.0 747.
Tobacco (000, T) 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.4 3.1 4.1
Textiles (Mill.M) 2.5 14.2 9.9 8.5 10.8 15.3 20.7 20.6
Clothiung (000, U) 617 625 597 592 678 762 834 806 700 804 1500 1900 2200 2700
Leather (Mill.F) 0.1 1.2 2.0 1.9 2.2 1.3 3.4 3.5 3.8 5.1 6
Footwear (000 Pa) 40.0 100.0 380.0 530.0 840.0 2000.0 2923 4100 6400 5200 5800
Industrial Detergents (000, T) 6.4 6.6 9.0 9.6 10.2 11.1 12.8 17.1 17.0 17.3 16.6 17.0 16.5 20.0
Sop (000, T) _ _ _ _ _ __ 2.4 2.1
Paints (000, T) 7.2 7.5 10.5 13.9 15.4 19.4 21.6 23.5 23.8 25.4 26.1 26.4 26.9 31.2
Petrochemicals (000, T) 318.0 338.0 517.0 414 438 882 1205
Oil refining (000, T) 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.9 4.6 5.5 4.9 28.2 58.8 88 71.9
Cholered Sodium (000, T) _ _ _ _ 4.0 12.3 26.8
Plastic (000, T) _ _ __ __ _ __ 1.5 17.8 36.9
Salt (000, T) 7.5 7.8 8.2 8.6 7.5 9.4 8.5 8.6 8.0 80 2.4 16.1 15.4 17.3
Sodium Hypochlorite (000, T) _ _ _ __ _ . 3.5 6.4 8.8 9.1
Cement (000, T) 95 72.9 60.7 78.5 485.0 6220 675.0 708 1300 1600 1900 2720 3200 3200
Other non-metallic (000, T) 3.4 4 7.7 4.6 20.6 33.1 71.7 141 247.3 227.0 226 330 353 244
Metal Products (000, T) 3.5 8.9 7.9 16.9 31.6 44.3 38.9 78.1
T rucks (truck) _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ 221.0 358.
Bicycles (000, U) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9.4 30.2
T ractors (Tract.) _ __ _ _ 670.0 2514 2742 2933 243
Lorry and Buses (unit) _ __ _ _ _ 136.0 357.0 206
Refrigerators (000, U) _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ 1.7 3.0
Ovens (000, U) _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ 11.3 9.4
Washing Mach (000, U) 6.3 4.5
Source: See: Table AVII-1 -8b
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Table AVII-1-8b
M anufacturing O utput (In P h y sical te rm s 1984-1896)
______________ PU 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Dairy products (000, T) 74.0 54.6 50.0 47.5 53.0 59.0 73.4 42.0 71.0 85.0 56.8 80.5 62.0
Grain Mill Products (000, T) 351.0 366.5 348.7 308.5 389.7 408.4 393.0 414 502 477 473 458 478
Macaroni (000, T) 65.4 65.1 69.7 65.2 65.9 77.9 69.0 75.8 77.3 77.5 81.0 91.0 70.0
Canning of Fish (000, T) 240.0 580.0 742.0 858.0 n.a. 1215 n.a. 3521 2717.0 540.0 2212 1861 1557
Animal Feed (000, T) 776 857 732 775.0 600.0 620.0 870.0 610.0 585.0 656.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canning of Veg., & Fruit (000, T) 49.6 28.1 19.4 17.4 24 27.2 37.0 32.4 16.1 13.9 13.1 12.7
Olive Oil (000, T) 27.0 12.0 9.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 7.0 9.0 10.0 8.0 7.0 5.0 11.0
Confectionery (000, T) 17.9 12.0 15.8 11.2 13.9 9.5 8.7 5.3 5.3 5.2 4.6 6.1 4.4
Soft Drinks (000, T) 737 737 737 737 737 737 737 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tobacco (000, T) 2.1 2.8 3.9 4.2 4.6 4.9 3.6 3.3 3.3 4.2 3.8 4.4 4.0
Textiles (Mill.M) 19.6 17.3 20.9 17.2 23.3 20.3 13.4 16.7 16.0 12.9 9.8 5.7 8.1
Clothing (000, U) 1900 1600 1500 1800 2001 1600 733.0 800.0 800.0 100 800.0 800.0 n.a.
Leather (Mill.F) 6.2 7.1 4.6 4.6 6.7 5.1 5.1 6.1 6.3 4.6 6.1 4.9 5.0
Footwear (000 Pa) 7500 6600 8500 8700 8400 5600 3400 5400 4000 5900 5300 5600 5600
Industrial Detergents (000, T) 16 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sop (000, T) 2.7 1.2 0.9 1.6 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.7 1.8 2.1 n.a. n.a.
Paints (000, T) 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Petrochemicals (000, T) 1586 1506 1615 1783 1137 1061 1372 1501 1805 1542 1901 2203 2230
Oil refining (000, T) 98.8 113 154 188 117 149 79.1 72 138.3 125 96.6 63.8 55.4
Cholered Sodium (000, T) 25.1 21.4 21.7 22.5 33.4 33.3 37.0 36.8 38.1 36.7 36.6 36.0 37.8
Plastic (000, T) 38.5 31.7 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 43.1 49.0 40.0
Salt (000, T) 15.3 20.3 22.0 21.3 16.5 21.1 16.0 11.7 12.7 15.3 17.0 13.0 15.0
Sodium Hypochlorite (000, T) 7.2 4.1 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Cement (000, T) 3200 2800 2900 2700 3300 3800 4000 4300 3900 4300 3700 3200 3500
Other non-metallic (000, T) 239 175 156 149 211 177 156 167 103.2 104 113 109 121
Metal Products (000, T) 64.5 63.5 18.7 23.9 62.7 113 373 434 389.8 504 447 405 423
T rucks (truck) 949.0 913.0 1891 1304 842.0 907.0 940.0 1104 965.0 650.0 700.0 600.0 800.0
Bicycles (000, U) 23.6 47.1 35.7 19.8 68.0 94.0 52.0 2800 39.0 64.0 46.2 68.6 52.0
T ractors (Tract.) 3364 2164 3168 3504 3900 2736 3576 3360 2812 n.a 1600 1500 1200
Lorry and Buses (unit) 724 784 690 780 1378 1463 955 1871 1904 2848 1300 1900 3000
Refrigerators (000, U) 9.4 17.1 23.0 28.6 33.2 44.9 20.9 20.0 22.5 184 29.8 188 20.8
Ovens (000, U) 8.7 9.4 16.8 32.1 42.2 70.4 38.0 66.0 69.7 52.5 35.0 43.8 45.0
Washing Mach. (000, U) 3.0 5.0 7.0 9.5 10 1 5.0 10.1 7.6 5.1 5.8 5.8 5.8 8.0
Source: National Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical series, various issues, and Ministry 
of Planning, Economic and Social Indicators 1962-1983. February 1984: Tripoli.
Note : T= tons, Mill = million, F = Feet, M = Meter, p = pairs and U = unit. (-) Production not started (n.a.) not available
Table AVII-1-9
Development of Gross Output in Manufacturing Partnership Industries 1986-1993 (LDOOO)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 Average Growth Rate
%of %of %of %of % of 1985 1989
Value Total Value Total Value Total Value Total Value Total 1988 1993
Food Products 1.22 1.2 1.74 1.4 2.67 1.6 4.31 2.0 10.9 3.4 16.1 39.9
Textiles & Waving 3.42 3.5 5.02 4.0 7.13 4.4 11.8 5.4 13.4 4.2 15.6 19
Furniture and Paper 0.37 0.4 0.97 0.8 2.38 1.5 6.98 3.2 19.4 6.0 43.3 68.2
Chemical industries 2.68 2.7 4.44 3.5 6.83 4.2 12.3 5.6 27.6 8.6 20.6 38.3
Building Materials 1.59 1.6 2.51 2.0 3.86 2.4 6.87 3.1 21.70 6.7 19.00 51
Fabricated Metal 2.93 3.0 4.63 3.7 6.83 4.2 12.3 5.6 24.40 7.6 19.10 33.7
Beakers 80.5 81.6 969 77.1 119 72.7 138 62.7 164.7 51.2 6.64 9.77
Garages 6.0 6.1 9.5 7.6 14.9 9.1 27.3 12.4 39.70 12.3 19.50 28.00
Total 98.7 100.0 125.7 100.0 163.4 100.0 219.5 100.0 321.7 100.0 9.24 18.2
Source: Private Survey.
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APPENDIX AVII-2 
Capacity Utilisation in Manufacturing Industries 
in Libya 1964-1993
This appendix presents a measurement of capacity utilisation in Libya under the 
assumption of the existing linear correlation between capacity utilisation and the 
unemployment. Symbolically this can be defined as follows:
CU = a + ^ - ,
UE
where CU and UE are capacity utilisation and overall employment rate, a and P are
constants.
1- for 1972 CU is given at 54 % (IRC, industrial survey, 1973)
2- for 1981 CU is assumed to be maximum at 95%.
Using these figures gives the following structure:
P Pfor 1972 we get 54 = a H and for 1981 we get 95 = a -\------
2.9 1.7
Solving these two equations simultaneously gives a = (-4.07) and p (168.4). Applying
them to the period of 1964-1993 gives the CU as shown in the Table AVII-2-1 and Figure
AVII-2-1 below.
T ab le  AVII-2-1
R e la tio n sh ip  B e tw een  C a p ac ity  
U tilisation  a n d  U n em p lo y m en t
Capacity
______ Unemployment Utilisation
1964 2.8 57
1965 2.8 56
1966 2.8 55
1967 2.9 55
1968 2.9 54
1969 2.9 54
1970 2.9 54
1971 2.9 55
1972 2.8 56
1973 2.3 70
1974 2.1 75
1975 2.1 78
1976 2.0 80
1977 2.0 81
1978 1.9 83
1979 1.9 84
1980 1.9 85
1981 1.9 85
1982 1.7 95
1983 1.8 91
1984 2.3 69
1985 2.4 66
1986 2.4 65
1987 2.6 61
1988 2.6 60
1989 2.7 58
1990 2.9 55
1991 3.0 52
1992 3.1 51
1993 3.0 52
o
&O)
5
Figure AVII-2-1 
Relationship Between Unemployment and Capacity 
Utilisation in Libya's Manufacturing Sector 1964-93
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Source : Calculated from National Authority for Information and Documentation, yearly statistical
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APPENDIX AVH-3 
Correlation Coefficients Between Variables of Manufacturing Industries
This appendix presents the results of a simple correlation between growth 
rates of output, labour, capital, total factor productivity, export etc. and 
absolute values of other variables. These are listed in the Table AVII-3-1. 
The correlation is performed on large-scale manufacturing industries 
discussed in the chapter (VII) for three periods, the pre-boom period 1965- 
1972, the boom period (1973-1982), and the post-boom period 1983-1992. 
The analysis is in two parts i) correlation coefficients between two different 
variables in the same period and ii) Correlation coefficients between the 
same variables in the successive periods. The results are shown in Tables 
(Table AVI 1-3-2) and (AVI1-3-2) respectively.
Table AVII-3-1
Definition of the Variables Used in Correlation Estimation
Variable Abbreviation
Annual Percentages Growth Rates of:
Output qA
Labour LA
Capital KA
TFP PA
Labour Productivity qA/ L A
Capital Productivity qA/ K A
Capital per unit output KA/ q A
Capital per workers KA/ L A
Exports XA
Absolute Value of:
Output per worker (First year of period) q /L
Capital per worker (first year of period) K /L
Capital / Output ration (first year of period) K /q
Proportion of output exported (first year of period X /q
Ratio of imported input to intermediate input M/c
Wage rate (first year of period) W
Wage rate (Last year as a percent of first year of period) W A
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Table AVII-3-1
W ithin-Period C orrelation Coefficient for M anufacturing Industries in Libya 1967-72, 1973-82 & 1983-1992
KA LA f A RA q /L qA/LA K /L KA/ L A K/q KA/qA qA/KA x/q xA wA
Variable
qA
0.495
0.226
0.203
0.155
-0.107
0.026
0.372
0.228
0.227
0.907
0.974
0.950
0.242
-0.494
0.228
0.628
0.978
0.752
0.212
-0.530
-0.434
0.325
0.206
0.122
-0.155
0.083
-0.461
-0.637
-0.806
-0.758
-0.164
-0.734
0.464
0.696
0.138
0.455
0.025
0.509
0.721
0.068
-0.53
0.328
KA
0.721
-0.591
-0.361
0.945
0.982
0.798
0.099
0.005
-0.019
0.730
-0.194
-0.502
-0.207
0.334
0.412
0.759
-0.096
0.417
0.084
0.974
0.815
-0.578
0.408
0.602
0.354
0.391
0.478
0.709
0.381
0.922
0.911
-0.091
-0.634
0.485
0.053
0.026
0.646
-0.00
-0.69
LA
0.908
-0.430
0.273
-0.224
-0.011
-0.068
0.740
-0.241
-0.343
-0.671 
-0.313 
-0 637
0.666
-0.235
-0.410
-0.630
-0.758
-0.832
-0.708
0.127
-0.154
0.471
-0.282
-0.261
0.575
-0.287
-0.342
0.670
-0.172
0.321
0.942
0.046
0.185
0.736
-0.21
-0.12
f A
-0.046
0.003
-0.063
0.790
-0.273
-0.739
-0.442
0.302
0.013
0.773
-0.162
0.165
-0.248
0.914
0.303
-0.684
0.487
0.522
0.436
0.372
0.324
0.700
0.359
0.731
0.867
-0.142
-0.447
0.738
0.070
0.146
0.738
-0.05
-0.80
PA
-0.131
-0.445
0.470
0.860
0.935
0.769
-0.161
-0.507
-0.472
0.424
0.001
0.048
0.177
-0.027
-0.613
-0.889
-0.913
-0.851
-0.500
-0.837
0.270
0.352
0.175
0.592
-0.285
0.506
0.713
-0.29
-0.53
0.549
q /L
-0.409
-0.413
0.381
0.985
0.966
-0.138
-0.238 
-0.077 
-0 083
-0.970 
-0.563 
-0.611
0.389
0.344
-0.518
0.462
0.160
-0.266
0.750
-0.221
0.533
0.702
-0.882
0.295
0.984
0.866
0.795
qA/LA
-0.377
-0.449
-0.052
0.727
0.352
0.653
0.443
0.048
-0.234
-0.858
-0.714
-0.401
-0.580
-0.646
0.601
-0.018
0.165
0.126
-0.721
0.471
0.425
-0.53
-0.45
0.323
K /L
-0.100
0.000
0.496
-0.930
-0.332
0.865
0.446 
0 432 
0.648
0.523
0.251
0.407
0.748
-0.367
-0.530
0.599 
-0 862 
-0.057
0.969
0.959
-0.52
KA/ L A
0.364
0.292
0.446
-0.273
0.400
0.428
-0.032
0.389
0.766
0.059
-0.035
-0.559
-0.808
0.017
-0.093
-0.32
0.072
-0.32
K/q
-0.351
0.151
0.795
-0.378
0.228
0.470
-0.602
-0.381
-0.721
-0.721
0.464
-0.201
-0.96
-0.09
-0.84
KA/qA
0.814
0.945
0.790
0.052
-0.164
-0.824
0.399
-0.432
-0.622
0.500
0.487
-0.76
<*<c
r
0.365
-0.087
-0.399
0.337
-0.223
0.323
0.473
0.317
-0.50
x/q
0.518
0.173
0.633
0.646
-0.55
0.742
xA
0.733
-0.78
0.219
Source: Calculated from Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey and Industrial Censuses, various issues; & External 
Trade Statistics; various issues
Note: Figures corresponding to each variable refer to pre-boom, boom and post-boom periods respectively
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Table AVII-3-3
Between -Periods Correlation Coefficient for Manufacturing Industries
Variable
1967/1972
and
1973/1982
1967/1972
and
1983/1992
1973/1982
and
1983/1992
qA -0.437 0.286 -0.183
KA -0.805 -0.609 0.210
LA 0.158 0.321 -0.067
FA -0.703 -0.373 -0.023
PA -0.527 0.345 -0.236
q /L 0.904 0.519 0.493
qA / LA -0.567 0.733 -0.056
K /L 0.923 0.427 -0.738
KA/ L A -0.114 0.209 0.267
K /q 0.635 -0.045 0.084
KA/ q A -0.683 -0.221 -0.274
qA/ K A -0.761 -0.444 -0.213
x/ q 0.374 0.523 -0.108
xA -0.867 -0706 0.254
M /c 0.366 0.205 -0.213
r -0.122 -0.194 -0.015
w 0.805 0.455 0.816
Sources: As for Table AVII-222
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